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3The turmoil 
that hit finan-
cial markets 
and the econ-
omy in 2008 
led to the 
deepest reces-
sion in the 
history of the 
European Union, bringing unprec-
edented challenges. Employment 
rates across Europe suffered greatly, 
but the involvement of employers, 
trade unions and governments in 
negotiations and consultation has 
helped to minimise job losses and we 
have weathered the crisis better than 
feared. This report shows how the 
social partners have helped workers 
and companies adapt to the dramatic 
economic situation over the past two 
years. Strong social dialogue has led 
to effective responses like, for exam-
ple, the introduction or extension 
of short-time working schemes in 
 Germany or the Netherlands and other 
countries and across various sectors. 
It has also seen genuine progress on 
issues like the transition to the low-
carbon economy with social partners 
in countries like Spain and Belgium 
contributing to proposals for invest-
ment in green technologies and skills 
to their national recovery plans.
The distribution of the full cost 
of the crisis and the current eco-
nomic outlook continue however to 
raise  serious concerns among social 
partners. Public debt has risen and 
 fiscal consolidation programmes are 
underway throughout the EU. In 
some countries they carry the risk 
of undermining recovery. Social dia-
logue and collective wage bargaining 
have been especially challenging in 
countries under pressure from finan-
cial markets. Yet it is precisely in this 
difficult climate that social dialogue 
can play its fullest role. This year’s 
report shows that in countries where 
social partnership is strongest - like 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Poland - they are managing to 
get through challenging times. The 
participation of their employers and 
workers in shaping concrete policy 
responses to the crisis is one of their 
important recovery tools. This is why 
I believe we need to emerge from 
this crisis with more, not less social 
 dialogue. 
At the same time, the dynamics of 
social dialogue are very uneven across 
Member States. In many of the Mem-
ber States that joined in 2004 and 
2007 for example, the weaknesses of 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions are worrying. In countries 
like Romania, Bulgaria and my own 
country Hungary, limitations in insti-
tutional capacity translate into limita-
tions in the industrial relations system. 
The EU helps by supporting capacity 
building of social partners through 
the European Social Fund or through 
co-financing of transnational projects. 
But I call on Member States and social 
partners to step up their efforts fur-
ther and reinforce support for social 
dialogue and collective bargaining.
At European level, social dialogue 
continues to deliver tangible results 
and improvements to European work-
ers and companies. The report con-
firms that collective bargaining is 
very much present in the EU with two 
thirds of workers in Europe covered 
by collective agreements. Although 
there is still room for improvement, 
concrete results have been achieved 
with EU cross-industry social dia-
logue leading to a number of consul-
tations, joint actions and successful 
negotiations. All of this shows that 
both cross-industry and sectoral social 
dialogue have an important contribu-
tion to make to the EU’s Europe 2020 
strategy, helping to put our economy 
firmly on the path to smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth. 
March 2011 
László Andor 
Commissioner for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion
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7The Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 report reviews 
trends and developments in the collective relationships 
between workers, employers and their respective represent-
atives over the past two years. It is the sixth such report by 
the European Commission and builds on the 2008 edition. 
As the period under review coincided with the onset and 
spread of the worst economic crisis in recent history, this 
report looks closely at the way industrial relations systems 
across the European Union coped with the crisis, affected 
its course and influenced outcomes.
The report illustrates that the economic crisis presented 
industrial relations actors and institutions across the Euro-
pean Union with unprecedented challenges. On the whole, 
industrial relations in Europe have been shown to be robust 
under strain and have been vital in mitigating the effects of 
the recession, although not to the same extent in all coun-
tries. Trade unions and employers’ organisations were recog-
nised as being major interlocutors for several governments 
seeking to respond to the crisis. Together with monetary and 
fiscal stimulus policies, negotiation and consultation involv-
ing the social partners have played a significant role in limit-
ing negative social consequences. However, the importance 
of this has varied considerably across the Member States.
The recession produced its most severe initial impact in 
countries that were most vulnerable to the financial origins 
of the crisis, leading to early tensions between social part-
ners there. As the crisis spread and affected more Mem-
ber States in 2008 and early 2009, a consensus developed 
between social partners in many countries on the need for 
rapid action to preserve employment and to stimulate the 
economy. This went hand in hand with a better coordinated 
response to the crisis at European level. Social dialogue led 
to innovative responses in many Member States and sec-
tors, such as the introduction or extension of short-time 
working schemes. The success of these measures is evident: 
the overall rise in unemployment has been less severe than 
had been feared relative to the dramatic drop in economic 
activity. Many companies across the European Union har-
nessed the benefits of social dialogue and accompanying 
government measures, which enabled them to absorb the 
shock of the recession through internal flexibility, such as 
reducing the hours worked, rather than being forced to use 
external flexibility and having to dismiss workers.
The picture is not uniform across the European Union, 
however. Some Member States were particularly hard hit 
and experienced massive increases in unemployment, while 
in others there was hardly a recession at all. Variations in 
the traditional role and strength of different countries’ 
 social dialogue institutions were also an important factor in 
 determining whether compromise and agreement between 
social partners was possible. Consequently the degree of 
consensus or disagreement varied widely between countries 
and between economic sectors, with conflicts emerging in a 
number of Member States. Lately these disagreements have 
centred on the necessity and extent of austerity measures 
to reduce public deficits, the reform of social security and 
pension systems and future wage policy. While a general 
consensus has emerged on the need for long-term reforms 
and forward-looking responses to the crisis, the disagree-
ments on specific policy measures may stem from a more 
fundamental divergence of views between the two sides of 
industry about the root causes of the crisis.
Nonetheless the social partners have often been influential in 
bringing new ideas to the attention of policymakers at all lev-
els, as they are the interlocutors who know best the world of 
work. Throughout the crisis and despite a fair share of con-
flict, they have forged a remarkable degree of coordination 
and solidarity across Europe, largely resisting the temptation 
to call for protectionist national responses. This has also dis-
tinguished this recession from similar events in the past. At 
European level, several agreements concluded by the social 
partners make a real difference for all workers in the Euro-
pean Union, addressing issues such as parental leave, health 
and safety at work or inclusive labour markets.
In addition, social partners at both national and European 
level are paying increasing attention to the transition to a 
low-carbon economy and they have contributed concrete 
proposals for investment in green technologies and skills to 
the recovery plans of several Member States. In the long run, 
social dialogue will be crucial for a well-managed and socially 
just transition to a low-carbon economy. This will also have 
a positive impact on the awareness of the need for increasing 
specific research and innovation addressing these challenges. 
Besides contributing to climate change related policy-
 making, social partners are introducing a green dimension 
into their dialogue, in particular at company level. They con-
tribute directly to the transition through awareness-raising, 
labels or research, albeit to different degrees depending on 
the quality of industrial relations in the Member States.
As this report indicates, the recession has important conse-
quences for the role of the state and public policies in society 
and the economy. The economic crisis heightens the pressure 
to modernise public services, which is accentuated by the 
need to consolidate public finances and reduce deficits. The 
success of policy measures in the public sector will therefore 
be crucial to Europe’s ability to exit the crisis permanently. 
Important choices need to be made by governments and 
social partners in the process of  modernisation and  structural 
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change in public services. For this reason, the next edition of 
the Industrial Relations in Europe report will look in more 
detail at industrial relations in the public sector.
For the foreseeable future, the social partners have a vital 
role to play in the implementation of the Europe 2020 strat-
egy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Europe 
needs to make full use of the problem-solving potential of 
social dialogue at all levels if it is to realise its objectives. 
The crisis has shown that the European industrial relations 
system, in all its diversity and at all levels (company, sec-
tor, cross-industry, national, European), is crucial to the 
success and stability of the European social model and will 
continue to be of importance as the European Union exits 
the crisis and enters a renewed period of growth.
Structure of the report
The report comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives an 
overview of the main characteristics of industrial relations 
institutions. It reports on the organisation of workers and 
employers, collective bargaining, industrial action and state 
involvement in industrial relations, reviewing variations 
and trends since the turn of the century.
The second and third chapters analyse social dialogue 
developments in the face of the economic crisis. Chapter 2 
sets the scene by outlining the main economic parameters 
of the recession and the policy debates amongst social 
partners in the Member States and at EU level. It examines 
the views of social partners on the crisis and their differ-
ing analysis of its nature and exit strategies, showing where 
consensus developed and where disagreement predomi-
nated. Chapter 3 presents the concrete actions agreed on by 
social partners to address the challenges identified in the 
previous chapter, their innovations in procedure and the 
outcome. In some cases, persistent blockage and conflict 
rather than consensus were the order of the day. The analy-
sis focuses both on the cross-industry dimension and on 
sectoral and  company-level developments.
Chapter 4 covers wage bargaining and minimum wages in 
the Member States, with a particular focus on the continu-
ing decentralisation of collective bargaining and the increas-
ing use of wage flexibility in the form of variable payment 
systems. Chapter 5 explores the effect that the transition to 
a low-carbon economy will have on industrial relations sys-
tems and the extent to which the topic already features on the 
social partners’ agenda. The chapter also shows how social 
partners themselves contribute to the necessary greening of 
the economy and the corresponding restructuring.
The final two chapters of the report provide an overview of 
developments at European level. Chapter 6 outlines the activ-
ities of the European social dialogue committees, many of 
which are actively addressing the consequences of the crisis. 
It reports on the many instruments that are used in the Euro-
pean social dialogue, from binding agreements to guidelines, 
which help to make real improvements in the daily lives of 
the vast majority of workers and companies in the European 
Union. Finally, Chapter 7 details employment-related legisla-
tive developments in the EU, focusing on labour law, health 
and safety legislation and equality rights in employment.
Chapter 1:  Variations and Trends in European 
industrial relations in the  
21st century’s first decade
Earlier trends towards declining union density, decentrali-
sation of collective bargaining and greater employee par-
ticipation continued, and the company level has become 
more prominent. Continuity can be seen in the high levels 
of employer organisation, bargaining coverage, and a slightly 
less pronounced role for government in industrial relations.
The picture of industrial relations systems in the EU is one of 
diversity. The organisation of the social partners, collective bar-
gaining over pay and primary working conditions, and indus-
trial action remain varied. Only where there is scope for EU 
intervention — as on employee representation within the enter-
prise — is some tendency towards convergence apparent.
The power and presence of trade unions is determined by var-
ious factors. The level of membership is an important determi-
nant of trade union power, while the structure of membership 
influences the extent to which unions can legitimately claim 
to be representative of workers or even of those currently out-
side the labour market. Other factors are the support to trade 
unions given by the legal framework; unity and cooperation 
inside and outside the union movement; the relationship with 
other actors; leadership, internal organisation and member-
ship participation; a coherent value system; and the standing 
of the unions and their leaders in the eyes of the public.
Trade unions at European level demonstrate a high degree 
of unity. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
brings together 64 national confederations. The ETUC is 
represented in each country of the EU-27 and its market 
share at the European level is close to 88 %. 
Overall, trade union membership continued to decline but 
there are large variations between countries. The proportion 
of union members among all workers across today’s EU-27 
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fell from 27.8 % in 2000 to 23.4 % in 2008, with unions  losing 
nearly 3 million members. This is the result of lower and 
declining unionisation rates among young people, and the 
difficulty of recruiting and retaining members in the services 
sector, in small firms, and among those with flexible and fixed-
term employment contracts. Consequently, unions are ageing 
and increasingly reliant on the public sector. Announced job 
losses in the public sector are therefore a threat to the unions, 
as this is where they have the highest membership numbers in 
nearly all countries. Within this general trend, there are still 
huge differences across countries. In 2008, union density var-
ied from 68.8 % in Sweden to 7.6 % in Estonia. Trade unions in 
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland 
have experienced the largest decline in membership since 2000 
in percentage terms, while union membership has increased 
in Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Belgium and Italy. However, only 
in Belgium has there been no decrease in the share of union 
members among all workers.
For employers’ associations, discipline and cohesion rather 
than membership are the key issues. National confedera-
tions of employers in the EU outnumber national union 
confederations. At the sector level employers’ associations 
tend to be more differentiated and numerous than the 
trade unions. Collective bargaining is often no longer their 
main role. Services and lobbying have become much more 
prominent. The organisational centralisation of employ-
ers is lower than union centralisation in all Member States 
as a result of both the lower authority and the greater 
 fragmentation of employers’ organisations.
Three organisations represent employers at the European 
level. Businesseurope is the general organisation for businesses 
in all sectors of the privately owned economy. The European 
Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME) represents small and medium-sized businesses 
in Europe. The European Centre of Enterprises with  Public 
Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic  Interest 
(CEEP, Centre européen des entreprises publiques) represents 
enterprises and organisations with public participation or 
 carrying out activities of general economic interest.
At the sectoral level, there is even more diversity among 
European employers’ organisations. However, only a minor-
ity of these are employers’ organisations in the strict sense. 
Such organisations are mainly found in those sectors where 
a sectoral social dialogue has developed (see Chapter 6).
The density of employers’ organisations is more than dou-
ble that of trade unions, but while the level of employer 
organisation in the EU appears stable and high,  employers’ 
 associations are challenged by changes in their  environment, 
such as national and transnational mergers of firms, a greater 
emphasis on company as opposed to sector bargaining, and 
pressure for greater effectiveness in European and global 
 representation.
The role, coverage and effectiveness of collective bargaining 
differs widely across EU Member States. A large two thirds 
majority of European employees are covered by collective 
agreements, but decentralisation of actual pay setting has 
continued and sector agreements are increasingly being 
amended by company-level agreements and arrangements.
As indicated in the Industrial Relations in Europe 2008 
report, it is the rate of employer organisation rather than 
the rate of unionisation that determines collective bar-
gaining coverage. High bargaining coverage occurs under 
multi-employer bargaining, and requires the existence of 
organisations of employers with a mandate to negotiate 
 agreements with the representatives of employees.
Statutory employee representation at company level is a key 
feature of European industrial relations systems. Legal pro-
visions are based on Directive 2002/14/EC on information 
and consultation. Some convergence towards a broader 
range of rights is apparent, yet there is concern that cross-
border mergers and increased financial risk-taking have 
made works councils and other employee representation 
bodies less powerful than they once were.
The state is involved in industrial relations in various ways. 
The state can influence decisions regarding wages, hours and 
working conditions. Government intervention is associated 
with statutory minimum wages, the extension of collective 
agreements and the negotiation of pacts with social partners. 
Direct government intervention tends to be a substitute for 
coordination by the social partners themselves.
Chapter 2:  The crisis: challenges and social 
partner perspectives
The economic crisis was an unprecedented challenge for 
European industrial relations systems. The economic and 
financial crisis presented industrial relations actors and insti-
tutions across the EU with formidable challenges. In central 
and south-eastern Europe, the worst crisis since the transition 
to a market economy two decades ago proved a hard test for 
the industrial relations institutions established since then.
While the magnitude and timing of the recession dif-
fered between Member States, EU GDP declined by over 
5 %  between the first half of 2008 and the first six months 
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of 2009. Growth only resumed at the beginning of 2010. 
The severity of the crisis varied between countries, ranging 
from a GDP decline of 15 % in the Baltic states to small 
growth in Poland. The onset of the recession and the timing 
of renewed growth also differed between Member States.
In most countries, private consumption declined less than 
GDP, so that purchasing power was an important factor in 
sustaining economic activity. The trend in consumption 
reflected wage developments up to the end of 2009, with 
real wage growth of 1.4 % in the EU in 2009. Contrary to 
this trend, wages declined, sometimes steeply, in the Baltic 
states, Ireland, Greece and Hungary, and they essentially 
stagnated in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK.
Growth in nominal labour costs in the EU was lower in 2009 
than in 2008, but was 1.5 times above growth in nominal wages. 
Productivity fell by 2.5 % in 2009 across the EU, and unit labour 
costs rose by 3.0  % in real terms in 2009. The crisis had a dra-
matic effect on the public finances of Member States.
Across the EU, public deficits grew from 2.3% of GDP 
in 2008 to 6.8 % in 2009; in 11 Member States, deficits 
 increased by over 5 % of GDP.
In general, the employment consequences of the crisis in the 
EU have not been as severe as might have been expected. 
Employment dropped by 2.5 % across the EU between 
the second quarters of 2008 and 2010, less than half of the 
decline in GDP. Unemployment increased to a record 9.6 % 
in each of the first three quarters of 2010. To a significant 
extent, the recession has been tackled through the internal 
flexibility of companies, by a decline in hours worked rather 
than through redundancies. Short-time working schemes 
and other collectively agreed adjustments to working time 
played a considerable part in this outcome (see Chapter 3).
The magnitude and timing of the employment decline have 
varied between countries, with the Baltic states, Ireland and 
Spain being particularly hard hit, with a fall in employment 
which mirrored or exceeded the drop in GDP. Workers 
employed on temporary contracts have been more exposed to 
job loss than those on open-ended or permanent contracts.
The different outcomes in economic and employment 
developments are due to two main factors. Economies 
underwent different types of recessions, either originating 
in the construction and real estate sector, causing immedi-
ate job losses, or caused by a collapse in business confidence 
and trade, affecting primarily manufacturing. Reactions of 
 social partners and public authorities to the crisis differed 
and may explain the outcomes (see Chapter 3).
There were important sectoral differences in the impact of the 
recession. The industrial sector was the hardest hit, although 
a reduction in hours worked offset some of the decline in 
activity, so that the fall in manufacturing employment was 
considerably smaller than the decline in output. During the 
worst of the crisis, public services contributed to sustaining 
economic activity but budgetary austerity measures are likely 
to put a halt to this role for the public sector.
Social partners agreed at the outset on the need for pub-
lic stimulus measures, albeit with differences in emphasis. 
Employers’ organisations gave priority to ensuring access 
to credit for companies, measures to reduce labour costs 
and reductions in taxation. Trade unions urged a larger 
fiscal stimulus, and measures to sustain purchasing power 
and to boost public investment. 
The degree of consensus and conflict between the social 
partners has differed widely between the Member States. In 
12 countries, consensus was dominant. Amongst these are 
EU-15 Member States with robust social dialogue institutions. 
In others, policy consensus has also dominated at least partly, 
where tripartite structures have been mobilised and/or joint 
platforms forged between the social partners. In 11 countries, 
disagreements prevailed. Neither the severity of the crisis nor 
the differences in industrial relations systems can explain the 
dominance of consensus or conflict. These include Member 
States with comparatively weak social dialogue institutions, 
but also countries with traditionally more robust industrial 
relations systems. In terms of institutional effects, the lines of 
similarity and difference between countries therefore reach 
across the  distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States.
Chapter 3:   Negotiating the crisis:  
social partner responses
Through the processes of social dialogue, employers and 
trade unions have played a prominent role in countering the 
impact of the crisis. There is, however, considerable variation 
across countries and sectors. It appears that differences in the 
economic situation have influenced the pattern of negotiated 
responses more at sectoral levels than between countries. 
The influence of industrial relations institutions is significant 
as are public policy and the extent to which social partners 
are involved in it. In a majority of Member States, the cross-
 industry social partners attempted to reach agreement on 
measures to address the crisis. Explicit attempts to negotiate 
bipartite or tripartite national agreements aimed at addressing 
the crisis were made in 16 Member States. While some focused 
principally on employment issues such as short-time work and 
wage  moderation, others dealt with a wider range of measures.
Executive summary
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The magnitude of the crisis in the Member States did not 
determine whether attempts at negotiation were success-
ful but public policy has played an important role. Exist-
ing social protection systems and active inclusion policies 
provided a baseline of support during the crisis on which 
social partner solutions could be built. In addition to the 
evident role of governments in the conclusion of tripartite 
agreements, they have frequently played an important role 
in supporting bipartite ones. 
Crisis response agreements at sectoral level were influ-
enced by traditional practices and company-level 
agreements were more widespread. Sector-level nego-
tiations are confined to a group of countries with well-
 established multi-employer bargaining arrangements. 
They also occur mainly in manufacturing sectors, with 
relatively little evidence of negotiations in the private 
service  sectors. At company level, agreements address-
ing the consequences of the crisis are spread across a 
wider range of countries.
While real wages increased considerably in 2009, average 
earnings grew much more slowly. In most Member States 
the crisis depressed average agreed pay increases in 2009, 
but rarely to a great extent. Declining inflation meant higher 
increases in real wages. But the effects were felt more deeply 
in actual earnings than in the basic pay rates set by collec-
tive agreements, owing to reduced working hours and/or 
cuts in elements of remuneration.
In the manufacturing sector, measures have been intro-
duced both in specific sector agreements aimed at tack-
ling the employment effects of the downturn and as part 
of ‘regular’ agreements dealing with pay and conditions 
of employment. The main theme was short-time work, 
but other innovative responses such as ‘employee leasing’ 
were also observed. Many agreements related exclusively 
or partly to short-time work. Others involved ‘conces-
sion bargaining’, with trade-offs between some form of 
employment guarantee in return for employee flexibility 
in terms of pay and conditions. 
Company-level agreements in the services sector focused 
on concessions on pay and working conditions, while short-
time work featured relatively little. Agreements were mainly 
concentrated in the civil aviation and post and telecommu-
nications sectors. Over a third of the agreements related to 
company cost-reduction programmes and  provided for a 
range of employee sacrifices without employment guaran-
tees in return. Half of the remaining agreements also pro-
vided for pay cuts or freezes, but in return for guarantees in 
respect of employment. 
Particular strategic choices of the social partners account 
for much of the cross-country variation observed. This is 
apparent in the instances of those new Member States where 
agreements had not previously been concluded and in those 
EU-15 countries where agreements have not been concluded 
even though institutional capacity to do so exists.
The pattern of agreements at sector and company level 
suggests that social partner strategies have been shaped by 
institutional arrangements for industrial relations as well 
as by public policy intervention in the form of statutory 
 short-time work schemes.
In several Member States, the crisis led for the first time to 
social partner agreements at a cross-industry level. Insofar as 
the crisis has provoked negotiated or concerted responses, 
where governments or employers might otherwise have 
acted alone, an issue is the sustainability of such agreements, 
particularly in several central and east European countries 
where they were hitherto unknown. There is no indication 
at present that the parties envisage further negotiations or 
agreements, but neither can the parties unlearn the process. 
At sector level, a striking feature is provisions which enhance 
competence for wage setting at company level. The crisis 
may thus prove to have further accelerated the long-running 
trend towards decentralisation. 
Chapter 4:  Wage flexibilisation 
and the minimum wage
Wage flexibility has been an important element of debate dur-
ing the economic crisis. The degree of wage flexibility depends 
to a large extent on factors such as the level and coverage of col-
lective bargaining, the power relations between trade unions 
and employers, the use of performance-related pay systems 
and the minimum wage. It refers to the extent to which wages 
respond to market forces. This debate about wage flexibility 
took on extra importance during the economic crisis.
The degree of centralisation of wage bargaining varies 
widely between Member States. In many countries, the 
recent trend towards decentralisation of wage-setting 
arrangements and towards company and single-employer 
bargaining accelerated during the economic crisis. In gen-
eral, bargaining is more centralised in the public than in the 
private sector. More centralised bargaining leads to more 
equal wages and working conditions. In addition, the per-
centage of employees covered by a collectively bargained 
agreement in countries with more centralised bargaining is 
markedly higher than in the countries where  company-level 
 bargaining is dominant.
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Variable pay systems are increasingly used to provide 
additional elements of wage flexibility. More than half of 
 workers in the EU have some form of variable pay system 
(VPS), facilitated by the decentralisation of wage bargain-
ing. While employers are generally positive about VPS, 
trade union attitudes differ. Some unions see it as a way 
to give workers a share in company performance, whereas 
others fear that it may create greater wage inequality and 
undermine the principle of equal pay for equal work.
Low pay affects one out of every 10 workers in the EU and 
in general, low pay is a bigger problem in countries with 
more decentralised bargaining structures and low collec-
tive  bargaining coverage.
In many countries, the statutory minimum wage has had 
only a limited impact on the incidence of low pay. Twenty 
Member States have a statutory minimum wage. While the 
level differs widely between countries, the gap between the 
central and eastern Member States and the EU-15 has nar-
rowed slightly in the past few years. Nevertheless, the seven 
countries with the highest incidence of low pay all have 
statutory minimum wages. In addition, in more than half 
the countries, the minimum wage lost value compared to 
the average wage during the past decade.
In those countries that do not have a statutory minimum 
wage, the wage floor is set by collective bargaining. In most 
of these countries, low pay is not a widespread problem. 
The main exception is Germany, where the incidence of low 
pay is above the EU average, although the government can 
make a collectively agreed minimum wage binding for an 
entire sector, and such statutory minimum wages now exist 
in a number of sectors.
Chapter 5:  Industrial relations and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy
Climate change represents one of the greatest threats facing 
the planet. More and more, the transition to a low-carbon 
economy has been recognised as a necessity that involves 
social and economic opportunities and costs. 
Social dialogue can help to create consensus for the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy and contribute to a well-
managed and socially just transition. Social partners can 
facilitate innovation and negotiate solutions for change 
which are to the benefit of workers and businesses.
The European Union is committed to local and global 
action to control climate change. Each Member State has 
also put in place its own domestic mix of policies. These 
efforts accelerated with the adoption of the European 
 climate change package in 2008. Europe 2020 confirms 
these commitments and provides an integrated set of poli-
cies to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
Not only new green jobs but above all the greening of the 
whole economy will involve structural change. It should 
have a small but slightly positive impact on the over-
all employment level, albeit with different effects across 
 sectors, skill types and regions. Anticipation of future 
skills needs, responsive lifelong learning systems and well-
 managed  restructuring processes are important.
The low-carbon economy has come onto the social dialogue 
agenda but remains marginal. Social partner involvement 
with the low-carbon economy differs from country to coun-
try depending on the organisation of industrial relations and 
on the number of years that climate change has been of inter-
est to public authorities, the social partners and the public.
Social partners mostly act by influencing policymaking, includ-
ing their own policy proposals. Standard tripartite social dia-
logue bodies rarely address low-carbon economy issues in a 
systematic manner. But, in many Member States, social part-
ners participate in advisory bodies, such as sustainable develop-
ment councils, together with  other stakeholders. Some address 
directly the employment  consequences of a low-carbon future. 
Collective bargaining rarely addresses issues related to the 
low-carbon economy. But social dialogue at company level on 
environment and energy matters seems to be slowly develop-
ing. Some workers’ representatives have information, consul-
tation and sometimes negotiation rights in this respect. 
In addition, social partners contribute to the implementa-
tion of low-carbon policies and practices. In most Member 
States, this direct contribution occurs through training and 
counselling, awareness-raising campaigns and research and 
innovation, often in cooperation with public authorities. 
The transition to a low-carbon economy is being ‘main-
streamed’ into social partners’ sphere of competence, nota-
bly restructuring and skills policies. The state is the main 
actor in the transition to a low-carbon economy and mobi-
lises regulatory, market and financial instruments. It is in 
the management of the employment implications where 
social partners have direct competence. 
At the EU level, there is clear commitment by social partners 
to dialogue on the economic and employment  implications 
of the transition to a low-carbon economy.
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European social partners influence policymaking and 
have started to explore the employment consequences and 
related best practices. The European cross-industry social 
partners have expressed a keen interest in climate-change-
related policies and have recently taken a stance on their 
employment implications. The ETUC advocates a ‘just 
transition’ that is based on tripartite social dialogue, green 
and decent jobs, investment, green skills, with an emphasis 
on anticipation and management of change, and extended 
rights relating to the protection of health and of the envi-
ronment at work. BusinessEurope advocates more flexible 
labour markets accompanied by efficient public employ-
ment services, active labour market policies and training. 
Anticipation of future skills needs must be improved, and 
science, technological, engineering and mathematical skills 
fostered. CEEP and UEAPME focus more on the areas of 
energy (efficiency) and transport, and have also contrib-
uted to the debate on employment and skills in the low-
carbon economy. European social partners in six sectors 
— encompassing gas and electricity, wood, and the extrac-
tive industries — have adopted joint opinions in order to 
draw attention to the specific concerns of their sectors.
European social partners have also started to study the con-
sequences of the transition to a low-carbon economy and 
related best practices in their autonomous bipartite dia-
logue. The ETUC, Businesseurope, CEEP and UEAPME 
have launched joint research on the employment dimension 
of climate-change-related policies and intend to develop 
a common view on this topic in order to assess the role of 
social partners and to draw conclusions on the consequences 
for employment and skills. European social partners in eight 
sectors (e.g. electricity) have launched similar activities. 
Some transnational company agreements address envi-
ronmental protection and climate issues but as yet there 
are no instan ces of bipartite autonomous regulation at Euro-
pean level.
Chapter 6:  European social dialogue 
developments 2008–10
The economic crisis was the dominant subject of discussion 
in many European social dialogue committees. 
The past two years were anything but ‘business as usual’ in 
European social dialogue. Discussions about the crisis led 
to a number of joint actions but also to disagreements. In 
March 2009, the Cross-Industry Social Dialogue Commit-
tee failed to agree on a joint declaration due to fundamen-
tal differences of opinion about the causes of the economic 
crisis and the measures needed to address it. A number of 
sectoral social dialogue committees agreed on joint state-
ments, including those for the chemical industry, construc-
tion, road transport, commerce, live performance, regional 
and local government, woodworking and furniture sectors.
Many European and national social partners at both cross-
industry and sectoral level contributed to the public con-
sultation on the Europe 2020 strategy. In June 2010, the 
Cross-Industry Social Dialogue Committee adopted a joint 
contribution, which expressed their belief that a number 
of objectives will be crucial for successful economic recov-
ery: reform of the global financial system, restoring and 
improving growth dynamics to create more and better 
jobs, promoting skills and entrepreneurship, revitalising 
the single market, developing an integrated EU industrial 
policy, supporting new means of financing for investment, 
and combating poverty and inequality, among others. They 
identify social cohesion as a precondition for a dynamic 
and sustainable economy.
In the European social dialogue, work on the management 
of change took on special importance. The cross-industry 
social partners finalised a five-year project examining 
their role in economic restructuring in the EU. The Social 
Dialogue Committee for the Chemical Industry studied 
restructuring in the sector, while the Electricity Social Dia-
logue Committee published a toolkit for socially responsi-
ble restructuring.
The cross-industry European social partners signed an 
autonomous agreement on inclusive labour markets. The 
aim of the agreement, which will be implemented under 
the responsibility of national social partners within three 
years, is to make full use of Europe’s labour force potential, 
improve job quality and increase employment rates in the 
face of demographic ageing. It covers persons who encoun-
ter difficulties in entering, returning to or integrating into 
the labour market and those in employment who are at risk 
of losing their job.
Skills and training continue to be a core area of European 
social dialogue. European social dialogue committees in 16 
sectors were active in this area. In particular, in 2009 the 
social partners in the personal services sector signed an 
autonomous agreement facilitating comparison of quali-
fications and cross-border mobility. The agriculture and 
hospitality sectoral social dialogue committees are working 
on initiatives to enhance the transparency and compatibil-
ity of skills and qualifications. Five sectoral social dialogue 
committees have expressed interest in setting up European 
sector councils for jobs and skills. 
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The European social partners have a key role to play in the 
second phase of the flexicurity agenda. They are committed 
to jointly monitoring the implementation of the flexicurity 
principles, evaluating the role and involvement of the social 
partners, and drawing joint conclusions.
Health and safety remained an important area of activ-
ity for many European social dialogue committees. The 
European social partners in the hospitals and healthcare 
sector successfully negotiated an agreement on protection 
from sharp injuries, aiming to prevent injuries to work-
ers caused by all types of sharp medical objects (including 
needle sticks). For this purpose an integrated approach to 
assessing and preventing risks, as well as to training and 
informing workers, is envisaged. The Personal Services 
Social Dialogue Committee launched negotiations on a 
framework agreement on the prevention of health risks in 
the hairdressing sector.
Mobility remained an important topic for the Cross-
 Industry Social Dialogue Committee and for sectors with 
a highly mobile workforce. The Cross-Industry Social 
Dialogue Committee carried out joint work on the con-
sequences of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases 
relating to economic freedoms and fundamental social 
rights of workers. While they agreed on the identification 
of key issues, they expressed clear differences of opinion 
regarding the consequences of the rulings or the actions 
ahead. Discussions on mobility were held in the Inland 
Waterways, Construction, Hospitals, Agriculture,  Private 
Security and Temporary Agency Sectoral Committees.
In the field of equality, the European cross-industry social 
partners successfully negotiated a revised EU framework 
agreement on parental leave. The revised framework agree-
ment was implemented as Directive 2010/18/EU, which 
provides that each parent will be able to take off four months 
per child, with one month non-transferable between par-
ents. The rights will apply to all workers regardless of their 
type of contract, and employees returning from parental 
leave will have the right to request changes to their work 
schedules for a set period of time.
Five sectors signed guidelines on third-party violence. 
Following the signature of the cross-industry social part-
ner framework agreement on harassment and violence at 
work in 2007, the European social partners in the hos-
pitals, regional and local government, commerce, private 
security and education sectors adopted multi-sectoral 
guidelines to tackle third-party violence and harassment 
related to work.
The Commission took stock of more than 10 years of Euro-
pean sectoral social dialogue. After more than a decade of 
experience with European sectoral social dialogue, the Com-
mission published a staff working document assessing the 
functioning of the sectoral social dialogue committees and 
proposing possible improvements. The Commission intends 
to encourage the European and national sectoral social part-
ners to fully use their area of negotiation, reinforce their 
administrative capacity and create synergies between sectors. 
Within this framework, the Commission also encourages the 
integration of new players as well as better participation of 
representatives from the new Member States.
Three new European sectoral social dialogue commit-
tees were launched during 2010 at the joint request of the 
respective European social partners. The first meetings of 
the committees in the metal, paper and education sectors 
have taken place, while the European social dialogue for 
central (government) administrations may soon be formal-
ised following a two-year test phase. Social partners in the 
agro-food industry and sports sector are currently explor-
ing the possibility of sectoral social dialogue committees.
Chapter 7:  Review of European  
legislation 2008–10
The adoption of a directive on temporary agency work and 
the recast European works councils directive were major 
achievements.
In the area of labour law, a number of important directives 
were adopted during the past two years. A major break-
through was achieved with the adoption of a new directive 
on temporary agency work, which provides for a signifi-
cant increase in the legal protection afforded to temporary 
workers while recognising the role of temporary agencies 
in promoting greater flexibility in the labour market and 
providing job opportunities.
Another success was the adoption of the recast European 
works councils directive. The joint opinion of the EU social 
partners expressed during the co-decision process facili-
tated swift agreement on the final text. The new directive 
clarifies and strengthens the previous legislation from 1994 
in several respects, particularly regarding the information 
and consultation rights of workers on transnational mat-
ters. In the context of the economic crisis, this legislation 
became  particularly relevant.
In addition, the Commission is undertaking an evalua-
tion of existing directives in order to review their effects, 
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notably Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, 
 Directive 2001/23/EC on transfers of undertakings and 
Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework 
relating to information and consultation of workers in 
the EU.
Three agreements between European social partners 
were implemented by Council directives. The adoption 
of Council Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the 2009 
framework agreement on parental leave concluded by the 
European social partners demonstrated the capacity of the 
social partners — and the EU institutions — to build on the 
previous 1995 agreement, which was also implemented as a 
directive. The new legislation strengthens and further clari-
fies the rights of working parents to take leave.
Council Directive 2010/32/EU implemented the framework 
agreement on the prevention of injuries from sharp instru-
ments in the hospital and healthcare sector, concluded by 
the European social partners in the sector. The incorpora-
tion of this agreement into EU legislation constitutes a sig-
nificant contribution to creating the safest possible working 
environment in the sectors concerned.
Following a consultation of the European social partners 
in maritime transport by the Commission, they decided to 
negotiate and subsequently agreed on the incorporation 
into EU legislation of a substantial number of provisions 
contained in the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention. 
The agreement was implemented by Directive 2009/13/EC, 
which completes or amends existing EU provisions apply-
ing to the working conditions of seafarers, including 
working time.
In line with the Commission’s better regulation agenda, 
work continued on the implementation of the EU strat-
egy for health and safety at work 2007–12. In this area 
the developments during the period aimed to ensure a 
regulatory framework capable of continuously adapt-
ing to change while respecting the principle that leg-
islation should be coherent, simple and effective and 
also meeting the objective of reducing the administra-
tive burden on companies. An example of this was the 
adoption of a third list of indicative occupational limit 
values for chemical agents (Directive 2009/161/EU), 
which shows the determination of the Commission to keep 
the EU health and safety at work acquis in line with the most 
recent scientific data available. Two ‘codification’ Direc-
tives 2009/104/EC on work equipment and 2009/148/EC 
on asbestos stem from the better regulation agenda. Good 
practice guides have been developed, aiming at facilitating 
and improving the practical application of certain health 
and safety at work directives such as those dealing with 
noise, construction and artificial optical  radiation.
Equality rights in employment are being monitored 
and strengthened. The Commission continues to place 
great emphasis on monitoring the correct transposition 
and application of directives in the field of equality. This 
includes Council Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, 
which prohibit discrimination based on race and ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orien-
tation in employment and occupation across the EU. In 
October 2008, the Commission presented a proposal to 
amend the current provisions of Directive 92/85/EEC on 
maternity protection. The aim of this proposal is to pro-
vide for better reconciliation of private, professional and 
family life and thus allow more women to enter or stay in 
the employment market if they have children. In another 
important development, the application of the principle 
of the right to equal treatment between men and women 
will be strengthened for those working in a self-employed 
capacity, through Council  Directive 2010/41/EU.
Major setbacks and difficulties were encountered in two 
fields: The failure of the amended working time directive 
and the interpretation and enforcement of the posting of 
workers directive.
A major setback occurred when the Commission proposal 
to amend the working time directive (2003/88/EC) was 
withdrawn, after the failure of the Council and Parliament 
to agree on a compromise. The proposal sought to identify 
a solution to the difficulties in implementing Court of Jus-
tice (CJEU) rulings on the SIMAP and Jaeger cases, as well 
as to address stakeholders’ claims in regard to extension 
of the reference period for averaging weekly working time 
and the individual opt-out. The Commission responded to 
the failed conciliation by launching a review of the direc-
tive including an extensive evaluation exercise and a first 
consultation of the European social partners.
Another source of difficulties was the interpretation and 
enforcement of the posting of workers Directive (96/71/EC), 
including respect for collective social rights. In the wake 
of the CJEU rulings on Laval, Rüffert and Commission v 
 Luxembourg, the Commission decided to step up its efforts 
to facilitate administrative cooperation among Member 
States, and promote debate with stakeholders. With such 
difficulties in mind, the Commission is reviewing the imple-
mentation and interpretation of the legal framework on post-
ing of workers and has already launched (or commissioned) 
several external studies of the legal aspects and economic 
effects of the directive. These studies are still ongoing.
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Introduction1.1. 
This chapter presents an overview of 
industrial relations in the European 
Union (EU) during the 2000s. This was 
the first decade in which economic and 
monetary union (EMU) was in full 
operation. In 2004 the biggest enlarge-
ment in the history of the EU took 
place, adding 10 Member States, fol-
lowed in 2007 by two more, bringing the 
total to 27 Member States. The decade 
started with the EU’s ambitious Lisbon 
Agenda of 2000, it ended with the deep-
est economic crisis since the 1930s. In 
2009 the economy of the EU contracted 
by 4 % and by early 2010 average unem-
ployment in the EU reached 10 % of the 
labour force. In 2010, under pressure 
of rising public debts and government 
deficits incurred during the crisis, many 
countries are preparing austerity meas-
ures that include pay cuts or freezes and 
significant job loss in the public sector.
In short, the beginning and end of 
this first decade present different sets 
of conditions, expectations and chal-
lenges. In the early 2000s the three key 
issues were the design of national and 
sector wage policies adapting to a cen-
tralised European monetary policy; the 
promotion of labour market participa-
tion and social inclusion; and the polit-
ical, social and economic integration of 
the new Member States, especially the 
post-Communist countries of central 
and eastern Europe (CEE countries). 
Earlier reports on industrial relations 
in Europe, especially in 2006 and 2008, 
have reported on these issues and on 
the contribution of trade unions and 
employers. Today, at the end of the dec-
ade, the agenda is overwhelmed by the 
challenge of the economic crisis: rising 
unemployment; increased competitive 
pressures in the private sector; finan-
cial problems in the public sector; and 
finding a new path towards sustainable 
growth, greater productivity, real wage 
improvements and more jobs. The next 
chapters report on the industrial rela-
tions’ response to the crisis at different 
levels (EU, national, sector and com-
pany). This chapter reports, firstly, on 
the current state of industrial relations; 
secondly, on the main developments 
during the decade; and indicates, 
thirdly, what the impact of the crisis on 
industrial  relations might be.
The chapter starts with a portrait of the 
main collective actors in industrial rela-
tions: trade unions (Section 1.2) and 
employers’ associations (Section 1.3), 
respectively. For each, the main organi-
sational features and representation 
of members (individual workers and 
firms) will be highlighted. A key insti-
tution in the relation between unions 
(workers) and employers (firms) is the 
collective labour agreement. Section 
1.4 discusses main features and trends, 
such as coverage, centralisation and 
coordination, in collective bargain-
ing. As important for the management 
of change and the settling of conflict-
ing interests are the structures and 
practices of employee representation 
in the enterprise or workplace. This 
is addressed in Section 1.5, followed 
in Section 1.6 by a description of the 
trends and variations in industrial con-
flict. The role of the government is the 
subject of Section 1.7. The chapter ends 
with a brief analysis of the likely effects 
Trends in industrial relations institutions show a mix of continuity and diversity. 
Rates of trade union density, decentralisation of collective bargaining, employers’ 
organisations and collective bargaining have remained relatively stable. National 
industrial relations regimes remain diverse — mainly between the EU-15 and the 12 
new Member States, but also within them in different country groupings. The effect of 
the crisis on industrial relations arrangements is not yet clear.
This chapter is based on a draft by Jelle Visser of the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS, University of Amsterdam)
Chapter 1:  Variations and trends in European industrial  
relations in the 21st century’s first decade
Box 1.1: Data sources
The main source used for this chapter is the ICTWSS — Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts — database, which con-
tains data on some 100 variables from 1960 to 2009 in 34 countries. The database was 
developed by Jelle Visser and can be consulted at the website of the Amsterdam Insti-
tute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS (http://www.uva-aias.net/). An updated version 
( ICTWSS, version 3.0) is now available (Visser, 2010). Integrated in the database is infor-
mation from national surveys, the European Social Survey (http://www.europeansocialsur-
vey.org), administrative data obtained from the unions and from the European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions, in particular the EIRO country profiles (http://www.eurofound.
europa.eu/eiro/). Also used for this chapter are the two reports on trade union member-
ship in 1993–2003 and 2003–08 (…/eiro/2004/03/update/tn0403105u.htm; eiro/studies/
tn0904019s/tn0904019s.htm), written for the Foundation by Mark Carley, as well as his 
recent report on ‘Development in social partnership — employer organisations’ (…/eiro/
studies/tn0910049s/tn0910049s.htm). Another invaluable source on employer organisa-
tion in Europe is the 2004 study by Franz Traxler and Martin Behrens, also for the Foun-
dation (…/eiro/2003/11/study/tn0311101s.htm). The data on employee representation are 
from the ICTWSS database and from the 2009 European Company Survey, released by 
the European Foundation in March 2010 (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/com-
panysurvey/2009/index.htm). The data on industrial conflict are from the ILO’s Laborsta 
database, combined with Carley’s report for the Foundation on ‘Developments in indus-
trial action 2005–2009’ (…/eiro/studies/TN1004049S/TN1004049S.htm). The employ-
ment data in the ICTWSS database are from the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics (‘Wage 
and salary earners in employment’) and, for non-OECD members, from Eurostat and the 
Commission’s annual Employment in Europe reports.
18
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010
of the crisis on industrial relations. As 
far as possible, the chapter presents 
recent data and developments, usually 
relating to 2008 or 2009. The year 2000 
or, to avoid outliers, an average for 
1997–99, is taken as the benchmark for 
comparison with recent years.
Trade unions1.2. 
The power and presence of trade 
unions is determined by various fac-
tors. The level of membership, in abso-
lute terms and relative to employment, 
is an important but not the only deter-
minant of trade union power. Other 
factors are the unity and cooperation 
inside and outside the union move-
ment; the relationship with employ-
ers, governments, political parties and 
other social organisations; leadership, 
internal organisation and member-
ship participation; sound finances; 
a coherent value system or ideology; 
and the standing of the unions and 
their leaders in public opinion (see 
Hyman, 2001; Visser, 1995). The com-
position of unions and union mem-
bership, their representation among 
different categories defined by skill, 
sector, gender, sector, age, national-
ity and status in the labour market is 
relevant for understanding the policy 
choices of unions, for instance regard-
ing employment protection, pension 
reform, incomes policy or wage set-
ting (Iversen, 1999; Ebbinghaus and 
Visser, 2000).
The present section discusses, firstly, 
the organisational make-up of the 
union movement in EU Member States; 
 secondly, tendencies towards concen-
tration or fragmentation, thirdly, issues 
of leadership, in particular related to 
the role and authority of the main 
confederations and largest (sector) 
unions and, fourthly, the membership 
basis and composition of the unions. 
For each issue, where appropriate, 
 developments at EU and national level 
will be indicated.
Union confederations 1.2.1. 
and divisions in national 
union movements
In view of the varied pattern of 
union organisation it is hard to dis-
cern any general EU model of trade 
unionism. Across Member States, 
the number of confederations or 
peak associations of trade unions 
varies from one to nine; the mem-
bership share of the largest confed-
eration varies from 100 % in Austria 
to 23 % in France; and the number 
of affiliated unions in the main or 
largest union confederation varies 
from eight in Germany to more than 
a hundred in Poland. There is not a 
particular north–south or east–west 
gradient in these variations.
General and specialised 1.2.1.1. 
confederations
Table 1.1 highlights the main divi-
sions. A first distinction can be made 
 between ‘general’ confederations, 
which organise throughout the econ-
omy in all sectors of the economy 
Table 1.1: Number of union confederations,  
domains and key divisions in 2010
Total General Divisions Public Services
# # Political Reli-gious
Occu-
pational Regional # #
AT 1 1
IE 1 1
LV 1 1
UK 1 1
EL 2 1 1
EE 2 1   1
MT 2 2 X
SK 3 2 x 1
BG 3 2 X 1
BE 3 3 X X x
DE 3 2 x  1
LT 3 3 X x  
PL 3 3 X
NL 3 3 x X x
FI 3 3 X
SE 3 3 X
DK 4 4 x X
CY 4 3 X  x  1
LU 4 2 X X 1 1
PT 4 4 X
CZ 5 4 X x x 1
RO 5 5 X
ES 6 5 X x  x 1
HU 6 6 X
SI 7 5 X x 1 1
IT 7 6 X 1
FR 9 5 X x x 4
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010.
NB: X = major or primary demarcationline; x = minor or secondary.
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(including the public sector), and ‘spe-
cialised’ confederations with members 
in the public sector or some special-
ised sector (e.g. commerce; financial 
services, healthcare). Of the 98 con-
federations counted in January 2010, 
nine are limited to the public sector, 
eight to services, and 81 are general.
Political, religious and 1.2.1.2. 
regional divisions
Politics as a source of disunity is 
present in 15 of the 27 EU Member 
States (Table 1.1). It is absent in Scan-
dinavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Ger-
many, Ireland and the UK. In Austria 
and Greece party-political differences 
are ‘internalised’ as factions within the 
main confederations, ÖGB and GSEE 
respectively. Religious differences are 
usually a minor or secondary demar-
cation, or they overlap with political 
differences, as is the case in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
Small, minority organisations based 
on religious identity exist in Ger-
many, Denmark, France, Spain, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Lithuania. Finally, 
confederations of unions limited to 
a particular language community or 
region exist in Spain (Basque area), 
the Czech Republic (Bohemia, Mora-
via and Silesia) and Slovenia (coastal 
area). Within the Belgian confedera-
tions, unions have sometimes a dis-
tinct regional (and linguistic) identity, 
especially those for white-collar staff 
and in the public sector.
Divisions by occupational 1.2.1.3. 
class or status
Occupational demarcations between 
blue- and white-collar employees, with 
separate organisations for (academic) 
professions and managers, are the 
main dividing line in the Nordic coun-
tries. In a few other countries, higher-
ranking white-collar employees have 
formed minority  confederations, for 
example in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
France and Cyprus (1). In many other 
countries, for instance Belgium or Aus-
tria and in a more varied way also in 
Ireland and the UK, occupational sta-
tus is the source of divisions between 
unions within the same confedera-
tion. In some of these cases blue- and 
white-collar workers negotiate differ-
ent collective agreements and/or have 
different social insurance provisions 
and employment protection rights. In 
the industrial unions of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain or Italy, and also in 
most CEE countries these distinctions 
are absent, and blue- and white-collar 
staff in the private sector tend to be 
covered by the same collective agree-
ments and legal statutes. Recent union 
mergers and labour market reforms in 
Austria and Belgium go in the same 
direction of lowering or removing the 
distinctions between blue- and white-
collar staff. In the Nordic countries, the 
decline in manual work is a long-term 
threat to the historically dominant con-
federations of blue-collar workers.
Unity or pluralism?1.2.1.4. 
In the history of (western) European 
trade unions, the political, religious and 
occupational demarcations between 
trade union confederations emerged 
relatively early, before or around the 
First World War. They have proved 
very stable (Ebbinghaus and Visser 
2000). Only in Germany and Austria, 
under allied occupation, was it possible 
to overcome pre-war differences and 
organise all or most unions under the 
common roof of the German and Aus-
trian Confederation of Trade Unions, 
1 There are also separate unions, federations or 
forums for managers with executive functions in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, but 
they are usually very small, not recognised and not 
involved in collective bargaining — if known, their 
membership is included under ‘independent or 
unaffiliated’ unions, but they are not included in the 
list of confederations in Table 1.1.
the DGB and ÖGB respectively. Simi-
lar attempts in Italy and France failed. 
The Netherlands is a rare case where, in 
the 1970s, a general and Catholic union 
federation merged to become the FNV, 
which is the country’s dominant union 
confederation. In nearly all countries 
in which free unions were suppressed, 
or unionisation was allowed only in 
a ‘united’ organisation, the return to 
democracy expressed itself in union 
pluralism, with ‘old’ and ‘new’ centres 
competing with one another. This hap-
pened in Spain and Portugal in the late 
1970s and in Poland, Hungary and the 
other CEE countries after the fall of 
communism. The process of experi-
mentation and differentiation has not 
stopped yet, although some consoli-
dation has taken place, for instance in 
Hungary where two confederations 
merged. Compared with 2000, the 
number of union confederations in the 
EU-27 has risen from 93 to 98; in the 
10 post-Communist CEE countries the 
number rose from 29 to 38, with fur-
ther splits and new union federations 
in Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia and Romania.
Organisational fragmentation 1.2.1.5. 
and recognition rules
Union pluralism tends to go together 
with competition over members, 
influence, bargaining rights and seats 
in national, sector or company consul-
tation councils. This competition may 
be intense when confederations are 
ideologically and politically opposed 
to one another, or muted when their 
membership is demarcated by occupa-
tion, region or religion and they have 
reached a cooperation agreement.
Changes in recognition rules may put 
pressure on trade unions and confed-
erations to seek a merger with larger 
organisations. Not reaching the repre-
sentativeness threshold may shut the 
confederation and its member unions 
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out from participation in consultation 
and bargaining. For instance, in Poland 
a recognition threshold of 10 % applies 
to unions claiming representation in 
companies; increasing this threshold, 
as was debated in the Tripartite Com-
mission in 2008, would probably hurt 
all unions, but especially those affiliated 
with the smallest confederation. In Italy, 
since the late 1990s bargaining rights in 
the public sector depend on reaching a 
threshold of 5 %, based on membership 
and electoral data. Even this low thresh-
old has triggered a spate of union merg-
ers in the public sector. In France, under 
new legislation applying from 2012, in 
order to take part in collective bargaining 
at the sector or cross-sector level, trade 
union organisations must obtain 8 % of 
the votes in workplace elections across 
the sector or nationally, while participa-
tion in company-level bargaining will 
require 10 % of the votes in the relevant 
enterprise elections. The Confederation 
of Professional and Managerial Staff 
(CFE-CGC) and the National Federa-
tion of Independent Unions (UNSA), 
neither of which currently reaches the 
threshold, have broached the possibility 
of a merger, but no conclusion has yet 
been reached. In Luxembourg, a change 
in the representation criteria set by the 
law in 2004 triggered a regrouping of 
union confederations and their overall 
reduction from seven to four. 
Number of unions1.2.1.6. 
The total number of unions affiliated to 
the largest confederation in each coun-
try decreased from 829 in 2000 to 758 
in 2008, which represents an average of 
29 per country (Table 1.2). A cautious 
estimate and considering that smaller 
confederations may also have a smaller 
number of affiliates, suggests that the 
total number of national unions in the 
EU might be in the order of 2 000. Not 
included in this count are the inde-
pendent or unaffiliated unions; they 
probably add another 1 000 mostly very 
small unions in professions and occu-
pations in the public or state-subsidised 
sector as well as associations represent-
ing managers. As mainstream public 
sector unions have increasingly come 
under pressure to accept change in the 
employment status of civil servants and 
moderation in wage settlements, some 
powerful and well-organised profes-
sional groups have tried to defend their 
privileges by splitting off from the main 
unions. Examples of this development 
go back to the 1980s in Italy and France 
and the 1990s in the Netherlands. In 
the 2000s, train drivers, air pilots, and 
physicians in Germany won separate 
bargaining rights, often after a strike 
(Schroeder and Greef, 2008).
There appears to be no relationship 
between the number of unions or 
union confederations and the size of 
the country (the correlation coefficient 
is close to zero). The country with the 
largest population in the EU, Germany, 
has one of the most concentrated union 
movements, whereas small countries 
like Slovenia, Hungary or Portugal have 
many confederations and many unions. 
A relatively strict application of the sec-
tor principle of demarcation between 
affiliated unions reduces the number of 
unions, whereas occupational demar-
cations raise the number, as the com-
parison between Germany and Britain 
shows, although mega unions strad-
dling the boundaries of many sectors 
and occupations now exist in both 
countries. The relationship between the 
number of unions and bargaining units 
no longer exists, as some large unions 
negotiate many contracts in different 
parts of the economy. 
Union mergers1.2.1.7. 
The process of consolidation through 
mergers of separate unions has contin-
ued, but at a much reduced pace than at 
the beginning of the decade when there 
was a flurry of activity resulting in the 
creation of mega unions, for instance 
in Finland, Germany, the UK, Austria 
and Denmark. In the early 2000s, union 
mergers were often broadcast as a solu-
tion to problems of membership decline 
and union renewal, freeing resources bot-
tled up in unions organising in declining 
industrial sectors for recruitment drives 
in services. But mergers are costly opera-
tions in themselves and the high expecta-
tions associated with some subsequently 
gave way to disillusionment (Wadding-
ton, 2006). In early 2008 three white-col-
lar employee unions merged in Sweden, 
but in Finland a merger of six unions, 
decided in 2006, was reversed. Another 
group of Finnish unions is poised to 
create a mega union in 2010 or 2011. In 
January 2010, the construction union 
of the Dutch Christian National Union 
Confederation (CNV) integrated into the 
union for manufacturing industries. In 
the FNV the industry union had merged 
10 years earlier, with unions in transport 
and services, but the construction union 
has retained its independence. Union 
mergers do not necessarily make union 
structures more similar.
Until recently union mergers have 
respected the boundaries of confed-
erations and nations, but in July 2008 
UNITE, the largest ‘general union’ in the 
UK, signed an agreement to merge with 
the North American United Steelwork-
ers union, adopting as its name Work-
ers Uniting and claiming more than 
3 million members in the UK, Ireland, 
the USA, Canada and the Caribbean. 
Unions operating cross-border are a 
well-known phenomenon in the USA 
and Canada, and between the United 
Kingdom and the Irish Republic, but in 
continental Europe it is rare. The nearest 
example is the European Cockpit Asso-
ciation (ECA), which represents 38 650 
pilots and flight engineers in 38 national 
flight crew associations in Europe and 
operates at the EU level. All of ECA’s 
member associations are also members 
of the International Federation of Air 
Line Pilots (Ifalpa). Since 2003 ECA 
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has been mandated to act as IFALPA’s 
European voice in bodies such as the 
European Aviation Safety Association 
and the European Organisation for Air 
traffic Navigation Eurocontrol.
Associational monopoly 1.2.2. 
or membership shares
The 98 union confederations currently 
existing in the EU are quite differ-
ent in who and what they represent; 
they differ in size, internal organisa-
tion and ideology and in the tasks 
they fulfil. To grasp these differences 
we look at the relative size or ‘market 
share’, i.e. how many of all unionists in 
a particular country does the confed-
eration represent? Sometimes, where 
reliable membership figures are absent 
the market share can be gauged on the 
basis of the voting results in elections 
for works councils or other bodies in 
which unions compete for seats and 
influence. In France this has become 
the main way of adjudicating the rela-
tive importance of the different union 
currents, but such elections also play 
an important role in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and Spain. In Italy workplace 
elections became re-institutionalised 
through the 1992–93 pacts; and they 
are used to assign or withhold recog-
nition rights to independent minority 
unions in the public sector. In Austria 
works council elections determine the 
weight of different political currents 
within the united confederation and its 
affiliated unions.
The variation is considerable and goes 
from a market share of 100 % for the 
largest confederation in Austria to 23 % 
in France (Table 1.2). The EU average 
is 60 % for the largest and 22 % for 
the second-largest confederation. The 
position of the Austrian Confederation 
of Trade Unions (ÖGB) is unique and 
in no other country has one confedera-
tion an absolute monopoly. The main 
confederations in Ireland, the UK, Ger-
many, Latvia and Slovakia approach 
this situation but must in each case tol-
erate rival, independent unions.
Between 2000 and 2008 relative mem-
bership shares have been fairly stable, 
with a continued decline of the market 
share of confederations, like the LO in 
Sweden and SAK in Finland, which 
Table 1.2: Major union confederations, market shares and effective number of unions
Largest confederation Second confederation Effective number of unions
No affiliation Market share No affiliation Market share 2000 2008
AT ÖGB 9 100.0 % 8 7
IE ITUC 43 95.3 % 5.5 5.1
LV LBAS 23 91.0 % .. 9
SK KOZ SR 35 88.0 % 20 17
UK TUC 60 83.0 % 15 10
DE DGB 8 77.8 % DBB 40 15.6 % 10 6
EE EAKL 17 75.1 % TALO 12 24.9 % 23 20
LT LPSK 26 74.9 % LDF 10 19.1 % 21 17
BG CITUB 35 69.8 % CL Pokreba 24 19.5 % 26 29
PT CGTP 60 64.2 % UGT 53 25.1 % 19 17
NL FNV 14 63.2 % CNV 9 17.7 % 10 9
EL GSEE 70 60.3 % ADEDY 46 39.7 % 32 29
DK LO 17 59.6 % FTF > 50 17.4 % 14 14
CZ ČMKOS 33 55.5 % ASO .. 22.4 % .. 8
BE CSC/ACV 11 52.3 % FGTB/ABVV 7 40.3 % 22 19
RO Cartel Alfa .. 52.0 % C. Frăţia .. 25.7 % .. ..
SI ZSSS 21 51.3 % KSJSS .. 19.7 % 30 50
MT GMU 32 49.0 % CMTU .. 37.7 % .. 26
PL NSZZ Solid. 102 48.0 % OPZZ 36 43.0 % 46 47
FI SAK 22 46.8 % STTK 20 28.6 % 26 22
ES CC.OO 12 44.2 % UGT 10 31.4 % 26 25
SE LO 15 43.3 % TCO 16 35.3 % 14 16
LU CGT-L 16 43.1 % LCGB 16 26.1 % 22 24
IT CGIL 16 41.4 % CISL 22 32.5 % 33 31
CY PEO .. 39.6 % SEK .. 34.8 % .. ..
HU SZEF 36 28.6 % MSzOSz .. 26.1 % 42 48
FR CGT 18 23.0 % CFDT 15 22.7 % 71 67
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010.
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organise mainly blue-collar workers 
and have their strongest membership 
basis in industry. Once dominant, 
they now represent less than half of 
all union members. This undoubtedly 
has a limiting effect on their coordi-
nating abilities in wage bargaining 
and on their political influence. Most 
confederations define their domain 
more broadly and they follow the skill 
or status upgrading of their members. 
Competition may come from inde-
pendent unions in the public sector 
and in some occupations that enjoy 
special protection, consultation or 
bargaining rights, or some unique 
market powers. Transport sectors are 
generally those with most, and the 
most powerful, independent unions.
Union concentration1.2.2.1. 
In Germany only a handful of unions 
determine the direction and terms 
of union politics and collective bar-
gaining. IG Metall, the large union 
in engineering, Ver.di, which organ-
ises employees and workers in public 
and private services, and IG Chemie, 
the union in chemical and extraction 
 industries, represent almost two thirds 
of all union members between them. 
Taking into account the actual number 
of unions and their relative member-
ship size as a proxy of their weight 
in bargaining and policymaking, we 
can calculate the effective number of 
unions (see Box 1.2).
The effective number of unions — or 
equal sized unions — varies greatly 
across countries, from 5 in Ireland to 
67 in France (Table 1.2, right-hand 
column). France’s high number is the 
result of both a relative large number 
of unions (‘federations’) within each 
confederation and the large number of 
confederations. The opposite applies 
to Ireland: one main confederation 
and a few very large unions. Histori-
cally, the German and Austrian union 
movements are the most concentrated, 
after the merger wave of recent times 
the Irish, British and Dutch unions 
are also in this category. So too are the 
Czech and Latvian union movements. 
In general, union movements in south-
ern and in central and eastern Europe 
are more fragmented, whereas the Nor-
dic union movements, and Belgium, 
occupy a position in the middle. One 
implication is that the few large unions 
in Ireland, or in Germany and the 
Netherlands, must be taken very seri-
ously in the event of national discus-
sions of wages and/or reform  policies, 
and that they are able to coordinate 
even if the confederation is not. In any 
case, their vote will be decisive in any 
agreement or pact entered into by the 
confederation. In the opposite case of 
Box 1.2: Herfindahl index 
of union concentration
The effective number of unions is the 
inverse of the Herfindahl (H) index, 
which measures the degree of concentra-
tion. The Herfindahl (H) index is defined 
as ∑in (pi2), where pi is the proportion 
of total membership organised by the 
ith union and n is the total number of 
unions. The maximum of this index is 1, 
obtained if all union members belong to 
just one union; the minimum approaches 
0, if each union member organises in a 
separate union. Thus, in the case of Ire-
land one large union (SIPTU) represents 
36 % of all union members, the following 
four another 40 % and the next 30 unions 
the rest. This results in a H-index of 
0.190 and an effective number of unions 
of 1/0.190 = 5.3. 
Box 1.3: Index of union authority
The ICTWSS database constructs an index of union (i.e. confederal and affiliate) authority 
based on the following set of propositions.
Confederal authority is higher if:
(a)  the confederation represents the affiliates politically and is routinely involved in 
 consultation with government through bipartite or tripartite contacts;
(b)  the confederation has (political) control or influence over the appointment of the 
 leaders of its affiliates;
(c) the confederation negotiates national agreements with employers;
(d)  the confederation runs a ‘joint resistance or strike fund’ from which affiliates are 
 reimbursed in case of ‘approved’ strikes; and
(e)  strikes of affiliated unions need prior approval from confederation and/or the confedera-
tion can end strikes through central procedures of conflict settlement and arbitration.
Affiliate authority increases if:
(f) affiliate unions negotiate enforceable contracts at sector level;
(g)  affiliate unions have control or influence over the appointment of workplace 
 representatives;
(h) affiliate unions do not depend on local or workplace branches for their finances;
(i) affiliate unions run a central strike fund; and
(j)  affiliate unions can veto local strike or end strikes through sector settlement or 
 arbitration procedures.
Each of the variables (a) to (j) is measured on a three-point scale, with (2) as the highest 
score, (1) as the intermediate score and (0) as the condition being absent. Dividing by 10 
(5 × 2), produces a range from 1 to 0 for each of two subscales (confederal authority and 
union authority).
The measure for union centralisation reflects not only the degree of authority or verti-
cal integration but also the degree of unity and concentration. The centralisation index is 
an additive measure obtained by dividing the level of authority at each level (confedera-
tion, union) by the effective number of confederations (unions) at that level. At each level 
weights are applied to reflect the intensity of divisions between confederations (unions), 
with a 2 for political and ideological conflict, 1.5 for occupational and religious demarca-
tions, and 1 for no or only minor divisions. The centralisation scale is adjusted by taking 
the root square, which serves to increase the differences at the lower end of the scale. For 
further details see ICTWSS database, 3.0; see also Iversen 1999.
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many small unions, policy direction 
and coordination can only be realised 
through the confederation. In short, 
union concentration may be a substi-
tute for the  confederation’s authority.
Although a more concentrated union 
movement can be more cost-efficient 
in its services to members and recruit-
ment, there seems to be no relation-
ship between the effective number of 
unions in a country and the level of 
unionisation. In fact, the causal arrow 
may point in the other direction as 
many mergers tend to be motivated by 
employment and membership decline 
(Waddington, 2006).
Union authority  1.2.3. 
and centralisation
Authority can be defined as the chance 
that decisions by the leaders of an 
organisation will be followed by their 
members. Applied to trade unions, this 
can be studied at two levels: 1. Will the 
affiliated unions follow the confederal 
leadership in its decisions? 2. Will the 
members, individually or organised in 
branches and workplace or enterprise 
units, follow the directions of their 
union leaders? To address these ques-
tions, an index of union authority has 
been constructed (see Box 1.3).
As shown in Table 1.3, the average 
degree of union authority, both of 
confederations over their affiliates 
and of national unions over their 
branches and members, is twice as 
high in the EU-15 as in the 12 new 
Member States. Between 2000 and 
2010 the two groups of Member States 
began to converge, however. In the 12 
new Member States union authority 
increased in some countries, start-
ing from a very low level, whereas in 
the EU-15 developments went in the 
opposite direction. The coefficients 
of variation reveal that the authority 
of unions and confederations varies a 
great deal in the Member States of the 
EU and that the diversity in the EU-15 
is as large, and as constant, as that in 
the 12 new Member States.
Overall, measuring the centralisation 
of trade unions as a combination of 
union authority and union concentra-
tion (see Box 1.3), we observe neither 
centralisation nor decentralisation. 
The small decline in union and con-
federal authority in some countries in 
the EU-15 is compensated by further 
concentration, whereas the opposite 
— rising authority amidst further frag-
mentation — is found in some coun-
tries in the 12 new Member States. 
Ranking the countries by degree of 
union centralisation (Chart 1.1), we 
find that the five most centralised 
union movements are in Austria, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and 
Sweden. The position of Germany 
and Ireland is remarkable, since the 
authority of the German and Irish 
confederations (DGB and ICTU) is 
rather limited. But both union move-
ments are highly concentrated; in Ger-
many, the power of unions over their 
branches is formidable; in Ireland 
the participation in seven consecu-
tive social pacts with the government 
and central employers’ associations 
since 1987 has caused an upward shift 
Table 1.3: Union authority and union centralisation, averages
Confederal authority Affiliate authority Centralisation index
1997–99 2007–09 1997–99 2007–09 1997–99 2007–09
Averages
EU-27 254 .259  306 .300  319 .324  
EU-15 341 .332 – 411 .387 – 384 .388  
EU-10 
+EU-2 144 .167 + 175 .192 + 238 .243  
Coefficient of variation
EU-27 .686 .642 – .679 .642 – .475 .444 –
EU-15 .534 .533 – .523 .533 .432 .415
EU-10 
+EU-2 .493 .498 .528 .498 .308 .208
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0; 2010.
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in authority, as the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU) has increased 
its role in relation to affiliates.
Judged in terms of union centralisa-
tion, the UK, France, Poland and Hun-
gary occupy the bottom positions. The 
weakness of the Trade Union Con-
gress (TUC) vis-à-vis its affiliates is 
well-known. In the absence of regular 
national consultation with employers 
and governments over the past three 
decades, and with the replacement 
of sector by company bargaining, the 
national unions are left with limited 
authority. The French union confed-
erations have a centralised outlook 
and policies are decided in relatively 
centralised fashion, but local or sec-
tional interests wield significant con-
trol on the ground, in particular in 
the public sector. The Polish trade 
union movement, in particular NSZZ 
Solidarność, is decentralised, with its 
basis in company unions, even though 
its key political stance tends to be 
based on centralised decisions. Hun-
gary is characterised by an extreme 
degree of fragmentation between and 
within confederations.
Affiliation and 1.2.4. 
organisation at the 
European level
In spite of massive diversity at the 
national level, trade unionism at the 
European level is characterised by a 
high degree of unity. The European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
brings together all major confedera-
tions. Of the 98 confederations iden-
tified in Table 1.1, 64 are member 
organisations of the ETUC, with a 
combined membership of 56 mil-
lion people. This includes the 5 mil-
lion members claimed by Eurocadres, 
the European  federation of mana-
gerial staff, which is an associated 
member organisation of the ETUC. 
There is another organisation for 
executive managers, the Confédéra-
tion Européenne des Cadres (CEC, 
founded in 1989), which claims 1.5 
million members in 16 national organ-
isations from 15 countries (mostly in 
the EU-15). Since 2009, Eurocadres 
and CEC are recognised, in addition 
to the ETUC, as official ‘social part-
ners’ by the EU.
About 8 million employees in the EU 
join independent unions and confed-
erations that are not affiliated with the 
ETUC. Some of these organisations, 
with an estimated total of about 4 mil-
lion members, are represented in the 
European Confederation of Independ-
ent Unions (CESI, reflecting its French 
name: Confédération Européenne des 
Syndicats Indépendents, founded in 
1990). CESI has member organisa-
tions in 15 EU Member States, mostly 
in the EU-15 (2).
The ETUC is represented in each and 
every country of the EU-27 and its 
associational monopoly at the Euro-
pean level, measured as its share in 
the total membership, is close to 88 %, 
with majorities in each Member State, 
varying from 51 % in Slovenia to 100 % 
in Hungary and Austria. Beyond the 
EU-27 the ETUC has 18 affiliates in 
Norway, Iceland,  Switzerland, Turkey, 
2 The estimate of 4 million union members of CESI 
must be interpreted with caution, since only few of 
these organisations publish membership numbers and 
no independent check of published data is possible. 
The four Italian confederations (CISAL, CISAS, Conf.
ILL and Conf.S.A.L) are estimated to have a combined 
membership of 1.8 million, which is 15 % of total 
membership in Italy. The German Civil Servants’ 
Federation DBB, with almost 1.3 million members in 
2008, is the dominant organisation in CESI.
Turkish Cyprus, Croatia, Andorra, 
Monaco, Liechtenstein and San 
Marino, bringing the total number of 
national affiliates to 82. Five confeder-
ations, from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia have observer 
status in the ETUC.
Starting with 36 million members in 
1973 from 14 countries (Table 1.4), 
all in western Europe, the ETUC’s 
combined membership has increased 
to nearly 56 million in 36 coun-
tries, spanning the whole European 
(sub)continent. Also affiliated to the 
ETUC are 12 European industry 
federations (see Table 1.5), grouping 
almost all major EU trade unions in 
their respective sectors.
Should the ETUC be ranked in terms 
of ‘union concentration’, ‘union 
authority’ or ‘union centralisation’, 
the organisation would score high on 
concentration and low on authority 
and centralisation. In other words, the 
ETUC would find itself somewhere 
between the TUC in Britain and the 
ICTU in Ireland. The ETUC does rep-
resent its member organisations in con-
sultations with the Commission, the 
Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Central Bank, and it has 
a mandate from its members for nego-
tiating with BusinessEurope and CEEP. 
Occasionally it does reach agreement 
with these organisations on matters of 
labour market regulation, which subse-
quently requires implementation at the 
national level. The European frame-
work agreements on stress at work 
Table 1.4: Affiliation and membership in the ETUC, 1993–2008
1973 1983 1992 2003 2008
Total membership (million) 36 41 45 59 56
Number of national affiliates 17 34 46 77 82
Number of countries 14 20 22 35 36
European industry federations 6 10 15 11 12
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, Chapter 19, updated with ETUC reports and website.
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(2004) and inclusive labour markets 
(2010) are examples (see Chapter 6). 
Although far from a full-fledged fed-
eral structure, by relying on majority 
voting the ETUC can and occasion-
ally does overrule the veto of its largest 
members and contributors, such as the 
British TUC and German DGB.
Union membership  1.2.5. 
and density
The trend of union decline that 
began in the 1980s and became more 
widespread in the 1990s continued. 
On aggregate, between 2000 and 
2008 union membership among the 
employed salaried workforce in the 
EU fell by nearly 3 million people, 
from 46 to 43 million, whereas the 
number of non-unionised employees 
increased with more than 20  million 
from 120 million to 140 million 
people. As a result, aggregate union 
density — union members with paid 
employment as a proportion of all 
employed wage and salary earners 
— in the EU-27 fell from 27.8 to 23.4 
(Chart 1.2).
Chart 1.2 shows that the decline 
was fairly linear; each year the trade 
unions lost terrain and 2008 was no 
different from earlier years. At the 
time of writing, mid-2010, we have 
not yet comparative membership and 
employment data for 2009, the first 
year in which the effect of the crisis on 
unemployment and union member-
ship can be observed. From scattered 
data, there is no reason to believe 
that the trend has turned — the 
main confederations in for instance 
 Germany, Austria,  Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland had fewer members in 
January 2010 than a year  earlier, and 
it appears that most losses are due to 
unemployment and came from the 
unions in construction and manu-
facturing. For the near future, the 
announced cuts in staff numbers in 
the public sector are a threat to the 
unions, as this is where they have 
the highest membership numbers in 
nearly all countries.
Absolute and relative 1.2.5.1. 
membership gains and losses
During the 2000s unions in about 
half of the EU Member States lost 
members; in the other half there 
were small gains. Of the total losses, 
2 million occurred in CEE countries, 
Table 1.5: European industry federations,  
affiliated with the ETUC, 2010
Sector European industry federation Website
Food, agriculture, 
tourism
European Federation of Trade Unions 
in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism 
sectors and allied branches
http://www.effat.org
Chemicals, mining, 
energy
European Mine, Chemical and 
Energy Workers’ Federation http://www.emcef.org
Metal, engineering European Metalworkers’ Federation http://www.emf-fem.org
Textile, clothing, 
leather
European Trade Union Federation — 
Textiles Clothing and Leather http://www.etuf-tcl.org
Construction and 
wood
European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers http://www.efbww.org
Transport European Transport Workers’  Federation http://www.itfglobal.org/ETF
Services Union Network International http://www.uni-europa.org
Arts and  
entertainment
European Arts and Entertainment 
Alliance http://www.uniglobalunion.org
Journalism, media European Federation of Journalists http://www.ifj.org
Public services European Federation of Public  Service Unions http://www.epsu.org
Police European Confederation of Police http://www.eurocop-police.org
Education European Trade Union Committee for Education http://www.csee-etuce.org
Source: ETUC website (http://www.etuc.org/).
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1 million in the EU-15. The biggest 
losses, in absolute terms, happened 
in Germany (nearly – 1.5 mil-
lion members), Poland (– 650 000) 
and Romania (– 424 000); the 
biggest gains took place in Italy 
(+ 555 000), Spain (+ 317 000) and 
Belgium (+ 205 000). In percentage 
terms, the biggest losses happened 
in  Lithuania (– 47.7 %), Estonia 
(– 43.6 %),  Slovakia (– 43.4 %), 
the Czech Republic (– 27.9 %) and 
Poland (– 25.5 %); trade unions in 
Spain (+ 15.4 %), Cyprus (+ 14.6 %), 
Greece (+ 13.9 %) and Belgium 
(+ 11.5 %) made the largest gains.
These gains and losses must be com-
pared with developments in employ-
ment. For instance, the decline in 
membership in the Czech Republic 
or Romania is partly explained by 
the lack of growth in employment, 
whereas the strong growth in union 
membership in Spain reflected, and 
lagged considerably behind, the 
very strong increase in employ-
ment. The general trend in these 
years is that increases in employ-
ment were not matched by increases 
in union membership. Two exam-
ples of this development over a 
longer period are Ireland and the 
Netherlands: both have experienced 
rapid employment growth, small 
increases in membership and a fall-
ing union density rate. In a recent 
study Roche (2008) concludes that 
the rapid increase of the ‘pool of 
potential members’ and the inability 
of unions to organise in new sectors 
and among (migrant) workers with 
less than standard contracts ‘exerted 
a drag on density’. Something similar 
occurred in the  Netherlands. Often 
driven to defend the employment 
protection rights of the incumbent 
workforce and membership, unions 
clearly suffer from the expansion of 
a labour market built on flexibil-
ity and the dualism of two types of 
 employment status. 
Union density rates1.2.5.2. 
Within a general trend of decreasing 
density rates, the differences across 
countries have remained as large as ever 
(Chart 1.3). In 2008 union density var-
ied from 68.8 % in Sweden and 67.6 % 
in Denmark to 7.6 % in Estonia and 
7.7 % in France. In general, the lowest 
density rates are currently found in the 
post-Communist countries — Slovenia 
and Romania are the exceptions — and 
in southern Europe — where Italy, 
Malta and Cyprus are the exception. In 
the EU-15 the highest rates are found 
in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Bel-
gium. For explanations of these differ-
ences, authors have pointed to political 
and institutional conditions that vary 
across countries, such as coordinated 
and multi-employer bargaining, at sec-
tor level or higher, versus uncoordi-
nated and single-employer bargaining; 
the general acceptance and recognition 
of unions in national and workplace 
consultation; and union involvement 
in unemployment insurance (Ebbing-
haus and Visser, 1999, for a summary). 
In recent times, scholars have drawn 
attention to variations in union coali-
tion building and legacies of the past, 
especially in CEE countries (Avdagic, 
2005) and differences in union organ-
ising strategies (Frege and Kelly, 2003; 
Kaminska and Kahancová, 2011).
To assess possible future developments 
it is necessary to decompose these 
aggregate figures on unionisation. 
With the help of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and national survey 
data, differences according to selected 
aspects of three types of characteristic 
are reviewed: individual (gender, age, 
etc.), employment status (unemploy-
ment, type of contract, working hours, 
etc.) and employment situation (sec-
tor, workplace, size, etc.). 
Individual characteristics1.2.5.3. 
The feminisation of unions has contin-
ued through the 2000s, although at a 
slower pace than in the preceding dec-
ade. This is the result of two contrasting 
trends — a small decrease of the female 
presence in unions in CEE countries, 
starting from very high levels, and con-
tinued progress of the share of female 
members in the EU-15. Overall, the 
number of female (employed) union 
members was stable at 18 million, 
whereas male (employed) membership 
Chart 1.3: Union density by country, 2000-08 
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decreased from 28 million in 2000 to 25 
million in 2008; as a result the female 
share rose from 42.8 to 44.1 %. The 
variation across countries is still large. 
There are now more female than male 
union members in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark and the UK. The 
lowest share of female members, no 
doubt reflecting their weaker position 
in the labour market, is observed in 
the southern countries (Spain, Italy, 
Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, but 
not Portugal and Bulgaria) and in the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany 
and Austria.
Age-related density rates can be esti-
mated with the help of ESS and ISSP 
surveys (3). From these estimates a clear 
picture emerges of much lower density 
3 Van Gyes in Industrial Relations in Europe 
2006; also based on the European Social Survey 
(ESS), waves of 2002/03: Ebbinghaus et al 2008 
use the same waves, but show different results. 
Yet different are the estimates from the same 
waves published by Schnabel and Wagner, 
2007. Blanchflower (2006) and Checchi and 
Visser (2009) use data from the International 
Social Science Program (ISSP) which has 
the advantage of longer time series, but the 
disadvantage of fewer EU countries.
rates of young people, between 15 and 
34 years (Chart 1.5). In many coun-
tries young people reach only half the 
unionisation rate of workers aged 35 
years and older. Moreover, unionisa-
tion rates in the oldest age group, over 
55 years of age, tend to be  highest. For 
the future of trade unionism the devel-
opment of unionisation rates among 
young people and the comparison with 
earlier generations is of great interest. 
Nearly all trade unions, including those 
in Scandinavia, report a lower inflow 
and decreasing unionisation of young 
people (Pedersini, 2010). As fewer 
young people join, European trade 
unions are ageing and more union 
members near retirement age. A triple 
effect is at work: smaller birth cohorts 
are entering the labour market; entry 
into the labour market is later, due to 
longer education and a longer school-
to-work transition via temporary jobs; 
and the unionisation propensity among 
younger generations is lower.
Employment status1.2.5.4. 
Almost a quarter of all trade union 
members in the EU are without paid 
employment: 13.6 million of the total 
of 56.6 million union members in 
2008 (they are excluded from calculat-
ing density rates). The average share of 
members without paid employment 
varies per country and is almost five 
times higher in the EU-15 than in the 
12 new Member States. The  highest 
share, in particular of pensioners 
but also members in (temporary or 
 partial) unemployment, is found in 
Italian unions (52 %), followed by 
 Belgium (37 %) and Finland (34 %).
Chart 1.4: Men and women union density, 2008
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Chart 1.5: Union density by age group, mid-2000s 
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Results from the ESS suggest that in 
most European countries only a minor-
ity of the unemployed are union mem-
bers. In the Netherlands,  Germany 
and Ireland around 10 % of the unem-
ployed retain membership, in Finland 
and Belgium about 50 %, and in Den-
mark and Sweden about 70 %. Recent 
legislation in Sweden has weakened 
the incentives for unemployed workers 
to combine union membership with 
membership of a voluntary unemploy-
ment insurance fund, and this is one 
reason why in 2007 and 2008 there 
has been a sharp drop in union mem-
bership (Kjellberg, 2009). In Finland 
and Denmark, the creation of general 
state-sponsored unemployment funds, 
at greater distance from the unions, 
has been associated with a decline in 
unionisation, especially among the 
young (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006; 
Lind, 2009). Not relying on voluntary 
unemployment funds, but with strong 
involvement in the administration 
of the compulsory system, Belgian 
unions have continued to grow, with 
high unionisation rates among young 
people, industrial and lower-skilled 
workers, i.e. those with the highest risk 
of unemployment (Van Rie and Marx, 
forthcoming).
Employees working on fixed-term 
employment contracts are likely to have 
lower probabilities of unionisation. 
Chart 1.6 shows that the gap in unioni-
sation between workers in standard 
and temporary jobs is still very large 
in Slovenia, Italy, Spain, Poland, the 
UK, Germany and the Netherlands. 
There are no data for France, Portugal, 
 Bulgaria, Romania and the three Baltic 
states. Various unions in, for instance, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK, Italy, 
Spain and Hungary have campaigned 
in recent years to recruit temporary 
workers. A particular challenge for 
trade unions is the recruitment of the 
increasing number of (temporary) 
migrants and self-employed workers. 
Migrants, many coming from  outside 
Europe, are a huge challenge for 
unions in Malta, Spain and Italy; Irish 
and Swedish unions have focused on 
organising migrants from CEE coun-
tries, Dutch and Italian unions have set 
up special unions for the self-employed 
(Pedersini, 2010).
Employees working part-time tend to 
join unions less than those working 
full-time, but with the ‘normalisation’ 
of part-time work, the differences have 
become smaller. They are smallest in 
countries such as Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden where part-time work is 
culturally accepted and distinctions 
in employment and social security 
rights, by law and in individual or col-
lective contracts, are absent. However, 
employees working in small part-
time jobs, of less than 15 hours, tend 
to remain outside unions; the preva-
lence of these jobs in some countries, 
especially among young people and 
married women, explains part of the 
large gap in unionisation between 
part-time and full-time workers in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK (4). 
4 Estimates based on the Dutch Labour Force Survey 
suggest that the unionisation rate of people working 
between 20 and 35 hours per week is almost twice as 
high as the rate among people with small part-time 
jobs, of less than 20 hours (22 versus 12 % in 2006), 
and nearly as high as among full-timers (26 %).
In southern and eastern Europe, part-
time employment is much less present 
and the unionisation of part-time 
workers has been much less an issue 
for the unions. 
Employment situation1.2.5.5. 
In all countries, unionisation levels 
are much higher in the public than 
in the private sector, sometimes by 
a factor two or three. Density rates 
in the public sector in Scandinavia 
are well over 75 %; above 55 % or 
twice the level in the private  sector 
in Austria, the UK and Ireland, 
probably also in Italy (if we include 
the membership of the ‘autonomous’ 
unions); above 40 % in Germany and 
the Netherlands; and some 15 % in 
France, which is at least three times 
higher than in the private sector. In 
Belgium, however, the differences 
appear slight. Data for most other 
countries are not comparable or 
non-existent. The situation in CEE 
countries seems to be different, with 
relatively high unionisation rates in 
the ‘old’ state-based industries and 
firms and rather low unionisation 
rates among central government 
employees (Bordogna, 2008). 
Chart 1.6: Union density, employees in standard  
and temporary jobs, mid-2000s 
%
 o
f e
m
pl
oy
ed
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e 
in
 e
ac
h 
gr
ou
p
Chart 1.6: Union density, e ployees in standard and temporary jobs, mid-2000s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Temporary
Standard
ESHUPLNLDEELUKATITIELUSIBEDKFISE
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010, based on estimates from ESS and ISSP surveys.
Chapter 1: Variations and trends in European industrial relations in the 21st century’s first decade
29
Unionisation levels rise with estab-
lishment size (Visser, 1991), perhaps 
because the benefits of membership 
rise with size, impersonal manage-
ment leads to greater alienation and 
demand for protection, or because 
size proxies unions’ organising 
costs. This is strongly related to 
workplace-level union organisation 
and employee representation, which 
tends to be guaranteed, by law or 
national agreement, for establish-
ments above a particular size. Such 
rights may help trade union repre-
sentatives to organise, although this 
is not always the case.
Conclusion1.2.6. 
The Achilles’ heel of European trade 
unions is the lower and often decreas-
ing unionisation rates of young 
people, the difficulty to recruit and 
retain union members in the expand-
ing services sector, in small firms, 
and among those with flexible and 
fixed-term employment contracts. 
The mirror image of this weakness is 
that unions are ageing and increas-
ingly reliant on the public sector. The 
strongest unions in Europe in, say, 
Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain or the Netherlands, still have 
their basis in industry and in large 
firms. How these unions weather the 
current crisis is crucial and the use 
of short-time working and part-time 
unemployment schemes (see Chap-
ter 3) may have helped to sustain 
employment. Challenges ahead lie 
in the public sector. Given the high 
proportion of union members in the 
public sector, austerity programmes 
and job retrenchment threatens to 
translate in membership losses and 
may push more union members into 
(early) retirement. Whether unions 
can compensate this by recruit-
ing more members in ill-organised 
service sectors is an open question 
( Pedersini, 2010).
 Employers’ 1.3. 
associations
The problems of collective organisa-
tion of employers differ from those of 
workers. For trade unions, the biggest 
problem is to recruit and maintain 
members, followed by the problem of 
solidarity and unity among workers. 
Control over members is usually much 
less a problem for trade unions than 
for employers’ associations, whose 
members are usually not individuals 
but organisations (firms). For employ-
ers’ associations discipline and cohe-
sion rather than membership are the 
key issues: ‘employers find it a much 
greater sacrifice [than workers] to 
comply with the decisions and regu-
lations of their organisations, as these 
reduce their much cherished freedom 
of enterprise’ (van Waarden, 1995: 75). 
This reluctance to cede control and 
mandate the association, for instance 
in matters of pay bargaining or nego-
tiations with the government, is visible 
at all levels: sector, national and Euro-
pean. As will be seen, for most employ-
ers associations it is not so difficult to 
maintain high levels of membership, 
once the association is established and 
provides services to its members. This 
may be different if the association is in 
its initial phase and has yet to demon-
strate its usefulness — as in the case in 
many CEE countries after 1989, where 
employers’ associations had to start 
from scratch.
Employers’ 1.3.1. 
confederations and the 
main divisions
A total of 111 national confederations 
and peak associations of employers were 
counted amongst the 27 EU  Member 
States in early 2010. This is slightly 
more than in 2000, and also more than 
the number of national union confed-
erations. This number does not include 
farmers’ organisations, (con)federations 
representing cooperatives, organisa-
tions for the self-employed and agen-
cies or associations representing public 
services (5). The outcome confirms the 
conclusion of earlier studies that the 
organisation of employers tends to be 
more fragmented than the organisation 
of workers (Traxler, 1993; van Waarden, 
1995). Of these 111 confederations, 49 
are ‘general’ organisations with member 
firms throughout the private economy; 
39 specialise in organising small- and 
medium-sized firms; and 23 specialise 
in organising a particular sector, either 
in industry (6), construction (4), trade 
and commerce (8), finance (5) or agri-
culture (10). Table 1.7 presents the data 
for each country.
There is considerable diversity; on 
the one hand there is a small group of 
countries with one or two peak associa-
tions, on the other there is a group with 
five or more, with Italy and Romania 
in a class apart. There is some relation 
with the number of union confedera-
tions, though the correlation is modest 
(r = .46). In some countries there are 
only one or two organisations on either 
side (Austria, the UK, Latvia), whereas 
in other countries both sides are very 
fragmented (Italy, Romania, Hungary, 
Portugal, Slovenia). There are also coun-
tries where labour is fragmented but 
capital relatively united (Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Lithuania); the 
opposite also occurs (Ireland). Until 2000 
 Luxembourg had eight national employ-
ers’ associations and the  Netherlands 
had five until 1990, but in both countries 
either through creating a joint umbrella 
organisation ( Luxembourg) or via 
mergers (the  Netherlands), this number 
was reduced.
5 Including farmers’ organisations reduces the 
comparability across countries, since in some 
countries (Netherlands, Italy, France) the same 
organisations are included that are excluded in others 
(Belgium, Spain, UK). Organisations representing 
producers’ cooperatives and associations looking after 
the interests of self-employed persons are excluded 
for the same reason, and since they may just as well be 
counted as ‘labour’ organisations.
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Organisational change1.3.1.1. 
The overall structure of peak-level 
employer representation has remained 
stable over the past decade (Carley, 
2010). In the countries that have seen 
change, this has in the majority of cases 
been through mergers, usually with the 
aim of strengthening employers’ collec-
tive voice towards the government and 
the trade unions and, in some cases, 
avoiding duplication in activities and 
creating more economy of scale, for 
instance when building up a (national) 
representation at European level. 
Many if not most peak associations 
have been under pressure to cut their 
budgets, scale down or commercialise 
activities (Streeck and Visser, 2006). As 
part of a larger trend of re-integrating 
industrial relations and social policy 
in general business practice, the once 
common division between ‘trade’ or 
‘business’ association on the one hand 
and ‘employers’ association on the other 
has almost disappeared. The separation 
between the employers’ confederation 
BDA and the industry confederation 
BDI in Germany is one of the last exam-
ples of a dual organisation that was quite 
common in Europe 20 to 30 years ago.
Another trend, also found among 
trade unions, is to merge associations 
in  industry and services. This hap-
pened in 2004 in Malta, in 2005 in Fin-
land and, in 2008, at the sector level, in 
Denmark, when Dansk Industri (DI), 
the powerful Confederation of Dan-
ish Industries, which negotiates the 
main multiannual collective agreement 
with a cartel of blue-and white-collar 
unions in manufacturing, merged with 
the main organisation in commerce, 
transport and service. In some cases, 
confederations, seek more mutual 
cooperation, whilst stopping short of 
merger. This is the case in Germany, 
where BDA and BDI have stepped up 
cooperation at home by occupying 
the same headquarters building and 
abroad through a joint representation 
in Europe. In Romania eight employ-
ers’ confederations created an ‘alliance’ 
in 2007, but stopped short of full inte-
gration. In the Netherlands, however, 
the attempt to merge the general con-
federation VNO-NCW with the con-
federation for SMEs failed. In central 
and eastern Europe, where employer 
organisations proper have existed for 
only two decades, the direction of 
change has been less clear-cut, and the 
structure of employer representation is 
still in a state of flux in some countries 
(Carley, 2010). There are both cases 
of business associations, represent-
ing special interests, combining their 
resources, for instance in  Bulgaria in 
2006, and new organisations splitting 
off from existing ones or being created 
new, for example in Poland, Bulgaria 
and Slovenia.
Business associations usually organ-
ise only firms and activities in the 
private or market sector. Within the 
public sector, the core of government 
activities, including local and cen-
tral administration, policy, army, and 
most of education remains outside 
the scope of business associations and 
the government may have set up spe-
cial, quasi-independent agencies or 
coordination bodies for the purpose 
of representation and  negotiations 
Table 1.6: Number of employers’ confederations,  
domains and key divisions in 2010
 Total General SMEs Sector Of which
  Industry Building Trade Finance Agriculture
LU 1 1 (1)    
UK 1 1   
AT 2 1  1 1
FI 2 1 1  1
LV 2 1 1  
LT 2 1 1  
NL 2 1 1  1
ES 2 1 1  
BE 3 1 2   
EE 3 1 2  
ES 3 1 1 1 1
MT 3 2 1  
SK 3 2 1  
FR 4 1 3   
SE 4 1 1 2 1 1
CZ 4 2 2  
DK 4 2 1 1 1 1
DE 4 2 2  
CY 5 1 1 3 1 1 1
IE 5 2 2 1 1
SI 5 2 2 1 1
PL 5 4 1  
PT 6  1 5 1 1 2 1 2
HU 6 3 3  1
BG 7 5 2  
IT 10 1 5 4 3 1 4
RO 13 8 1 4 3 1
Total 111 49 39 23 6 4 8 5 10
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010; Carley 2010.
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with the unions, as in Italy or Cyprus. 
Under the influence of new public 
management the management and 
organisation of the public sector has 
changed with tendencies towards full 
or partial privatisation, outsourcing, 
decentralisation, strengthening of 
the prerogatives of management and 
management by contract rather than 
hierarchy, and a reform of personal 
policies. Generally business associa-
tions now also recruit members (firms 
and associations) that were previously 
in the public domain. Telecom firms, 
postal services, railway companies, 
energy providers, hospital associa-
tions, even university associations are 
now among the  member organisations 
of general business associations (see, 
for instance, the European Foundation 
study on social partnership organisa-
tions in hospitals (Traxler, 2009)).
Number of associations1.3.1.2. 
At the sector level employers’ associa-
tions tend to be more differentiated 
and numerous than the trade unions. 
The main general employers’ con-
federations have an estimated 1 700 
sector affiliates, which represents an 
average of 74 per country (no data 
were available for Austria, Slovenia, 
Lithuania and Romania). This is more 
than twice the average (of 29) counted 
for the main union confederations.
The variation across countries is very 
large, from 15 affiliates in the Danish 
employers’ confederation DA and 18 
in the Italian Confindustria, to 134 
affiliates in the British CBI, 150 in 
the Dutch VNO-NCW, and 164 in 
the Spanish CEOE. The latter three 
organisations admit also individual 
(large) firms as members. This con-
trasts with the practice, for instance 
of the German BDA or Italy’s Confin-
dustria, to admit only associations of 
firms as member organisations. Often, 
there are a few dominant affiliates, 
sometimes themselves federations 
with associations as their members, 
which have more resources than the 
parent confederation. A case in point 
is Dansk Industri (DI), which after its 
merger with the parallel organisation 
in commerce, transport and services, 
covers 62 % of the DA’s total mem-
bership and clearly outstrips DA in 
resources. The General Employer’s 
Association (AWVN) in the Nether-
lands, VNO-NCW’s largest member, 
is in a similar position, although it 
has left international representation 
in matters of employment and social 
policy entirely to its parent confedera-
tion. At home, representing nearly all 
large firms in negotiations with the 
unions and responsible for 70 % of all 
collective agreements in the country, 
it pays the piper and calls the tune.
Involvement in national 1.3.2. 
bargaining and 
consultation
It is not possible to measure the degree 
of concentration, authority and cen-
tralisation of employers’ confedera-
tions as was done for trade unions in 
the previous section. Membership in 
Table 1.7: Major employers’ confederations, number  
of affiliates and organisation rates in the private sector
All enterprises Small- and medium-sized enterprises
Members of BusinessEurope Members of UEAPME
Name Affiliation Density Name Affiliation Density
AT IV 21 13.0 % WKÖ 130 75.0 %
BE FEB/VBO 33 75.0 % UCM, UNIZO ..,100 ..
BG BIA 69 .. NCCB, UPEE .., 24 ..
CY OEB 61 .. KEBE 141 ..
CZ SPŽ ČR 29 .. AMSP-CR, CCC 7,.. ..
DE BDA/BDA 56,34 80.0 % ZDH .. ..
DK DA,DI 13,.. 90.0 % Håndværksrådet .. ..
EE ETTK 24 23.0 % EVEA .. ..
EL SEV .. .. GSEVEE 26 ..
ES CEOE 164 75.0 % CEPYME 100 ..
FI EK 34 72.0 % SY 80 ..
FR MEDEF 85 .. CGPME, UPA, APCM ..,50,.. ..
HU MGYOSZ 50 20.0 % IPOSZ,KISOSZ,OKISZ ..,22,22 ..
IE IBEC 60 .. ISME,SFA ..,.. ..
IT Confindustria 22 .. Cna, Confapi,  Confart, Confes. ..,9,..,60 ..
LT LPK 32 .. LVDK .. ..
LU FEDIL .. .. ChdM, FDA ..,51 ..
LV LDDK 47 35.0 % LAK .. ..
MT MCCEI .. .. GRTU .. ..
NL VNO-NCW 150 85.0 % MKB 120 25.0 %
PL PKPP Lewiatan 28 .. ZRP .. ..
PT AIP,CIP ..,40 .. CMPME .. ..
RO ACPR .. .. CONPMMR .. ..
SE SN 50 85.0 % Företagarna .. ..
SI ZDS .. 35.0 % OZS .. 18.1 %
SK RUZ 24 .. SZZ .. ..
UK CBI 150 33.3 %
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010; Carley 2010.
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business associations often overlaps, 
with firms belonging to more than 
one association. Regarding bargain-
ing mandates, there are only lim-
ited, recent data on the division of 
resources, authority and tasks.
Until the 1990s the raison d’être of an 
employers’ federation was linked to 
the conclusion and administration of 
multi-employer collective bargaining 
but this is no longer the case. Services 
and lobbying in national and interna-
tional arenas have acquired a much 
more prominent place. This went along 
with the merger of functions between 
employer and trade associations and a 
restructuring of activities in the direc-
tion of smaller ‘industrial relations’ 
departments and more decentralisa-
tion in representational structures. 
Still, many national peak associations 
of employers are involved in bargain-
ing or consultation at the national level. 
However, with fewer binding agree-
ments or with agreements that are in 
reality recommendations, they need 
less elaborate structures for monitor-
ing, implementation and adjudication. 
Probably in all EU countries the organ-
isational centralisation of employers is 
lower than union centralisation. This 
results both from the lower author-
ity and the greater fragmentation of 
employers’ organisations.
At some point between 2000 and 2010 
in all countries, except Germany, the 
UK and the Czech Republic, national 
employers associations negotiated 
and signed agreements with the 
unions or the government (Avdagic, 
Rhodes and Visser, 2011). A minor-
ity of these agreements were about 
wages and wage setting (Belgium, 
Estonia, Greece,  Ireland, Finland, the 
 Netherlands,  Slovenia, Romania, Spain 
and  Portugal). In  Belgium,  Estonia and 
Greece the central employers organisa-
tion negotiate the minimum wage with 
the central union organisations before it 
is declared binding by the government. 
In Luxembourg minimum wage deci-
sions are in the hands of the tripartite 
commission deciding on the applica-
tion of price indexation to (minimum) 
wages, benefits and pensions. In 2008 
the central organisations in Romania 
reached agreement on the annual rise 
of the minimum wages until 2014; a 
similar agreement, for 10 years, was 
reached in 2006 in Portugal. In Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal 
and Slovenia and in recent years also 
in Spain the central organisations are 
involved in non-binding consultations 
over the statutory minimum wage.
In France, Belgium and Poland central 
organisations negotiate over the imple-
mentation of European legislation 
before it is implemented in national 
law; in the UK, the central organisations 
of employers and unions, CBI and the 
TUC, negotiated a ‘joint statement’ on 
how to implement the ‘Agency Work’ 
directive. Cross-industry  bargaining 
over specific issues, sometimes in 
preparation of a bargaining round at 
the sector level happens on a regular 
basis and with success in Denmark and 
Spain, and on an irregular basis and in 
2009 without success, in Sweden. In 
sum, in nearly all countries the central 
employers are involved in negotiations 
and consultations at the national level, 
although it is clear that this nowadays 
rarely results in a wage agreement that 
binds their member organisations. 
Slovenia, Finland and Ireland were 
the last countries where such central 
incomes policy agreements detailed 
wage developments, but in Finland the 
employers pulled out in 2007 and in 
2009 social partners in Ireland failed 
to reach agreement over how the exist-
ing social pact had to be revised in 
response to the severe economic crisis 
(see Chapter 3).
At the industry level, sectoral employ-
ers’ organisations with a collective 
 bargaining role are key components 
of the industrial relations systems in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In 
Ireland, the UK and Luxembourg there 
are hardly any sectoral employers’ 
associations which retain a bargain-
ing role. In the new Member States, 
sector bargaining has failed to become 
the dominant model, with the notable 
exception of Slovenia. Some degree of 
multi-employer bargaining, with the 
involvement of employers’ associations 
at the sector or national level, is also 
found in Bulgaria and Romania.
European-level 1.3.3. 
organisations
There are three European organisations 
representing employers’ interests. Busi-
nessEurope is the main ‘general’ organi-
sation for large and small businesses in 
all sectors of the privately owned econ-
omy. It has 40 national member organi-
sations: 30 (of the 111 listed in Table 1.6) 
from the EU, one in each Member State 
and two in Denmark, Germany and Por-
tugal; and 10 outside the EU, in Croatia, 
Iceland, Norway, San Marino, Switzer-
land and Turkey. BusinessEurope was 
founded in 1957 as the Union des Indus-
tries de la Communauté Européenne 
(UNICE), with eight affiliates from the 
founding Member States of the Euro-
pean Community. It renamed itself as 
BusinessEurope. In addition to national 
member federations, it has formed the 
Alliance for a Competitive European 
Industry with 11 major sector industry 
federations, though this alliance has no 
direct role in industrial relations. Busi-
nessEurope also has an Advisory and 
Support Group which brings together 
33 major multinational firms. 
The European Association of Craft, 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME) represents small- and 
medium-sized businesses in Europe. 
UEAPME has 39 national member 
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organisations in the EU (out of the 
list of 111), with one or more in each 
Member State, with the exception 
of the UK. UEAPME has associated 
members in Croatia, Liechtenstein, 
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, 
Serbia and Turkey. There are also 
five sector European organisations 
for SMEs in construction, foodstuffs, 
transport, services and healthcare 
associated with the organisation. 
Since 1998, UEAPME and Busines-
sEurope have cooperated closely in 
EU-level social dialogue and nego-
tiations with the trade unions. The 
European Centre of Enterprises with 
Public Participation and of Enter-
prises of General Economic Interest 
(CEEP, Centre Européen des Entre-
prises à Intérêt Publique), which was 
founded in 1961, represents enter-
prises and organisations with public 
participation or carrying out activities 
of general economic interest, irrespec-
tive of their legal or ownership status. 
CEEP has national sections in all EU 
Member States, except the three Bal-
tic states, Cyprus, Malta, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia.
At the European sector level, there are 
hundreds of organisations represent-
ing business interests. However, only 
a minority of these are employers’ 
organisations, in the sense that they 
represent their members on employ-
ment issues or have relations with the 
trade unions. Such organisations are 
mainly found in those sectors where a 
sector social dialogue has developed. 
The role and development of the EU 
sector social dialogue is addressed in 
Chapter 6.
The organisation rate  1.3.4. 
of employers
The organisation rate of employers’ 
organisations is hard to assess, due 
to lack of data, difficulties of defini-
tion and firms that join two or more 
 organisations. The figures available 
therefore need to be interpreted with 
caution. In few countries membership 
of employers’ organisations is docu-
mented in official statistics. Unlike 
household or labour force surveys 
with questions on union member-
ship, there are no parallel enterprise 
surveys with information on a compa-
rable European scale on membership 
of employers’ associations. Conse-
quently, the figures on absolute or 
relative membership are mostly based 
on self-reported data from the organi-
sations themselves. An additional 
problem is the definition of ‘potential 
membership’. Unlike trade unions, 
which with a few exceptions recruit 
and represent individuals throughout 
the economy, the government sector is 
not within the domain of business and 
employers’ organisations. 
Similar to union density, which is meas-
ured as the proportion of all  employees 
joining a trade union, employer organ-
isation density can be defined as the 
proportion of all employers (firms) 
joining an employers’ association. By 
taking into account the employment 
size of firms, an employment density 
rate for employers can be calculated, 
expressed in terms of the share of 
employees working in firms joining 
employers’ associations. After adjust-
ment for the size of the government 
sector, this yields a statistic that is com-
mensurate with union density. Chart 
1.7 presents the results.
In 2008 approximately 106 million 
employees, or nearly 58 % of the rel-
evant European Union total, worked 
in firms affiliated with employers’ 
associations. This is more than double 
the level of unionisation, illustrating 
the point made earlier that maintain-
ing high membership levels seems 
easier for employers’ associations than 
for trade unions. It is not possible to 
make a comparison with 2000 for the 
EU-27, as in a number of CEE coun-
tries there are no comparable data. 
However, in the EU-15 the organi-
sation rate of employers was stable 
at 63 %. Chart 1.7 confirms that the 
changes over time were rather small 
— except in Slovenia where obliga-
tory membership of Chambers was 
replaced by voluntary organisation, 
and the organisation rate dropped 
from 100 to 70 %. Within the EU-15 
the organisation rate of employees 
decreased in Germany and the UK, 
Chart 1.7: Organisation rate of employers’ organisations 
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but increased in Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Belgium, France and Spain. 
To avoid further membership losses, 
some German employers’ associa-
tions have introduced an option for 
companies to become associate mem-
bers, not bound by the collective 
agreements signed by the association 
(‘Ohne Tarifbindung’). Gesamtmetall, 
the powerful association which coor-
dinates the regional agreements in 
metal-engineering with the IG Metall 
union, did so in 2005.
The variation in the level of organisa-
tion across countries is considerable, 
with the 12 new Member States grouped 
towards the lower end, together with 
the UK. In central and eastern Europe 
only about one third of all employees 
work in firms organised in employers’ 
associations. However, both Romania 
and Bulgaria appear to have rather high 
levels of employer organisation, and the 
same goes for Malta and Cyprus. One 
of the problems of employers’ organi-
sations in CEE countries is that, like 
trade unions, they find it hard to gain a 
foothold in the newly emerging private 
sector, either because these firms are 
exceedingly small and rapidly chang-
ing, or because employers, especially in 
the international large firm sector, are 
reluctant to join or form associations 
for the purpose of collective services 
and representation. In addition, these 
organisations often lack a mandate 
from their members and their finan-
cial position is often too weak to enable 
them to provide adequate services to 
member firms. Frequently, this creates 
obstacles to social dialogue, concerta-
tion and collective bargaining.
Chart 1.8 compares the density rate 
of employers and of workers. Overall, 
there is a positive association between 
the two (r = .47). Three combinations 
are apparent: (1) high union density 
and high employers density (in the 
upper right corner): the  Nordic coun-
tries, Belgium, Malta and Cyprus; 
(2) low union density and low employer 
density (in the lower left corner): the 
UK and most CEE countries; (3) low 
union density and high employer den-
sity (in the lower right corner): coun-
tries in western and southern Europe. 
The fourth combination of high union 
density and low employer organisa-
tion does not feature; the upper left 
corner of Chart 1.8 is empty. The find-
ing suggests three hypotheses. First, 
where labour is highly organised busi-
ness will be highly organised as well, 
and through central bargaining each 
side will have incentives to maintain 
cohesion and high levels of organisa-
tion (the Nordic trajectory, at least 
until recently). Second, where labour 
has a hard time organising and the 
state prioritises market liberalisation, 
the pressure on employers to organ-
ise is limited and both sides will be 
locked into a relationship at low lev-
els of organisation and internal cohe-
sion (the post- Communist or CEE 
countries trajectory). Third, where the 
state’s role in social policy is extensive, 
business needs to be highly organised, 
but the pressure on labour to organ-
ise is comparatively less since labour 
may rely on the state and public policy 
instead (the continental, southern and 
western European trajectory).
Overall, with 58 % of all employees 
working in firms joining employ-
ers’ federations, the level of employer 
organisation in the EU appears stable 
and high, albeit with a significant gap 
between the EU-15 and the 12 new 
Member States. However, as in the 
case of trade unions, employers’ asso-
ciations are challenged by changes 
in their environment, for instance, 
national and transnational mergers of 
firms, a greater emphasis on company 
as opposed to sector bargaining, and 
pressures for greater effectiveness in 
European and global representation.
 Collective 1.4. 
bargaining
Voluntary collective bargaining plays 
a key role in industrial relations and 
is a defining element in social part-
nership within and beyond the EU. 
Across EU Member States there are, 
however, large differences in the role, 
coverage and effectiveness of collective 
bargaining and in the attitude taken 
by the authorities. This section first 
analyses the differences due to varia-
tion in the rate of union and  employer 
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 organisation and discusses the use of 
extension mechanisms by the state. 
Second it considers the organisation 
and centralisation of collective bar-
gaining and its coordination across 
different levels (company, sector, 
region or nation). The main findings 
are that a large majority of European 
employees are covered by collective 
agreements, that extension mecha-
nisms based on public law continue to 
play an important role, that decentral-
isation of actual pay setting has con-
tinued and sector agreements, where 
they apply, are increasingly amended 
by company-level agreements and 
arrangements, and that coordination 
across bargaining units and agents is a 
distinguishing feature in most EU-15 
but not the 12 new Member States.
The existence of EU-level actors 
notwithstanding, there is as yet no 
EU-level competence or capacity to 
undertake collective negotiations over 
wages, working hours or other core 
conditions of employment which mir-
ror collective bargaining at national, 
sector or company level. Unlike the 
previous sections, therefore, there are 
no paragraphs devoted to EU develop-
ments. The capacity to engage in EU-
level agreement-making exists under 
the social dialogue at cross-sector and 
sector level, and is addressed in Chap-
ter 6. It has also emerged in some mul-
tinational companies, and Chapters 3 
and 6 touch on this.
Bargaining coverage1.4.1. 
The bargaining coverage rate is an 
indicator of the extent to which the 
terms of employment are negotiated 
by trade unions. Operationally, the 
coverage rate is defined as the number 
of employees covered by a collec-
tive agreement as a proportion of all 
wage- and salary-earners in employ-
ment. This definition renders the 
measurement of bargaining coverage 
comparable with union and employer 
density. While union density is one of 
the indicators of potential bargaining 
strength and solidarity among work-
ers, bargaining coverage measures the 
real rather than potential extent to 
which employees are subject to union-
negotiated terms and conditions of 
employment.
There are a number of reasons why 
employees may not be covered, even 
if collective bargaining takes place 
(Traxler and Behrens, 2002). First, 
unions and employers may be too 
weak to include all employees belong-
ing to their domain of action. Second, 
the  bargaining parties may explicitly 
exclude certain employee groups. In 
the past, collective agreements often 
excluded (part-time) employees work-
ing less than a minimum number of 
hours per week, thereby excluding 
large numbers of women and young 
people — a practice that would now 
contravene the spirit if not the letter 
of the EU’s part-time workers’ direc-
tive and anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. Collective agreements may also 
exclude managers or employees above 
a certain pay threshold. In such cases, 
employment terms are regulated by 
individual contract. Third, certain 
 categories of employees may be legally 
Box 1.4: Measurement of bargaining coverage rates
The coverage data used are from the ICTWSS database; in some countries this is based 
on household surveys, for instance the UK; in others on occasional surveys among enter-
prises and employers’ federations (e.g. Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland); and in 
most countries on administrative data and estimates by the government. The ICTWSS data 
incorporate EIRO data (Traxler and Behrens, 2002), including the annual Industrial Rela-
tions reports of the European Foundation and the country profiles in EIRO. For 2008–09 
we have been able to compare the ICTWSS data with data obtained from the European 
Company Survey, which relies on estimates from management but excludes firms with 
less than 10 employees. The ranking is very similar; the correlation coefficient between the 
ICTWSS data and the ECS data is r=.94. The ICTWSS data have the obvious advantage that 
it allows a comparison through time, in many cases since 1960.
As in the case of calculating union density and employers’ organisation rates, there are 
many data and measurement problems. Comparing across countries it seems useful to 
take account of the fact that some groups of employees may be excluded from collective 
bargaining (and from the right to strike). In that case it is necessary to calculate an adjusted 
coverage rate, i.e., to calculate the number of employees covered by a collective agreement 
as a proportion not of all employees but only of those with the right to bargain. In most 
Member States the difference is slight, since only very few are excluded. In some Member 
States, however, such as Austria, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg or Spain, it does make 
a difference when public employees without bargaining rights are taken out. Besides these 
adjustment difficulties, a problem of comparability may also arise due to the fact that, 
under multi-level bargaining, many employees are covered by two (or more) agreements. 
This may cause double counting in statistics on coverage. Confusion may also derive from 
multiannual agreements and missing specification of the date when agreements expire. 
Sometimes collective agreements are only reported in their first year of validity, thus 
excluding still valid multi-year agreements from an earlier year. In the statistics reported, 
every effort has been made to include all collective agreements that are (still) valid dur-
ing the year under consideration and calculate adjusted rates. Finally, the data refer only 
to the formal coverage of collective agreements, as demarcated by their scope. Hence the 
informal application of the terms of the agreement by firms not formally bound by the 
agreement is not considered, though this may give collective bargaining additional repre-
sentation and influence. Formal coverage does, however, include those employees covered 
by extension procedures.
A measurement problem that remains is that bargaining coverage is measured only for 
the formal sector or registered employment. OECD and Eurostat estimates of the infor-
mal sector, including self-employed and family workers, vary from 5 % in some northern 
economies to 35 % in Greece.
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excluded from the right to collective 
bargaining. This sometimes applies 
to civil servants or particular groups 
such as the police and the armed 
forces, whose employment terms are 
regulated unilaterally by the state.
An estimated 121.5 million of the 184 
million employees in employment in 
the EU were covered by a collective 
agreement in 2008. This translates 
into an adjusted bargaining coverage 
rate of 66 %, or two-thirds of all EU 
employees. Over the first decade of the 
21st century the number of employ-
ees covered increased by more than 
eight million, but since employment 
increased much faster, the coverage 
rate slipped by 2 percentage points. 
The most striking feature of Chart 
1.9 is the huge cross-national varia-
tion, ranging from virtually 100 % in 
Austria to less than 20 % in Lithuania. 
There was a small decrease in cover-
age rate in many countries, and some 
larger declines in Portugal, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta and Poland. 
The erosion of collective bargaining 
coverage in Germany between 1995 
and 2005 appears, however, to have 
slowed. During the 1990s bargaining 
coverage increased in Denmark, Fin-
land, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Portugal, but this increase came 
to a halt or reversed after 2000. In 
 Portugal there was a large decline in 
coverage in response to a change in the 
law in 2004, which ended the practice, 
common in many countries, that col-
lective agreements remain valid even 
after they expire, until a new agree-
ment is reached. Although employers 
and unions reached a central agree-
ment restoring the practice in 2006, 
the coverage rate — although recover-
ing somewhat — has not returned to 
its previous level.
In the 1990s the two countries with 
the largest decline in bargaining cov-
erage were the UK and Germany, but 
developments after 2000 were less dra-
matic. In the UK, bargaining coverage 
shrank from 54 % in 1990 to 32.3 % in 
1998, but has since stabilised and was 
33.6 % in 2008. This may reflect the 
effect of legal changes in 1999, intro-
ducing a statutory mechanism for 
workers to secure union recognition 
and thereby bargaining representa-
tion. Nonetheless, bargaining cover-
age in the UK is the lowest amongst the 
EU-15 — a striking expression of the 
consequences of the near absence of 
significant sector-level collective bar-
gaining. In Germany, the second half 
of the 1990s saw a noticeable  erosion 
of bargaining coverage. According to 
the IAB enterprise panel the coverage 
rate of firms fell from 72 to 63 % in 
the ‘old’ Federal  Republic and from 
56 to 44 % in the five new eastern 
states (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003). 
Coverage slipped further to 56 % of 
the firms in the western and stabi-
lised around 41 % in the eastern part 
between 2003 and 2008 (Ellguth and 
Kohaut, 2008). Most defections came 
from small- and medium-sized firms 
and were related to the difficulty faced 
by employers’ associations in binding 
employers to standardised collective 
agreements with the unions. With 
moderate pay settlements and allow-
ing ‘hardship clauses’ and settlements 
emphasising investment, employ-
ment stability and flexibility in work-
ing time arrangements, the main 
German unions, especially in chemi-
cals and metal, have tried to stem 
the decline and strengthened their 
cooperation with the main employ-
ers’ federations. This seems to have 
curtailed the tendency towards ‘disor-
ganised’ decentralisation and contrib-
uted to some degree of re- regulation 
( Haipeter, 2009).
Collective bargaining structures and 
practices remain fragile in central 
and eastern Europe and coverage is 
low — the average of 43 % around 
the end of the decade is 4 percent-
age points below that in 2000. There 
was a decline in Estonia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria, and 
a small rise, from very low levels, in 
Latvia and Lithuania. The rate was 
broadly level in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Low coverage rages 
and weak collective bargaining struc-
tures amongst the CEE countries 
tend to go together with a still con-
siderable role for the state in private 
sector wage setting, mostly through 
the mandatory minimum wage — a 
feature which is returned to below 
(see also Chapter 4).
Chart 1.9: Bargaining coverage rates, 1997–99 and 2007–09 
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The relation between 1.4.1.1. 
bargaining coverage, 
employer organisation and 
union density
There appears to be a weak albeit signif-
icant association between union den-
sity and bargaining coverage (r = .45; 
27 countries). Chart 1.10 shows that 
coverage rates exceed union density 
rates in all EU Member States except 
Cyprus and Malta. Often the ‘excess’ 
of coverage over density is by a very 
wide margin, for instance in France, 
Spain, Portugal, Austria,  Germany 
and the Netherlands. A much stronger 
association exists between bargaining 
coverage and the employers’ rate of 
organisation (r = .84; 26 countries). 
High bargaining coverage occurs 
under multi-employer bargaining, 
and requires the existence of organi-
sations of employers with a mandate 
to negotiate agreements with the rep-
resentatives of employees.
The level of employer organisation 
exceeds bargaining coverage, by a large 
degree in Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Cyprus, and by a small margin in 
the Netherlands, the UK, Hungary, 
Estonia and Lithuania (Chart 1.10). 
These differences could arise for at 
least two reasons: some employers’ 
associations may not seek negotia-
tions with trade unions; where they do 
have a mandate to negotiate they may, 
however, fail to identify an appropri-
ate union capable of signing an agree-
ment. The standard case, found in most 
countries, is that bargaining coverage 
exceeds the rate of employer organisa-
tion. The main explanation for this is 
the extension of agreements to non-
organised employers, either voluntary 
(and perhaps under union pressure, 
as is customary in Scandinavia) or 
through extension mechanisms under 
public law.
Chart 1.10: Bargaining coverage,  
union and employer density, 2007–09 
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Table 1.8: Extension of collective agreements  
and minimum wage legislation 
Extension Enlargement Functional equivalents Mandatory minimum wage
AT widespread other sectors membership Chamber almost
BE widespread yes
BG limited/not used yes
CY no partial
CZ limited yes
DE limited public procurement rules partial
DK no no
EE limited yes
EL widespread national covering agreement yes
ES widespread other sectors yes
FI widespread public procurement rules no
FR widespread other sectors yes
HU limited yes
IE no joint labour committees yes
IT no courts no
LT limited/not used yes
LU widespread yes
LV limited yes
MT no yes
NL limited yes
PL limited/not used yes
PT widespread other regions yes
RO no national covering agreement yes
SE no no
SI limited yes
SK limited yes
UK no yes
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010; Traxler and Behrens, 2002, and EIROnline.
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Extension of collective 1.4.2. 
agreement and sector 
organisation
As reported in the 2002 Industrial Rela-
tions in Europe report, most EU Mem-
ber States have availed themselves of 
a legal technique allowing the public 
authorities, usually the Ministry of 
Labour, to extend the collective agree-
ments reached by unions and employ-
ers, or clauses from agreements, to 
similar employers who are not mem-
bers of the relevant employer asso-
ciation (Traxler and Behrens, 2002). 
Usually, extension applies to similar 
firms in the same sector or branch of 
economic activity. In some countries 
the mechanism is used to include all 
firms under a national agreement, for 
instance in Belgium with regard to the 
minimum wage. In a few countries 
extension mechanisms are used to 
apply the agreement outside the sec-
tor by means of a procedure termed 
‘enlargement’ (see Table 1.8).
The possibility of legal extension of 
collective agreements exists in 19 out 
of 27 EU Member States. In eight 
(Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Fin-
land, France, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece) the practice of extension is 
widespread and quasi-automatic, and 
in four of these countries agreements 
can be applied in other sectors or 
regions. In 11 countries extension is 
more restricted through the require-
ment that the agreement meets a 
threshold of representation, that both 
unions and employers agree, or that 
the agreement promotes some pub-
lic policy objective or at least does 
not contradict it. In some countries 
extension is legally possible but hardly 
practiced because few sector agree-
ments are reached; Poland, Lithua-
nia and Bulgaria, in recent years also 
Slovakia and Hungary, are cases in 
point. In Germany extension is little 
used because employers hold an effec-
tive veto and tend to oppose use of 
the mechanism to raise the minimum 
wage in a particular sector, a practice 
which has expanded from construc-
tion to other sectors in the context 
of regulating minimum conditions 
for posted workers in Germany. In 
Ireland, although the formal scope 
for extension is wider, in practice it 
applies only in construction. 
Of the eight countries without extension 
laws, five have a mandatory minimum 
wage (Ireland, the UK, Romania, Malta 
and Cyprus for some occupations) and 
in one, Italy, the courts tend to enforce 
minimum wages in similar occupa-
tions. The annual national collective 
agreements in Greece and the five-year 
agreement in Romania, concluded in 
2006, can also be counted as functional 
equivalents of public extension in so far 
as they cover all occupations and sec-
tors in the formal economy. This leaves 
only two EU Member States, Denmark 
and Sweden, with neither the possibil-
ity of legally extending the collective 
agreement nor a mandatory minimum 
wage or some functional equivalent for 
either of the two. In both countries the 
trade unions see it as their task to assure 
that all employers, organised or not, 
pay the going rate, though the methods 
used to assure compliance have been 
challenged by the Court of Justice 2007 
ruling in the Laval case (Davies, 2008; 
Malmberg and Sigeman, 2008).
Finally, although important for ‘excess 
coverage’ above the level of union and 
employer organisation, extension does 
not correlate strongly with the rank-
ing of countries in terms of bargaining 
coverage. There are too many other 
factors that play a role, e.g. employer 
organisation, bargaining centralisa-
tion and/or union pressure. Far more 
important is the organisation of col-
lective bargaining and, in particular, 
the dominance or absence of the sec-
tor as the key organising device for 
trade unions, employers’ associations 
and collective bargaining. Chart 1.11 
shows a clear pattern. Where sector 
organisation is the dominant principle 
in collective bargaining (score = 2), 
bargaining coverage, employer organ-
isation and union density rates are 
higher. Where sector organisation is 
weakly or partially applied (score = 1), 
coverage rates as well as organisa-
tional levels of employers and unions 
are lower. Where the sector is absent 
as an organising principle (score = 0), 
coverage and employer organisation 
Chart 1.11: Sectoral organisation, bargaining coverage, 
 employer and union density, 2007–09 
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rates, though not union density, are 
lowest. Finally, ‘excess coverage’, i.e. 
the distance between bargaining cov-
erage and the rate of union organisa-
tion, is largest in countries where the 
sector principle applies.
Decentralisation 1.4.3. 
and organisation of 
collective bargaining
The main trend in industrial relations 
in the past two or three decades is 
decentralisation. This means that the 
centre of gravity in decision-making 
on employment contracting, wages 
and human resources has moved 
closer to the firm. In countries with 
sector  bargaining, single-level bar-
gaining tends to make way for multi-
level bargaining. These developments 
put pressure on collective organisa-
tions outside the firm, such as trade 
unions and employers’ organisations, 
and also the state and the law to make 
room for derogation, for firms, groups 
or individuals, from general and col-
lective standards set for the entire 
 sector, or wider economy. To this end, 
different techniques are being used, 
from individual opt-outs to company 
social pacts and agreements negoti-
ated by works councils, union work-
place representatives or designated 
staff members.
A further component of decentralisa-
tion is procedural, allowing more flex-
ibility in the application of legal norms 
and collective standards. Rather than 
standard terms, collective agreements 
tend to set minimum conditions; or in 
some cases, the terms set by collective 
agreements allow deviation both above 
and below the norm, if some proce-
dural conditions — for instance, fair 
negotiations involving representatives 
from the group of workers making 
concessions — have been met. Some 
of the implications of these develop-
ments for collective labour law have 
been discussed in the 2006 Industrial 
Relations in Europe report.
The level of bargaining1.4.3.1. 
The distinction between levels (i.e. 
national or regional, sector and 
company bargaining) is only a first 
approximation of the reality in each 
country. First, in no country does bar-
gaining take place exclusively at one 
level. The extreme cases are, at one 
end,  Lithuania, where according to the 
European Company Survey’s manage-
ment respondents, 94 % of all bargain-
ing activity, in terms of coverage, is 
based on company bargaining and, at 
the other,  Finland where 76 % of those 
covered rely on sector or national 
bargaining (ECS, 2010). In many 
countries, bargaining over wages and 
working hours takes place at two or 
more levels: the company and the sec-
tor (metal, textile, construction, bank-
ing, etc., or in some cases the entire 
manufacturing or private sector). It 
may be that the level of bargaining 
alternates between levels in different 
years, especially when national or sec-
tor agreements set terms for several 
years, to be detailed in subsequent 
firm-level negotiations, as is the case 
the Nordic countries and Italy.
Over the years 2007–09, the  sector 
was the main level at which wage 
negotiations took place in 11 EU 
Member States: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Finland, Germany, Italy, the 
 Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and Slovenia. According to the ECS, 
for more than half of all employees 
covered by collective agreements in 
these countries, there was no addi-
tional firm-level bargaining. This is 
a situation which characterises serv-
ices and smaller firms, rather than 
manufacturing and larger compa-
nies, where multi-level bargaining is 
becoming increasingly widespread. In 
 Sweden recent collective agreements in 
 industry have  incorporated provisions 
for local pay review and opportuni-
ties for individuals to negotiate their 
own wages (Granqvist and Regnér, 
2008). In Denmark, recent agreements 
in industry detail general conditions 
and procedures, as well as minimum, 
youth and entry wages, and leave the 
allocation and division of pay rises 
to firm-level negotiations. In Austria 
since 1997 some industrial agreements 
include a distributional pay component 
that can be decided at company level. 
In the Netherlands, most sector agree-
ments detail pay increases, but there is 
now a staggering diversity in types of 
agreements. In the private sector area 
of FNV Allies and the employers’ fed-
eration AWVN, which covers some 700 
of the country’s 1 000 agreements, 36 % 
of all agreements are multi-level, 55 % 
have à la carte provisions which allow 
employees to make a choice between 
types of working hours arrangements 
and between pay and working hours, 
and the building up of ‘personal budg-
ets’ for training, paid leave and early 
retirement ( Zielschot, 2010). Since the 
2004 ‘Pforzheim’ agreement in metal 
engineering in Germany and a similar, 
earlier agreement in chemicals, ‘open-
ing’ and ‘hardship’ clauses in sector 
agreements have been tied to com-
pany negotiations over employment, 
investment and, in some cases, advan-
tages for union members (Ellguth and 
Kohout, 2008; Haipeter, 2009). In Italy, 
ever since the 1993 social pact, bargain-
ing over wages takes place at two levels 
— sector, over cost-of-living increases 
and firms, over performance- or 
 productivity-based increases. In prac-
tice, firm-level negotiations cover only 
employees in large firms. In a recent 
pact, signed in 2009 by two of the three 
main confederations — but not the 
CGIL union, Confindustria and the 
government, this structure was reaf-
firmed, but with sector pay increases 
tied to actual (past) rather than pre-
dicted (future) inflation and greater 
scope for firm-level  negotiations. 
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In France, Ireland, Greece, Romania 
and Luxembourg, too, a majority of all 
employees were covered by agreements 
that set standards above the level of 
firms in 2007–09, but in each of these 
cases the sector plays a less prominent 
role. Sector agreements play a role in 
France, especially in setting minimum 
standards in sectors with many small 
firms. They do so with the help of the 
public authorities, through extension 
or, if no bargaining takes place or agree-
ment is not reached, through impos-
ing the rules of another, similar sector. 
However, the most vibrant element in 
recent times has been company bargain-
ing. This has been stimulated by nego-
tiations over working time reduction, 
with tax concessions and incentives 
tied to productivity and work organisa-
tion issues. In Ireland sector bargaining 
never played an important role, except 
in construction, but since 1987 pay 
bargaining had been determined by a 
series of triennial social pacts or ‘part-
nership programmes’, the last of which 
was negotiated in 2006 with a pay 
clause for 24 to 35 months, depending 
on the economic sector. When nego-
tiations over an adjustment of the pay 
clause to the economic crisis broke 
down in 2009 and employers pulled 
out, Ireland braced itself for a return to 
company bargaining. Company nego-
tiations prevail in Luxembourg and 
cover many employees, but the adjust-
ment of the cost-of-living index, based 
on  consultation with social partners, 
has remained a very important source 
of wage regulation. In contrast, in 
Greece, unions and employers, assisted 
by the government, negotiate each sec-
ond year a biennial national agreement, 
though a new agreement for 2010–11 
has not yet been reached. In Romania 
the central social partners are used to 
signing a national agreement on mini-
mum conditions. In both countries, for 
most workers the national agreement, 
together with the law, is the only source 
of regulation of wages and working 
hours, since few large companies exist 
and additional company negotiations 
are therefore rare.
In 11 countries the main and for most 
workers the only bargaining activ-
ity, if there is bargaining at all, is in the 
company: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
the United Kingdom. With the excep-
tion of Malta and Cyprus these are 
precisely the countries with the lowest 
coverage rates. According to the ECS, 
in these countries for more than 50 % of 
the (relatively few) employees who have 
their pay packages decided through col-
lective bargaining, company bargaining 
is the only source. Higher-level bargain-
ing, at the level of sectors or groups, 
does occur in some of these countries, 
including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slova-
kia. But it is unstable and fairly limited 
in coverage and/or in the scope of the 
regulation specified.
National pay agreements and 1.4.3.2. 
pattern setting
National pay agreements or cross-
industry social pact have not 
 completely disappeared, but with 
the end of such agreements and 
pacts in Finland in 2007, in Ireland 
in 2009 and in Slovenia in 2010 they 
have become few and far between. 
In Greece the national agreement 
for 2008–09 faces a difficult renewal. 
National agreements continue to be 
an important feature in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Spain, and the most 
recent agreements concluded since 
the onset of the crisis are reviewed in 
Chapter 3. In the absence of national 
agreements, pattern setting between 
sectors is, or has become, prominent 
in some  countries.
In Finland, which since 1968 has had 
a history of central incomes policy 
pacts, the last such pact expired in 
September 2007. Bargaining has sub-
sequently shifted to sector level, with 
employers pressing for flexibility at 
company level. Accordingly, the sec-
tor agreements concluded in 2008 
and 2009 introduced some measure 
of flexibility, especially regarding 
working hours and overtime. It seems 
that Finland is moving closer to the 
situation of its Nordic neighbours. In 
both Sweden and Denmark, national 
pay agreements have long since 
Box 1.5: Index of bargaining centralisation  
and dominant level of bargaining
In the ICTWSS database there is, in addition to the indicator on union centralisation, discussed 
earlier, an indicator of bargaining centralisation based on the dominant level at which bargain-
ing takes place. This is scored on a five-point scale: 5 = national (cross-sectoral) bargaining; 
4 = national (cross-sectoral) bargaining with derogation and additional sector or company 
bargaining; 3 = sector- or industry-level bargaining; 2 = sector- or industry-level, with addi-
tional local or company bargaining; and 1 = local or company bargaining. Bargaining centrali-
sation tends to increase with union centralisation, but the correlation is modest (r = .52). With 
union and confederal authority the correlation is .62.
The coordination index in the ICTWSS database is derived from Kenworthy (2001) and has 
the following values: 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on (a) enforceable agreements 
between the central organisations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or 
entire  private sector, or on (b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling; 
4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: (a) central organisations negotiate non-
enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or (b) key unions and employers associations 
set pattern for the entire economy; 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, 
limited involvement of central organisations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining; 
2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak enforceability of 
industry agreements; 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level.
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 disappeared, though in Denmark the 
agreement between DI and a cartel of 
unions for the entire industrial sector 
usually sets the trend for the subse-
quent private sector agreements under 
the umbrella of the national union and 
employers’ confederations LO and 
DA. In Sweden, conflict has arisen 
over which sector should set the trend 
— the retail and commercial services 
sector, as some unions wanted, or the 
industrial export sector — which has 
been hit hard by the recession — as 
had usually been the case. In Germany 
and Austria the collective agreement 
in the metal industry has long acted 
as the pattern setter for other sectors 
(Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001).
Finally, the involvement of unions and 
employers in agreements and consul-
tations over the minimum wage can 
play a similar, though clearly less influ-
ential role, in coordinating national 
wage developments, especially in cen-
tral and eastern Europe.
Centralisation and 1.4.3.3. 
coordination of (wage) 
bargaining
With more decentralisation, multi- level 
bargaining and the larger space for 
company or even individual bargaining, 
coordination across bargaining units 
(or bargaining agents, be they firms or 
unions) in a horizontal sense or within 
bargaining units (or agents) in a vertical 
sense tends to become more rather than 
less important. Some of the national 
agreements or trend setting arrange-
ments described in the previous section 
have exactly that function.
The first main message from Chart 1.12 
is that there is a large divide between 
the EU-15 and the 12 new Member 
States. In the EU-15 sector some other 
form of multi-employer bargaining 
prevails, the main exception being 
the UK. In the 12 new Member States 
company bargaining prevails, albeit 
mixed with some element of multi-
employer bargaining, although usu-
ally not at the sector level; here there 
appear to be three exceptions, i.e. 
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria The 
second main message is that there is 
a clear tendency towards decentralisa-
tion and that sector bargaining with 
the possibility of additional company 
bargaining has become the main-
stream in the EU-15.
Finally, bargaining centralisation and 
coordination are nicely aligned, as is 
shown in Chart 1.13. There are two 
main groups in the European Union: 
the economies of CEE countries plus 
Malta, Cyprus and the UK, where on 
average decision-making over wages 
is taking place in the company, with 
less coordination among bargaining 
agents or units (lower left corner); and 
the continental European countries of 
north and south Europe, plus Ireland 
and Slovenia, where decisions over 
wages are also influenced by bargain-
ing agents above the level of firms and 
Chart 1.12: Bargaining centralisation, 2000s 
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these agents coordinate among them-
selves (upper right corner). Within 
each group, however, there is con-
siderable variation, with for instance 
France much lower on coordination 
than Germany, Italy or Spain, and a 
more coordinated wage bargaining 
approach in Romania compared to 
the rest of the new Member States.
 Employee 1.5. 
representation in 
the enterprise
Employee representation in enterprises 
for the purpose of information and 
consultation is a key feature of Euro-
pean industrial relations. Legal provi-
sions for employee representation exist 
in all countries and are required by EU 
law, based on Directive 2002/14/EC 
on information and consultation. The 
ways of organising employee organi-
sation; the rights and activities of rep-
resentatives; their reliance upon the 
unions; independence from manage-
ment; formal and informal involvement 
in grievance handling and negotiations 
in the workplace or enterprise differ 
widely across the EU. In the Industrial 
Relations in Europe reports of 2002, 
2004 and 2006 various descriptions 
and categorisations have been offered.
This section takes stock of the situation 
in 2008 or 2009 and of developments 
since 2000. First, we discuss the pattern 
of employee representation, including 
the relation with trade unions. Next, 
an attempt at ‘measuring’ the formal 
or organisational strength of employee 
representation in the enterprise by inte-
grating four different pieces of informa-
tion (see Box 1.6) is presented. Third, 
with help of the European Company 
Survey, the focus shifts to the incidence 
of employee representation in the 
enterprise. Developments in transna-
tional representation in ( multinational) 
 enterprises, through European works 
councils and the provisions for 
employee involvement in European 
Companies (SEs), are also reviewed.
National variations in 1.5.1. 
employee representation 
in the enterprise
Forms of employee representation at 
the workplace have been legally estab-
lished and institutionalised in most of 
the EU Member States (6). In recent 
history, EU directives have fostered 
the formation and revision of insti-
tutional arrangements for workplace 
representation, not least in the 12 new 
Member States. Directive 2002/14/
EC establishing a general framework 
for informing and consulting employ-
ees in the European Community has 
been an important landmark in this 
context. A great variety of institu-
tional structures exists among the 
Member States with regard to the for-
mal organisation of employee repre-
sentation in the enterprise. The basic 
differentiation is whether employee 
representation proceeds through the 
union or is based on a construction 
that is formally independent from the 
union, i.e. the works council. This dif-
ference has various consequences, i.e. 
how representatives are elected; whom 
they represent; what powers they hold; 
and what competences they have.
Workplace representation through the 
union, as in the pure ‘single channel’ 
model, is based on election by and or 
appointment from union members. 
It does not pretend to represent the 
interests of non-union members and 
derives its powers and competences 
from the union, though this may be 
specified by the law or in agreement 
6 This section draws heavily on a contribution 
from the European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions, based on the 
summary findings of the 2009 European Company 
Survey issued in March 2010.
with  employers. Member States in 
which such ‘single channel’ representa-
tion dominates include Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Malta, 
Italy, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Workplace representation based on 
works councils, as in a pure ‘dual chan-
nel’ model, exists in addition to and is 
independent from unions. It is usually 
elected by and from all employees (with 
some restrictions on those with tempo-
rary or part-time contracts, etc.); is held 
accountable to union and non-union 
members alike; and operates within 
powers and competences defined by 
the law. Dual channel representation 
based on works councils is found in 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain 
and Hungary. 
In reality various mixed forms are 
found and in many countries both 
structures exist alongside each other. In 
many countries trade union and works 
council representation are treated as 
being complementary, with a division 
of tasks between them. Negotiating 
and strike rights tend to be ‘invested’ 
in the union and denied to the works 
council, but this is not universally so 
and in firms where unions are absent 
councils can sometimes take over the 
union’s role. The opposite is also pos-
sible and in some countries the works 
council ceases to exist when a trade 
union is established at the workplace. 
It is important to note that several 
countries have separate regulations for 
the public sector, although these often 
amount to nominal differences only. 
Institutional differences also exist in 
the powers assigned to works coun-
cils, in particular whether the works 
council has only consultation rights, as 
established through the EU directive, 
or co-determination rights — that is, 
the right to decide jointly with man-
agement. Works council regulations in 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, 
for instance, include co-determination 
powers in specific areas.
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The ESC data confirm that in most 
Member States works council mem-
bers are also active in the trade union. 
Based on the response of employee 
representatives, the survey indicates 
that in 84 % of the works councils there 
are trade union representatives and in 
56 % of the councils union members 
are in the majority. Compared with the 
much lower average for union mem-
bership in the EU — around 25 % — 
and considering that works councils 
are elected, this might be seen as a vote 
of confidence in the unions. 
The organisational basis 1.5.2. 
and formal power of 
employee representation
Combining various pieces of infor-
mation including formal rights, 
involvement in co-determination 
and firm-level negotiations, as well 
as the nature of the relationship with 
the union(s), the formal strength of 
employee representation in the enter-
prise can be assessed (see Box 1.6). 
Chart 1.14 summarises the variation 
between EU Member States and the 
developments since 2000.
The picture that emerges is, again, one 
of diversity. At one end are the three 
Nordic countries, with the strong-
est workplace representation rights, 
based on integration between union 
and employee representation, backed 
by basic agreements and legal rights. 
This is followed by a group of conti-
nental European countries —  Benelux, 
 Germany, Austria and Italy, then 
France, Spain and Slovenia — each 
with strong works councils but with 
different arrangements concerning the 
cooperation between unions and coun-
cils. At the other are the Baltic states, 
Cyprus and Malta, Bulgaria and Greece, 
with weakly institutionalised bodies of 
employee representation, alongside or 
instead of trade unions, and with weak 
rights vis-à-vis management. The other 
message from Chart 1.14 is that EU 
Member States have to some extent 
converged on this issue, with more 
rights accruing to employees in coun-
tries where employee representation 
was weakly founded. The convergence 
is clearest in the area of formal rights 
where, before the introduction and 
application of Directive  2002/14/EC, 
few existed amongst the 12 new 
Member States or in Ireland and the 
UK. It would, however, be wrong to 
infer from Chart 1.14 that employee 
 representatives have become more 
powerful as against other stakehold-
ers in the firms. In fact, works councils 
and other employee representation 
bodies often express concern that they 
in practice have lost influence in the 
recent past.
The incidence and 1.5.3. 
coverage of employee 
representation in the 
enterprise
According to the ECS, in 2009 about 
37 % of all establishments with 10 or 
more employees had an institutional 
form of employee representation. This 
translates into a ‘representation cover-
age rate’ of about 60 % of the employ-
ees in these establishments. With a 
correction for the employees work-
ing in small firms — including them 
would yield a lower coverage rate, 
somewhere near 50 % — a compari-
son can be made with union density 
and the bargaining coverage rate. The 
employee representation coverage rate 
is almost twice as high as union density. 
In other words, due to institutional-
ised forms of enterprise representation 
unions can extend their audience and 
influence. But  representation  coverage 
Box 1.6: the organisational strength  
of employee representation in the enterprise
The ICTWSS database contains information on (a) whether a provision for information 
and consultation in the workplace exists (0–2); (b) whether it can rely on strong or weak 
powers delegated to it by the unions, or acts independently from the unions (0–4); (c) has 
strong or weak rights of intervention against management in a narrow or wide range of 
issues (0–3), and (d) is directly involved in negotiations over (aspects of) pay, working 
hours and conditions of the firm’s workforce (0 or 1). With this information an additive, 
10-point scale has been constructed.
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rate is lower than that for bargaining 
coverage. The main reason is that 
most national regulations and Direc-
tive 2002/14/EC contain thresholds, 
usually 50 employees, above which 
representation becomes mandatory. 
There are pronounced differences in 
incidence and coverage of employee 
representation by company size and 
sector. The highest coverage rate — up 
to 90 % — is reached in large firms 
and in the public sector, followed by 
industry. Coverage is noticeably lower 
in private services, and lowest in firms 
with 20 to 49 employees.
As shown in Chart 1.15 there are sig-
nificant differences across the EU in 
the incidence and coverage of employee 
representation. These differences are 
somewhat related to union density 
(r=.41), but more strongly to bargaining 
coverage (r=.57). In one group of coun-
tries, a majority of the establishments 
have an institutional form of employee 
representation at the workplace, with 
more than 70 % of the employees being 
covered. The group is led by the Nordic 
countries and also includes Belgium, 
Spain, France, Luxembourg, Romania 
and the Netherlands, all countries with a 
high bargaining coverage rate, although 
some (Spain, France, the Netherlands) 
have a rather low unionisation rate. 
Countries with a low incidence and cov-
erage are situated in CEE countries and 
in southern Europe, with Portugal and 
Greece revealing the lowest rates.
Chart 1.15 further compares the cov-
erage rate, based on the ECS, with 
the ICTWSS indicator of ‘representa-
tion strength’. The two are aligned: it 
seems that coverage is highest where 
employee representation has a stronger 
organisational basis, independent 
from management, can rely on union 
support, workplace representatives 
are routinely involved in negotiations, 
and have strong information and con-
sultation rights regarding major com-
pany decisions.
European-level employee 
representation within the 
enterprise
There are two main forms of Euro-
pean-level employee representation 
within multinational enterprises. First, 
European works councils (EWCs) are 
standing bodies providing for the infor-
mation and consultation of employees 
in Community-scale undertakings and 
groups of undertakings as required 
by the 1994 European works council 
directive (Directive 94/45/EC), recast 
in 2009 as Directive 2009/38/EC 
(see Chapter 7). Second, European 
Companies (SEs) established under 
the 2001 regulation on the statute for 
a European Company (Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 2157/2001), have to 
comply with provisions for employee 
involvement, including board-level 
representation and/or European-
level works councils under Directive 
2001/86/EC (see Box 1.7).  
The thresholds required for an enter-
prise to be covered by the  European 
Chart 1.15: Workplace representation — rights and coverage
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works council directive are, for a Com-
munity-scale undertaking, ‘at least 
1 000 employees within the Member 
States and at least 150 employees in 
each of at least two Member States’ 
(Article 2(1)(a)). Essentially, the aim 
of the directive is to promote volun-
tary agreements on the constitution 
and operation of EWCs. Not all of the 
multinational companies covered have 
established an EWC. This is  because 
the introduction of EWCs is not auto-
matic but requires either the initiative 
of central management or ‘the writ-
ten request of at least 100 employees 
or their representatives in at least two 
undertakings or establishments in 
at least two different Member States’ 
(Article 5(1)). According to the EWC 
database of the European Trade Union 
Institute, 938 EWCs were active at the 
beginning of 2010, representing some 
16 million workers (7). This represents 
a coverage rate of around 40 % of the 
multinationals, and 60 % of the work-
force, estimated by the Institute to be 
covered by the directive. Since 2000, 
each year some 40 EWCs have been 
newly established, whereas 14 ceased 
to exist — largely due to mergers 
and acquisitions. Cumulatively, the 
7 The ETUI’s database on European works council 
agreements can be found at http://www.ewcdb.eu/
Box 1.7: Employee involvement in European Companies (SEs)
A European Company (Societas Europaea (SE)) is a European legal form established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the 
statute for a European Company. The Regulation introduces a set of rules directly applicable in all Member States, in particular on the 
formation and the structure of the SE. The legal regime of the SE in completed with cross-references to the national legislation applicable 
to public limited-liability companies. Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the SE Statute stipulates employee involvement rules 
in SEs in the form of information and consultation of employees and, in some cases, board-level participation. Both the Regulation and the 
Directive were adopted on 8 October 2001 and were to be implemented in the Member States by 8 October 2004 (however, the Directive was 
transposed by all Member States only at the beginning of 2007). EU-based companies may form an SE in four ways (the first three involve 
more than one company): merger; creation of a joint holding company; creation of a subsidiary; or when a Single EU-based company is 
transformed into an SE, provided it had a subsidiary governed by the law of another Member State for at least two years. A company based 
outside the EU may (if individual Member States so decide) participate in the formation of an SE on condition that it is created under the 
law of a Member State, has its registered office in that Member State and has a real and continuous link with a Member State’s economy. An 
already existing SE may also itself set up one or more subsidiaries in the form of SEs.
For the first time ever, the SE directive introduces into and defines ‘participation’ in Union law, i.e. the influence of the body representative of 
the employees and/or the employees’ representatives in the affairs of a company by way of the right to elect or appoint some of the members of 
the company’s supervisory or administrative organ, or the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or all of the members 
of the company’s supervisory or administrative organ. Though in a manner that leaves significant space for the self-regulation of practical 
arrangements at company level, the SE accepts the fact of employees’ interest representation where applicable. Where this right was conferred 
by national statue and used before the creation of the SE, employees have the guarantee that this will remain in the corporate bodies of an SE. 
As regards the date on existing SEs, as of July 2010, some 595 SEs had been registered in the EU/EEA Member States. Around a quarter (151) 
were known to be ‘normal SEs’, i.e. operating and with 5 or more employees. Around 6% (43) of all SEs were known to be ‘micro SEs’, i.e. operat-
ing with between 1 and 4 employees. Many of the SEs (77) are so-called ‘shelf ’ companies which are for sale, with most of them in the Czech 
Republic (44), ‘empty’ SEs (83), operating but apparently without any employees yet, and a rather large number of SEs (around 241) which were 
known or seemed to be operating but for which the information on the number of employees were not available. This implies that to date a 
large number of SEs is operating but without actively employing people (or only employing few people). This diverse picture of different types 
of SEs is replicated also with regard to the geographical coverage: in eight EU Member States (BG, FI, EL, IT, LT, MT, RO, SI) no SE had been 
registered by summer 2010 and the diffusion of ‘normal’ SEs, operating and with 5 or more employees, in the remaining countries is quite 
unequal with Germany being the most important country (74 out of 151), followed by the Czech Republic (25), France (9), Netherlands (8) 
and Austria (7) (1). At least 30 of the ‘normal’ SEs have employee representatives on the company’s supervisory or administrative body, and over 
60 have transnational arrangements for employee information and consultation through SE works councils (2).
In reviewing the interim results of the case studies of the Eurofound project (3), the influence of SEs on any ‘Europeanisation of industrial 
relations’ should not be overestimated. Two other preliminary findings from the fieldwork are of note. First, initial results of the case studies 
confirm that the negotiation and implementation of practical arrangements of employee involvement follow company specific requirements 
and paths. In the long run SEs could turn out to be a factor in the emergence of supranational, enterprise specific industrial relations which 
are different from the respective national IR environments. Second, there are indications that in some cases the new legal form of an SE may 
have been used to circumvent existing national regulations for employee participation rights. Yet, the analysis of 10 company cases demon-
strates that employee involvement is widely regarded as an integral part of corporate governance in the EU. 
1 The figures are taken from the Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2010) 1391, accompanying the Report on the application of the Regulation on the 
Statute for a European Company, of 17.11.2010.
2 ETUI (2010), European Company (SE) Factsheets, http://ecdb.worker-participation.eu/
3 In July 2009, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Dublin launched a research project on the European Company 
Statute. The aim of this research is to gather information about the practical functioning of European Companies (SEs). The project was completed in summer 2010, 
consisting of an analytical report and 10 separate company case studies. The contactors were Wilke, Maack and Partner, Hamburg, in consortium with IRES, Paris. The 
consortium was supported by the Seeurope network of ETUI. The analytical report and the company case studies are available online at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu
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number of EWCs has increased by 255 
since 2000 (Chart 1.16).
Practice amongst EWCs has varied 
widely. In some instances, they have 
played an extremely limited role and 
were often a simple recipient of infor-
mation about a restructuring exercise, 
sometimes even after the decision had 
been taken. More rarely, they have been 
fully involved participants, becoming 
a site for collective bargaining in some 
multinational enterprises (8).
Industrial conflict1.6. 
Industrial or social conflict is an 
inherent part of industrial relations. 
The right to bargain for better con-
ditions implies the right to strike 
as a means to exert pressure should 
negotiations reach an impasse or fail. 
This is recognised in Article 28 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU: ‘Workers and employers, or 
their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices, the right 
to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels 
and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to 
take collective action to defend their 
interests, including strike action.’ The 
exercise of this right, notably strikes 
or lock-outs, constitutes a high-profile 
aspect of industrial relations in terms 
of public impact and media coverage.
Considering the period 2000–08, a 
wave-like pattern in the EU average of 
strike participation is observed with 
a peak in 2002–03 (Chart 1.17). In 
these two years some particularly large 
strikes took place in ‘low strike’ coun-
tries like Austria, Slovenia and Sweden, 
whilst large-scale mobilisation affected 
8 M. A. Moreau and J. J. Paris, ‘Le role du comité 
d’entreprise européen au cours des restructurations, 
experiences et prospectives’, Semaine sociale Lamy, 
2008. suppl. No 1376.
‘strike prone’ countries like Greece, 
Italy, France and Romania. Generally, 
strike activity was up in most coun-
tries and it is tempting to view this in 
the context of wage and job conflicts in 
the wake of the 2001–02 ‘Dotcom’ and 
9/11 recession. Some conflicts in cen-
tral and eastern Europe were related 
to reforms preparing for accession 
to the European Union and satisfy-
ing conditions for future participation 
in the EMU. Setting aside this peak, 
the ‘ equilibrium’ level, with 20 work-
ers involved in industrial conflicts per 
1 000 workers, is lower than the long-
term average in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Shalev, 1992) and also the 1990s (9). 
The EU average is also lower than the 
average of the  non-European OECD 
countries.
9 According to data analysed by the UK Office 
for National Statistics, as reported in Economic and 
Labour Market Review, April 2008.
Box 1.8: strike statistics
Statistics in this area are notoriously difficult, especially when comparing across countries. 
Methods, definitions and thresholds for recording differ greatly, despite efforts to har-
monise statistics by the International Labour Organisation. Eurostat has collected strike 
data since 1960 and since 2005 has a data-sharing arrangement with the ILO, using the 
same international definitions. The data include an annual series on the number of strikes 
and lockouts; the number of working days lost (1 000); the number of working days lost 
per 1 000 workers; the number of workers involved (1 000); and the number of workers 
involved per 1 000 workers. Below we have used the national data collected by EIRO (M. 
Carley, ‘Developments in industrial action, 2005–09’, document TN10040495), with addi-
tional data from Eurostat and the ILO Laborstat database for earlier years. One reason 
for this choice is that Carley also reports data on the sectors involved, the reasons for 
industrial action and strike threats that are not carried out. Unfortunately, despite the title, 
the EIRO data cover the year 2009 for very few countries. Since 2009 is neither covered 
by Eurostat nor by the ILO, it is not possible to assess the impact of the current crisis on 
industrial action. For all years, data for the Czech Republic are absent.
In strike statistics it is common to make a distinction between the frequency of strikes 
(number of strikes and lockouts), the duration and size of strikes (number of says lost) 
and participation (number of workers involved). This section focuses on participation, i.e. 
strikes per 1 000 employees.
Chart 1.17: Relative strike involvement, 2000–08
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The EU average hides large variations 
across Member States (Chart 1.18). To 
begin with, there appears to be more 
labour acquiescence in the 12 new 
Member States than in the EU-15. 
This may reflect the weaker position 
of trade unions and the harsher eco-
nomic conditions faced by workers in 
the CEE countries. This is not to say 
that high rates of conflict, expressed 
in the number of strikes, the dura-
tion of strikes, working days lost or 
relative involvement, is necessarily 
an indicator of union strength. It has 
long been noted that strong unions 
may call strikes only rarely and judi-
ciously, whereas weaker unions have 
very limited control over the strike 
weapon. Moreover, the strike par-
ticipation data used here are strongly 
influenced by the use of so-called 24 
hours strikes — a practice currently 
used by the unions in Greece in their 
mobilisation against the government’s 
austerity package. Generally, these are 
a more widespread practice in France 
and the southern Member States than 
elsewhere in the EU.
In order to show the variations 
across countries, an ‘adjusted’ aver-
age for the years 2000–08 has been 
calculated. Since the average can be 
unduly influenced by what happened 
in one particular year, the adjusted 
average simply replaces the year with 
the highest strike involvement by 
the average for the other years. The 
resulting corrected average, without 
the outlier year, better reflects the 
long-term trend in countries’ level of 
conflict. By definition, this procedure 
reduces the average in all countries 
(see Chart 1.18), and the difference 
is particularly large in Austria, where 
the ‘unadjusted’ average was strongly 
influenced by the huge conflict in 
2003 over pension reform.
On the basis of the adjusted averages, 
the 25 EU Member States (no com-
parable data for Luxembourg and the 
Czech Republic) can be divided in 
three groups: (1) countries with, in an 
average year, less than 10 workers per 
1 000 involved in industrial action: 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, as 
well as Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland 
and Portugal; (2) countries where 
industrial action is at moderate levels, 
with an average of 10–30 workers per 
1 000 involved in conflicts: Denmark, 
Finland, the UK, Malta, Cyprus, 
France, Bulgaria and Romania; and 
(3)  countries where industrial action 
was at relatively high levels, with in 
an average year more than 50 workers 
per 1 000 involved in conflict: Greece, 
Spain and Italy.
Carley (2010) offers an interesting 
discussion and some data on the 
causes of conflict, the sectors where 
most conflicts occur and strike 
threats. Pay is the most common 
source of conflict, together with lay-
offs, restructuring and redundancies, 
followed by government reform plans 
and working time issues. There is also 
some evidence that the trend, dating 
from the 1980s, of industrial conflict 
migrating from industry to public 
services, is continuing. Manufactur-
ing is where most strikes occur, but 
the largest conflicts, with most par-
ticipants, tend to occur in the public 
sector. Large conflicts, triggered by 
government public sector and/or wel-
fare reform plans, occurred in recent 
years in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland and Spain. Italy, too, 
has seen substantial conflict  triggered 
by such reform plans.
Strikes may be called or threatened, but 
not materialise, either, because they are 
meant as a ‘warning’ and an accom-
modation is subsequently reached, or 
because unions are unsuccessful when 
balloting members. Some countries 
have statistics on balloting outcomes. 
In Italy public sector strikes must be 
announced in advance and they are 
monitored by an independent Guar-
antee Authority, which can sanction a 
union which breaks the rules. In 2008, 
there were 2 195 strike notifications, of 
which 39 % were called off. In the UK 
it is possible to compare the number 
of disputes involving industrial action 
with the number of successful strike 
ballots, which are obligatory before 
taking industrial action. In 2008 
there were 658 successful ballots, 
with industrial action subsequently 
taking place in 144 instances (22 %), 
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 suggesting substantial use of ballots 
as a ‘warning’. National strikes which 
are threatened but subsequently called 
off are part and parcel of industrial 
relations in some countries. In Swe-
den, for example, two national strikes 
where cancelled in 2009, while LO’s 
affiliates called 16 regional strikes but 
called them all off. Unfulfilled strike 
threats were also reported in 2009 in 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, 
Portugal and Romania. Carley (2010) 
gives some examples of the issues over 
which collective action was threatened 
but did not take place. These include 
pay and job cuts, government reform 
plans and company restructuring, and 
suggest at least some of the unfulfilled 
threats are related to the worsening 
economic situation. It is not clear, 
however, whether the phenomenon 
has increased as compared to previous 
years. Such conflicts tend to be more 
intense and the unions’ position more 
constrained in times of recession.
There appears to be no correlation 
between relative strike involvement 
and any of the industrial relations 
indicators discussed earlier in this 
chapter (union density, coverage, 
coordination, centralisation). There is 
some indication that under company 
bargaining the incidence of conflict is 
higher but that each dispute is smaller 
with relatively fewer workers involved; 
where bargaining takes place at higher 
levels relatively more workers are 
involved, but conflicts are fewer. But 
these associations are weak and fur-
ther analysis is needed in which it is 
necessary to model economic and 
political variables in addition to the 
institutional ones portrayed here.
 State and 1.7. 
government 
intervention
There are various ways in which the 
state is involved in industrial relations 
and directly or indirectly influences 
decisions regarding wages, hours and 
working conditions. All EU Member 
States lay down basic legal guarantees 
on association, collective bargaining 
and strike action, and all are bound by 
a considerable body of EU law in mat-
ters of non-discrimination, heath and 
safety in the workplace, maximum 
working hours, parental leave, employ-
ment contracting and employee rights 
of information and consultation. As 
noted above, most EU Member States 
have minimum wage legislation in 
place and many have procedures for 
extending collective agreements to 
non-organised employers. Govern-
ments can influence the outcomes of 
wage bargaining, directly or indirectly, 
in various ways; by prescribing con-
flict settlement and arbitration pro-
cedures; issuing or negotiating wage 
guidelines; using public sector wage 
setting as an example and pace-setter 
for the private sector; by imposing a 
ceiling on outcomes, raising taxes or 
even suspending collective bargain-
ing temporarily. The last mentioned 
technique has not been used in recent 
years, although it was not uncommon 
in the 1970s and 1980s. All the other 
methods have featured in the years 
since 2000. Based on a measure of 
government intervention in wage set-
ting (see Box 1.9), Chart 1.19 portrays 
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Box 1.9: government intervention in wage bargaining
Using a scale developed by Hassel (2006), with a slight modification, the ICTWSS database 
distinguishes the following grades of government involvement in collective bargaining: 
the government imposes a settlement or ceiling on the private sector and/or suspends bar-
gaining (= 5); the government participates directly in private sector wage bargaining and 
provides norms or ceilings, or tax-based compensation to achieve particular outcomes 
(= 4); the government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through minimum 
wage setting, wage setting in the public sector, through compulsory arbitration and/or 
by withholding extension or recognition (= 3); the government provides the institutional 
framework for national or sector collective bargaining (legal protection of agreements, 
extension) (= 2); and, finally, no role of government in wage setting (= 1).
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the cross-national variation in the EU 
and compares the situation in  2007–09 
with 10 years earlier.
Overall, it appears that the intensity 
of government intervention in wage 
setting has decreased, albeit by a small 
amount and not in all Member States. 
Generally, we note a convergent trend, 
with the averages for the 12 new Mem-
ber States and EU-15 moving close to 
each other. In particular, CEE coun-
tries economies have moved away 
from restrictive government controls. 
while maintaining influence over 
general wage developments through 
minimum wage setting and related 
procedures of consultation. There are 
no strong regional differences within 
the EU as a whole and this variable — 
the index of government intervention 
— does not seem to correlate with 
any of the indicators (unionisation, 
employer organisation, bargaining 
coverage, centralisation, coordina-
tion) discussed in this Chapter.
Government intervention is associ-
ated with minimum wage legislation 
and the practice of extending collec-
tive bargaining and it has centralising 
effects as it tends to raise the level at 
which bargaining takes place. But, as 
has been noted in the Industrial Rela-
tions in Europe 2004 report, direct 
government intervention tends to be 
an alternative, or substitute, for coor-
dination by the trade unions and the 
employers’ associations themselves. 
However, the absence of government 
intervention in matters of wage setting 
can combine with either a coordinated 
approach — as in Germany, Austria or 
Sweden — or with an uncoordinated, 
market-based one — as in the UK, the 
Czech Republic or Poland.
Social pacts1.7.1. 
In various EU Member States gov-
ernments have tried to engage trade 
unions and employers’ organisa-
tions in tripartite social pacts on 
wage moderation and reform on 
issues such as pensions, early retire-
ment, employment protection, active 
labour market policies, unemploy-
ment insurance and training. Social 
pacts are defined as tripartite bar-
gains, more precisely as ‘publicly 
announced formal policy contracts 
between the government and social 
partners over income, labour market 
or welfare policies that identify policy 
issues and targets, means to achieve 
them, and tasks and responsibilities 
of the signatories’ (Avdagic, Rhodes 
and Visser, 2011). Such bargains can 
take different forms, have a different 
content or scope in terms of issues 
and policy domains and they differ in 
their duration or period of applica-
tion and in their potential effects.
In the years 2000–09, 44 attempts to 
negotiate a social pact were identified. 
This is half the total over the preced-
ing decade. In both decades the fail-
ure rate i.e. of pact negotiations that 
do not end in an agreement is the 
same, at one third. Compared to the 
1990s fewer governments turned to 
this instrument. One potential rea-
son, discussed in a recent collection 
of studies (Pochet, Keune and Natali, 
2010) is that social pacts were espe-
cially popular in the run up to EMU. 
Even so, since 2000 governments 
tried to negotiate a social pact at 
some point in 18 of the 27 EU Mem-
ber States, and in 14 some agreement 
was reached. No pact negotiations 
took place during this period in Aus-
tria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Sweden 
and the UK, whilst in Germany the 
Alliance for Jobs, Competitiveness 
and Training, begun in 1998, ended 
at some point in 2001. In four coun-
tries — Belgium, Greece, Malta and 
Poland — one or more attempts to 
negotiate a social pact occurred but 
these were never successful.
Of the pacts that were signed Table 1.9 
shows that the number one issue was 
wage setting, including conflict regu-
lation (‘wage procedure’) and the use 
of inflation targets (‘wage max’). Social 
security (in particular unemployment 
insurance) is the next most important 
issue, followed by vocational training, 
active labour market policies, employ-
ment protection and pension reform. 
Social dialogue procedures, together 
with consultations over minimum 
wage decisions, are relatively frequent 
issues in social pacts in the 12 new 
Member States.
Table 1.9: Issues negotiated in social pacts, 2000s
Wage 
procedure
Wage 
max
Tax 
budget
Working 
hours
Jobs 
ALMP* EPL**
Social 
security Pension Training
Union 
rights
Social 
dialogue
EU-27 44 15 11 4 12 10 25 10 20 9 8
EU-15 28 13 8 3 8 7 20 8 18 7 2
EU-12  
+ EU-2 16 2 3 1 4 3 5 2 2 2 7
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS database 3.0, 2010, multiple issues per pact. 
*Active labour market policy. 
** Employment protection legislation.
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Many of these issues can (also) 
be subject to bilateral agreements 
between the central union and 
employers’ associations, without the 
participation or intervention of the 
government. Two types of agree-
ment can be  distinguished, simi-
lar to the two procedures specified 
under Article 136 of the EU Treaty. 
Sponsored agreements depend for 
their implementation on subsequent 
legislation by the government. They 
can be seen as a form of prepara-
tion for legal intervention, similar to 
the European social partner agree-
ments in the 1990s (on parental 
leave, fixed-duration contracts and 
part-time work) that were imple-
mented by means of an EU directive. 
Autonomous agreements are imple-
mented by the unions and employers 
themselves, by means of collective 
bargaining or guidelines and do not 
seek or require subsequent legisla-
tion. Autonomous agreements often 
pre-empt legislation and surely one 
motive for employers and unions 
to conclude such agreements is that 
they exert more influence over the 
content of regulation than if it were 
done through the law. The parallel is 
found in the European framework 
agreements on telework, work-
related stress, sexual harassment, 
each concluded since 2000.
As can be seen from Chart 1.20, 
autonomous central agreements are 
relatively rare; most agreements rely 
on subsequent legislation. Some of 
the agreements in Portugal after 2005, 
in an attempt to repair the damage of 
prior legislation on collective bargain-
ing, can be classified as autonomous 
and the same applies to the seven 
procedural wage agreements and one 
further agreement in Spain. The other 
examples are found in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Sponsored 
agreements, some related to EU legis-
lation, are frequent in France, south-
ern and eastern Europe.
Conclusion1.8. 
This chapter has offered a ‘bird’s eye’ 
overview of recent trends and vari-
ations in industrial relations in the 
European Union. To that end, it has 
presented a demography of national 
variations on the six major variables 
that, arguably, make up the institu-
tional fabric of industrial relations: 
trade unions, employer organisation, 
collective bargaining, workplace rep-
resentation, industrial action and 
government intervention. The result 
can be summarised as follows: on 
most variables the years since 2000 
have seen a continuation and devel-
opment of trends started earlier, 
without major breaks. This is true, 
for instance, for the decline of union 
density, decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, lower levels of industrial 
action and more employee participa-
tion in the enterprise (at transnational 
as well as national and sub-national 
levels). The combined effect of the 
second and fourth of these trends 
has been to further augment the 
prominence of the company level in 
the institutional fabric of European 
industrial relations. Continuities are, 
moreover, noted in the continued 
high levels of employer organisation, 
bargaining coverage and, a contin-
ued, albeit slightly less pronounced 
role for government in industrial 
relations, including through public 
extension of collective agreements to 
non-organised firms, the institution 
of a mandatory minimum wage and 
the negotiations of social pacts.
Amidst such common trends and 
developments, the chapter has also 
highlighted the continued diversity 
of national industrial relations in the 
EU. Some of this diversity is between 
the EU-15 and the CEE countries and 
flows from the enlargements of 2004 
and 2007. But the diversity within 
these two groups of countries is large 
as well; and other plausible ‘quasi-
 regional’ groupings are detectable 
(see Industrial Relations in Europe 
2008 report). On many ‘hard core’ 
variables where EU competences are 
limited — the organisation of the 
social partners, collective bargain-
ing over pay and primary working 
conditions and industrial action — 
diversity around common trends has 
persisted. Only where there is scope 
for EU intervention — as on employee 
representation within the enterprise 
— is some tendency toward conver-
gence apparent.
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How the trends outlined in this 
chapter will be affected by the cur-
rent crisis, with the prospect — at 
the time of writing in mid-2010 — 
of severe public sector cuts and aus-
terity measures in many Member 
States, cannot be foreseen with any 
certainty. Will unions gain mem-
bers, industrial action go up, govern-
ments rush to negotiate social pacts? 
Or will the opposite happen, with 
further union decline, more labour 
acquiescence, unilateral government 
measures? Scattered evidence from 
various countries indicates tenden-
cies in both directions.
For instance, the data for union mem-
bership and union density in 2009, 
where available, variously show con-
tinued but not excessive union decline 
(Austria, Germany, Denmark, Fin-
land, Sweden), no change (the Neth-
erlands) or an increase (Belgium, 
related to the continued role of unions 
in the administration of unemploy-
ment insurance). Longitudinal studies 
of union membership and business 
cycles tend to conclude that increases 
in unemployment are associated with 
membership decline, sometimes 
with a delay of one or two years. To 
the extent that a number of countries 
have been able to contain the effects 
of the crisis on unemployment with 
special measures, in particular by 
using short-time working arrange-
ments, any consequent reduction in 
union membership will be less. These 
measures have been particularly effec-
tive in manufacturing and agreements 
between unions and employers have 
been a key tool in implementing such 
schemes (see Chapter 3). Come 2010, 
the crisis has moved on to the pub-
lic sector, with most Member States 
now announcing severe austerity pro-
grammes with a standstill or cut-back 
in wages and/or employment. Unions 
in many countries will be propelled 
to take defensive industrial action in 
circumstances which threaten them 
with large losses in membership and 
in influence.
Finally, it is hard to foretell whether 
the increased coordination of fiscal 
policies and financial regulation in 
the EU, and in the euro area in par-
ticular, will trigger joint responses 
from unions and employers, autono-
mously or in concert with the public 
authorities, in the domain of indus-
trial relations and wage policy. Such 
initiatives would seem vital for retain-
ing some influence over how the crisis 
will unfold. In crisis conditions the 
tendency to negotiate social pacts is 
stronger, but the combination with 
other conditions — in particular the 
position of the government and the 
strength of the unions — is crucial 
(Avdagic, Rhodes and Visser, 2011). 
Economic crises as such are poor pre-
dictors of concerted, joint action.
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Introduction2.1. 
The effects of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis have permeated national 
borders as a form of international 
contagion, underlining the height-
ened interdependence of national 
economies, their labour markets and 
their national industrial relations 
systems. The crisis has presented, and 
continues to present, industrial rela-
tions actors and institutions across 
the EU with formidable challenges. 
For the countries of western Europe, 
these are unprecedented in their 
magnitude in the post-war era. For 
those of central- and south-eastern 
Europe, the transition to a market 
economy 20 years ago was accom-
panied by major economic upheaval. 
The present challenges lie in the test-
ing nature of the crisis for the indus-
trial relations institutions established 
during and since that transition.
The chapter establishes the broader 
economic, employment and policy 
context for Chapter 3, which focuses on 
negotiated and concerted responses by 
the social partners which address the 
effects of the crisis. After first establish-
ing the varying scale and nature of the 
economic and employment challenges 
that confront the public authorities 
and social partners across the Member 
States, the chapter then addresses the 
perspectives of the social partners on 
the public policy responses required 
to deal with the effects of the crisis on 
economic activity and  employment. 
Accordingly, the first section of the 
chapter briefly reviews the main eco-
nomic and employment dimensions 
of the crisis. It does so by focusing 
on trends in output, employment and 
unemployment and, in addition, on 
those indicators which are of particu-
lar interest to employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions, respectively. 
Employers’ organisations tend to pay 
attention to developments in labour 
costs (including wages), flexibility 
and productivity, whilst trade unions 
tend to be concerned with purchas-
ing power, as reflected in expenditure 
on private consumption and wage 
developments. The second section of 
the chapter surveys the perspectives 
of national and EU-level social part-
ner organisations on the main policies 
required to address the effects of the 
crisis. It pays attention to the extent 
to which there are commonalities and 
differences in the policy prescriptions 
of employers’ organisations and trade 
unions. In broad terms, it finds that 
substantial consensus on the need for 
emergency measures to stimulate eco-
nomic activity and maintain employ-
ment in the early phase of the crisis 
has tended in some, but not all, coun-
tries to be followed by tensions over 
the distribution of costs and the tim-
ing and content of measures to reduce 
public deficits. At the same time, dif-
ferences are apparent across  countries 
in the presence, and degree, of bipar-
tisan consensus between employers’ 
organisations and trade unions on the 
measures advocated.
The chapter concludes that variation 
across countries in the extent of pol-
icy consensus between the social part-
ners is associated with the influence 
of two kinds of ‘input’ factor. One is 
‘economic’ and concerns the scale and 
timing of the crisis in different coun-
tries. The other is ‘institutional’ and 
relates to institutional arrangements 
for bi- and tripartite social dialogue. It 
finds that both exercise a partial influ-
ence, but that neither is determining. 
Economic  2.2. 
and employment 
dimensions  
of the crisis
This section has three main aims. The 
first is to establish the scale of the cri-
sis in terms of the main economic 
and employment indicators identified 
above, and the relationship between 
trends in economic activity and those 
in employment. The second is to 
highlight similarities and differences 
between Member States in the scale and 
timing of the economic and employ-
ment dimensions of the crisis. Cross-
country differences in the economic 
and employment context are likely to 
be one source of variation in the policy 
responses advocated by the social part-
ners at national level, reviewed in the 
second section of this chapter. These 
cross-country differences context are 
also a potential source of variation in 
the concrete actions taken by the social 
partners, which are the focus of Chap-
ter 3. The third is to identify sectoral 
differences in trends in output and 
employment, differentiating between 
broad economic sectors. The rationale 
for doing so is similar. Sectoral varia-
tion in the economic and employment 
impact of the crisis is also likely to be 
important in accounting for the secto-
ral pattern of negotiated responses to 
the crisis by the social partners, which 
are the central concern of Chapter 3.
The economic and financial crisis presented industrial relations actors and institutions 
across the EU with formidable challenges. There appears to be no obvious association 
between the magnitude of the crisis in terms of its employment or fiscal impact and 
the development of consensus and divergence in the policy perspective between social 
partners. On the one hand, where the crisis has been most severe, policy disagreement 
has predominated. On the other hand, a degree of policy  consensus has developed not 
only in some EU-15 countries with well-established social dialogue traditions, but also 
in some new Member States where tripartite structures have been exploited.
This chapter is based on a draft by Paul Marginson and Mark Carley of the Univer-
sity of Warwick’s Industrial Relations Research Unit.
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Economy-wide trends2.2.1. 
The recession sparked by the finan-
cial crisis has seen sharp reductions 
in levels of economic activity, as 
Chart 2.1 shows (Table 2.A1 reports 
changes in GDP for all Member 
States). GDP across the EU fell by 
over 5 % between the opening half 
of 2008 and the first of 2009, as com-
pared to growth of 2 % in the 12 pre-
vious months. Growth only resumed 
in the first half of 2010, when GDP 
for the EU-27 rose 1.3 % as compared 
with the first half of 2009.
Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, employment and productivity
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, employment and productivity, EU-27
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, 
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, 
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Within this overall picture, the tra-
jectory of individual countries dif-
fers in two respects. The first is the 
degree of severity of the decline in 
economic activity. The Baltic states 
each experienced a decline in GDP 
of the order of 15 %, whilst Fin-
land, Ireland, Romania and Slov-
enia experienced declines in GDP 
of some 7–8 %, between 2008 and 
2009. At the other end of the spec-
trum, GDP grew in Poland, albeit 
more slowly than the year before, 
whilst the decline in GDP was com-
paratively small in Cyprus, France, 
Greece and Malta. The second is the 
timing of the onset of recession. The 
majority of countries entered reces-
sion in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
GDP had started to fall, however, 
by the second quarter of 2008 in 
Ireland, Italy, Estonia and Latvia. 
In contrast, GDP did not start to 
decline until the first quarter of 
2009 in Bulgaria, Greece, Malta, 
Romania and  Slovakia and until the 
second quarter in Cyprus.
Latvia Poland
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, 
employment and productivity, Romania
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, 
employment and productivity, Ireland
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Chart 2.1.: Recent developments in GDP, 
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There are also differences over when 
countries began to move out of reces-
sion. By the middle of 2009 some 
economies began moving out of 
recession. Member States registering 
quarterly GDP growth in the second 
quarter included France, Germany, 
Portugal, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia and Slovenia, as well as Poland. 
In the third quarter they were joined 
by the majority of the other Member 
States, when aggregate quarterly GDP 
growth figures for the EU-27 moved 
into positive terrain for the first time 
since the first quarter of 2008. Quar-
terly growth in the aggregate EU-27 
figures for the third quarter of 2009 
onwards was positive, although small 
in magnitude, indicating the tentative 
nature of recovery in many countries. 
Seven countries remained in recession 
in the final quarter of 2009: Greece, 
Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Bul-
garia and Romania. By the second 
quarter of 2010, this was still the case 
for Greece, whilst Ireland had slipped 
back into recession after registering 
growth for a single quarter (1).
1 GDP quarterly change data, not shown in Table 2.A1, 
accessed at Eurostat PEEIs: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/euroindicators/peeis/
Private consumption has declined by 
less than GDP in most Member States, 
indicating that purchasing power has 
been an important factor sustaining 
economic activity. For the EU-27, 
private consumption fell by 1.7 % 
between 2008 and 2009 (Chart 2.2), as 
compared to a 4.3 % decline in GDP 
(Chart 2.1). The Baltic states, Hun-
gary, Romania and Spain, where the 
decline in private consumption was 
even steeper than that in GDP and 
Ireland, where it was of similar mag-
nitude, stand out as exceptions to this 
overall pattern.
The trend in private consumption 
reflects developments in wages up 
until the end of 2009. Although 
growth in nominal wages slowed dur-
ing 2009, they nonetheless increased 
by 1.8 % for the EU-27 during 2009 
as compared to 3.3 % in 2008. The 
figures for real wages indicate that 
real wage growth actually increased, 
from 0.2 % for the EU-27 during 
2008 to 1.4 % in 2009 (see Chart 
2.2. for both). Against this overall 
trend, wages declined or stagnated 
in a few Member States during 2009. 
Latvia and Lithuania experienced 
nominal wage declines of the order 
of 10 % (with even larger declines 
in real wages); nominal wages also 
declined in Ireland (by 4.1 %), Esto-
nia (by 3.0 %) and Greece (by 1.6 %) 
(although real wages fell by less in all 
three). In Hungary, nominal wages 
fell marginally and real wages fell 
by over 4 %. In Germany, there was 
no growth in nominal wages and in 
France, Sweden and the UK nomi-
nal wage growth was not much more 
than 1 %; real wages fell or stagnated 
in all but France. Overall, there is 
considerable similarity with the 
cross-country variation evident for 
private consumption.
Growth in nominal labour costs, at 
2.7 % for 2009 was down from the 
4.0 % of 2008, but was nonetheless 
above that in nominal wages (1.8 %) 
by a factor of 1.5 (Chart 2.2). The 
gap between nominal wage growth 
and changes in labour costs was rela-
tively large in Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many and Greece. The rate of change 
in  labour productivity had already 
slowed down in 2008, when it stood 
at 0.4 % for the EU-27, as compared to 
the 2007 figure of 1.6 %. In 2009 it fell 
by 2.5 % (Chart 2.2). This is consist-
ent with the gap between the scale of 
the decline in GDP and the lesser one 
in employment (Chart 2.1). Particu-
larly steep falls in labour productivity 
occurred in the Baltic states, Finland, 
Romania and Slovenia, all countries 
experiencing some of the sharpest 
declines in GDP. Ireland, where pro-
ductivity rose by 1.2 % in 2009, was an 
exception in this respect. Elsewhere, 
Germany — where employment has 
held up (see below) despite a 4.9 % 
decline in GDP — experienced an 
equivalent (4.9 %) decline in labour 
productivity.
Continued labour cost growth during 
2009, combined with declining pro-
ductivity, meant that unit labour costs 
rose. Real unit labour costs, which 
Chart 2.2.: Changes in consumption, wage, labour cost  
and productivity indicators in EU-27 in 2007, 2008 and 2009
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had declined in earlier years, rose by 
0.5 % in 2008 and then by 3.0 % in 
2009 (Chart 2.2). Rises in real unit 
labour costs were particularly sharp, 
at more than 5 %, in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Only Latvia, Hungary and 
Poland experienced a decline (of 1 % 
or more) in 2009.
The extent of the impact of the finan-
cial and economic crisis on the public 
finances of Member States is indicated 
in Chart 2.3 (Table 2.A2 reports 
changes in the position of the pub-
lic finances for all Member States). 
Whereas across the EU-27 public 
sector deficits amounted to less than 
1 % of GDP in 2007, by 2008 this had 
already grown to 2.3 %. The situation 
deteriorated rapidly during 2009 by 
which time public sector deficits stood 
at 6.8 % of GDP. Sharp increases in 
the public sector deficit were already 
evident in 2008 (as compared with 
2007) in some countries, notably Ire-
land, Spain and Estonia. In 2009, this 
became the case for many more coun-
tries. Increases in the deficit equiva-
lent to at least 5 % of GDP occurred in 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, 
Spain (for a second successive year), 
Finland, Ireland (also for a second 
successive year), Latvia, Lithuania, 
Portugal and the UK. 
The decline in GDP has only par-
tially been reflected in employment 
which, as Chart 2.4 shows, fell by 
just under 2 % between the second 
 quarters of 2008 and 2009 and by a 
further 0.6 % over the next 12 months 
(Table 2.A3 reports 12 monthly 
changes by quarter for each Member 
State). In proportionate terms the 
decline in employment was less than 
half that in GDP between 2008 and 
2009. Two influences are potentially 
at work. One is the lagged effect of 
a downturn in economic activity on 
levels of employment, observed in 
 previous recessions (Hurley et al., 
2009), which is confirmed by the 
continued decline in employment 
reported in most countries in the sec-
ond half of 2009 and through into the 
first half of 2010. The second is the 
impact of measures taken to preserve 
jobs, for example through short-
time working schemes, which are 
reviewed in Chapter 3. The relevance 
of this second influence is indicated 
by the data on average hours worked, 
reported below (Table 2.1). 
As with GDP, the magnitude of the 
decline in employment varied across 
countries (see Chart 2.1). Steep 
declines in employment were evident 
in the Baltic states, Ireland and also 
Spain. In contrast, employment growth 
continued into 2009; and subsequent 
 declines were modest in  Germany, 
Chart 2.3.: Public sector deficits or surplus in the EU-27  
and selected Member States 2007, 2008 and 2009
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the Benelux countries, Cyprus, Malta, 
Poland (where employment did not 
decline until the final quarter and 
then only marginally) and Slovenia 
(where subsequent declines have been 
comparatively greater). There are two 
main exceptions to the general trend 
for the decline in GDP to be mark-
edly greater than that in employment: 
Ireland and Spain, where the fall in 
employment paralleled or exceeded 
that in GDP. Both countries were dis-
tinctive in that recession was initially 
triggered by a sharp drop in activity in 
construction associated with a slump 
in the housing and property markets. 
In addition, in Estonia and Latvia, the 
steep falls in employment are close in 
magnitude to those in GDP. At the 
other end of the spectrum, Germany 
and the Benelux countries stand out 
in terms of the magnitude of the gap 
between GDP decline and the trajec-
tory of  employment.
Declines in employment contin-
ued into 2010, despite the upturn in 
quarterly GDP by the third quarter 
of 2009 in most countries. The rate 
of quarterly decline in employment 
had, however, slowed by this point 
in most countries. Even so, Ireland, 
Denmark, Bulgaria and the Baltic 
states reported further substantial 
falls in employment in the third and 
fourth quarters, and Bulgaria and the 
Baltic states again in the opening two 
quarters of 2010 (2).
Unemployment rates have risen since 
2008, when the percentage of the 
EU-27’s workforce who were unem-
ployed was 7 %. By the first half of 
2010 Chart 2.5 shows that the figure 
stood at 9.6 %. Large increases in the 
unemployment rate between the first 
half of 2008 and the first half of 2010 
were recorded in those countries 
2 Employment change quarterly data, not shown in 
Table 2.A3, accessed at Eurostat PEEIs:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
euroindicators/peeis/
Chart 2.5.: Unemployment rates for EU Member States, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 (first half) 
Chart 2.5.: Unemployment rates for EU Member States, 2008, 2009 and 2010
Note: 2008,2009: annual average; 2010: average of rst and second quaters
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Chart 2.6.: Employment rates by gender and for young  
people, EU-27, first quarter 2007 to second quarter 2010 
Chart 2.6.: Employment rates by gender and for young people, 
EU-27, rst quarter 2007 to second quarter 2010
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Table 2.1: Fixed-term contracts and actual hours worked  
in the EU-27 2007, 2008 and 2009
2007 2008 2009
Fixed-term contracts (% on total employees)
EU-27 14.5 14.0 13.5
EU-15 14.8 14.4 13.7
Actual hours worked (full-time employees) 
EU-27 39.9 39.8 39.5
EU-15 39.6 39.5 39.2
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey (a) [tps00073],(b) [lfsq_ewahana, lfsq_ewhan2]. 
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where the decline in employment 
was steepest: Ireland, Spain and the 
Baltic states — where unemployment 
rates have tripled. Over the same 
period, the unemployment rate did 
not rise at all in Germany despite the 
fall in GDP. Elsewhere, the smallest 
proportionate rises were in  Austria 
and the Benelux countries, each of 
which also experienced a sizeable 
fall in GDP.
Employment rates have declined 
faster for men than for women 
(Chart 2.6). Whereas the female 
employment rate stood at 59.1 % 
in the second quarter of 2008, and 
declined only marginally to 58.4 % 
by the second quarter of 2010, that 
for males decreased by 2.8 percent-
age points from 73.0 % to 70.2 % over 
the same period. Young people under 
25 have been particularly affected by 
the recession. Youth employment 
rates have slumped by 3.4 percent-
age points from 37.4 % in the second 
quarter of 2008 to 34.0 % in the sec-
ond quarter of 2010 (Chart 2.6).
Workers employed on temporary 
contracts have been more exposed 
to job loss than those on open-
 ended or permanent contracts. Table 
2.1 shows that the proportion of the 
workforce on fixed-term contracts 
shrank by 0.5 percentage points in 
both 2008 and 2009. Although the 
trajectory in the majority of coun-
tries corresponds with this aggre-
gate development, there are also 
some sharp contrasts between par-
ticular countries. Spain, where use 
of temporary contracts is easily the 
most widespread amongst Mem-
ber States, registered a fall in 2009 
of almost 4 percentage points from 
the 2008 level of 29.4 % (indicating 
that workers on fixed-term con-
tracts have borne the brunt of  rising 
 unemployment). In contrast, the 
proportion of workers on fixed-term 
contracts rose between 2008 and 
2009 in a few countries,  including 
Greece,  Hungary, Luxembourg and 
Malta.
Reductions in hours worked would 
seem to have cushioned the impact 
of the recession on employment 
levels. Actual hours worked by full-
time employees fell by just under 1 % 
(from 39.8 to 39.5 hours per week) 
on average across the EU-27 in 
2009 as compared with 2008 ( Table 
2.1). Larger falls, approaching 2 %, 
occurred in Austria and Germany, 
both countries where statutory 
short-time working schemes have 
been widely taken up. Reductions 
in average hours worked seem to be 
particularly focused on the  industrial 
sector, where they have been propor-
tionately larger (see below).
Sector and company-2.2.2. 
level trends
The impact of the crisis has differed 
markedly between the main sectors of 
the economy, as Chart 2.7 shows. The 
industrial sector, including manufac-
turing but excluding construction, 
has experienced a steep decline in 
activity, amounting to a 12 % decline 
in value-added for the EU-27 in 2009 
as compared with 2008. Construc-
tion experienced a 6 % decline over 
the same period. Private services have 
been less affected, although there are 
differences within the broad sector. 
Value-added fell by over 4 % in 2009, 
in distribution, transport, communi-
cation and hotels and catering, taken 
together. The decline was only half 
this, at around 2 %, in finance and 
other business services. The role of the 
public services in sustaining economic 
activity is underlined by the contin-
ued increase in activity in 2009. Given 
the scale of the public sector deficit in 
many countries (Chart 2.3) and the 
spread of austerity measures to reduce 
deficits, this is unlikely to persist.
As at the aggregate economy level, 
sectoral developments in employment 
in 2009 as compared to 2008 show 
declines which are noticeably less 
than those in output (Chart 2.8 and 
Chart 2.7). The steep decline in 
activity in industry has been accom-
panied by a more modest fall in 
employment, of some 5 %. In con-
struction, however, the decline in 
employment was broadly equivalent 
Chart 2.7.: Change in value-added by broad sector in the 
EU-27, first quarter 2007 to second quarter 2010
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to that in output. In private services, 
the decline in employment in distri-
bution, transport, communications, 
hotels and catering was noticeably 
less, at 1.7 %, than that in output, 
whilst that in finance and other 
business services was of equivalent 
magnitude. In the public services, 
employment rose slightly.
In manufacturing, Hurley et al. 
(2009) indicate the extent to which 
a reduction in average hours worked 
has ameliorated the deterioration in 
employment. Average hours worked 
in manufacturing in 15 Member 
States fell by some 7 % between the 
first quarters of 2008 and 2009 as 
 compared to a reduction in employ-
ment of 5 %. There were marked 
 differences  between countries. In 
 Denmark, France, Spain and the UK, 
the percentage reduction in employ-
ment exceeded that in hours worked, 
whereas the reverse was the case in 
Austria, Germany, Finland, Portugal, 
Greece, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Latvia. In three countries the burden 
of adjustment was heavily weighted 
towards reduced working hours as 
compared to reductions in employ-
ment: Austria, Finland and  Germany. 
Box 2.1 provides a more detailed pic-
ture for the EU-15 only of develop-
ments in production and employment 
in selected sectors.
Job losses and newly created jobs 
announced by companies, which 
involve at least 100 jobs or more than 
10 % of the workforce at sites employ-
ing at least 250, are recorded by the 
European Restructuring Monitor 
(ERM). It relies on systematic moni-
toring of reports in the media in each 
of the EU’s Member States (and Nor-
way) to identify these. Although the 
data are neither comprehensive nor 
necessarily representative, their value 
lies in indicating trends and patterns 
in company restructuring and dif-
ferentiating between different types 
of restructuring (Hurley et al., 2009). 
The impact of the crisis on trends in 
job creation and job loss amongst 
companies is clear. During 2007, prior 
to the onset of the crisis, job gains 
from company restructuring — total-
ling over 450 000 — exceeded those 
from job losses — at around 330 000. 
In contrast, over the 18 months cov-
ered by the 2009 ERM Report (Hur-
ley et al., 2009), from the start of 2008 
up to the end of June 2009, total job 
losses arising from company restruc-
turing totalled over 900 000 across the 
EU as compared to 400 000 new job 
announcements. Job losses started 
rising in the first quarter of 2008, 
peaking in the first quarter of 2009 
before declining somewhat in the 
second quarter. Job losses outnum-
bered jobs created from the second 
quarter of 2008 onwards, coinciding 
with the onset of recession.
Analysis of the sectoral pattern of 
job losses over the 18-month period 
reported by the European Restruc-
turing Monitor indicates that 49 % 
occurred in manufacturing and 
other production industries and 
47 % in services (Hurley et al., 2009). 
The balance was accounted for by 
agriculture, forestry and fishing and 
construction, which because of the 
small-scale of many businesses and 
high incidence of self-employment 
often fall beneath the ERM report-
ing thresholds. Given that service 
sector employment accounts for over 
65 % of total EU employment and 
manufacturing for less than 20 %, 
the extent to which the latter has 
been hit harder by the crisis is again 
apparent. This is underlined by the 7 
percentage point increase in the pro-
portion of job losses accounted for 
by manufacturing over the 18-month 
period as compared to the six years 
up to 2008. The increase was more 
marked in higher-technology indus-
tries, such as automotive, than in 
lower-technology industries such 
as food processing. Amongst the 
service sectors, retail accounted for 
a markedly higher proportion of job 
losses over the 18-month period than 
in the previous period. In contrast 
public administration accounted 
for a smaller proportion of job loss, 
reflecting the role of central and 
Chart 2.8.: Change in employment by broad sector in the 
EU-27, first quarter 2008 to second quarter 2010
 
Chart 2.8.: Change in employm nt by broad sector in the EU-27, 
first quarter 2007 to second quarter 2010
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local government  employment as a 
stabilising factor during recession.
The ERM database also differenti-
ates job loss according to the type 
of restructuring involved. The larg-
est proportion of job losses over the 
18-month period — 70 % — were 
attributed to ‘internal restructur-
ing’ by companies, which includes 
all those forms of restructuring not 
falling under other headings. Bank-
ruptcy or closure was the next most 
prevalent, accounting for 21 %. 
Restructurings of this kind increased 
sharply as compared to the years prior 
to 2008, when they stood at 14 % (see 
Box 2.2). In contrast, the relatively 
small proportion of restructurings 
attributed to offshoring (or delocali-
sation) declined, from 6 % to 3 % of 
the total. Job loss associated with 
mergers and acquisitions remained 
steady at around 4 % of the total.
Box 2.1: Contrasting trends in production and employment in selected sectors
An examination of developments in selected sectors confirms that the manufacturing and construction sectors in the EU-15 have 
been particularly hard hit by the economic crisis, and that some private service sectors have also experienced sharp declines in 
economic activity whilst others have been much less affected. Table 2.2, reproduced from Hurley et al. (2009), shows that within 
manufacturing, steep declines were experienced in textiles and clothing and across metalworking — particularly in the automotive 
sector, which saw a 41 % decline in output between the first quarters of 2008 and 2009. One of the least affected industries within 
manufacturing was food processing where output fell by just 2 % over the same period. Only pharmaceuticals saw an increase in 
output. An aggregate figure for the service sectors was not available. In general the declines in turnover reported by individual serv-
ice industries over the same period were smaller than those experienced by manufacturing industries, although reductions of some 
10 % were reported in retail and the transport industries. No data were available for financial services, although reported job losses 
have been substantial (Glassner, 2009). Of the service sectors covered only computing showed an increase in output between the first 
quarters of 2008 and 2009.
Reflecting the economy-wide pattern, Table 2.2 also indicates that falls in employment in manufacturing were modest when com-
pared to the scale of the decline in output. Employment had fallen by 4 % between the first quarters of 2008 and 2009 as compared 
to the 17 % loss of output. The same applied to the service sectors for which data were available. Construction, however, registered 
a much sharper drop in employment, of 8 % compared to output loss of 11 %, probably reflecting the project-based nature of much 
employment in the sector.
Table 2.2: Changes in production and employment by selected sectors in the EU-15, 2007–09 (%)
Production Employment
Q1 2007–08 Q1 2008–09 Q1 2007–08 Q1 2008–09
Manufacturing (all) 2.9 – 16.7 1.0 – 4.0
Food products 1.2 – 1.9 1.4 – 1.3
Textiles – 3.9 – 23.0 – 3.6 – 10.4
Chemicals 1.8 – 19.0 – 0.2 – 3.8
Pharmaceuticals 0.4 3.4 1.0 – 4.0
Metal products 3.9 – 26.1 2.8 – 4.2
Motor vehicles 5.7 – 41.4 0.1 – 5.6
Electricity, gas 3.2 – 5.1 0.5 1.1
Construction 0.1 – 11.4 1.8 – 8.0
Retailing, wholesaling 8.7 – 9.8 2.0 – 1.5
Land transport 12.9 – 7.4 2.3 – 2.4
Postal services 3.3 – 3.9 – 0.2 – 2.0
Hotels, restaurants 3.9 – 4.5 2.7 – 1.9
Telecommunications – 0.4 0.8 – 2.1 – 2.7
Computing 6.4 2.2 4.7 2.6
Source: ERM 2009 Report (Eurostat, Short-term business statistics).
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Assessment2.2.3. 
The steep falls in output have, in 
many but not all Member States, been 
followed by a period from mid-2009 
onwards where output has stabilised 
and a gradual recovery commenced. 
Cross-country variation is, however, 
evident in the severity of the decline 
in economic activity  experienced, 
the timing of the onset of the reces-
sion and the point at which eco-
nomic recovery commenced. The 
sectoral pattern of restructuring that 
the recession has unleashed appears 
to reinforce longer-run structural 
changes in the European economy. 
The decline in manufacturing output 
has been much sharper than that in 
services, with the probable effect of 
further accelerating the shift in eco-
nomic activity from the former to the 
latter (Hurley et al., 2009).
In considering the possible trajec-
tory of economic recovery, account 
needs to be taken of the origins of the 
current recession. Historical experi-
ence, for example from the Nordic 
 countries in the early 1990s, shows 
that recovery from a recession trig-
gered by a financial crisis tends to be 
slower than otherwise. This is for two 
reasons: financial markets and busi-
ness confidence take time to recover; 
and aggravated levels of private and 
public debt remain to be dealt with 
(Hurley et al., 2009; Eurofound, 2009). 
Whilst activity in financial markets 
appears to be picking up, and there 
are signs that business confidence 
is recovering, the debt problems 
seem unlikely to be resolved rap-
idly. Unemployment and short-time 
working arrangements will continue 
to depress earnings  levels, and hence 
constrain the capacity to pay off pri-
vate debt, until well after a recovery in 
output is underway. The levels of pub-
lic debt incurred, in the first instance, 
to address the immediate financial 
Box 2.2: From boom to bust: a surge in bankruptcies
The number of cases of bankruptcies or closures reported by the European Restructuring Monitor (Chart 2.9) climbed from a quarterly total 
of some 10 000 in the opening quarter of 2008 to over 60 000 in the final quarter. By the second half of 2009 it had declined to just under 
25 000 per quarter, although this level was still substantially above that prevailing during before the summer of 2008.
Data on bankruptcies for Member States indicated a surge in many countries, more marked in some than others (Coughtrie et al., 2009; Glassner 
and Keune, 2010). For example, in Belgium, the total for the first four months of 2009 was three-and-a-half times higher than the equivalent period 
in 2008, and in Spain the total was more than two-and-a-half times higher over the same period. In the Netherlands, the number of bankruptcies 
doubled between mid-2008 and mid-2009. In Denmark the number rose by 85 % over the 12 months up to May 2009, whilst in Sweden the total 
was up by 45 % comparing the first quarters of 2008 and 2009. Bankruptcies doubled in Bulgaria comparing the first four months of 2009 and 2008, 
whilst in Romania the total was up by almost 60 % comparing the first quarter of 2009 with that of 2008. The Baltic states all saw sharp increases in 
numbers of bankruptcies, with the upwards surge commencing earlier in 2008 than elsewhere. In a few countries, the increase in bankruptcies has 
been modest or no increase had been recorded by mid-2009. Austria reported a 9 % increase between the first half of 2008 and the same period a 
year later. The Czech Republic reported no increase over the same period, although a sharp increase was anticipated over the second half of 2009.
Chart 2.9.: Cases of bankruptcy and closures recorded  
by the ERM by quarter 2008–09
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recorded by the ERM by quarter 2008–09
%
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 1
2 
m
on
th
s 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 
Note: ERM is the European Restructuring Monitor maintained by the European Foundation in Dublin
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
2009 Q42009 Q32009 Q22009 Q12008 Q42008 Q32008 Q22008 Q1
0
30
60
90
120
150
Job losses announced (right axis)
Number of cases (left axis)
Source: Eurostat.
Chapter 2: The crisis: challenges and social partner perspectives
65
Box 2.3: Work inequalities exacerbated in the crisis (1)
Inequalities in the world of work have been affected by the crisis, although in a differentiated way, depending on individual coun-
tries — and their policy responses to the crisis — and the area under study.
The first source of inequality unleashed by the crisis was due to the differentiated impact of employment adjustments among 
workers. Employment adjustments to the crisis have differed not only between countries, but also between different categories of 
workers.
The high percentage of temporary workers in countries such as Germany and Spain and also Hungary has led to employment 
adjustments without these being accompanied by a significant increase in unemployment rates. This also means, however, that 
temporary workers were the first category to be affected by the crisis, as in Spain, where they account for 95 % of employment 
adjustments. Short-term work contracts in France have also served as a sort of buffer during the crisis, with 53 % of job losses 
affecting interim agency workers, with not only low-skilled and young workers, but also older workers being severely hit. Self-
employed and family workers have also been particularly hard hit in Bulgaria, where the employment loss was also higher among 
temporary workers (– 10 %) compared to workers on a permanent contract (– 3 %). Part-time contracts have also been reduced 
twice as often as full-time contracts. Discriminatory practices have also been on the rise, as shown in Spain, where differentiated 
employment practices have multiplied on the basic of ethnic origin (reflected in a relatively higher growth in unemployment), or 
in Estonia where job losses have been much higher for non-nationals.
Younger groups have been severely affected everywhere — often because overrepresented among temporary workers — together 
with those with only basic or no qualifications, as in Spain and the UK — where long-term unemployment increased significantly 
among young people (16–17 and 19–24 years of age). In Spain, workers aged 20–29 have absorbed 75 % of the employment 
decrease. In the Netherlands, even young workers (below 25) in full-time jobs with permanent contracts have been hit hard, 
accounting for almost half of the total decline in employment. Low-skilled youth employment fell by more than 25 % between 2008 
(second quarter) and 2010. Targeted programmes for young people, as implemented in Sweden, have immediately helped. Regional 
differences also seem to have increased, with a greater impact being felt in, for instance, the south than the north of Italy, leading 
to a sharp fall in living standards and purchasing power in 2008–09 and a general increase in wage and income inequalities.
Certain sectors have suffered more than others, such as manufacturing and construction — which are dominated by men, and 
also — in the case of construction — migrant workers. This partly explains why men have so far been hardest hit by the crisis. Italy 
is an exception, with female — especially young (under 25) — workers so far being most affected by employment adjustments in 
the crisis.
The crisis has also hurt categories of employees not particularly affected in earlier recessions, such as those in middle-income jobs 
or in the public sector, or employees from the financial sector. Business failures have also multiplied, leading to a new source of 
vulnerability and exclusion.
There is also some evidence that the quality of work has significantly declined during the crisis. Intensity at work has often 
increased, together with the harassment and bullying of regular employees — as witnessed in Spain — while social dialogue and 
workers’ rights became harder to implement. There has also been a reallocation of work from large firms to smaller firms with 
lower quality jobs as reported in France in the care sector and in other countries in manufacturing. The rate of undeclared work 
may also have increased in the current crisis. In most EU countries, quality of work has declined not only for those who remain 
in work, but also from the perspective of those who lost their job in the crisis and had to — or will have to — take another job 
but of lower quality. The replacement of permanent jobs by temporary jobs (to promote future external flexibility), as observed in 
Bulgaria, France, Italy and the Baltic states may also have a long-term impact on employment quality.
Inequalities have also increased on the wage front. During the crisis, wage disparity (measured by the first over the last wage 
decile) has increased in Italy, but also in the Baltic states and other countries, while in Spain the proportion of workers on low 
incomes has increased — despite massive employment adjustment among the low skilled — together with increasing pressure 
from employers to renegotiate collective agreements. Government policy of freezing the minimum wage in Estonia and Lithuania 
has also contributed to this. Similarly, in the UK, France and also Bulgaria, wage disparity seems to have increased due to the fact 
that the minimum wage has not been raised during the crisis. This is in contrast to countries such as Poland or Portugal where 
the minimum wage has been raised to protect the most vulnerable workers. Non-payment of wages has also been observed, for 
example in Bulgaria, notably in railways. Violations of labour law, for instance with regard to the proper payment of working hours 
and overtime, have been reported in France, but also in other countries.
Alongside wage moderation, enterprises have also adapted through shorter working hours. Government intervention seems to 
have been decisive in Germany, with an average reduction of working time of 3.5 % or 50 hours per employee, but also in Sweden 
and France to promote work-sharing and avoid lay-offs in the crisis. In the UK, 20 % of interviewed companies also reported 
shorting working hours because of the crisis. Enterprise data in Hungary also show a reduction of working hours both in the pub-
lic and the private sectors. We must report, however, that such avoidance of job losses through working time reduction has been 
concerning mainly the core labour force that is permanent employees. In Estonia, working time reduction mainly occurred for a 
middle-aged, trade-unionised labour force.
1 Compiled on the basis of the preliminary findings of an ongoing EC–ILO project on this topic covering 30 countries (EU-27; Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia and Turkey), forthcoming in Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.), Work inequalities in the crisis, Edward Elgar, 2011.
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crisis and, in the second, to sustain 
economic activity through the worst 
of the downturn mean that the con-
sequences of the crisis for the public 
finances are now the focus of signifi-
cant retrenchment measures across 
the EU. Major measures to restore 
and stabilise the public finances have 
already been implemented in several 
countries, including Greece, Ireland, 
Spain,  Portugal and the  Baltic states.
The employment consequences of 
the crisis have not been as severe as 
might have been expected given the 
experience of previous recessions. 
The decline in output has not, in 
the majority of Member States, been 
mirrored by an equivalent fall in 
employment, or rise in unemploy-
ment. Employment effects are well-
known to lag those in output during 
a recession, and half-way through 
2010 the employment situation was 
continuing to deteriorate in most 
countries, albeit at a slower rate 
than in 2009, even though output 
had begun to rise in many. None-
theless, job loss has — to some sig-
nificant extent — been mitigated by 
a decline in average hours worked. 
The role of the short-time work-
ing schemes implemented in many 
countries, and of collectively nego-
tiated adjustments to working time, 
are addressed in Chapter 3.
Different patterns in the relationship 
between output and employment are, 
however, apparent across countries. 
Taking the countries that differ the 
most, in Ireland and Spain the decline 
in employment has been at least as 
great as that in output. In contrast, in 
Germany and the Benelux countries 
employment levels have been broadly 
sustained despite falls in GDP of 
varying magnitude. One explanation 
for the contrast advanced by com-
mentators (3), is that economies have 
undergone different types of reces-
sion. One was initially triggered by 
a sharp drop in construction activity 
associated with a slump in the hous-
ing and property markets, as occurred 
in Ireland and Spain. Decreasing out-
put in construction rapidly translates 
into job loss. The other originated 
through a collapse in consumer and 
business confidence and in trade, and 
corresponds to the experience of Ger-
many and the Benelux countries, and 
a range of other economies including 
France and the UK. In these coun-
tries, the downturn is focused more 
on the manufacturing sector, where 
strenuous efforts have been made to 
sustain employment levels. If the dif-
fering nature of the economic crisis in 
different c ountries offers one possible 
3 For example, Stefano Scarpetta of the OECD cited 
in the Financial Times’ feature ‘At the sharp end’, 22 
January 2010.
explanation, another, to be addressed 
in Chapter 3, is the actions of the 
social partners and public authorities 
aimed at mitigating job loss.
Perspectives of 2.3. 
the social partners 
on public policy 
responses to the 
crisis
The aims of this section are threefold. 
First, to identify the perspectives of 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions respectively on the public pol-
icy responses required to address the 
crisis and its consequences. Second, to 
establish the extent to which there are 
points in common between the social 
partners as well as differences. Third, 
to try and account for cross-country 
variation in the extent to which the 
social partners have reached similar 
or common positions according to the 
magnitude of the crisis and/or insti-
tutional arrangements for social dia-
logue in different countries. 
Surveying the perspectives of national 
social partner organisations towards 
addressing the effects of the crisis, 
two main phases can be distinguished 
(Freyssinet, 2009; Hethy, 2009). In 
Trends in social dialogue have also had some impact on inequalities during the crisis. In several countries, sectors covered by 
collective bargaining seem to have benefited from the negotiation of alternatives to employment cuts (see Chapter 3). In contrast, 
where social dialogue was weaker — as in several central and east European countries — there seems to have been no alternative to 
immediate employment adjustments and wage cuts have been immediate and more severe. Labour disputes have increased — for 
instance in 2009 their number doubled in Estonia — mainly because of claims for unpaid wages, bonuses and paid holidays, as well 
as the unlawful termination of employment contracts and abuses of some work contracts.
The impact of the crisis on other labour areas has also contributed to increase inequalities. The decrease in training programmes in 
the crisis, as witnessed in Estonia, Spain and also other countries, seems to have put unskilled workers in an even more vulnerable 
position. Short-term effects should also be distinguished from longer-term effects. While women so far may have suffered less from 
employment adjustments, this may be changing — with, for instance, current job cuts in the public sector and services. Moreover, 
it does not mean that women may not have suffered more from other types of pressure, for instance on the wage front, or from a 
deterioration of other working conditions and work and family arrangements that have been radically curtailed in the crisis.
Cuts in training expenditure but also work and family services within the crisis may have weakened even further the potential for 
employees to shift toward better quality and better paid jobs, an effect that will only be visible after a long time. It might therefore 
be expected that, beyond the most obvious increases in inequalities in the crisis, other sources of inequality will become more 
evident over the years to come.
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the first, from the onset of the crisis 
in mid-2008 through until early 2009, 
the adoption by governments of anti-
crisis packages aimed at sustaining 
economic activity and employment 
received broad, if qualified, support 
from employers’ organisations and 
trade unions. In the second, from 
mid-2009 onwards, tensions and con-
flicts between employers’ organisa-
tions, trade unions and governments 
emerge in some, but not all, countries 
over the distribution of costs and 
uncertainties associated with two 
main aspects of measures paving the 
way towards recovery. One concerns 
the conditions for restoring business 
activity. The other involves growing 
recourse by governments to austerity 
measures to tackle the impact of the 
crisis on public finances.
The first phase was marked by con-
siderable consensus across coun-
tries on the urgency of governments 
intervening with measures to stimu-
late the economy, even if there were 
differences over the magnitude of 
the stimulus required and the means 
by which it should be achieved. 
Trade unions tended to call for a 
larger-scale stimulus than employ-
ers’ organisations, and emphasised 
increases in public investment, 
including  infrastructure and edu-
cation and training, and measures 
to maintain purchasing power and 
thereby consumption. Employers’ 
organisations, whilst also advocat-
ing measures to promote education 
and training, tended to favour meas-
ures which reduced labour costs and 
taxes, thereby facilitating private 
investment as well as consumption 
(Demetriades and Kullander, 2009; 
Rychly, 2009). Nonetheless, bipartite 
consensus and/or explicit tripartite 
agreement over anti-crisis measures 
was evident across a range of coun-
tries. The main exceptions were 
those, such as Ireland, Hungary and 
the Baltic states, where the  severity 
of the crisis from its inception elimi-
nated the scope for any stimulus 
package, essentially confronting 
these countries from the outset with 
the distributional issues that were to 
subsequently emerge elsewhere.
Under the second phase, two kinds 
of disagreement have become appar-
ent (Freyssinet, 2009; Hethy, 2009; 
Rychly, 2009). The first, between 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions, is over the conditions 
required for business activity to be 
restored.
Employers’ organisations place •	
priority on measures to restore 
competitiveness, including tight 
control of labour costs — evi-
denced in calls for freezing wages 
and/or wage moderation — and 
measures to further enhance 
flexibility in the labour market 
and workplace.
Trade unions prioritise employ-•	
ment security — for example 
through extension of short-time 
working schemes, social  protection 
— for example by extending the 
reach of welfare systems and the 
maintenance of purchasing power 
— through increases in wages suf-
ficient to maintain them in real 
terms and protection of the real 
value of unemployment and social 
benefits. They fear that measures 
to increase flexibility will nega-
tively impact further on employ-
ment security.
Governments are at the centre of the 
second, where proposed austerity 
measures have major implications 
for public sector employment, and, 
in some countries (the Baltic states, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and 
also Ireland and Greece), involve 
cuts or the freezing of public sector 
pay and/or cuts in benefit entitle-
ments and/or levels.
Such proposals have invoked wide-•	
spread trade union opposition (see 
Box 3.7 in Chapter 3), but have been 
urged by, or received open or tacit 
support from, employers’ organi-
sations, who are concerned to see 
public deficits brought down.
Further disagreement between •	
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions over austerity measures has 
focused on the balance between 
reduction in public services and 
increases in taxation, with trade 
unions favouring the preserva-
tion of public services at the cost 
of higher taxation and employ-
ers tending to advocate the con-
verse (Demetriades and Kullander, 
2009).
Around this overall trajectory, there 
is variation across countries in the 
extent to which there has been con-
sensus between the social partner 
organisations on the public policy 
measures required to address the cri-
sis. A broad three-way distinction can 
be drawn (see Table 2.3) between:
countries where a considerable •	
degree of bi-partisan consensus has 
been forged and for the most part 
sustained;
countries characterised by a lesser •	
degree of bi-partisan consensus, 
including some where it has been 
confined to specific issues and some 
where disagreements have prevailed 
over part of the period; and
countries where disagreements •	
between the social partners pre-
vailed throughout, of for part of, 
the period.
The extent to which governments 
were receptive to social partner 
 proposals and involved social part-
ners in the framing of packages of 
measures has also varied.
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In order to gauge the extent and 
 nature of these two kinds of varia-
tion, the perspectives of employers’ 
organisations and trade unions on 
the measures required to address the 
crisis, and their involvement in fram-
ing the policies implemented by gov-
ernments, in the Member States are 
briefly reviewed. The perspectives of 
the two main cross-sector European 
social partners are summarised in 
Box 2.5 (BusinessEurope) and Box 2.6 
(ETUC). The account focuses on 
 developments from the onset of the 
crisis, in the summer of 2008, up 
 until April 2010.
Panorama of national 2.3.1. 
social partner policy 
perspectives
In Germany and Austria, there 
has been a significant degree of 
 bi-partisan support for measures 
 introduced by government, although 
some disagreements have emerged 
over proposed austerity measures. 
Germany’s social partners were con-
sulted — and exerted a degree of 
influence — over the two economic 
stimulus packages brought for-
ward by the federal government in 
November 2008 and January 2009, 
and participated in two economic 
summits convened by the govern-
ment in December 2008 and April 
2009,  respectively (Zagelmeyer, 
2009). They also recommended suc-
cessfully that the duration of statu-
tory short-time work benefit should 
be extended. Employers’ and trade 
associations welcomed the stimu-
lus packages and have repeatedly 
called for a reduction in employers’ 
social security contributions and 
 non-wage labour costs, measures 
to ease companies’ access to bank 
loans and investment in education 
and infrastructure. Trade unions 
have welcomed aspects of the stimu-
lus packages, such as the additional 
support for short-time working, 
but criticised the magnitude of the 
stimulus as being insufficient. They 
called for a further stimulus package 
at the April 2009 summit, includ-
ing education and infrastructure 
investments. In December 2009, the 
short-time work scheme was fur-
ther extended as part of an ‘employ-
ment pact’ tabled by the government 
and endorsed by the social partners 
(Planet Labor, 2009). The scale and 
composition of austerity measures 
proposed by the government in the 
spring of 2010 have, however, been 
strongly criticised by trade unions.
In Austria, a government package 
of measures aimed at stimulating 
the labour market, introduced in 
July 2009, drew support from both 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions, which had both been criti-
cal of an unsuccessful earlier set of 
measures adopted in January (Adam, 
2009). The social partners also 
made a joint proposal to make the 
statutory short-time work scheme 
more flexible, which was enacted in 
 February 2009.
The picture amongst the Nor-
dic countries varies. In Denmark, 
broad consensus has been  apparent 
 between the social partners, but 
there have been differences with 
the government. In Sweden, differ-
ences  between employer organisa-
tions’ and trade unions on policy 
responses to the crisis have been 
apparent from the start of the crisis, 
whilst in Finland bi-partisan support 
for government anti-crisis measures 
in the early phase has given way to 
tensions between trade unions and 
government over distribution of the 
burden in the medium-term.
The Danish government had set up a 
tripartite committee in early 2008 to 
consider labour market reforms. Fol-
lowing the onset of the crisis recom-
mendations were submitted in the 
autumn. However, the subsequent 
proposals put forward by the govern-
ment failed to win the support of the 
social partners and the initiative was 
deferred. The social partners called 
on the government to take measures 
to strengthen the labour market, 
notably making the state-supported 
short-time work (‘work-sharing’) 
scheme more flexible. In March 
2009, the government launched a 
four-pronged package of measures 
to simulate the labour market. Three 
elements, boosting support for train-
ing; introducing an early-warning 
system for pending job losses; and 
improvements to labour market 
monitoring, were welcomed by both 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions. The fourth element intro-
ducing more flexible rules for work-
sharing was, however, criticised by 
both social partners as not going far 
enough (Jørgensen, 2009).
Responding to the Swedish govern-
ment’s draft budget bill published 
in September 2008, employers’ 
organisations welcomed the empha-
sis on tax cuts and a reduction in 
social contributions as the princi-
pal means of implementing a fiscal 
stimulus. Unions, whilst welcom-
ing the  stimulus, were sceptical over 
the efficacy of tax cuts and called 
instead for larger cuts in employee 
contributions to unemployment 
benefits and measures to boost 
employment and training through 
Box 2.4:  
Information sources
The data on the perspectives of national 
employer and trade union organisa-
tions are, unless otherwise indicated, 
drawn from: Eurofound’s European 
Industrial Relations Observatory; and 
two private-subscription based online 
services, European Employment 
Review and Planet Labor. 
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more active labour market interven-
tion. Responding to the 2009 finance 
bill, introduced in April, employers’ 
organisations criticised measures 
providing extra support for local 
authorities and the welfare system, 
advocating instead further stimulus 
measures directed towards public 
investment and incentivising private 
investment. Trade unions, however, 
considered the further support for 
local authorities and the welfare sys-
tem to be insufficient, and raised the 
spectre of a return to the high levels 
of long-term unemployment expe-
rienced in the early 1990s, unless 
further action was taken. In July, 
the social partners again disagreed 
over measures required to tackle ris-
ing youth unemployment. Unions 
also criticised the government’s 
employment policy programme for 
2010–11, issued in August 2009, as 
being inadequate for dealing with 
the rising level of unemployment. In 
the autumn, further disagreement 
between the social partners emerged 
over wage policy for 2010 onwards 
(Lovén, 2009).
Both employers’ organisations and 
trade unions broadly welcomed 
the January 2009 stimulus pack-
age introduced by the Finnish 
government, although employers 
expressed concern at the possibil-
ity of offsetting increases in com-
pany taxation to fund reductions in 
social contributions. Trade unions 
particularly welcomed the positive 
employment impact of measures 
to boost infrastructure investment. 
Subsequently, government plans to 
raise the retirement age (from 63 
to 65) and eliminate the possibil-
ity of early retirement were fiercely 
 opposed by trade unions and, fol-
lowing the threat of a general strike, 
were withdrawn in March. The 
issue was passed to the social part-
ners to identify an alternative solu-
tion which would have the desired 
impact on public debt. By February 
2010, however, agreement could be 
reached on only one of two linked 
sets of proposals. Trade unions have 
subsequently criticised the govern-
ment’s draft 2010 budget on the 
grounds that the stimulus envisaged 
is insufficient to impact on unem-
ployment and — like their Swedish 
counterparts — invoked the risk of 
a return to the high level of long-
term unemployment experienced 
20 years ago. Unions were generally 
more favourable to a government 
proposal not to increase income tax 
if unions agreed moderate pay rises 
in 2010 (Jokivuori, 2009).
Belgium and the Netherlands have 
seen a considerable measure of con-
sensus between the social partners 
in the course of sustained bipartite 
discussions and tripartite concerta-
tion with government over policy 
responses to the crisis, although 
with some strains appearing as 2009 
progressed. In Luxembourg, how-
ever, whilst the government devel-
oped its initial anti-crisis measures 
in close concertation with the social 
partners, further tripartite talks in 
early 2010 broke down.
In Belgium, the social partners pre-
sented a set of joint anti-crisis meas-
ures to the government in December 
2008, in the context of the inter-
sector agreement concluded by 
the employers’ and trade union 
confederations for 2009–10. The 
measures proposed bolstering pur-
chasing power by improvements to 
fringe benefits (travel to and meals 
at work) and increases in pensions 
and unemployment benefits and the 
reduction of taxes on labour costs. 
Together the measures were aimed 
at achieving a balance between 
sustaining purchasing power and 
improving companies’ competi-
tiveness, were incorporated by the 
government in a stimulus package 
launched in January 2009. However, 
controversy between the social part-
ners erupted in the summer over 
proposals from the employers’ con-
federation to curtail the possibility 
of early retirement and recalibrate 
pension entitlements. Further disa-
greement emerged later in the year 
over the emphasis of government 
plans to reduce public expenditure, 
with employers favouring cuts in 
public employment and opposing 
higher taxation and trade unions 
calling for a fair sharing of cuts and 
the protection of social security 
budgets. In January 2010, the three 
main union confederations mounted 
a joint demonstration in support of 
their position (Van Gyes, 2010).
Whilst the social partners in Luxem-
bourg supported government meas-
ures, introduced in March 2009, 
providing support for purchasing 
power and businesses, employers’ 
organisations regretted that they did 
not go further in terms of structural 
reforms to boost company competi-
tiveness. Subsequent tripartite talks 
in the opening months of 2010 col-
lapsed over employers’ central pro-
posal for a two-year freeze in the 
indexation of wages and pensions, 
which received some support from 
the government but was fiercely 
rejected by trade unions (Planet 
 Labor, 2010a).
In the Netherlands, the government 
and the social partners discussed 
the impending problems as early as 
March 2008. Cooperation intensified 
with the onset of the crisis, with the 
parties agreeing in their autumn con-
sultation that they should proceed by 
consensus in addressing the effects. 
Trade unions emphasised the need 
for measures to sustain purchas-
ing power, but agreed to moder-
ate wage demands in exchange for 
other measures, including reduced 
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Box 2.5: European social partner perspectives: BusinessEurope
The European economic recovery plan, presented by the Commission in November 2008 and adopted by the European Council 
the following month, contained two main elements: a fiscal stimulus equivalent to 1.5 % of the EU’s GDP; and short-term action to 
strengthen the long-term competitiveness of the European economy, including fostering a more rapid shift towards climate friendly 
business activity.
BusinessEurope broadly welcomed the Council’s recovery plan (BusinessEurope, 2008). It underlined the need for short-term crisis 
response measures to sustain economic activity, to ensure access to finance for companies and to maintain employment, to be accom-
panied by the speeding up of structural reforms. BusinessEurope stressed that short-term measures should not be to the detriment 
of necessary, longer-run, structural reforms. Neither should they undermine the functioning of the single market, through invoking 
forms of protection. An effectively functioning and well-enforced single market is seen as integral to the resumption of economic 
growth and the creation of jobs. BusinessEurope called for macroeconomic coordination, viewing uncoordinated national responses 
as potentially damaging to the process of economic integration and, relatedly, called for a strengthening of the role of the ECB (Busi-
nessEurope, 2009b, 2009c). It also proposed a series of measures aimed at improving availability of corporate finance and reducing its 
sharply increased cost (BusinessEurope, 2009a).
In its spring 2009 European reform barometer (BusinessEurope, 2009b), BusinessEurope described the absence of a visible structural 
reform strategy as ‘a vital flaw in the European response to the crisis’. Structural reforms in three areas were highlighted: improving 
the business environment for companies; cost-saving reforms to public finances, to ensure sustainability; and labour market reforms. 
On the last, BusinessEurope proposes further measures to increase flexibility in the labour market, including investment in skills, to 
facilitate the recovery. It views measures to reduce non-wage labour costs as necessary to the achievement of a more inclusive labour 
market, as well as to improving competitiveness (BusinessEurope, 2009c). More generally, BusinessEurope has emphasised the cen-
trality of flexicurity principles as providing the appropriate policy framework for responding to the crisis (BusinessEurope, 2010c).
BusinessEurope’s autumn 2009 economic outlook (BusinessEurope, 2009d) noted the emerging signs that the economic situation was 
stabilising and renewed its call for accelerated structural reform to facilitate recovery. Further action to stabilise financial markets 
and alleviate continuing restrictions on companies’ access to finance, was urged. And steps to secure the long-term stability of public 
finances were advocated, through reform of the public sector and changes to social welfare systems aimed at placing them on a sus-
tainable footing. Also in the autumn, BusinessEurope published a strategy for European economic growth and jobs over a five-year 
period beyond 2010 (BusinessEurope, 2009e). This calls for EU policies to be strengthened around five pillars, seen by BusinessEu-
rope as mutually reinforcing:
deepening economic integration and restoring financial stability, with particular priority given to completing the internal market •	
for services.
strengthening governance arrangements for the euro area;•	
enhancing innovation, entrepreneurship, education and skills, thereby augmenting the EU’s productivity potential and external •	
competitiveness;
modernisation of social protection and employment systems, involving reforms which reduce public expenditure commitments •	
(and therefore deficits), promote labour mobility and enhance labour market participation. Employment policies should stimulate 
the education and training required to significantly enhance the quality and quantity of skills available;
an integrated approach to energy, environmental and competitiveness policies, to simultaneously address the challenges of energy •	
security, mitigating climate change and enhancing competitiveness;
shaping globalisation and combating protectionism through external policies aimed at promoting trade and balanced and sustain-•	
able international growth, and reinforcing the international financial system.
In its spring 2010 economic outlook (BusinessEurope, 2010a), BusinessEurope observed that although severe, the recession was 
seemingly relatively short-lived and that business confidence was improving. Nonetheless daunting challenges remained and three 
priorities were identified in order to consolidate the recovery. First, action to restore the viability of the public services, otherwise 
currently unsustainable levels of public debt would soon impede the recovery. Second, companies needed to be assured that the 
external financing required for new investment would be available from the currently weakened banking sector. Third, the temporary 
schemes which had supported employment through the recession needed to be complemented by long-term structural reforms to 
the labour market to ensure future employment growth. Ahead of the March European Council, BusinessEurope published its own 
growth agenda (BusinessEurope, 2010b) which called for an ‘exit strategy’ to cap and reduce public debt, including tighter fiscal rules 
to ensure long-term budgetary discipline, ‘credible’ measures to cut public expenditure, efficiency improvements in public admin-
istration and healthcare, a greater role for the private sector in public service and public infrastructure provision and the reform of 
pension systems. These measures needed to be coupled with an ‘entry strategy’ aimed at doubling the EU’s growth potential by 2014, 
including measures to better anticipate future skill requirements, improve the returns from R & D and innovation and boost public 
infrastructure investment (BusinessEurope, 2010c).
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 unemployment insurance contri-
butions and a reduction in VAT. 
Employers’ organisations empha-
sised actions aimed at competitive-
ness, including reduction of taxation, 
wage moderation and reform of dis-
missal laws. Agreement was reached 
in October on a compromise pack-
age of measures to be introduced 
by the government. By the spring of 
2009, both employers’ organisations 
and trade unions were critical of the 
government’s emergency economic 
plans as being too cautious, taking 
the view that a more substantial fis-
cal stimulus was required. Following 
extensive tripartite deliberations, 
a consensus was reached in April 
between the government and the 
social partners on a further pack-
age, aimed at providing a stimu-
lus to economic activity through 
until 2011. This package comprised 
measures in four areas: actions to 
promote employment, training and 
education; maintenance of the pur-
chasing power of unemployment 
benefit; a boost to public investment 
in infrastructure; and measures to 
foster innovation and sustainable 
economic activity. As in Finland, 
there was disagreement between the 
government and trade unions over a 
proposal to raise the retirement age; 
and the social partners were handed 
the responsibility of coming up with 
an alternative proposal. They sub-
sequently failed in their attempt to 
do so and in October the govern-
ment announced that it would act 
unilaterally (Grünell, 2010). As 
in Belgium, tripartite consensus 
on the package was accompanied 
by a bipartite agreement between 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions to moderate wage increases 
in the 2010 bargaining round.
In Spain, a broad measure of con-
sensus between the government and 
social partners in the early phase of 
the crisis gave way to deadlock, as 
the social partners failed to agree 
over wage policy and labour mar-
ket reform. After almost a year the 
social partners re-established bipar-
tite consensus over pay. Measures 
to address the crisis were discussed 
within Spain’s tripartite social dia-
logue process in the spring of 2008. 
Employers’ organisations and trade 
unions gave broad support to the 
measures launched by the govern-
ment to bolster economic activity, 
which included improving compa-
nies’ access to credit, a stimulus to 
business activity and employment, 
and promotion of training and life-
long learning. By early 2009, the 
social dialogue process was dead-
locked as employers’ organisations 
and trade unions differed over 
apportioning the costs of the crisis. 
Employers’ organisations and trade 
unions had failed to make progress 
on negotiations for their usual 
annual multi-sector agreement to 
frame wage negotiations and no 
agreement could be reached for 
2009. Further disagreement focused 
on the renewal by the main employ-
ers’ organisation of its long-standing 
call to reform dismissal law, so as 
to improve labour market flexibil-
ity (Freyssinet, 2009). In February 
it proposed an ‘anti-crisis’ employ-
ment contract, which would have 
reduced severance payments and 
eliminated administrative require-
ments to notify public authorities 
of redundancies. Trade unions (and 
the government) rejected the pro-
posals. Further government meas-
ures introduced in March 2009, 
aimed at combating unemployment, 
were, as a result, introduced with-
out the views of the social partners 
being sought. The social partners 
eventually succeeded in overcoming 
their differences over the conduct of 
wage bargaining in 2009, in Novem-
ber, and subsequently signed a new 
cross-sector agreement in February 
2010. The breakthrough encouraged 
the government to make a renewed 
attempt in February to reach a tri-
partite agreement on labour market 
reform, largely focused on promot-
ing stable employment (European 
Employment Review, 2010). How-
ever, the initiative was partly over-
shadowed by government proposals 
to increase the retirement age, which 
elicited fierce protests from trade 
unions (Sanz de Miguel, 2010).
France presents a mixed picture, 
exhibiting both disagreements 
between trade unions and govern-
ment, and between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations, on the 
measures required to address the cri-
sis, and also government-instigated 
cooperation between the social part-
ners over employment measures. 
The government convened tripartite 
‘social summits’ in February and July 
2009, set up a tripartite committee to 
monitor the crisis and in April 2009 
launched a joint  government–social 
partner ‘social  investment fund’ to 
coordinate action on training and 
reskilling for those workers most 
affected by the crisis. In January 2009 
the social partners — at the behest of 
the government — agreed on boost-
ing training opportunities for less-
well-qualified people as part of an 
employment action plan. They also 
reached a cross-sector agreement in 
July on managing the employment 
consequences of the economic crisis, 
many of whose provisions (such as 
amendments to the short-time work 
scheme) were implemented by the 
government. Meanwhile, a govern-
ment stimulus package, announced 
in February 2009, which focused 
on providing public aid for compa-
nies, bolstering the welfare system 
and public investment to modern-
ise infrastructure, was welcomed by 
employers’ organisations but strongly 
criticised by trade unions. Trade 
unions organised a series of nation-
wide demonstrations on four dates 
72
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010
between  mid-March and mid-June, 
to reinforce their call for government 
action to sustain purchasing power, 
to abolish taxation privileges for the 
wealthy and to make reductions in 
employers’ social contributions con-
tingent on employers taking compen-
sating measures to enhance training 
and/or preserve employment (Robin, 
2009). The extent to which France’s 
traditionally fractious union con-
federations have mobilised around 
a common platform is noticeable, 
and contrasts with the situation in 
Italy. The employers’ confederation, 
Medef, has criticised trade union tac-
tics of instigating large-scale protests, 
as well as advancing its own policy 
proposals focused on improving 
adaptability and employability in the 
labour market and improving com-
petitiveness.
In Italy, the picture is also mixed. A 
measure of consensus has been appar-
ent between the main employers’ con-
federation, Confindustria and two 
of the trade union confederations, 
alongside sharp differences with the 
third (and largest) union confedera-
tion, CGIL. The former gave a cau-
tious welcome to the government’s 
anti-crisis package announced in 
November 2008, which was mainly 
aimed at boosting demand for con-
sumer industries, with a particular 
focus on the automotive sector and 
increasing support for the poorest 
households. Confindustria called, in 
addition, for support to be broadened 
to other sectors and to SMEs. The 
three main trade union confedera-
tions each called for the social part-
ners to be consulted over this and 
subsequent measures, but in contrast 
to most other countries characterised 
by multiple union confederations, 
display divisions. CGIL has proposed 
different measures to those called for 
by the other two confederations (Watt 
and Nikolova, 2009). Whereas CISL 
and UIL welcomed the government’s 
package and have continued their dia-
logue with government and employ-
ers’ organisations, CGIL was strongly 
critical. It presented a six-point plan 
of measures to address the crisis, 
including support for employment by 
extending the scope and duration of 
temporary lay-off benefit, incentives 
for innovation and investment, pub-
lic investment aimed at greening the 
economy and enhanced welfare sup-
ports for those on low incomes. CGIL 
unilaterally called a general strike in 
April 2009 in protest over the per-
ceived inadequacy of the government’s 
response to the crisis, and a further 
one in support of similar demands in 
March 2010 (Tajani, 2010).
Consensus between the social part-
ners in Portugal and Greece has 
been limited and in neither country 
have the social partners been closely 
involved in the development of gov-
ernment measures responding to the 
crisis. As the debt crisis has escalated, 
this limited consensus has broken 
down in Greece. In Portugal, trade 
unions have pressed government to 
introduce more ambitious measures 
than those undertaken to maintain 
employment, sustain business activity 
(through enhancing the short-term 
working scheme) and boost train-
ing opportunities throughout 2009. 
The main employers’ organisations 
called for measures to improve com-
panies’ competitiveness and facilitate 
restructuring including reductions 
in the burden of taxation, improved 
access to credit, special assistance for 
SMEs and public investment in edu-
cation and training. Autumn 2009 
saw sharp differences between the 
social partners over wages policy for 
2010 and the government’s decision 
to raise the minimum wage (da Paz 
Campos Lima, 2009).
The Greek employers’ and trade 
union confederations have pre-
sented their own, separate proposals 
to  government. There was common 
ground in the calls of both social 
partners for support to sustain activ-
ity in hard-sit sectors, including 
construction and tourism, and for 
public investment in infrastructure. 
Employers’ organisations emphasised 
measures to reduce the cost of social 
welfare and tax incentives to promote 
investment. Trade unions called for 
measures to support purchasing 
power, particularly for low earners 
and those in receipt of unemploy-
ment benefit. Differences emerged 
as the Greek government moved to 
address the rising public deficit from 
mid-2009 onwards, with public sector 
trade unions staging a general strike 
against measures to freeze public sec-
tor pay and pensions, whilst employ-
ers’ organisations acknowledged 
the necessity for such measures. As 
the economic and financial situa-
tion deteriorated, further govern-
ment moves to drastically cut public 
spending, with cumulative effects 
on social benefits and public sector 
pay and pensions, triggered renewed 
and large-scale protests by private 
as well as public sector trade unions 
throughout the opening months of 
2010 (Planet Labor, 2010b).
In Cyprus and Malta, there has been 
considerable consensus around the 
response to the crisis. In Cyprus, gov-
ernment initiatives to stimulate the 
economy and protect jobs, launched 
in November 2009, received a gen-
erally positive response from the 
social partners, while some trade 
unions decided to moderate their 
2010 pay demands in the light of 
the economic situation (Soumeli, 
2009). In early 2009, a number of 
Maltese social partner organisations 
made joint proposals for improv-
ing the economic situation, such as 
reducing companies’ costs and fiscal 
burden and supporting employees 
on short-time working. The social 
partners subsequently supported and 
Chapter 2: The crisis: challenges and social partner perspectives
73
 cooperated with government efforts 
to prevent job losses and support 
crisis-hit sectors. However, there 
were areas of disagreement. Employ-
ers called for the statutory cost-of-
living wage increase for 2010 to be 
awarded only to lower-paid employ-
ees, or subsidised by the government, 
given the economic situation. This 
was opposed by the government and 
trade unions (Rizzo, 2009).
In the UK, consensus between the 
social partners has been confined 
to specific issues. Trade unions and 
employers’ organisations have been 
involved in informal and ad hoc dis-
cussions with the public authorities 
on the direction of economic and 
labour market policy. In autumn 
2008, trade unions unsuccessfully 
called for the implementation of a 
short-time working scheme similar to 
those  being brought into use in other 
EU countries. They have also made 
repeated calls for an increase in statu-
tory redundancy pay (which is below 
the levels of comparable countries). 
The employers’ confederation, CBI, 
subsequently proposed an ‘alternative 
to  redundancy plan’, partially financed 
by the state, under which employ-
ees could be placed on temporary 
leave for up to six months, but this 
Box 2.6 European social partner perspectives: the ETUC
In the lead-up to the November and December 2008 Council meetings, the ETUC called for a major fiscal stimulus for Europe’s 
economy. It welcomed the fiscal stimulus contained in the European economic recovery plan (see Box 2.5), but drew attention to the 
absence of a European framework for implementing it, which it regarded as a major flaw. Uncoordinated national measures risked 
dangers of competition between Member States and, relatedly, the spread of protectionism. In emphasising the need to police the 
single market, the ETUC underlined the disruptive social consequences of failing to do so. It saw a real risk of Europe being pulled 
apart economically, socially and politically (ETUC, 2009a).
In a resolution adopted just ahead of the December 2008 Council meeting, the ETUC called for a series of further measures. These 
included proposals for a ‘new social deal’, which would focus recovery measures on investments leading to the creation of more and 
better (including ‘greener’) jobs, a strengthening of social welfare systems and strengthened workers’ rights. The new social deal, 
formalised in May, covers five main action points (ETUC, 2009b):
investment in an augmented European recovery plan aimed at creating more and better jobs. The ETUC called for an additional •	
1 % of the EU’s GDP for an investment programme, including accelerating the ‘greening’ of the European economy which were 
presented as proposals for a ‘New green deal’ (see Box 5.7 in Chapter 5);
strengthening of social welfare systems to enhance social protection, and equality, and to mitigate against social exclusion;•	
strengthening of workers’ rights, particularly at transnational level, in order to eliminate disruptive social effects of the single mar-•	
ket;
better pay, seen as vital to sustaining purchasing power, to be achieved through the strengthening of collective bargaining and wage •	
formation institutions, and thereby the wage floors that they entrench;
effective re-regulation of financial markets and actions to secure distributive justice through fair taxation systems. Amongst the •	
measures specified is the creation of a level playing field for tax regimes on sources of income, such as profits and capital gains, 
which are mobile across borders.
May also saw coordinated protest actions in support of a new social deal in Madrid, Brussels, Berlin and Prague.
In its autumn report on the European economy (ETUC, 2009c), the ETUC warned European and national public authorities against 
a premature exit from the fiscal stimulus strategy at the heart of the European economic recovery plan. Incipient recovery, according 
to the ETUC, is based on factors that are temporary in nature: re-stocking, as companies bring inventories up to levels consistent with 
current demand; the fixed-term nature of elements of the fiscal stimulus undertaken by national governments; and the cushioning 
of household consumption from the worst effects of the recession by short-time working schemes and the legacy of wage agreements 
concluded before the crisis broke. Against this, the spectre of public, and private, debt-induced deflation threatens economic recovery 
in the medium term. For these reasons the ETUC considered that the fiscal stimulus needed to be maintained.
The ETUC’s growing concerns at signs that (some) national governments were preparing to exit prematurely from the fiscal stimulus 
packages which have sustained economic activity and employment were reiterated in its December memorandum to the incoming 
Spanish Presidency (ETUC, 2009d) and in a March 2010 message to the European Council (ETUC, 2010). According to the ETUC, 
premature exit would cause more economic and social harm than a further short-term deterioration in public finances, with any 
budget cuts threatening to choke off recovery, undermine social protection (when it needed to be strengthened) and lead to a spike 
in unemployment. Winding down of the stimulus packages needed to be synchronised with an upturn in private sector activity, when 
that arrived. In its message to the European Council, the ETUC declared that ‘Social Europe is under pressure’ and underlined in 
particular the need for measures to reduce high levels of youth unemployment. It renewed its call for an augmented recovery plan 
and a new social deal. It also proposed a strengthening of European economic governance in two respects. First, to enable a recovery 
programme to be agreed with Greece, and any other Member State in difficulty, which would protect essential public services and the 
interests of workers. Second, to enable the introduction of new means of raising the funds required to support recovery and return 
Europe’s economy to growth, such as a financial transactions tax.
74
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010
was not  taken up either.  Employers’ 
organisations have repeatedly called 
on government to place more focus 
on providing support for companies, 
including access to credit, which 
would have the effect of preventing 
unemployment. Ahead of the 2009 
budget in April, both social partners 
called for measures aimed at main-
taining employment and mitigating 
the rise in unemployment, although 
they differed in the preferred means 
to achieve this. They also differed 
over the balance of measures aimed 
at stimulating the economy and those 
which addressed the mounting pub-
lic sector deficit (Carley, 2009). By 
early 2010, the CBI was increasingly 
critical of the absence of government 
action to tackle the deteriorating 
public finances. The union confeder-
ation, TUC, however, was concerned 
that premature action could jeopard-
ise the fragile economic recovery and 
exacerbate unemployment.
In Ireland the magnitude of the cri-
sis from the outset, and its impact 
on public finances, immediately con-
fronted government and the social 
partners with major policy decisions 
on the distribution of the burden. 
Disagreements between government, 
employers’ organisations and trade 
unions have tested Ireland’s long-
standing  national partnership to, and 
seemingly beyond, the limit. In Janu-
ary 2009, the government convened 
emergency tripartite consultations to 
identify measures to secure an imme-
diate and lasting reduction in public 
expenditure in the face of the rapidly 
escalating public deficit. Talks col-
lapsed in February over the govern-
ment’s introduction of a 7 % pension 
levy on all public sector workers and 
proposed public sector pay freeze. 
At the same time, the employers’ 
confederation, IBEC requested that 
implementation of the national wage 
agreement concluded in Septem-
ber 2008 be deferred in the light of 
companies’ economic circumstances 
(IBEC  formally pulled out of the 
agreement at the end of 2009 — see 
Chapter 3). The union confederation, 
ICTU, opposed the government’s 
overall approach on the grounds that 
the pain of fiscal adjustment needed 
to be shared by other groups in society 
and not focus on a particular group. 
It criticised the March 2009 emer-
gency budget, which incorporated 
the measures, as well as reductions in 
welfare payments and an increase in 
employers’ social charges; and pro-
posed a reform of the taxation system 
towards a fairer set of arrangements, 
with implied increases in taxation and 
measures to maintain employment, as 
part a broad ‘social solidarity pact’ to 
tackle the crisis. IBEC welcomed the 
budget’s remedial action to address 
the public finances and emphasised 
its preference for measures which 
reduced public expenditure over 
those which increased taxes. Fur-
ther talks over a possible tripartite 
national recovery agreement in sum-
mer 2009 again failed, with unions 
unable to accept the government’s 
planned cuts in public expenditure. 
Public sector trade unions held a 
one-day national strike in November 
2009, and subsequent talks between 
the government and unions over fur-
ther reductions in the public sector 
paybill failed, with the government 
rejecting union plans to achieve sav-
ings through unpaid leave and going 
on to impose pay cuts of 6 % to 8 % 
in its 2010 budget (Sheehan, 2010). 
However, renewed talks led to a draft 
agreement between the government 
and public services unions in March 
2010, which provided for no further 
pay cuts before 2014 and no com-
pulsory redundancies, in exchange 
for union commitments on public 
sector reform.
The economic context in the three 
Baltic states is even more acute but 
there was a sharp difference with 
Ireland in the extent to which the 
social partners have been engaged by 
 government.  Social partner organi-
sations  complained at their lack of 
involvement in, and consultation 
over, the preparation of government 
measures, whilst differing in their 
policy prescriptions. However, as the 
economic situation worsened govern-
ments moved to engage social part-
ner and other civic organisations in 
dialogue to varying degree on aspects 
of the response to the crisis. Govern-
ments in all three countries have pro-
posed cuts or freezes in public sector 
wages, as part of stringent measures 
aimed at sharply reducing public 
expenditure.
In Latvia, at the time of the prepara-
tion of the state budget in the autumn 
of 2008, trade unions opposed the 
freeze on public sector wages and 
proposed instead taxation increases 
to fund the public deficit. Employers’ 
organisations supported reductions 
in public expenditure, but urged that 
these be achieved through ‘efficiencies’, 
and opposed tax increases. Amend-
ments to the budget in June 2009, 
decreasing expenditure on health and 
expenditure, prompted trade unions 
to organise protest demonstrations. 
Although the government did involve 
the social partners in dialogue over 
its 2010 budget plans, the measures 
announced in December 2009 — 
which included wide-ranging tax 
increases — were sharply criticised by 
employers as damaging competitive-
ness and trade unions as weakening 
domestic demand (Curkina, 2010). 
In Lithuania, sustained opposition 
by trade unions to government pro-
posals to cut the public sector wage 
fund culminated in a broader national 
protest action in January 2009 against 
the government’s anti-crisis plans. 
Unions called for strengthened social 
 protection arrangements, an increase 
in the minimum wage, the intro-
duction of a property tax, as well as 
no cuts in public sector pay. A trade 
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union-initiated hunger strike in June 
finally forced the government to aban-
don proposed public sector wage cuts. 
The  government stepped up efforts to 
find consensus over its crisis response, 
and a multi-partite agreement on eco-
nomic and social policies during the 
downturn was eventually signed in 
October 2009 (Blažiene, 2009). The 
agreement was subsequently criticised 
by unions organising in the public 
sector. In Estonia, the positions of the 
social partners on responses to the 
crisis differed sharply in autumn 2008. 
The employers’ confederation called 
for reductions in public expenditure, 
including benefit levels, a reduction in 
social charges and further measures 
to promote labour market flexibility. 
Trade unions opposed these proposals 
and called for measures to maintain 
purchasing power, including avoiding 
any cuts in public sector wages or wel-
fare benefits. There was also disagree-
ment over the review of the minimum 
wage for 2009, with employers oppos-
ing an increase on competitiveness 
grounds and trade unions advocating 
one to sustain purchasing power (it 
remained frozen during 2009). None-
theless the social partners reached 
agreement with government in March 
2009 over a set of measures aimed at 
preserving employment and improv-
ing employability. Consensus appears 
to have been fragile, however, since 
disagreements again emerged over a 
further package of employment meas-
ures introduced in October (Osila and 
Nurmela, 2009).
The onset of the crisis found Hungary 
in a similar economic position, with 
the government initiating an auster-
ity package in the summer of 2008 to 
address the rapid deterioration in the 
public finances — already in a par-
lous state. The government  convened 
a series of national summits between 
October 2008 and January 2009, in 
the hope of securing social part-
ner support for further  unpalatable 
 measures. Substantial differences 
between the social partners have, 
however, continued to be apparent. 
Employers’ organisations have sup-
ported austerity measures, questioned 
the sustainability of prevailing levels 
of wages and opposed addressing the 
public deficit through tax increases, 
preferring expenditure reductions. 
Trade unions criticised the auster-
ity measures and the associated job 
cuts proposed in public services and 
called for a fiscal stimulus and action 
to promote employment. Further 
disagreements emerged in June 2009 
over proposed government amend-
ments to labour laws proposed as an 
anti-crisis measure, responding to 
employer organisation calls for more 
flexibility in working time regulations. 
These were strongly opposed by trade 
unions (Fodor and Neumann, 2009).
The other three Visegrad countries 
present a varied picture. In Poland, 
significant common ground has 
been established between the social 
partners, providing the basis for 
meaningful engagement with the 
government. In Slovakia also, the cri-
sis has prompted intensive consulta-
tions between the government and 
social partners, and broad consensus 
between employers’ organisations and 
trade unions. In the Czech Republic 
the social partners have forged com-
mon positions, but were not involved 
in the development of anti-crisis 
measures until the autumn of 2009.
Discussions between Poland’s social 
partners in the early months of 2009 
identified common ground on meas-
ures to promote economic recovery, 
including public aid to companies to 
preserve jobs, improving the avail-
ability of loans to businesses and sub-
sidies to supplement low incomes. 
 Differences focused on the extent to 
which flexibilisation of working time 
was a necessary measure and whether 
this required changes to labour law. 
Nonetheless, agreement on a set of 
measures was reached by the social 
partners in March. The government 
based its June anti-crisis package on 
the agreement, although there was 
subsequent disagreement between 
trade unions and employers over the 
balance of measures included. Trade 
unions objected to the general scope of 
the flexible working time arrangements 
introduced, whilst employers’ organi-
sations welcomed them. At the start of 
2010, the social partners, concerned at 
the low take up of public assistance to 
companies to protect jobs, jointly pro-
posed that the qualifying thresholds be 
reviewed (Czarzasty, 2009).
The Slovakian social partners were 
also involved in intensive consul-
tations with government over the 
elaboration of anti-crisis measures in 
the opening months of 2009, which 
included the establishment of a tripar-
tite economic crisis council. In a mem-
orandum on solving the impact of the 
crisis on society, concluded between 
the government and trade unions in 
March, unions undertook to moder-
ate their wage demands in exchange 
for government measures to maintain 
employment. The government also 
agreed a memorandum with the main 
employers’ organisations, whereby 
the government undertook to avoid 
imposing new legislative or admin-
istrative burdens on employers and 
the employers not to use the crisis as 
a pretext for worsening employment 
conditions. Tripartite discussions in 
late 2009 over further measures to 
mitigate the employment effects of the 
crisis revealed differences between the 
social partners, with trade unions in 
favour and employers’ organisations 
concerned about the costs to the pub-
lic finances (Cziria, 2009).
Employers’ organisations and trade 
unions in the Czech Republic 
addressed joint proposals to govern-
ment in February 2009, including an 
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economic stimulus equivalent to that 
urged by the European recovery plan, 
a further boost to purchasing power 
through reduction of utility prices 
and introduction of a car scrappage 
scheme, action to improve compa-
nies’ access to finance and measures 
to boost training and skills available 
to companies. The social partners also 
called for their full involvement in 
the development of anti-crisis, meas-
ures stating that this had not hith-
erto occurred. A tripartite working 
group was set up in August 2009 to 
formulate a new short-time working 
scheme. In early 2010, tripartite dis-
cussions on a wider agenda resulted 
in agreement, in February, over a 
package of measures to deal with the 
effects of the crisis. Prior to the onset 
of the crisis, government measures to 
reform public finances had met with 
substantial trade union opposition 
including a large-scale national pro-
test in June 2008. Further cuts in pub-
lic sector employment and the paybill 
announced for 2010 again drew trade 
union opposition (Verveková, 2010).
Slovenia has seen a shift from con-
sensus to disagreement between the 
social partners. In the autumn of 
2008, changes proposed by the social 
partners to anticipated government 
measures to tackle the crisis were 
integral to the outcome of tripartite 
consultations. This included broad 
agreement over measures to reduce 
public spending. By the end of 2009, 
however, disagreement between the 
social partners over minimum wage 
policy led employers to suspend their 
participation in the main tripartite 
forum (Stanojevič, 2010).
In Bulgaria, differences between the 
social partners emerged as the cri-
sis progressed, before a degree of 
 consensus was reached in 2010, whilst 
in Romania a considerable degree 
of common ground has been main-
tained between employers’ organi-
sations and trade unions. Bulgaria’s 
 employers’  organisations and trade 
unions framed joint proposals in late 
2008, which were presented to the 
government at a meeting in Decem-
ber. These stressed the importance 
of concentrating initiatives on pre-
serving existing jobs and mitigating 
the rise in unemployment, including 
provision of public aid to companies, 
additional support for those being 
made unemployed and the introduc-
tion of a short-time working scheme. 
By mid-2009, however, differences 
emerged over government austerity 
measures and the distribution they 
entailed of the burden of the crisis. 
Trade unions withdrew from the main 
national tripartite institution, partly 
because of the government’s perceived 
lack of consultation on its anti-crisis 
measures. They mounted a national 
protest action in June, opposing the 
austerity measures and calling for pro-
tection of domestic production, jobs 
and incomes, maintenance of public 
service expenditures and increases in 
welfare and pension benefits. Employ-
ers’ organisations urged further action 
to tackle the public deficit, supporting 
the proposed pay freeze and reduc-
tions in public expenditures. How-
ever, a change of government in July 
was followed by renewed tripartite 
discussions aimed at developing and 
agreeing a new package of measures. 
This did not materialise immediately, 
and the austerity measures in the new 
government’s draft budget for 2010 
again divided the social partners. 
Nevertheless, in March 2010 tripartite 
agreement was reached on a package 
of measures to support employment, 
households, businesses and the state 
budget (Lyuben, 2009). 
In Romania, the government set up 
a tripartite process to draw up an 
 anti-crisis programme, resulting in 
the publication of a package in Febru-
ary 2009. This included measures on 
investments, tax, support for SMEs, 
unemployment benefits, short-time 
working, training and public sec-
tor pay. The social partners were not 
entirely happy that the measures 
reflected their own proposals and 
later expressed dissatisfaction with the 
implementation of the package. Both 
social partners considered the gov-
ernment’s stimulus measure insuffi-
cient, with trade unions criticising the 
lack of stimulus for purchasing power 
whilst employers criticised the absence 
of incentives for investment and funds 
for public infrastructure projects. May 
and June brought protest actions by 
trade unions focusing on measures to 
maintain purchasing power and pro-
mote employment. Employers’ organ-
isations and trade unions combined in 
a further joint call to the government 
in June for a package of measures suf-
ficient to stimulate economic activity. 
Further joint pressure from the main 
social partner organisations resulted, 
in February 2010, in the government 
extending its measures on temporary 
unemployment (Ciutacu, 2010). 
Assessment2.3.2. 
The early phase of the crisis was marked 
by a broad consensus on the need for 
governments to implement measures 
providing a significant fiscal stimulus 
in the face of the steep decline in eco-
nomic activity. Nonetheless, there were 
differences in emphasis. Employers’ 
organisations gave priority to ensuring 
access to credit for companies, meas-
ures which reduce labour costs and 
reductions in taxation. Trade unions 
tended to urge a larger fiscal stimulus 
and measures to sustain purchasing 
power and to boost public investment. 
A parallel difference in emphasis, 
around a broad consensus between the 
two main social partners, is evident at 
the EU level (see Box 2.7). As atten-
tion shifted to facilitating recovery and 
dealing with consequences of the crisis 
for the public finances tensions and 
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disagreements have emerged (Freyssi-
net, 2009; Hethy, 2009). In particular, 
sharp differences are apparent on three 
issues. The first is wages policy, where 
employers’ organisations see tight 
control of labour costs, and therefore 
wages, as essential to competitiveness, 
whereas trade unions view increases in 
wages as vital to sustaining purchasing 
power and therefore economic activ-
ity. The second are measures to fur-
ther increase labour market flexibility, 
favoured by employers as also enhanc-
ing competitiveness but seen by trade 
unions as potentially further under-
mining employment security. The 
third is austerity measures to address 
rising public deficits, where employers’ 
organisations are urging early action, 
including reform of social welfare 
systems, whereas trade unions stress 
the need in current circumstances to 
maintain public services and employ-
ment and, if anything, to strengthen 
social welfare systems. The differences 
between the social partners at EU level 
again reflect those at the national level 
(see Box 2.7).
In some countries, two further issues 
are also a source of contention. 
Labour law has become the object of 
controversy in a few, with employer 
and/or government proposals to 
enhance flexibility being resisted by 
trade unions, with differing degrees 
of success, in Hungary, Poland and 
Spain. Disagreements and incipient 
conflicts have surfaced over proposals 
to raise the age of retirement, as part 
of government austerity measures, in 
Ireland, Finland, France, the Nether-
lands and Spain.
Although there are differences on 
these and other policy measures 
between employers’ organisations and 
trade unions, a degree of consensus 
on the measures required to address 
the effects of the crisis is appar-
ent across a majority of countries. 
Table 2.3 summarises the picture 
across countries, according to the 
broad three-way distinction in the 
degree of bi-partisan consensus intro-
duced above. In 12 countries a consid-
erable degree of bi-partisan consensus 
has been obtained throughout, since 
the onset of the crisis in 2008. A 
lesser degree of consensus character-
ises four further countries. In another 
four countries disagreements have 
predominated. In seven countries, 
disagreements prevailed for some of 
the period, but were preceded by and/
or gave way to consensus between the 
social partners. The 12 countries char-
acterised by a considerable degree of 
Box 2.7: Common ground 
and differences  
in the perspectives of the 
European social partners
There is some common ground in the 
policy prescriptions proposed by Busi-
nessEurope and the ETUC. Both called 
early on for a substantial economic 
stimulus, and for fiscal and other public 
policy interventions to be coordinated 
across Member States. In the absence of 
effective coordination, the cross-sector 
social partners also warned of the dan-
gers of slipping towards protectionism. 
Both BusinessEurope and the ETUC 
have highlighted the need to address the 
challenge of mitigating climate change 
as an essential element to successful 
European economic recovery. Differ-
ences are apparent also. In respect of 
the single market,  BusinessEurope reaf-
firms the virtues of market principles, 
the further steps needed to complete 
the process in the market for services 
and the need to pursue further struc-
tural reform in a range of areas, whereas 
the ETUC underlines the disruptive 
social consequences of not effectively 
policing the single market and the need 
for strengthened workforce rights in 
the face of some of its consequences. 
Differences over the continuation of 
the fiscal stimulus, the priority to be 
given to tackling deteriorating public 
finances and over social welfare sys-
tems have also emerged as the crisis 
has unfurled. By late 2009 and into 
2010, BusinessEurope was calling for 
action to reduce rapidly rising deficits 
in public finances, including expendi-
ture-reducing reform of social welfare 
systems. The ETUC warned against 
early removal of the fiscal stimulus to 
economic activity (which has increased 
deficits) and called for a strengthening 
of social welfare systems.
Despite some commonalities in the 
policy prescriptions of BusinessEurope 
and the ETUC, the cross-sector Euro-
pean social partners have not as yet 
(end October 2010) adopted any joint 
statement on crisis responses. Joint 
statements on the crisis have, however, 
been a feature in some sectors at Euro-
pean level (see Chapter 6).
Table 2.3: Pattern of consensus and disagreement  
between social partner organisations in the EU-27
Considerable degree  
of bi-partisan 
consensus
Lesser degree  
of bi-partisan 
consensus 
Disagreements 
predominate
Countries
Austria, Belgium (*), 
Czech Republic (*), 
Cyprus,  
Denmark, Finland,  
Germany, Malta (*), 
Netherlands (*),  
Poland (*), Romania (*), 
Slovakia
France, Italy, Portugal, 
United Kingdom.
Part of the period since  
summer 2008:
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Lithuania,  
Luxembourg,  
Slovenia (*), Spain
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Sweden.
Part of the period since  
summer 2008:
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Lithuania,  
Luxembourg,  
Slovenia (*), Spain
(*) Joint proposals framed by the social partners.
Source: Own compilation.
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 consensus include six of the seven 
(Slovenia is the exception) in which 
the social partners concluded joint 
platforms on measures to address 
the crisis.
In a rapidly evolving situation where, 
at the time of writing (summer 2010) 
austerity measures to address pub-
lic sector deficits are being framed 
by governments in a number of 
countries, the picture reported in 
Table 2.3 may well change, as sub-
stantial policy disagreements emerge 
between the social partners where 
there has previously been consensus 
or common ground is established 
after a prolonged period of disagree-
ment between employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions.
Two factors help account, each par-
tially, for the pattern which Table 2.3 
presents. The first is the scale of the 
crisis in particular countries, which 
might be expected to make consensus 
more difficult to reach the larger its 
magnitude. The second is institutional 
arrangements for industrial relations, 
and specifically the presence or oth-
erwise of robust institutional arrange-
ments for bipartite and/or tripartite 
social dialogue. Consensus might be 
expected to be more likely, and more 
extensive, in the presence of well-
 established arrangements.
On the first, there is a marked ten-
dency amongst countries where the 
crisis has (up to the spring of 2010) 
been most severe, and its impact 
from the outset on public finances 
precluded any recourse to a fiscal 
stimulus, for disagreements to pre-
dominate throughout the period or 
for part of it. Such countries include 
Ireland, Hungary, Slovenia, the Bal-
tic states and latterly, as a result of its 
escalating debt crisis, Greece. At the 
other end of the spectrum, amongst 
countries where the crisis has (up to 
the spring of 2010) been least severe, 
such as  Poland, France and Cyprus, 
a degree of bi-partisan consensus has 
prevailed, albeit the extent of consen-
sus varies. The relative magnitude of 
the crisis does not, however, seem to 
clearly differentiate between the coun-
tries in the first and second columns, 
respectively. In addition, amongst 
those countries where disagreements 
predominate are some where the cri-
sis has not been exceptionally severe, 
such as Sweden and Bulgaria (for part 
of the period). Countries’ economic 
situation, therefore, accounts for only 
part of the pattern in Table 2.3.
On the second, there is some ten-
dency for differences in institutional 
arrangements for social dialogue to be 
reflected in Table 2.3’s cross-country 
pattern. Countries with robust insti-
tutional arrangements are to some 
extent clustered amongst those in 
the first column. This group includes 
many, but not all, of those EU-15 
countries which have long-estab-
lished arrangements for cross-sector 
social dialogue (see Chapter 3). But 
it also embraces several central-east 
European countries where tripartite 
social dialogue structures have been 
mobilised and/or bipartite initia-
tives launched. Conversely, countries 
where there are no national arrange-
ments for social dialogue, such as the 
UK, and those where social dialogue 
arrangements are widely seen as being 
weak, such as Hungary and the Baltic 
states (Meardi, 2007), are found in the 
second and third columns. Although 
tripartite arrangements exist in Hun-
gary and the Baltic states, bipartite 
arrangements between the social 
partners are noticeably absent and 
it is perhaps unsurprising that disa-
greements between the social part-
ners tend to predominate. Yet, the 
second column also includes  EU-15 
countries with established institu-
tional arrangements for social dia-
logue which have been mobilised on 
specific issues only, such as France, 
or hardly mobilised at all, such as 
Italy, Greece and Portugal. The third 
column also includes countries with 
hitherto robust institutional arrange-
ments for social dialogue, such as 
Ireland and Sweden and, for part of 
the period Slovenia and Spain. Insti-
tutional arrangements for social dia-
logue, therefore, also account for only 
part of the pattern in Table 2.3.
Drawing together both considerations 
suggests two provisional conclusions. 
First, faced with a crisis of extreme 
severity, robust institutional arrange-
ments for social dialogue may not 
be able to withstand the centrifugal 
pressures at play, with the social part-
ners being unable to forge common 
ground over public policy responses. 
This has been the case in Ireland and 
latterly Greece and Slovenia. Going 
forward this situation may extend 
to further countries where emer-
gency austerity measures to tackle 
the public deficit have the effect of 
prolonging the economic recession. 
Second, amongst the larger number 
of countries where the magnitude 
of the crisis has not been so severe, 
institutional arrangements for social 
dialogue have been mobilised by the 
social partners in several central and 
east European countries, including 
the Czech  Republic, Poland and Slo-
vakia, as well as amongst a number, 
but by no means all, of those  EU-15 
countries with long- established 
 arrangements. The reasons why four 
EU-15 countries with established 
institutional  arrangements — Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden — are 
not amongst those countries in 
which joint crisis  response actions 
have been elaborated are addressed 
in Chapter 3.
The extent to which social partners 
have been involved in the framing 
of government measures also var-
ies across countries and seems to 
shape their evaluations of the policy 
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 outcomes. Watt and Nikolova (2009) 
report that trade union views on the 
measures taken by governments to 
address the effects of the crisis dur-
ing its early phase (up until April 
2009) were strongly associated with 
the extent of social partner, and in 
particular trade union, involvement 
in the elaboration of anti-crisis meas-
ures. Drawing on a survey of national 
unions they conclude that ‘Where 
unions have had a voice in the design 
of packages, governments have ben-
efited from their political support 
for the package as a whole, even 
though they may be critical of spe-
cific measures or would have wanted 
a greater level of ambition [in the 
scale of the fiscal stimulus provided]
(Watt and Nikolova, 2009: 30). Con-
versely, where governments have not 
involved the social partners, unions 
were strongly critical of the anti-
crisis measures taken. Equivalent 
data are not available for employ-
ers’ organisations, although amongst 
the central and south-eastern Euro-
pean Member States Hethy (2009) 
observes that employers’ organisa-
tions have become more active, and 
more influential, in bi- and tripartite 
discussions in several countries.
A related outcome, which anticipates 
Chapter 3’s review of the negotiated 
or concerted outcomes of national 
social dialogue, is that insofar as gov-
ernments have been concerned to 
secure broad support for unpalatable 
measures, the influence of the social 
partners over measures proposed by 
the public authorities has increased 
in several countries. A necessary 
pre-condition for this to occur is the 
capacity of the social partners to forge 
and sustain a common policy plat-
form, since major differences between 
social partner organisations force or 
leave governments to act alone. It is 
not, however, a sufficient one, since 
governments can choose to act alone 
even though, as in the Czech Republic 
and Romania, the social partners suc-
ceeded in framing joint proposals.
Conclusion2.4. 
Translated into the debates on con-
vergence and divergence which have 
featured prominently in the literature 
on the Europeanisation of industrial 
relations (Hoffman et al., 2002; Mar-
ginson and Sisson, 2004; Vos, 2006), 
this chapter has highlighted the 
influence of two kinds of ‘input’, eco-
nomic and institutional, in shaping 
social partners’ policy perspectives, 
and in particular the extent to which 
consensus or disagreement prevails 
between them. The economic one 
concerns the magnitude of the cri-
sis in terms of its economic, fiscal 
and employment impact. The insti-
tutional one relates to arrangements 
for bipartite and tripartite social dia-
logue. The chapter shows that there is 
no straightforward pattern of associ-
ation between these two input factors 
and either the forging of consensus, 
involving compromise, between the 
social partners on measures to be 
taken or the emergence of tensions 
and conflicts over the distribution of 
costs brought by the crisis. Consist-
ent with Hay (2004), convergence (or 
divergence) in economic and insti-
tutional ‘inputs’ does not necessarily 
give rise to convergence (or diver-
gence) in policy perspectives. Some 
tendencies are, however, apparent.
First, amongst countries where the 
effects of the crisis have been most 
severe, the economic ‘input’ factor 
seems to have overwhelmed sub-
stantial divergence in ‘institutional’ 
arrangements, and policy disagree-
ment has predominated. This is 
underlined by the contrast between 
Ireland, which has robust institutional 
arrangements for social dialogue, and 
the Baltic states, where such arrange-
ments are weak. Second, a consid-
erable degree of policy consensus 
between social partner organisations 
has been evident not only amongst a 
number of those western European 
countries with  long-established tra-
ditions of social dialogue, but also in 
parts of central and eastern Europe 
— the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia — where tripartite struc-
tures have been mobilised and/or 
joint platforms forged between the 
social partners. In terms of institu-
tional effects, the lines of similarity 
and difference between countries 
reach across the distinction between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States.
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Appendix
Table 2.A1: GDP growth in EU Member States (% on previous 12 months by quarter)
2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
EU - 27 2.2 1.4 0.3 -2.1 -5.1 -5.1 -4.3 -2.2 0.7 2.0
AT 2.8 3.0 2.2 -0.4 -3.9 -5.1 -4.0 -2.1 0.2 2.3
BE 1.6 1.9 1.1 -1.3 -3.7 -4.1 -2.7 -0.1 1.6 2.4
BG 6.9 6.4 6.5 4.8 -3.3 -4.6 -6.0 -6.7 -0.8 -0.3
CY 4.6 4.4 3.4 2.1 0.2 -1.9 -2.6 -2.7 -1.2 0.2
CZ 3.1 3.5 2.2 0.5 -3.6 -4.7 -4.4 -3.2 1.0 2.4
DE 2.7 1.7 0.5 -2.0 -6.6 -5.5 -4.4 -2.0 2.0 3.7
DK -0.6 1.3 -0.7 -3.5 -3.9 -6.9 -5.3 -2.9 -0.4 3.8
EE -1.1 -2.5 -5.5 -11.2 -14.2 -16.5 -15.4 -9.0 -2.7 3.0
EL 2.7 2.7 1.9 0.7 -1.0 -1.9 -2.5 -2.5 -2.3 -3.7
ES 2.7 1.9 0.3 -1.4 -3.5 -4.4 -3.9 -3.0 -1.3 -0.1
FI 3.6 2.5 1.0 -3.0 -8.8 -9.8 -8.4 -5.2 0.6 3.4
FR 1.8 0.7 -0.2 -2.0 -3.9 -3.1 -2.7 -0.5 1.2 1.7
HU 1.9 1.6 0.3 -2.3 -6.1 -7.1 -6.7 -4.7 -1.2 0.1
IE -1.3 -2.1 -1.6 -9.1 -9.2 -7.7 -7.7 -5.6 -0.7 -1.8
IT 0.3 -0.5 -1.8 -3.3 -6.5 -6.2 -4.7 -2.8 0.5 1.3
LT 8.8 3.5 1.2 -2.2 -15.8 -15.6 -14.6 -12.9 -2.9 0.6
LU 5.0 4.0 1.4 -4.4 -5.3 -8.0 -3.3 2.1 2.9 5.3
LV 2.7 -2.4 -5.3 -10.2 -18.1 -17.5 -19.3 -16.8 -5.1 -2.9
MT 2.8 3.5 3.0 0.7 -2.3 -3.3 -2.2 0.1 3.5 3.7
NL 3.9 3.1 1.6 -1.0 -4.0 -5.0 -4.2 -2.4 0.5 2.7
PL 6.7 5.8 5.2 2.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 2.9 3.1 3.8
PT 1.0 0.9 0.3 -2.0 -3.8 -3.1 -2.3 -1.0 1.8 1.5
RO 9.3 9.6 8.3 2.6 -5.2 -8.0 -7.6 -6.9 -3.2 -1.5
SE 1.6 0.8 0.2 -4.9 -6.6 -6.2 -5.9 -1.5 2.8 4.5
SI 6.3 5.2 3.4 -0.8 -8.4 -9.5 -9.4 -6.1 -0.1 1.5
SK 8.9 8.2 6.8 1.2 -4.5 -5.1 -5.2 -3.9 4.6 5.0
UK 1.9 1.0 -0.4 -2.7 -5.5 -6.0 -5.4 -3.0 -0.3 1.7
Source: Eurostat National Accounts [teina 011].
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Table 2.A2: Public sector deficits (-) or surplus (+) in EU Member States, (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009
EU - 27 -0.8 -2.3 -6.8
AT -0.4 -0.4 -3.4
BE -0.2 -1.2 -6.0
BG 0.1 1.8 -3.9
CY 3.4 0.9 -6.1
CZ -0.7 -2.7 -5.9
DE 0.2 0.0 -3.3
DK 4.8 3.4 -2.7
EE 2.6 -2.7 -1.7
EL -5.1 -7.7 -13.6
ES 1.9 -4.1 -11.2
FI 5.2 4.2 -2.2
FR -2.7 -3.3 -7.5
HU -5.0 -3.8 -4.0
IE 0.1 -7.3 -14.3
IT -1.5 -2.7 -5.3
LT -1.0 -3.3 -8.9
LU 3.6 2.9 -0.7
LV -0.3 -4.1 -9.0
MT -2.2 -4.5 -3.8
NL 0.2 0.7 -5.3
PL -1.9 -3.7 -7.1
PT -2.6 -2.8 -9.4
RO -2.5 -5.4 -8.3
SE 3.8 2.5 -0.5
SI 0.0 -1.7 -5.5
SK -1.9 -2.3 -6.8
UK -2.8 -4.9 -11.5
Source: Eurostat National Accounts [teina 200].
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Table 2.A3: Change in employment for EU Member States (% on previous 12 months by quarter)
2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
EU-27 1.7 1.3 0.7 0.1 -1.2 -1.9 -2.1 -2.1 -1.5 -0.6
AT 2 1.9 1.6 1.3 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1 0.3 0.7
BE 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.3
BG 3.6 2.9 2.4 1.5 -0.2 -1.8 -3.7 -5.2 -6.5 -6.8
CY 2.4 2.7 3.5 1.9 1.4 -0.5 -2 -1.6 -1.3 -0.2
CZ 1.8 1.2 1 0.9 0 -1 -1.8 -1.9 -2.1 -1
DE 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.4 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.2
DK 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.6 -1.1 -2.5 -4.3 -5.5 -4 -2.4
EE 1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -6.1 -10.1 -11.2 -12.1 -9 -5.5
EL 0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -1.2 -2.2 -1.8 -2.5
ES 1.7 0.5 -0.7 -3 -6 -7 -7.3 -6.2 -3.7 -2.4
FI 2.4 2.1 1.1 0.7 -0.9 -3 -3.4 -4 -2.3 -0.5
FR 1.2 0.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -1.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.7 -0.1
HU -1.4 -1.9 -0.8 -1 -2.2 -2.4 -3.9 -2.8 -2.1 -0.6
IE 1.6 -0.1 -2 -4 -7.5 -8.3 -8.7 -8.2 -5.3 -4.1
IT 1 0.9 -0.3 -0.5 -1.1 -1.5 -2 -2.1 -0.9 -0.7
LT 1.2 -0.2 -1.3 -2.3 -5.3 -6 -7.5 -8.6 -7.4 -6.6
LU 5.3 4.9 4.9 4 2.4 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.5
LV 5.2 3.4 0.4 -5.3 -8.5 -13.2 -16.1 -14.4 -12.8 -7
MT 2.7 3 2.6 2.1 0.8 -0.5 -1.5 -0.9 1.6 0.4
NL 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.1 -1.2 -1.9 -1.7 -1.6 -0.6
PL 4.9 3.8 3.6 3.1 1 0.7 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 0.6
PT 0.8 1.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.7 -2.7 -3.1 -2.9 -1.7 -1.5
RO 1.3 -0.1 -1.1 0 -3.2 -2.8 -1 -1.3 -1.6 -2.2
SE 1.7 1.3 0.7 0 -1.2 -2.2 -2.6 -2.1 -0.5 0.8
SI 3.3 3.2 2.6 1.8 0.2 -1.4 -2.4 -3.2 -2.9 -2.4
SK 2.2 3.2 3.7 1.9 -0.7 -1.6 -3.7 -3.4 -1.9 -2.2
UK 1.5 1.2 0.5 -0.2 -1.1 -2.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 0.4
Source: Eurostat National Accounts [teina 300].
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Introduction3.1. 
This chapter explores the responses of 
employers and trade unions to the cri-
sis at the different levels of economic 
activity: cross-sector, sector and com-
pany. A central focus is the incidence, 
pattern and character of negotiated 
and concerted responses between the 
social partners. Attention is also paid 
to unsuccessful attempts to negotiate 
responses and instances of conflict. 
In terms of the character of the agree-
ments concluded at the different levels, 
the balance between their distributive 
and integrative elements is of inter-
est (1). In a context of economic crisis, 
the distributive element of agreements 
involves measures aimed at immedi-
ate cost reductions, such as redundan-
cies, wage freezes or cuts and enhanced 
 flexibilities including working time. 
The integrative element entails 
measures which frame short-term 
responses in ways which can provide 
medium-term benefits for both parties, 
such as those aimed at maintaining 
1 The distinction between distributive and 
integrative bargaining was first drawn by Walton and 
McKersie (1965). Traditionally, collective bargaining 
had been viewed as dealing with issues of distribution, 
such as wages and the length of the working week. 
Outcomes of distributive bargaining are zero-sum: one 
party’s gain corresponds to the other party’s losses. But 
collective bargaining can also engage with integrative 
agendas, under which outcomes are positive sum: both 
parties can secure gains. Restructuring agreements 
which aim both to reduce costs and enhance flexibility, 
and to enhance the skills and earnings capacity of the 
workforce, are an example. In practice, the distributive 
and integrative aspects of collective negotiations are 
intertwined, with the balance of outcomes tending in 
one direction or the other.
 employment through work-sharing, 
thereby  retaining skills — and even 
enhancing them through using down-
time for training (ILO, 2009).
Four main sets of influences can be 
identified as framing the extent to which 
responses to the crisis have been negoti-
ated or concerted between the social 
partners, and the character of the agree-
ments reached (Glassner and Keune, 
2010), as shown in Figure 3.1 below.
As Chapter 2 has shown, the economic 
situation during the course of the crisis 
at national, economy-wide level and in 
different sectors has varied. This varia-
tion shapes the need for and magnitude 
of policy responses and also the scope 
open to governments and social part-
ners to take action. Industrial relations 
institutions across the Member States 
display some important commonali-
ties, but also considerable variation, as 
Chapter 1 has established. Four insti-
tutional aspects are central to theme 
of this chapter. First, the presence and 
nature of institutional arrangements 
for tripartite or bipartite concertation 
and/or negotiation at cross-sector level, 
whose relevance is considered in the 
first main section of the chapter. Second, 
whether structures for collective bar-
gaining are multi- or single-employer in 
nature. Under multi-employer bargain-
ing arrangements, the possibility exists 
of higher levels establishing frame-
works which can facilitate and govern 
further negotiation at company level. 
Third, is collective bargaining cover-
age i.e. the percentage of the workforce 
covered by collective agreements? This 
is strongly associated with bargaining 
arrangements: it is well established that 
collective bargaining coverage under 
multi-employer bargaining is markedly 
higher than under single-employer bar-
gaining (Traxler et al., 2001). Accord-
ingly, negotiated responses to the crisis 
are more likely to cover a greater pro-
portion of the workforce where multi-
employer arrangements prevail. Under 
single-employer bargaining, minority 
coverage means that unilateral, man-
agement responses will be widespread. 
Fourth, whether under multi-employer 
bargaining arrangements there are pro-
visions which closely articulate negotia-
tions at the higher and company levels, 
respectively. Higher-level agreements 
can only frame and constrain company 
While negotiations and concertation between the social partners have played an 
important role in tackling the effects of the crisis, there is considerable variation across 
countries and sectors in their extent and character. Differences in economic situation 
are more clearly reflected in the differences between and within sectors than between 
countries. The influence of industrial relations institutions is notable, although the 
presence of institutional capacity for concertation and/or negotiation at national, 
cross-sector level is less significant. Public policy and social partners’ involvement in 
it are found to exercise a distinct influence on the pattern of negotiated responses. 
This chapter is based on a draft by Mark Carley and Paul Marginson of the  University 
of Warwick’s Industrial Relations Research Unit.
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Figure 3.1: Influences shaping social partner responses to the crisis 
Figure 3.1: Inuences shapi g social partner responses to th  crisis
Social partner
involvement in
government’s
policy response
Specic public
support measures
Employer and
trade union strategies
Industrial relations institutions
Negotiated/concerted response?
Integrative or distributive character?
Economic situation:
economy-wide, sectoral, company
Source: Based on Glassner and Keune (2010).
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negotiations in the presence of effective 
 multi-level governance arrangements 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2004; Nergaard 
et al., 2009). The second, third and fourth 
aspects shape social partner actions at 
sector and company level, as the second 
main section will demonstrate.
Two aspects of public policy shape 
the extent, and character, of negoti-
ated responses. The first, considered 
in Chapter 2, is the involvement of the 
social partners in the framing of anti-
crisis packages measures introduced 
by governments. The second are spe-
cific public policy measures aimed at 
maintaining employment, notably the 
short-time working schemes that have 
been mobilised or newly introduced in 
many Member States, which support 
the earnings of those affected, through 
partial unemployment benefits. These 
schemes, which are briefly surveyed 
in this chapter, can prompt employers 
and trade unions to negotiate further 
measures responding to the effect of 
the crisis and/or require negotiations 
for their implementation. In short, 
there is potentially an important inter-
action between specific public policy 
measures and the incidence and char-
acter of negotiated responses, with the 
former enhancing the scope for the lat-
ter. For their part, employers’ and trade 
unions’ responses are conditioned but 
not determined by the economic situ-
ation, industrial relations institutions 
and government actions. Responses 
are also the product of employers’ 
and trade unions’ respective strate-
gies (Glassner and Keune, 2010). Each 
exercises choices, has the potential to 
advocate innovative solutions and/or 
to rely on the tried and tested ones, to 
engage in compromises in the face of 
differences and/or to test their relative 
strength through conflict.
The chapter has two main sec-
tions. Cross-sector developments 
are addressed in the first, principally 
actions taken by the social partners 
at national level. Developments at 
regional level have been significant in 
several  countries, and some of these 
are reviewed in Box 3.4. The second 
section addresses the sector and com-
pany levels, focusing in turn on the 
production and private service sectors. 
Developments in the public service 
sector are briefly reviewed in Box 3.6. 
The section also reviews social partner 
actions at European level, which have 
mainly revolved around European 
works councils. The chapter has been 
compiled at a time when the devel-
opments with which it is concerned 
are moving rapidly and sometimes in 
unpredictable directions. Its assess-
ment rests on data from the onset of 
the  crisis up until April 2010.
The chapter concludes that whilst nego-
tiations and concertation between the 
social partners have played an impor-
tant role in tackling the effects of the 
crisis, there is considerable variation 
across countries and sectors in their 
extent and character. In accounting 
for this variation according to the four 
sets of factors identified in Figure 3.1, 
it finds that differences in economic 
situation are more clearly reflected 
in the varying pattern of negotiated 
responses between and within sectors 
than between countries. The influ-
ence of industrial relations institu-
tions is found to be generally marked, 
although least so for the presence of 
institutional capacity for concertation 
and/or negotiation at national, cross-
sector level. Both aspects of public 
policy are found to exercise a distinct 
influence on the pattern of negotiated 
responses. In practice, fully assessing 
the influence of social  partner  strategies 
requires in-depth data of a kind which 
was not available. At best inferences 
can be drawn, and these are strongly 
 suggestive of their relevance.
Cross-sector level3.2. 
This section examines specific bipartite 
and tripartite action taken or attempted 
in the EU Member States at cross-sector 
level by the social partners (along with 
the government in the case of tripartite 
action) directly in response to the eco-
nomic crisis. More general consultative 
and dialogue processes, and the social 
partners’ perspectives, are dealt with 
in Chapter 2. Up to the end of April 
2010, bipartite or tripartite national 
cross-sector agreements framing the 
approach, or on some specific actions, 
in response to the crisis were concluded 
in 10 countries: Belgium, the Nether-
lands, France, Spain, Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic. In an 11th, Slovakia, 
trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions concluded parallel, but separate 
accords with the government. In five 
countries there were unsuccessful talks 
over agreements: Ireland, Slovenia 
Spain (in the case of a possible tripar-
tite agreement), Finland and Hungary. 
In terms of the countries involved, two 
related features stand out. First, exist-
ing tripartite and bipartite institutions 
for negotiation and/or concertation 
were not mobilised,  successfully or 
 unsuccessfully, to address the crisis 
Box 3.1: Information sources
The data on specific developments at cross-sector, sector and company level in this chapter 
are, unless otherwise indicated, based on reporting in: Eurofound’s European Industrial 
Relations Observatory and European Restructuring Monitor; the ETUI’s Collective Bar-
gaining Newsletter; two private-subscription based online services, European Employ-
ment Review and Planet Labor; EWC News, published by the euro-betriebsrat.de training 
and consultancy network; in the cases of several company and sector-level agreements, 
the websites of the companies or trade unions involved; and an ILO Working Paper by 
Glassner and Keune (2010).
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in all the countries in which they are 
available. Second, agreements were 
concluded in a number of countries in 
central and eastern Europe where there 
is no established tradition of the social 
partners and/or government doing so.
Crisis response 3.2.1. 
agreements
The bipartite or tripartite national cross-
sector agreements in six countries, and 
the parallel accords in Slovakia, were 
concluded at a relatively early stage in 
the crisis. In the other four countries, 
the agreements were concluded more 
recently. In Lithuania, the tripartite 
agreement came only after protracted 
conflict, while the Spanish bipartite 
agreement came at the second attempt, 
after a one-year interregnum in nego-
tiations. The tripartite agreements in 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were 
not concluded until the early months 
of 2010 and followed calls by the social 
partners for greater involvement in the 
response to the crisis. In the cases of 
the Belgian and Spanish cross-sector 
and the Dutch tripartite agreements, 
the initiatives in question were an 
adaptation and shaping of normal, reg-
ular negotiating processes to address 
the current economic conditions. The 
accords in France, Poland, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic were ad hoc 
and free-standing responses to the cri-
sis. In Poland, the Baltic states and the 
Czech Republic, the agreements were, 
it seems, the first of their kind. The Slo-
vak accords followed an earlier agree-
ment anticipating effects of entry in 
the euro area.
In summary, the six agreements con-
cluded relatively early into the crisis 
were as follows.
The Belgian social partners expli-•	
citly responded to the crisis in their 
cross-sector collective agreement 
for 2009–10 (such agreements are 
normally signed every two years), 
concluded in December 2008, 
which aimed to achieve a balance 
among companies’ competitiveness, 
 workers’ purchasing power and 
employment levels. It included mod-
erate increases in purchasing power, 
reductions in taxation of income 
from night and overtime work, 
increases in short-time work ben-
efits and tax reductions to encour-
age employer to recruit long-term 
unemployed  people (Perin, 2009).
In the traditional autumn consulta-•	
tions in October 2008, the Dutch gov-
ernment and social partners reached 
wide-ranging agreement on issues 
such as moderate wage demands, 
reduced unemployment insurance 
contributions, reform of  dismissals 
law, assistance for low-paid and 
vulnerable groups, job creation and 
training. In March 2009, the bipar-
tite Labour Foundation reached an 
agreement on dealing with the crisis, 
covering 2009–10, which promoted 
employment, wage moderation, 
training, assistance for redundant 
workers and flexible employment 
(Labour Foundation, 2009).
In July 2009, the French social •	
partners reached a national cross-
sector agreement on managing the 
employment consequences of the 
economic crisis. This included: the 
extension of the statutory short-
time work scheme to new groups of 
employees; an increase in the dura-
tion of short-time benefit; a frame-
work for ‘employee leasing’ between 
companies; the promotion of 
employees’ geographical and occu-
pational mobility; improvements to 
schemes to help redundant workers 
back into employment; and assist-
ance targeted at groups such as 
the long-term unemployed, older 
workers and young people (see 
Box 3.2 for further details).
In March 2009, the Polish social •	
partners reached a bipartite agree-
ment on a package of anti-crisis 
measures, including greater work-
ing time flexibility, the introduction 
of a short-time working scheme and 
limits on fixed-term employment, 
as well as the minimum wage, social 
security and tax measures (see 
Box 3.3 for further details).
A tripartite accord reached in Esto-•	
nia in March 2009 set out principles 
for maintaining employment levels, 
for example through lifelong learn-
ing and flexible employment, and 
providing more effective assis tance 
for unemployed people ( Nurmela 
and Karu, 2009).
In June 2009, a tripartite accord •	
concluded in Latvia, which aimed 
to reduce the public sector deficit, 
embraced both revenue-raising 
measures and public expenditure 
cuts, including reductions in the 
public sector paybill and in pensions 
and benefits (Cabinet of Ministers 
of the Republic of Latvia, 2009).
A different type of concerted approach, 
involving parallel govern mental 
accords with the social partners, was 
forged in Slovakia. In early 2009, the 
Slovak government signed both:
a ‘memorandum on cooperation •	
in solving the impact of the finan-
cial and economic crises on Slovak 
society’ with the main trade union 
confederation, whereby the gov-
ernment would seek to maintain 
employment levels and protection 
and the unions would pursue mod-
erate wage demands and a dialogue-
based approach (Cziria, 2009); and
a similar memorandum with the •	
main national employers’ organi-
sations, whereby the government 
would avoid imposing new legisla-
tive or administrative burdens on 
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employers and the employers would 
not use the crisis as a pretext for 
reducing employment conditions 
(Planet Labor, 2009).
Linked to the conclusion of these 
accords, the Slovak government estab-
lished an Economic Crisis Council, with 
social partner representation, to make 
proposals for dealing with the crisis.
In Lithuania, the conclusion of an 
agreement in October 2009 was 
preceded, as Chapter 2 indicated, 
by months of sustained trade union 
opposition to government  austerity 
measures culminating in a hun-
ger strike in July which successfully 
prompted the government to change 
tack. The tripartite national agree-
ment on economic and social policies 
during the downturn covers areas 
such as tax, public spending, public 
sector pay, cuts in social security ben-
efits, public sector reform, economic 
stimulus measures, energy policy, 
education and training, healthcare 
and combating the illegal economy 
(Blažienė, 2009).
In Spain, the social partners were 
unable to reach for 2009 their usual 
cross-sector framework agreement 
providing guidelines for lower-level 
bargaining, mainly because of differ-
ences over pay increases (see below). 
However, they were able to resume the 
practice in 2010, taking the unprec-
edented step of reaching a three-year 
framework deal (European Employ-
ment Review, 2010). The ‘agreement 
for employment and collective bar-
gaining’ sets out recommendations for 
sector- and company-level bargaining 
in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Its central pri-
ority is protecting and creating jobs, 
including through wage moderation 
and by promoting open-ended rather 
than temporary employment. On pay, 
the agreement recommends moderate 
increases each year and the inclusion 
of: wage revision clauses, which would 
compensate workers for a rise in infla-
tion which exceeded wage increases 
over the three-year period; and hard-
ship clauses in sectoral agreements 
which could be triggered by compa-
nies facing financial difficulties. The 
accord also recommends that collec-
tive agreements include a range of 
measures to avoid and mitigate job 
losses, promote open-ended employ-
ment, develop workforce flexibility, 
deal with restructuring and improve 
training provision.
In the Czech Republic, following calls 
by unions and employers’  organisations 
Box 3.2: French cross-sector agreement on managing  
the employment consequences of the crisis
With unemployment rising rapidly, social partner organisations decided in May 2009 to 
open negotiations over a national cross-sector agreement on the ‘social management of the 
consequences of the economic crisis for employment’. The talks resulted on 8 July in an 
agreement on ‘emergency’ employment measures, signed by all the main social partners 
except the CGT trade union confederation (European Employment Review, 2009). Further 
negotiations were to be held on ‘structural’ measures to facilitate and accompany a future 
economic recovery.
The July agreement built on various crisis response labour market and training initiatives 
taken by the government and social partners during 2008 and 2009, providing for sup-
plementary measures aimed at ‘limiting the employment consequences of the economic 
crisis to the greatest extent possible’. These measures aimed to: help ‘maintain the contrac-
tual link’ between employers and employees during periods of reduced activity; provide 
more secure paths back into employment for redundant workers who have lost their jobs; 
mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on the most vulnerable groups; and enhance 
qualifications and skills. All of the agreed measures were temporary in nature and were due 
to expire on 1 January 2011, and many required implementation by the government, which 
indicated that it would issue the necessary regulations as soon as possible.
Key provisions of the agreement include:
the extension of the statutory short-time work scheme to new groups of employees •	
( especially in the services sector);
measures to promote the training of employees on short-time work and make their •	
 future career paths more secure;
an increase in the general maximum duration of short-time benefit from 800 to •	
1 000 hours per employee per year;
simplification of administrative procedures that companies must observe in applying for •	
short-time benefit;
a framework of rules and procedures to govern ‘employee leasing’ — this arrangement, •	
whereby a company temporarily places a number of its employees at the disposal of 
another company, is permitted by French law but lacks detailed regulation;
the promotion of employees’ geographical and occupational mobility by companies, for •	
example through internal ‘job exchanges’ or allowing employees to try out other jobs;
improvements to schemes to help redundant workers back into employment, such as •	
opening them up to people who formerly had fixed-term contracts or were temporary 
agency workers; and
assistance targeted at groups, such as, the long-term unemployed, older workers and •	
young people, mainly by adapting the use of various existing schemes that seek to keep 
these groups in employment, find them new jobs, or help them enter the labour market 
for the first time.
The social partners also reached a national cross-sector agreement on vocational training 
in January 2009, which was negotiated at the government’s behest. The negotiating process 
was not directly linked to the crisis but the final agreement’s content was influenced by 
the deteriorating employment situation. The accord includes measures aimed at providing 
training for an extra 700 000 low-skilled or unemployed workers each year and provides 
funding for urgent training measures to tackle the effects of the downturn.
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in 2009 for greater involvement in the 
government’s response to the crisis, 
and their participation in work in 
drawing up a new short-time work 
scheme (Box 3.5), serious engagement 
on broader issues began in early 2010. 
This resulted in tripartite agreement in 
February on a set of ‘short-term’ crisis 
response measures (Verveková, 2010). 
These related to a range of economic 
and social issues. Directly, employ-
ment-related points concerned train-
ing programmes, possible greater tax 
harmonisation between employees 
and the self-employed, and measures 
to address misuse of unemployment 
benefits. Additional measures were 
agreed in April. In employment terms, 
the government made commitments to 
examine the possibility of introducing 
a more ‘German style’ short-time work 
scheme and speeding up the payment 
of pensions and sickness benefit.
In Bulgaria, trade unions withdrew 
from the main national tripartite 
institution in late 2008, at least partly 
because of lack of consultation over 
government anti-crisis measures, and 
organised protests against the govern-
ment’s policies over the spring and 
early summer of 2009. However, fol-
lowing a change of government, tripar-
tite dialogue resumed in August 2009, 
with agreement to draw up a joint anti-
crisis package. Nevertheless, there was 
no consensus on the new government’s 
initial anti-crisis programme. Trade 
union discontent with the programme 
then led to negotiations with employers’ 
organisations over potential additional 
measures, resulting in a set of joint 
proposals to government and finally 
to a tripartite agreement on a package 
of 59 anti-crisis measures in March 
2010 (Daskalova, 2010). These wide-
ranging measures sought to support 
employment, households, businesses 
and the state budget. The employ-
ment measures included: a mechanism 
for increasing the minimum wage; 
increases in unemployment benefits; 
schemes to support employment in 
companies facing difficulties (such as 
support for workers placed on unpaid 
leave); employment subsidies; and pro-
motion of labour mobility.
The degree to which the various agree-
ments were bipartite or tripartite was 
not in all cases straightforward. The 
accords reached in Estonia, Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic were clearly 
tripartite, the Spanish agreement was 
bipartite, and the parallel accords 
concluded in Slovakia neither bi- nor 
tripartite. In the other countries there 
was a more complex interplay between 
the social partners and the govern-
ment. While the Belgian intersectoral 
agreement was formally bipartite, it 
was negotiated in conjunction with 
the government (which mediated in 
the talks), relies on government fund-
ing for some of its measures and forms 
part of the government’s response to 
the deteriorating economic situa-
tion. The Netherlands saw a mixture 
of tripartite and bipartite cross-sector 
agreements, with a broad tripartite 
crisis response accord in October 
2008 and a bipartite agreement in 
March 2009, though the latter appar-
ently emerged largely from work in a 
tripartite ‘crisis team’. In France, the 
July 2009 agreement on managing 
the employment consequences of the 
economic crisis relied on government 
approval and legislation for much of 
its enactment. The Polish agreement 
Box 3.3 Polish social partner agreement  
on anti-crisis package
Following talks on crisis response measures within the main national tripartite consulta-
tive body, the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs, trade unions and 
employers’ organisations opened bipartite talks on the issue and in March 2009 agreed on 
a package of anti-crisis measures (Czarzasty, 2009).
The main points (many of which were of a time-limited nature) included the following:
the introduction of a form of short-time working, whereby employers facing economic dif-•	
ficulties may, in order to avoid redundancies, place employees on short time or lay them off 
temporarily, with the workers concerned receiving a limited public wage subsidy;
an extension of the maximum reference period for averaging weekly working time from three •	
months to 12 and an amended statutory definition of ‘working day’ to allow more flexibility;
the introduction of working time flexibility in order to facilitate the reconciliation of •	
work and family life;
promoting the creation and use of company training funds;•	
a limitation of the duration of fixed-term contracts, with the aim of making employment •	
more stable;
a gradual increase in the national minimum wage to 50 % of the average wage;•	
increased social security benefits for redundant workers and support for families hardest •	
hit by the crisis;
tax exemptions for allowances and benefits paid by companies and trade unions to work-•	
ers facing financial difficulties;
recognition of company collective agreements as a source of labour law; and•	
repealing legislation capping the pay of senior executives in state-owned firms.•	
Many of the agreed measures required implementation through legislation. The govern-
ment committed itself to introducing the necessary legislation and issued draft laws in June 
2009, which were adopted in August. The legislation omitted some of the points agreed 
by the social partners (such as the increase in the national minimum wage) and amended 
others, drawing heavy criticism from trade unions (which accused the government of pur-
suing its own agenda and of failing to consult properly on the legislation) and to a lesser 
extent from employers. In early 2010, the social partners criticised the effectiveness of 
some of the measures introduced by the legislation and called for amendments.
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was negotiated on a bipartite basis fol-
lowing tripartite talks and many of its 
points required legislative implemen-
tation, which occurred in August. As 
well as some measures in most of the 
agreements requiring implementa-
tion through legislation, in the case 
of Belgium, Spain and to some extent 
the Netherlands, implementation was 
also predicated on further collective 
negotiations at lower levels.
The agreements in Latvia and Lithuania 
were multipartite, involving accords 
between the government and a range of 
interest organisations. As well as trade 
unions and employers’ organisations 
the accords were also signed by organi-
sations representing businesses (other 
than employers’ organisations as such) 
and pensioners, with various other 
parties being involved in each case. 
However, in Lithuania, the agreement 
was not signed by a number of (mainly 
public sector) trade unions and rel-
evant interest groups (such as associa-
tions representing older and disabled 
people), and these organisations criti-
cised the accord, claiming that it served 
the interests only of the signatories and 
not of the wider public.
In terms of their content, all of the 
agreements constituted ‘packages’ of 
measures aimed at tackling the eco-
nomic crisis, rather than addressing 
single issues. The agreements in Bel-
gium, Estonia, France, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain dealt 
centrally with employment-related 
matters. The other agreements were 
more wide-ranging, covering a variety 
of economic, fiscal, public and social 
policy matters, including some labour 
market elements (only marginally so 
in the case of Latvia, where the accord 
addressed only austerity measures 
aimed at restoring the public finances). 
To varying extent, this second group of 
agreements seemed to be exercises in 
obtaining social partner consensus for 
governments’ crisis response measures 
(notably spending cuts), in return for 
some compensating measures.
The most common employment-
related issues dealt with in the vari-
ous agreements were: short-time 
work (Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
France, Spain and Poland); employ-
ment-related tax/social security 
measures (Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Poland); employment incen-
tives, schemes and assistance aimed 
at unemployed people and vulnerable 
groups (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Spain and the Neth-
erlands); flexibility in employment 
type and/or working time (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Poland); wage moderation (Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain); 
and training/lifelong learning (the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain and 
the Netherlands).
Unsuccessful talks  3.2.2. 
and pressure on existing 
arrangements
In six countries, negotiations were 
held over a specific tripartite or bipar-
tite agreement or accord aimed at 
tackling the effects of the crisis, but 
without success by the end of April 
2010. Five of the countries concerned 
have established traditions of suc-
Box 3.4: Regional cross-sector agreements to address  
the crisis in Italy and Spain
In several Member States, national political structures devolve important responsibilities 
in the employment field to the regional level. This is notably the case in Italy and Spain. 
Since the crisis took hold, agreements on dealing with aspects of its employment effects 
have been signed in a number of regions in both countries.
In Italy, legislation adopted in January 2009 increased resources for the country’s system of 
‘social shock absorbers’ — measures that cushion the effects of redundancies and restruc-
turing, including special unemployment benefits and other forms of income support for 
workers who have lost their jobs or are temporarily laid off — and provided for the system 
to be extended and adapted during the 2009–10 period. The national government reached 
agreement with the authorities at regional level on implementing the law. The operational 
details were then determined by agreements signed by the social partners and authorities 
in each region. These regional tripartite accords typically extended support measures to 
cover types of company and worker normally excluded from the social shock absorbers, 
and some included training obligations for the workers concerned, or provided for social 
partner involvement in administering the scheme.
In at least one case, the regional social partners also signed a bipartite anti-crisis accord. 
An agreement reached in the Rome/Lazio region in June 2009 sought to boost the local 
economy and increase employment levels. It provided for employers to use enhanced 
social shock absorbers, while also introducing a new joint regional training fund and call-
ing for a range of initiatives to promote ‘green’ and high technology industries, along with 
investments in research and infrastructure.
In Spain, tripartite agreements were signed in a number of regions during 2009 to promote 
employment and stimulate the economy in the context of the crisis. For example, a ‘pact 
for development and competitiveness’, signed in Castilla-La Mancha in August, provided 
for: major public investments in public works, infrastructure, housing, research and new 
technologies; support for small businesses, vocational training measures; and subsidies for 
the recruitment of unemployed people. Similarly, a ‘social agreement for productivity and 
employment’ reached in La Rioja in March provided for public investment in innovation, 
export industries, renewable energy, the environment, competitiveness, infrastructure 
and tourism. The accord also focused on improving training, public employment services 
and working conditions. An ‘agreement for competitiveness and employment generation’ 
signed in Madrid in December aimed to create 30 000 ‘high-quality’ jobs directly and 
50 000 indirectly in strategic industrial sectors, through investments in innovation and 
new technologies.
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cessfully concluding cross-sector 
agreements: Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia, Spain and Finland (until very 
recently). In the sixth, Hungary, there 
is no previously successful initiative. 
Of these, Ireland, Slovenia and Spain 
saw a collapse (at least temporary) of 
long-standing cross-sector bipartite/
tripartite arrangements as a result of 
the crisis and differences over how to 
react to it. Tripartite arrangements 
also came under pressure in Bulgaria, 
as reported above.
The Hungarian government held tri-
partite discussions in late 2008 and 
2009 over a possible ‘social pact’ on 
its reform measures in response to the 
 crisis, but without success. As indi-
cated in Chapter 2, substantial dif-
ferences persisted between the social 
partners and amongst the rival trade 
union confederations, both over each 
others’ respective perspectives on the 
measures required to successfully 
address the  crisis and over the gov-
ernment’s proposals, and particularly 
those concerning labour law reform 
(Tóth, Edelényi and Neumann, 2009). 
The parties would seem to be ‘going 
through the motions’ rather than being 
engaged in a search for compromise.
In Finland, a long period of bipartite/
tripartite national incomes policy 
agreements had come to an end in 2007 
and the EK employers’ confederation 
had indicated that it no longer wanted 
a role in such cross-sector bargaining. 
However, linked to the late 2009 secto-
ral bargaining round, EK and the trade 
union confederations held secret talks 
over a possible overall framework for 
pay increases in sectoral agreements, 
with the aim of promoting employ-
ment. The talks ended without success 
in December 2009 when EK withdrew 
(Jokivuori, 2009).
Tripartite negotiations during March 
and April 2010 in Luxembourg were 
aimed at reaching agreement on 
 measures to support employment, 
maintain and enhance competitiveness 
and address the deterioration of the 
public finances. The negotiations broke 
down towards the end of April, with 
the principal focus of disagreement 
being the employers’ key proposal to 
freeze the automatic indexation of 
wagers and pensions for a two year 
period. This was fiercely resisted by the 
trade unions, although supported by 
the government (Planet Labor, 2010).
Since 1987, Ireland has been covered 
by an unbroken series of tripartite 
national social partnership agree-
ments, regulating a range of employ-
ment, social and economic matters, 
and including multi-year pay deals 
between unions and both private 
sector employers and the govern-
ment. The current 10-year partner-
ship agreement, ‘Towards 2016’, was 
signed in 2006 and within its frame-
work a ‘transitional agreement’ was 
negotiated in September 2008, which 
included a two- to three-year pay deal. 
In early 2009, with the economy in 
deep recession, the IBEC employers’ 
confederation called for a deferral of 
the agreed pay increases for at least a 
year. In practice, many employers did 
not pay the wage increases due in 2009, 
and IBEC formally withdrew from the 
deal at the end of the year, after the 
failure of talks with unions over an 
alternative pay accord. The public sec-
tor pay agreement also broke down, 
with the government not paying the 
wage increases due under the transi-
tional agreement and introducing pay 
cuts, following the failure of talks with 
unions (Sheehan, 2009). Discussions 
were held during 2009 over a form of 
tripartite national economic recov-
ery plan, but failed. The main stum-
bling blocks were government plans 
to cut public expenditure and public 
sector pay, which proved unaccept-
able to trade unions (and were subse-
quently implemented unilaterally by 
the  government), along with the fate 
of the transitional pay agreement and 
the degree of government support for 
employment preservation and crea-
tion. Unions argued unsuccessfully 
for a wide-ranging pact covering eco-
nomic, fiscal and social policy.
Bipartite relations between IBEC and 
the ICTU trade union confederations 
have not, however, broken down com-
pletely. In March 2010, they signed 
a ‘national protocol for the orderly 
conduct of industrial relations and 
local bargaining in the private sector’ 
aimed at ensuring that company-level 
collective bargaining is conducted in 
an orderly fashion in the absence of a 
national pay agreement, with efforts to 
avoid industrial action. The protocol 
states that bargaining in 2010 should 
serve the primary purpose of protect-
ing jobs. In the public sector too, there 
was some rapprochement between the 
government and unions, with a draft 
agreement on public sector pay, jobs 
and reform reached in March 2010 
(see Box 3.6).
In Slovenia, where cross-sector agree-
ments have been a recurring feature 
since the 1990s, tripartite dialogue 
over responses to the crisis was 
marked by considerable consensus in 
2008 but problems emerged in 2009. 
Major disagreement focused on mini-
mum wage policy and late in the year 
employers’ organisations started to 
boycott the main national tripartite 
forum following the government’s 
adoption of a new minimum wage law 
(Stanojevič, 2010).
In Spain, the social partners were 
 unable, in 2009, to reach their usual 
annual cross-sector framework agree-
ment laying down recommendations 
for lower-level bargaining, mainly 
because of differences over pay 
increases in the recession. Such agree-
ments had been signed every year from 
2002 to 2008. The lack of a national 
framework contributed to a difficult 
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 bargaining round in 2009, with nego-
tiations over many collective agree-
ments deadlocked or delayed, and 
disputes about the payment of wage 
increases due in 2009 under multi-
annual agreements signed in previ-
ous years. However, in November the 
social partners agreed a joint approach 
to resolving the problems that were 
affecting bargaining, thereby opening 
the way for them to conclude a three-
year national framework agreement 
in February 2010 (see 3.2.1 above).
While bipartite cross-sector rela-
tions between Spanish unions and 
employers’ organisations moved 
from disagreement to agreement, 
the opposite was true of tripartite 
dialogue over the crisis. In July 2008, 
the government and social partners 
signed a ‘declaration of principles for 
stimulating the economy, employ-
ment, competitiveness and social 
progress’, which expressed support 
for the government’s diagnosis of the 
problems facing the country and the 
financial measures adopted to bol-
ster the economy. During 2009, the 
government made repeated efforts 
to engage the social partners in a tri-
partite pact to boost employment and 
tackle the effects of the crisis. These 
efforts foundered mainly because 
employers wanted to discuss more 
radical employment law reforms and 
deeper cuts in employers’ non-wage 
labour costs than those proposed 
by the government or acceptable to 
trade unions. After the social part-
ners signed their renewed cross-
sector agreement in February 2010, 
the government reopened tripar-
tite social dialogue, and presented 
a series of proposals to the social 
partners for labour market reform 
aimed at increasing adaptability and 
flexibility. The dialogue was still 
under way at the end of April, but 
with little sign of consensus, and the 
talks were to some extent overshad-
owed by sharp  differences over the 
a pension reform announced by the 
government at the end of January, 
which would raise the age of retire-
ment, and by trade union discon-
tent over public sector pay cuts (see 
Box 3.6).
Specific public policy 3.2.3. 
measures: short-time 
working arrangements
In a number of cases, consensus 
(bipartite or tripartite) was reached 
Box 3.5 Short-time work and the social partners
Many Member States amongst the EU-15 already had short-time work schemes in place 
and responded to the crisis by amending them, as occurred in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The main 
changes included:
increasing the duration of the benefits paid to employees (or subsidies paid to employ-•	
ers), as in Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg;
increasing the level of income replacement for the employees concerned, as, for example, •	
in Belgium and France;
extending the scheme to new categories of companies and/or employees, as in Belgium, •	
France, Germany and Italy;
linking state subsidy to commitments by the employer not to make the workers con-•	
cerned redundant for a certain period, as in France and the Netherlands; and
making the arrangements more flexible and/or easier to access, as in Austria, Denmark, •	
Finland, Germany and Luxembourg.
Several of the Member States in central and south-eastern Europe — such as Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — introduced state-
supported short-time work schemes for the first time.
A key feature of all the short-time work schemes referred to here is that they are heavily 
dependent on state financial support for their operation.
In many cases, the social partners were involved in the adaptation or introduction of short-
time work schemes in response to the downturn. The partners jointly initiated change in 
several countries, for example:
the introduction of a short-time work scheme in Poland was based on the social partners’ •	
March 2009 anti-crisis agreement (see Box 3.4);
France’s statutory scheme was extended to new groups of employees and the duration of •	
benefit was increased as a result of calls made in the social partners’ cross-sector agree-
ment on managing the employment consequences of the economic crisis, signed in July 
2009 (see Box 3.3);
the Austrian social partners issued a joint proposal to make the statutory short-time •	
work scheme more flexible, which was enacted by parliament in February 2009;
the Danish social partners made a joint call to the government to take measures to •	
strengthen the labour market, notably adaption of the state-supported short-time work 
scheme, which was partially taken up by the government in March 2009;
the German social partners made a joint recommendation that the duration of statutory •	
short- time work benefit should be extended, which was enacted in May 2009; and
the Dutch social partners made joint requests in 2008 and 2009 for enhancing the state •	
short-time work scheme, which were largely taken up by the government.
Elsewhere, social partner involvement was more tripartite and/or consultative. Following 
the failure of bipartite talks on the issue, the Belgian government issued proposals for tem-
porarily extending short-time work measures (which normally apply only to blue-collar 
workers) to white-collar workers, which were endorsed by the social partners and enacted 
in April 2009. The introduction of a new scheme was reportedly agreed by the Bulgar-
ian government and social partners. A tripartite working group was set up in the Czech 
Republic in August 2009 to formulate a new short-time working scheme, and the Slov-
enian social partners were consulted on a new short-time work scheme, though in these 
cases no information is available on the degree of social partner influence exerted.
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on measures that were subsequently 
enacted by the government, or the 
social partners endorsed government 
plans. The most common measure to 
which this applied was the modifi-
cation, extension or introduction of 
state- supported short-time work and 
temporary lay-off schemes (known 
by other terms, such as partial unem-
ployment, in some countries). These 
schemes allow employers temporarily 
to reduce employees’ working time, 
partially or fully, with compensa-
tion, funded wholly or partly by the 
state, for some of the income lost by 
the employees. Such arrangements 
allow the employment relationship 
to be maintained through periods of 
reduced demand, protecting workers 
from unemployment and excessive 
income loss, while enabling employers 
to  retain skilled and experienced staff.
The social partners have been vari-
ously involved in the adaptation and 
introduction of state-supported short-
time work schemes. The schemes have 
also prompted, and in some cases 
require, further negotiations between 
employers and trade unions at inter-
sector level, as in Belgium, and at 
 sector and company levels in a number 
of countries (see below). Box 3.5 out-
lines the incidence of, changes to and 
introduction of state-supported short-
time work schemes, and the nature of 
 social partner involvement.
Assessment3.2.4. 
To summarise, up until the end of 
April 2010, explicit attempts to nego-
tiate a form of bipartite or tripar-
tite national cross-sector agreement 
involving a package of measures 
aimed at addressing aspects of the 
economic crisis were made in 16 of 
the 27 Member States. Agreements 
were concluded in Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain (in the 
case of a bipartite accord), the Baltic 
states, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
and, in the form of parallel accords, 
Slovakia. Negotiations, or short of this, 
talks, were unsuccessful in Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia. They have reopened in Spain 
(in the case of a tripartite accord) after 
a considerable interregnum. The aim 
in all cases was to reach a multi-issue 
package of crisis response measures, 
with one exception: the failed bipartite 
talks in Finland over a pay framework 
for sectoral bargaining.
The multi-issue nature of the agree-
ments concluded, involving a package 
of measures, is indicative of an inte-
grative dimension to the bargaining 
process. Addressing a wide-ranging 
agenda better facilitates a positive-sum 
outcome through scope for trade-offs 
in which each of the parties is able to 
secure gains, albeit that they also have 
to make compromises and even con-
cessions (Marginson and Sisson, 2004; 
Walton and McKersie, 1965). Beyond 
this, it is difficult to establish with any 
precision the balance between dis-
tributive and integrative elements of 
the agreements. Because the scope of 
the negotiation, and the subsequent 
agreement, was wider in, for example, 
the Netherlands and Poland, the pos-
sibilities for integrative outcomes were 
greater than in, for example, Estonia 
and Latvia, where the agenda was nar-
rower. In some instances, for example 
in Bulgaria and France, distributional 
conflicts have been a precursor or 
accompaniment to negotiations which 
have resulted in integrative outcomes.
In addition, the social partners have 
exercised a clear influence on the 
specific issue of short-time work-
ing. A close interaction between the 
action of the government and that 
of the social partners is a striking 
feature of most of the countries con-
cerned. Bipartite or tripartite con-
sensus has been reached on, or the 
social partners have endorsed, the 
implementation and/or  amendment 
of standing schemes or the intro-
duction of new ones in at least eight 
countries: Austria,  Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark,  Germany, 
the Netherlands and  Slovenia. In 
some countries, short-time work-
ing has been addressed as part of a 
wider package of measures, includ-
ing  Belgium and the  Netherlands. 
Elsewhere, as in  Austria, the Czech 
 Republic,  Denmark,  Germany and 
Slovenia, social partner accord or 
endorsement has focused on this spe-
cific issue. Integrative outcomes in this 
instance have flowed from the interac-
tion between public policy  measures 
and social partner actions.
For both types of intended interven-
tion, some procedural innovation was 
in evidence. New tripartite or bipartite 
processes or structures were estab-
lished specifically to address aspects 
of the crisis in several countries. This 
would appear to be the case, for exam-
ple, with the Czech tripartite work-
ing group on short-time working and 
the Dutch tripartite ‘crisis team’ on 
addressing the employment effects of 
the crisis. Other innovations included 
the launch in France, in April 2009, 
of a joint government–social partner 
‘social investment fund’ to coordinate 
their action on training and reskilling 
for those workers most affected by the 
crisis; and the establishment by the 
Slovak government of an Economic 
Crisis Council, with social partner 
representation, to make proposals for 
dealing with the crisis. Such proce-
dural innovation, aimed at facilitating 
‘problem solving’, is characteristic of 
integrative bargaining processes.
There were few cases of conflict 
specifically relating to bipartite/
tripartite negotiations about  crisis 
response measures, or their absence 
or failure. The main exception was 
probably in Ireland, where the 
breakdown of social partnership 
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was reflected in significant con-
flict, including a  one-day  public 
sector strike in November 2009. 
More broadly, trade unions organ-
ised protests over government crisis 
response measures, and especially 
austerity measures aimed at the 
public sector services (see Box 3.6), 
in a range of countries — includ-
ing Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
 Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria.
Categorising national responses
The countries where attempts have 
been made to conclude a cross-sector, 
multi-issue crisis response agreement 
does not correspond closely to the 
presence or absence of an established 
institutional capacity for negotiation 
and concertation at cross-sector level, 
as Table 3.1 shows. In terms of estab-
lished institutional capacity, Table 
3.1 classifies countries in five groups 
( Freyssinet, 2009; Hethy, 2009; Natali 
and Pochet, 2009):
those with an established tradition 1. 
of regular bipartite or tripartite 
negotiation or concertation;
those with an established tradition 2. 
of periodic bipartite, sometimes 
government prompted, or tripar-
tite negotiation or concertation;
those with sector-focused bipartite 3. 
negotiating arrangements along-
side social partner involvement in 
labour market policy;
those with tripartite or bipartite 4. 
social dialogue structures but no 
tradition of negotiation or concer-
tation; and
those with no institutional struc-5. 
tures for cross-sector social dia-
logue.
Table 3.1 combines this classifica-
tion with the actions of the social 
partners in (a) attempts, successful 
or unsuccessful, to conclude a multi-
issue crisis response agreement and 
(b) intervention on the specific issue 
of short-time working. The final col-
umn indicates those countries where 
 neither  development has occurred.
In accounting for the cross-country 
pattern in Table 3.1, two of the factors 
identified in Figure 3.1 seem influen-
tial: industrial relations institutions, 
in the form of established institutional 
capacity for cross-sector negotiation; 
and both aspects of public policy. Cir-
cumstantial evidence points to the rel-
evance of a third factor also, employer 
and trade unions strategies. In contrast, 
countries’ economic situation seems to 
exercise less influence. Institutional 
arrangements for industrial relations 
partially account for the placement of 
the countries in each group across the 
three columns of Table 3.1. Amongst 
the first group, negotiations over a 
 multi-issue crisis response agreement 
have indeed taken place, successfully 
and/or unsuccessfully, in all of the 
countries concerned, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia. Amongst the second 
group of countries, this has been the 
case in France, but not in Greece, Italy 
or Portugal. Such negotiations would 
not be expected amongst the third 
group of countries, given the sector 
focus of negotiating arrangements, 
although social partner intervention 
on short-time work schemes is antici-
pated given established involvement 
in labour market policy. This is the 
case for Austria, Denmark and Ger-
many, but not for Finland (unsuccess-
ful cross-sector negotiation) or Sweden 
(neither development). Although there 
is little tradition of successful concerta-
tion amongst the fourth group, agree-
ments have been concluded in six of 
the nine countries and an unsuccessful 
attempt made in a seventh. Consistent 
with the absence of cross-sector dia-
logue structures, neither development 
has featured in the two countries in the 
fifth group.
Considering further the second group 
of countries, the reasons why institu-
tional capacity for cross-sector nego-
tiation or concertation has not been 
mobilised are partly conjunctural (Frey-
ssinet, 2009). In Italy, arrangements had 
encountered problems before the onset 
of the crisis with differences opening up 
between the main union confederations 
(see Chapter 2) and attempts by the 
Table 3.1: Established institutional capacity for cross-sector 
negotiation and social partners’ crisis response actions 
Established 
institutional capacity 
Negotiations over multi-issue 
crisis response agreement
SP intervention 
on STW scheme 
Neither 
development 
1.  Regular bi/tripartite 
concertation
BE, NL (successful)
BG, ES (successful/unsuccessful)
IE, LU (unsuccessful)
 BE, LU, NL, 
BG, SI
2.  Periodic bi/tripartite 
concertation FR (successful) FR, IT EL, PT
3.  Sector bargaining, SPs 
involved in LM policy FI (unsuccessful) AT, DE, DK, FI SE
4.  Bi/tripartite dialogue 
structures; little 
concertation tradition
CZ, PL, SK, EE, LT, LV 
(successful)
HU (unsuccessful)
CZ, PL MT, RO
5.  No cross-sector 
dialogue structures CY, UK
Source: Own compilation.
95
Chapter 3: Negotiating the crisis: social partner responses
 government to play on these differences 
by reaching non-inclusive agreements. 
In Greece and Portugal, the social part-
ners have not been able to reach com-
mon positions on responses to the crisis 
(see Chapter 2). The significance of the 
strategic choices exercised by employ-
ers’ organisations and trade unions (and 
also governments) in these instances 
is apparent. In addition, the extent to 
which institutional arrangements for 
tri/bipartite negotiation and concerta-
tion are stable differs. Natali and Pochet 
(2009) contrast institutional dynamics 
over the past 20 years in Ireland and 
Spain, where institutionalised capac-
ity has been stabilised, with Italy and 
Portugal, where it has not. Extending 
this concept of ‘uneven institutionalisa-
tion’ to other countries in the first two 
groups, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands also have a stable institu-
tional capacity for agreement-making 
across a wide agenda, whereas France 
resembles more the situation in Italy 
and Portugal.
Turning to the third group of coun-
tries, a combination of conjunctural 
and institutional considerations 
helps account for the positions of 
Sweden and Finland. Current disa-
greements and tensions between the 
social partners in Sweden (see Chap-
ter 2) are at odds with the role that 
they have long exercised in labour 
market policy. Historically, all three 
Nordic countries featured bipartite 
cross-sector collective agreements. 
These central arrangements had been 
abandoned much earlier in Denmark 
(late 1980s) and Sweden (early 1990s) 
than in Finland (2007). It was poten-
tially feasible for institutional capac-
ity to be revived in Finland, but not 
in the other two countries, whatever 
the strategic  preferences of employ-
ers’  organisations and trade unions 
might have been. In contrast to the 
‘path dependency’ apparent in other 
countries in the group, Finland rep-
resents an attempt at ‘path recovery’ 
and underlines the scope for employ-
ers’ organisations and trade unions to 
exercise choices, albeit the initiative 
was unsuccessful.
The fourth group also underlines the 
scope that exists for strategic choices. 
The conclusion of agreements in five 
central and east European Member 
States with little or no previous history 
of doing so, and the parallel accords 
in Slovakia, suggests that the crisis 
may have acted as a ‘moment’ spur-
ring innovation in industrial relations 
at cross-sector level, and therefore 
‘path change’, in a manner similar to 
the effect that the conditions required 
for economic and monetary union 
had in prompting the negotiation of 
social pacts in several EU-15  Member 
States during the 1990s (Fajertag and 
Pochet, 2000). The implication is 
more relevant to the Visegrad coun-
tries, where cross-sector social dia-
logue structures are well established, 
than the Baltic states, where they are 
widely regarded as weakly embedded 
(Meardi, 2010). In Poland, there have 
been previous attempts to negotiate 
agreements — none of which have 
been successful, whilst in Slovakia 
an accord anticipating the effects of 
entry into the euro area had previ-
ously been concluded. Such initiatives 
have not previously been a feature in 
the Baltic states, where the extremity 
of the crisis seems to have eventually 
pushed governments into concluding 
accords involving not only the social 
partners but a wide range of other 
 interest groups.
In general, the economic situation, 
as reflected in the magnitude of the 
crisis, does not seem to have a strong 
bearing on the successful or unsuc-
cessful outcome of cross-sector nego-
tiations. Amongst the first group of 
countries, the magnitude of the crisis 
and its impact on the public finances 
sets Ireland apart from the others, but 
unsuccessful outcomes also feature 
elsewhere. Amongst the fourth group 
of countries, whilst the impact of the 
crisis, and the consequences for the 
public finances, in Poland, and to 
lesser extent the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, has been milder than in 
Hungary, the comparison does not 
extend to the Baltic states where, 
as noted above, accords have been 
concluded in the face of much more 
 severe  economic conditions. 
The role of public policy emerges 
as important in both of the respects 
identified in Figure 3.1. In addition 
to the evident role of governments in 
the conclusion of tripartite accords, 
they have frequently played an impor-
tant role in supporting bipartite ones. 
This in underlined a contrario by the 
case of Romania, where although the 
social partners were able to reach 
compromises on a package of crisis 
response measures (see Chapter 2), 
the government chose not to engage 
with them. Public intervention to sup-
port employment in the specific from 
of short-time intervention has been a 
focus for social partner interventions 
in most of the countries where such 
schemes operate.
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Box 3.6: Public sector services
In the public sector services, the consequences of the economic crisis for the public finances, and therefore for public services, have become 
apparent more quickly in some countries than others. As Chapter 2 shows, the scale of the problem with the public finances also varies across 
countries. The impact of the crisis, in employment terms, has largely manifested itself in government attempts to reduce expenditure on pay 
and jobs and to secure ‘efficiency savings’.
The means for determining pay and major conditions in public sector services vary across countries. In some, pay is determined by govern-
ment decree or other statutory means, including Greece, Luxembourg and the Baltic states. Tripartite structures play an important role in 
pay determination in Hungary and Poland. Elsewhere, collective bargaining over pay ranges in coverage from some groups of the public 
sector workforce, with pay being determined for other groups by statutory or other means, to most or all workforce groups. Where collec-
tive bargaining arrangements exist, these are generally multi-employer in nature (Bordogna, 2007; Broughton, 2009). The involvement of 
government in determining pay, either directly through decree or via their role in collective negotiations or indirectly through setting state 
budgets, means that trade unions are more inclined to turn to forms of political mobilisation to press home their demands than is the case 
in the private sector.
In 2009, freezes or cuts in public sector pay and/or pensions, job cuts or recruitment freezes featured mainly (though not exclusively) in 
countries hit by the crisis deeply and early. For example, total or selective pay freezes were applied in Belgium, Bulgaria (where the govern-
ment cancelled a planned 10 % rise), Estonia, Greece (except for one-off payments for low-paid workers), Hungary (with an effective pay 
cut for higher-paid employees), Ireland (with take-home pay cut by a 7 % ‘pension levy’) and Slovenia, while pay was cut in Latvia and 
Lithuania. In Belgium and Slovenia, the pay freezes were based on collective agreements. This was not the case in the other countries where, 
if negotiations were held, they were unsuccessful, with measures subsequently being imposed by governments. For example, in Ireland the 
government imposed a pay freeze (in breach of an earlier agreement on wage rises), following the breakdown of negotiations with trade 
unions. In other countries, agreements were not sought by the public authorities before imposing pay freezes or cuts. Examples include 
Greece and the Baltic states, where pay is set by government decree. In Lithuania, the government subsequently relented somewhat on its 
proposed public service pay cuts after mounting trade union protests (see 3.2.1). Such protests also occurred, with less success, in countries 
such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland and Latvia, including national strikes in the cases of Greece and Ireland. The year 2009 also saw 
considerable levels of protest against other aspects of government public sector policy in some countries. For instance, French unions organ-
ised protests throughout the year against public sector spending and job cuts, and in support of wage increases, while Romanian unions 
mobilised, including a one-day national strike in October 2009, against government plans to reform public sector pay.
In the latter part of 2009, as governments started to announce their public spending plans for 2010, it became apparent that more countries 
were intending to freeze or cut public sector pay and/or jobs, and in the early months of 2010, further countries joined the list or issued more 
detailed proposals. The main instances included:
plans for a 10 % cut in paybill across ministries and publicly funded organisations in Bulgaria in 2010, to be implemented through reduc-•	
tions in pay or employment levels;
a three-year freeze in public spending in France, with a pay freeze, workforce reductions and the non-filling of vacant posts, along with •	
changes to public sector pensions;
public sector pay cuts of 7 % in Greece in 2010, along with reductions in bonuses, allowances and pensions, and a recruitment freeze, or •	
only limited filling of vacant posts, in most areas;
public services pay cuts of 6 % to 8 % in Ireland in 2010;•	
a three-year public sector pay and recruitment freeze in Italy, plus the non-renewal of fixed-term contracts;•	
a pay freeze for 2010 in local and provincial government in the Netherlands;•	
a public sector pay freeze and cuts in allowances and pensions in Portugal in 2010, along with a recruitment freeze;•	
a 25 % cut in public sector paybill in Romania (partly to be achieved through compulsory hours cuts) in 2010, plus a 15 % reduction in •	
pensions and major job losses;
a 5 % cut in the pay of Spanish public employees in 2010, followed by a freeze in 2011, along with the non-filling of many vacant posts and •	
a pensions freeze; and
the announcement of a pay freeze over 2010–11 in local government in the UK.•	
These measures and proposals, generally imposed rather than negotiated, led to major protests by public employees in almost all the coun-
tries concerned. By the end of April 2010, these included public sector strikes held, or called for the coming months, in France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Spain. The situation in these countries is still developing at the time of writing, while it seems likely 
that further Member States will take similar steps in the near future.
As in 2009, collective bargaining over the various pay and employment measures appears (at the time of writing) to have been largely absent 
in 2010. Indeed, in the case of Spain, the pay cuts announced have overridden an agreement signed in September 2009, providing for a 0.3 % 
wage increase for 2010. A partial exception is Ireland. Here, following the government’s imposition of public sector pay cuts for 2010, it 
reached a draft agreement with public services unions in March 2010. This provided for no further pay reductions before 2014 and the 
possibility of some reimbursement of cuts already made, along with a commitment to no compulsory redundancies, in exchange for union 
commitments on public sector reform. The deal was subsequently ratified by a majority of unions.
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 Sector and  3.3. 
company levels
This section examines the response 
to the economic crisis of the social 
partners at sector and company 
level, in terms of agreed actions and 
unsuccessful negotiations, up until 
the end of April 2010. It is based 
on an examination of the evidence 
available from the sources listed in 
Box 3.1 above, and seeks to identify 
attempts to conclude agreements, 
successful or otherwise, that are, or 
appear to be, linked to the economic 
recession or aimed at dealing with its 
consequences. The information and 
analysis are for the most part pre-
sented separately for two broad eco-
nomic sectors: the production and 
manufacturing industries (includ-
ing construction and utilities) and 
private services. However, wage 
bargaining is dealt with differently: 
cases of clear links or trade-offs 
between pay and other outcomes are 
examined in the sectoral analysis, 
while the overall effect of the cri-
sis on wage bargaining outcomes is 
dealt with separately (under 3.3.1 
below). Within the two broad sec-
tors, social partner actions at sec-
tor and company (or establishment) 
level are reviewed separately.
In other countries not yet marked by very deep inroads into public sector pay and jobs, collective bargaining has in some cases enabled wage 
moderation to be introduced in a relatively consensual manner. For example:
an agreement signed in October 2009 in Slovakia provided for an increase of 1 % in civil service and public service pay in 2010, consider-•	
ably lower than in previous years, in the light of the economic downturn;
an agreement for the Finnish state sector, running from March 2010 to February 2012, provides — despite the government’s initial calls for •	
a two-year pay freeze — for a total wage increase of nearly 1 % in 2010 (partly to be negotiated locally), with the 2011 rise to be negotiated 
later, along with protection of the employment status of civil servants;
an agreement for (non-civil servant) employees of the German federal government and local authorities, signed in March 2010•	 , provides 
for pay increases of around 2.3 % over two years, and introduces a flexible working scheme and scope for phased retirement for older 
employees, aimed primarily at those in areas of the public services subject to restructuring or workforce reductions;
agreements signed in 2010 (after long and difficult negotiations, marked by industrial action) for local and provincial government employ-•	
ees in the Netherlands, provide for increases of 2 % (local government) and 1.9 % (provincial government, where workers also receive a 
lump sum worth 0.5 %) over two years, along with measures on job security; and
agreements signed in Swedish local government in 2010 provide for increases over two years of 4.65 % for blue-collar workers and 3.5 % •	
for white-collar workers.
Box 3.7: Institutional arrangements for collective bargaining
The fundamental difference between multi-employer (MEB) and single-employer (SEB) 
bargaining arrangements conditions whether or not sector-level negotiations take place: 
where they do negotiations at both sector and company levels are potentially relevant, 
where they do not, only the company level is relevant.
In the private sector, the relevance of the two levels of bargaining varies between countries. 
Sector-level bargaining covers a relatively high proportion of economic sectors, and MEB 
is therefore the predominant arrangement, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. In Bulgaria and 
Romania, manufacturing and other industrial sectors are characterised by multi-employer 
arrangements, whilst the service sectors have single-employer ones. Elsewhere sector-level 
bargaining is even more limited in its coverage in Cyprus and the Czech Republic, and 
marginal or almost non-existent in Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Poland and the UK. In these countries SEB is the predominant arrangement 
and the company is the key collective bargaining level. Company-level bargaining of vari-
ous types is present in most countries with MEB arrangements, often but not always within 
frameworks of varying rigidity set by sector (or cross-sector) agreements.
Amongst countries and sectors with MEB arrangements, the relevance of sector agreements 
for what happens at company level in the private sector is determined by the procedural 
provisions governing the articulation of the two levels (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2008; 
Traxler et al., 2001). Broadly speaking these tend to be comprehensive in nature, equipping 
the sector with the capacity to govern de jure if not always de facto developments at com-
pany level, in the Nordic countries, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France. In Italy such procedural provisions are more recent, and remain contested. 
Elsewhere amongst the EU-15, the relationship between sector- and company-level nego-
tiations is only incompletely governed by procedural arrangements in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. The same applies to greater extent in those central and south-eastern Member 
States which have MEB arrangements, with the exception of Slovenia.
Whether MEB or SEB arrangements prevail exercises a strong influence on collective bar-
gaining coverage. In part because the use of legal extension arrangements is widespread 
amongst countries with MEB arrangements (Traxler et al., 2001), whilst being unknown 
amongst those where SEB arrangements prevail, collective bargaining coverage is consid-
erably higher under MEB than it is under SEB, as Chapter 1 has shown.
Attempts to negotiate responses are likely to be more widespread under MEB than under 
SEB arrangements since collective bargaining coverage is much higher in the former. Con-
versely, the scope for and incidence of unilateral management action is likely to be consid-
erably greater under SEB than under MEB arrangements. Amongst countries and sectors 
with MEB arrangements, unilateral management actions at company level also seem more 
likely in the absence of effective governance arrangements articulating the two levels.
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The analysis finds that the incidence 
of crisis response agreements, and 
unsuccessful negotiations, at sec-
tor and at company level varies both 
between countries and between (and 
within) broad economic sectors. Sec-
tor-level negotiations are confined 
to a group of countries with well-
established multi-employer bargain-
ing arrangements which also have 
the governance capacity to exercise 
influence, by simultaneously prompt-
ing and constraining the scope of fur-
ther negotiations at company level. 
They are also mainly evident amongst 
manufacturing sectors, with relatively 
little evidence of negotiations in the 
private service sectors. At company 
level, negotiations and agreements 
addressing the consequences of the 
crisis are spread across a wider range 
of countries, although they are more 
apparent amongst the EU-15 than 
amongst the Member States of central 
and south-eastern Europe. As with 
sector-level negotiations, agreements 
are concentrated in manufactur-
ing and particularly in metalwork-
ing and within that the automotive 
sub- sector. In private services, the 
majority of the smaller number of 
agreements has been concluded in the 
transportation and communication 
sectors. In accounting for these dif-
ferences between countries and sec-
tors, three of the sources of variation 
identified in Figure 3.1 are significant. 
The first is institutional differences in 
collective bargaining arrangements 
(see Box 3.7). The second is the dif-
ferential impact of the crisis between 
(and within) broad economic sec-
tors, shown in Chapter 2. Negotiated 
responses, and unsuccessful attempts 
to do so, feature more prominently in 
sectors which have been hit hard by the 
recession as compared to those which 
have remained relatively unaffected. 
The third is the implementation of 
specific public policy measures, nota-
bly short-time work schemes, which 
can act to prompt negotiations.
Wage bargaining 3.3.1. 
outcomes
In most countries, the onset of the eco-
nomic downturn rom mid-2008 had 
little effect on collectively agreed pay 
increases during that year (according to 
data from the European Industrial Rela-
tions Observatory, on which this section 
is largely based). In many cases these 
had been negotiated before the reces-
sion began, at a time when the economy 
was growing, inflation relatively high 
and unemployment falling. The gen-
eral tendency was for agreed pay rises 
to be higher in 2008 than in 2007, with 
the exceptions mainly central and east 
European countries such as Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
The effects of the crisis were much 
more widely felt in 2009, though some 
countries, such as Denmark, Finland, 
Greece (with regard to minimum rates) 
and Sweden, were still largely covered 
by ‘pre-crisis’ collective agreements 
signed in previous years. In most other 
Member States for which information 
is available, the average collectively 
agreed pay increase in 2009 fell from 
2008 levels. However, the decline was 
rarely dramatic. For example, the aver-
age rate of increase dropped: from 
3.4 % to 2.5 % in Belgium; 5.4 % to 
4.4 % in the Czech Republic (enter-
prise-level agreements); 2.9 % to 2.6 % 
in Germany; 3.5 % to 3.1 % in Italy; 
3.3 % to 2.9 % in the Netherlands; 
3.1 % to 2.9 % in Portugal (private 
sector); 3.6 % to 2.6 % in Spain; and 
3.9 % to 3 % in the UK. The most sub-
stantial falls were in Slovenia (7 % to 
3.5 %) and Ireland. In the latter case, a 
national pay agreement provided for a 
4.8 % rise in the private sector in 2008, 
but with the collapse of the agreement, 
which had stipulated an increase of 
2.5 % to 3 % for 2009, survey evidence 
suggested that the majority of employ-
ers froze or (less commonly) cut 
wages. In the Baltic states, collective 
 bargaining does not play a  significant 
role in overall pay setting, owing to 
its low coverage, and no information 
is available on the outcomes of the 
wage bargaining that does occur. An 
indication of pay trends is, however, 
provided by national data on aver-
age earnings/wages, and these reveal 
substantial falls in 2009, of between 
minus 8.7 % in Lithuania and minus 
4 % in Estonia. The moderation in pay 
bargaining in 2009 was not, however, 
universal. In several countries, nota-
bly Austria, Hungary and Romania, 
the average collectively agreed pay rise 
was higher in 2009 than in 2008, while 
the rate of increase was unchanged in 
Malta and Slovakia.
In respect of most western European 
Member States and those central and 
east European countries where collec-
tive bargaining has significant cover-
age, the general picture is thus that the 
crisis depressed average agreed pay 
increases in 2009, but rarely to a great 
extent. Moreover, while nominal pay 
increases agreed in 2009 were often 
lower than in 2008, sharply declin-
ing inflation in many countries (the 
overall EU inflation rate, according to 
Eurostat, fell from 3.7 % in 2008 to 1 % 
in 2009) meant considerably higher 
increases in real wages in 2009 than in 
2008. This did not carry over to aver-
age earnings. In virtually all Member 
States, the fall in the average earnings 
increase from 2008 to 2009 was much 
sharper than the fall in the average 
collectively agreed pay increase. This 
suggests that the effects of the crisis 
were felt more deeply in actual earn-
ings than in the basic pay rates set 
by collective agreements, owing to 
reduced working hours (short-time 
working or reduced overtime) and/
or cuts in elements of remuneration 
(such as bonuses and premiums).
The early signs from the 2010 collec-
tive bargaining rounds in countries 
such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany and Sweden are that pay 
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moderation is more marked than in 
2009 and that decentralisation and 
flexibility in pay setting are frequently 
on the agenda (see 3.3.2 below).
Production and 3.3.2. 
manufacturing industries
Sector level3.3.2.1. 
Crisis response measures have been 
concluded both in specific sector agree-
ments aimed at tackling the employ-
ment effects of the downturn, and as 
part of ‘regular’ agreements dealing 
with pay and conditions of employ-
ment. Specific sectoral collective agree-
ments include instances in France, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden — see 
Table 3.2. The main theme was short-
time work. The March 2009 agreement 
covering the whole Swedish manufac-
turing sector was particularly notable, 
as it allowed for the introduction of 
short-time working, which is normally 
not permitted in Sweden, to prevent 
redundancies during the downturn. 
The use of short-time work required 
a local agreement. The employees 
affected received at least 80 % of nor-
mal pay and the local agreements 
could provide for training during the 
unworked hours. A two-year regular 
collective agreement for manufactur-
ing signed in April 2010 prolonged 
local short-time work agreements in 
companies still facing difficulties until 
the end of October 2010.
The agreements in French chemicals 
and French and German metalworking 
(Baden-Württemberg) provided for 
training during periods of short-time 
work. The April 2009 agreement in 
German metalworking’s Baden-Würt-
temberg region modified the compen-
sation for short-time working to reduce 
the burden on employers. The February 
2010 agreement in the North Rhine-
Westphalia region — which is expected 
to be extended, with adaptations, to 
other bargaining regions — intro-
duced further cost-reduction measures 
for employers. It also provided for an 
optional short-time working scheme 
(with some employer-funded pay com-
pensation) to be applied — with the 
agreement of the sectoral bargaining 
parties — in companies where employ-
ees have exhausted their entitlement to 
state short-time benefit. The agreement 
accompanied a pay agreement (also 
due to be extended to other bargaining 
regions) which provided for a degree 
of wage moderation over 23 months 
(see Table 3.3).
Beyond short-time work, a common 
theme in French and German met-
alworking and German chemicals 
was ‘employee leasing’, an innovative 
alternative to short-time work and 
redundancy, whereby employers with 
surplus staff may loan them to other 
companies that have a staff short-
age. The leasing company retains its 
employees in the longer term, recall-
ing them when activity picks up, 
and the user company has access to 
skilled and immediately available 
workers without having to recruit or 
train them. The agreements promote 
this arrangement and/or lay down 
the conditions to be observed. Other 
specific points agreed in French and 
German metalworking included: var-
ious measures to develop employees’ 
skills and maintain the recruitment of 
young people during the recession in 
France; and an extension of the maxi-
mum duration of fixed-term contracts 
in Germany (Baden-Württemberg), to 
allow employers to continue employ-
ing the staff involved without facing 
a choice between dismissal and open-
ended recruitment. The agreements 
in German chemicals: stressed the 
need for employers to explore the full 
range of previously agreed options 
to maintain employment, includ-
ing the use of opening clauses that 
allow  company-level deviations from 
the terms of the national agreement; 
and created a EUR 25 million fund, 
financed by employers, to encourage 
firms affected by the economic crisis 
to recruit trainees when they complete 
their apprenticeships, by  subsidising 
these employees’ wages.
While the other specific agreements 
focused largely on preventing redun-
dancies, the accord in Italian phar-
maceuticals dealt with assistance for 
those faced with redundancy, creat-
ing a scheme to retrain and outplace 
them (in the pharmaceuticals indus-
try or elsewhere) and an observatory 
to oversee the process.
Box 3.8: European joint declaration  
on avoiding redundancies in chemicals
At EU level, the sectoral social dialogue produced a number of joint positions and opin-
ions on the crisis and its effects (see Chapter 6). In most cases these did not provide for 
specific actions by the signatories or their national member organisations. However, a joint 
declaration adopted in March 2009 in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry by the 
European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) and the European 
Chemical Employers Group (ECEG) provided for at least some broad principles to be fol-
lowed by members in respect of (temporary) lay-offs, short-time work and similar meas-
ures aimed at avoiding redundancies. The declaration stated that:
lay-offs and short-time working should be introduced only after consultation with the •	
workforce and their representatives;
where lay-offs and short-time working occur, every effort should be made to use ‘the opportu-•	
nities of this available time’ for improving employees’ skills through training and education;
training that takes place during lay-offs and short-time work (and indeed all training) •	
should be accredited to ensure that ‘intrinsic skills’ are maintained so that, when the eco-
nomic situation improves, the sector does not lose vital human resources for the future.
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The public authorities played either a 
direct or indirect role in several of these 
agreements (Glassner and Keune, 2010). 
The German metalworking agreements 
on short-time working were predi-
cated on the measures already available 
under the statutory scheme, whilst the 
observatory established under the Ital-
ian pharmaceuticals agreement is a 
tripartite initiative. In addition to the 
union-employer short-time agreement 
in the French chemicals sector, Glassner 
and Keune report an accord concluded 
between the industry’s employers’ 
organisation and the ministry for 
economy, industry and employment, 
with strong support from the CFDT’s 
chemical federation, which addresses 
the opportunity for training activi-
ties brought by shorter working time 
arrangements. Specifically, it envisages 
the provision of state support for train-
ing programmes within the framework 
of the inter-sector agreement concluded 
in January 2009 (see Box 3.2).
Examples of specific crisis response 
actions in ‘regular’, periodically negoti-
ated collective agreements on pay and 
conditions can be identified in Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden 
— see Table 3.3. The most common 
response was to introduce greater 
flexibility and/or decentralisation in 
pay setting. In German metalworking, 
textiles and chemicals, this took the 
form of new opening clauses, allowing 
companies facing economic difficul-
ties, on the basis of a works  agreement 
(negotiated with their works council), 
to deviate from the sectoral agree-
ments’ provisions on pay rises. The 
metalworking agreement already 
provided for a range of pay flexibility 
options, notably allowing for employ-
ers and works councils to agree to 
deviate from sectorally agreed pay 
and working time provisions as part 
of a wider business-recovery plan. The 
2008 agreement added the possibil-
ity for works agreements to postpone 
for six months a sectorally agreed pay 
rise of 2.1 % due in May 2009 (a sub-
sequent 2010 agreement allowed for 
the award of a pay increase of 2.7 % 
due in April 2011 to be delayed or 
brought forward by two months, on 
the basis of a works agreement). The 
2009 textiles  agreement allows for all 
Table 3.2 Specific sectoral crisis response agreements in manufacturing
Country Sector Date Details
France Chemicals September 2009
Agreement updating existing accord on short-time work in light of recession and changes to legisla-
tion. Increased compensation for employees, promoted employment maintenance and provided for 
training and skills development during short-time work.
France Metalworking May 2009
Agreement on preserving jobs and developing employees’ skills during the recession. Promoted 
use of various training and development measures to help prevent short-time working and, 
where short-time working occurs, provided for the employees affected to receive training during 
unworked hours. Also promoted the use of employee leasing and young people’s access to jobs 
through the use of work/training contracts.
Germany Chemicals April 2010
Revision of agreements on employment and training. 
Called on employers to explore full range of previously agreed options to maintain employment, 
including opening clauses (including cuts in remuneration). Provided for establishment of regional 
networks to promote employee leasing. Subsidised hiring of trainees on completion of apprentice-
ships in firms that cannot afford to do so because of economic crisis, through central fund financed 
by employers.
Germany 
Baden-
Württemberg
Metalworking April 2009
Agreement on dealing with the effects of the economic crisis. Introduced new models for compensat-
ing employees on short-time work, aimed at cutting employers’ costs and delaying redundancies as 
long as possible. Also provided for training during short-time work and allowed companies to employ 
staff on fixed-term contracts for up to four years — double the statutory maximum duration.
Germany 
(North Rhine-
Westphalia)
Metalworking December 2009
Agreement on employee leasing. Set out the conditions for companies to lease employees temporar-
ily to other employers in the sector, while maintaining their employment contracts, as an alternative 
to short-time work or redundancy. The agreement of the employee and companies’ works councils 
is required.
Germany 
(North Rhine-
Westphalia)
Metalworking February 2010
‘Future in work’ agreement, creating a range of options aimed at maintaining employment, though 
lowering the costs to employers of placing employees on state short-time working scheme and 
allowing a form of agreed short-time work when entitlement to the state scheme expires.
Italy Pharmaceu-ticals
November 
2008
Agreement on assistance, retraining and outplacement for redundant workers, along with the crea-
tion of an observatory to monitor the labour market situation and geographical distribution of the 
workers concerned.
Sweden
Manufacturing 
(blue-collar 
workers)
March 
2009
Agreement allowing for short-time working and temporary lay-offs to prevent job losses, based on 
local agreements. Employees receive at last 80 % of normal pay and may receive training during 
unworked hours.
Sources: See Box 3.1.
101
Chapter 3: Negotiating the crisis: social partner responses
or part of the sectorally agreed pay 
increase (a moderate 2.85 % over 
two years, taking the form of a con-
solidated 1.5 % increase plus various 
one-off payments) to be withheld by 
works agreement in crisis-hit compa-
nies, but only in exchange for employ-
ment guarantees (by contrast, the 
one-off payments may be increased 
in better-performing companies). In 
German chemicals, the 2010 sectoral 
agreement froze basic pay rates for 11 
months and provided only for a one-
off payment, normally of EUR 550. 
The payment could be reduced to 
EUR 300 on economic grounds, sub-
ject to a works agreement. Further, 
in establishments not ‘substantially’ 
affected by the recession, an additional 
lump sum of EUR 200 could be paid.
While opening clauses of various 
types are common in Germany, more 
innovative crisis response pay pro-
visions were agreed in Dutch light 
engineering (metaal en techniek) and 
the Finnish technology sector. The 
Dutch agreement provided for a very 
moderate general pay increase (1.5 % 
after a 14-month pay pause) in return 
for employment guarantees. Further, 
employees were granted 3.5 addi-
tional ‘crisis’ days of holiday during 
2010, to reflect reduced production. 
However, employers may cancel these 
days off if their situation improves and 
instead make one-off payments to the 
employees. The Finnish agreement, 
which runs for three years, provides 
for pay bargaining to be decentralised 
to company level, with the general 
level of increase (0.5 %) set only in the 
first year and subsequent annual rises 
based on the prevailing economic sit-
uation. Increases may be deferred or 
nil if a company’s economic situation 
is sufficiently poor.
Beyond pay, the three-year agreement 
signed in Italian metalworking in Octo-
ber 2009 introduced a special income-
support fund for workers affected by 
temporary lay-offs or short-time work 
due to the economic crisis. Employers 
contribute EUR 2 per employee per 
month to the fund in 2011 and 2012. 
From 2013, employees who wish to be 
covered by the fund must make their 
own monthly contribution of EUR 1, 
and employers will be obliged to make 
the EUR 2 monthly contribution only 
Table 3.3: Crisis response measures in regular sectoral agreements in manufacturing
Country Sector Date Details
Belgium Metalworking April 2009
Inclusion in 2009–10 agreement of provisions on employment security (e.g. info on mass 
redundancies) and maintenance of early retirement schemes.
Denmark Manufacturing February 2010
Inclusion in 2010–11 agreement of new redundancy payments scheme, increasing workers 
unemployment benefits to nearer former pay for up to three months. 
Finland Technology August 2009
Inclusion in 2009–12 agreement of provisions decentralising pay bargaining to company level 
and linking it to the economic situation in each year, with the possibility of no wage increases in 
especially poor circumstances, in order to secure employment.
Germany Chemicals April 2010
Inclusion in 11-month agreement for 2010–11 of company-level flexibility in award of one-off 
payment (the agreement froze pay scales and provided only for a one-off payment). The pay-
ment can be cut by works agreement on economic grounds, or increased in firms not ‘substan-
tially’ affected by the recession
Germany (Baden-
Württemberg pilot 
agreement)
Metalworking November 2008
Inclusion in 19-month agreement for 2008–10 of additional pay flexibility provisions for 
companies facing economic difficulties: by works agreement, the second stage of the sectorally 
agreed wage rise can be postponed.
Germany (North 
Rhine-Westphalia 
pilot agreement)
Metalworking February 
2010
Pay rate freeze in 2010, with small lump sum payment, followed by a 2.7 % increase in 2011. 
Timing of payment of 2011 increase can be varied by local agreement. Parallel agreement on 
employment security and training (see Table 3.1). 
Germany (west) Textiles March 2009
Inclusion in 2009–11 agreement of provisions allowing companies facing financial difficulties 
to reduce or withhold some sectorally agreed pay rises, on the basis of a works agreement, in 
return for employment guarantees.
Italy Chemicals December 2009
Inclusion in 2010–12 agreement of special training schemes for workers who have been made 
redundant or temporarily laid off, aimed at promoting re-employment.
Italy Metalworking October 2009
Inclusion in 2010–12 agreement of provisions on the creation of a special income-support fund 
for workers affected by temporary lay-offs or short-time work due to the economic downturn. 
Netherlands
Metalworking 
(light engi-
neering)
October 
2009
Inclusion in 2009–11 agreement of provisions severely limiting pay increases in exchange for 
employment guarantees and additional days off (which may be converted into wage increases if 
the economic situation improves). 
Sweden 
Manufacturing
(blue-collar 
workers)
March 
2010
First (of two) pay increases in 22-month agreement can be delayed by up to 12 months through 
local negotiation. New provision giving priority to employees laid-off ahead of recourse to 
temporary employment agencies, backed up by sanctions. 
Sources: See Box 3.1.
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in respect of those employees that join 
the fund. The agreement also con-
tained provisions promoting training 
and established a bipartite observatory 
on training and labour market issues. 
Support for redundant and laid off 
workers also featured in the 2010–12 
agreement in Italian chemicals, in this 
case through new vocational training 
measures aimed specifically at these 
groups. In the case of Danish manu-
facturing the two-year agreement 
signed in February 2010 supports 
redundant workers by introducing a 
new form of employer-funded benefit, 
which tops up their unemployment 
benefit closer to their former wage 
for up to three months (dependent on 
service). Improvements to parental 
leave and pension entitlement were 
further measures offsetting a low 
wage increase. The two-, as compared 
to the previous three-, year duration 
of the agreement enabled the parties 
to address uncertainties about future 
developments. In Belgian metalwork-
ing, the 2009–10 agreement followed 
the general crisis response guidelines 
of the country’s cross-sector accord, 
for example on pay moderation and 
training, along with measures such 
as enhanced employment security 
provisions and the maintenance of 
early retirement arrangements. This 
agreement may be considered as rep-
resentative of 2009–10 accords across 
Belgian manufacturing, which imple-
mented and adapted the cross-sector 
agreement.
Company level3.3.2.2. 
Table 3.4 provides summary informa-
tion on 76 cases of specific agreements 
concluded at company or establishment 
level, from autumn 2008 to the end of 
April 2010, which seek to deal with the 
effects of the crisis (fuller details are 
provided in Appendix, Table 3.A1). 
Actions agreed at this level mainly fall 
into the following broad categories:
the introduction of short-time •	
work, usually based on statutory 
schemes, and the conditions for the 
employees affected;
the use of other working time •	
arrangements to prevent or reduce 
redundancies, or avoid short-
time work, notably forms of time 
accounts or banks, or adjustments 
to annual leave schemes;
trade-offs, involving sacrifices in •	
terms of pay and employment con-
ditions in return for employment 
guarantees;
measures aimed at mitigating •	
planned job losses, avoiding com-
pulsory redundancies through 
‘softer’ alternatives; and
compensation and assistance for •	
redundant workers.
Table 3.4 indicates the main categories 
which apply in each of the 76 agree-
ments.
Much company-level bargaining 
focused on the application of short-
time working and temporary lay-off 
schemes (see Box 3.5). State-funded 
Box 3.9: Europe-wide crisis response agreements  
in multinationals
There are three known examples of specific European-level crisis response agreements in 
multinational companies.
ArcelorMittal, the Luxembourg-headquartered steel multinational, signed a Europe-•	
wide agreement with the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) on managing and 
anticipating change in November 2009. As well as longer-term policies aimed at antici-
pating changes in jobs and skills needs, training and developing employees to improve 
their employability and on social dialogue, the agreement dealt with the economic crisis. 
It committed ArcelorMittal to maintaining and reopening in future European plants that 
were then closed, providing that market recovery allowed this. Compulsory redundan-
cies would be avoided as far as possible and workers would be trained during periods of 
short-time working, while there was to be dialogue over limiting employees’ loss of pay 
during short-time working.
General Motors Europe (US-based, automotive) signed with its EWC in January 2009 •	
a ‘framework agreement on common minimum standards on working time reductions 
for all European sites’. This provided for the use of working time reductions (without full 
maintenance of pay), short-time work and sabbaticals to adjust production capacity in 
the most cost-efficient and socially responsible way. It laid down minimum standards 
for group companies to compensate employees for part of their resulting loss of earn-
ings, on top of the state benefits available under national schemes. Where employees 
were placed on state short-time work benefit, the company would top this up by at least 
12.5 %. Where working hours were cut in other ways, employees would be compensated 
for at least 50 % of their lost pay. Management and employee representatives were to 
continue to work together to find ways of achieving cost savings.
General Motors EWC reached an agreement with management, in May 2010, on the •	
implementation of a major restructuring plan for Opel/Vauxhall, which involves 8 300 
job losses across Europe and substantial cost reductions, along with new investments. 
Following a series of national-level agreements on the workforce reductions and cost sav-
ings, the four-year European agreement lays down detailed investment and production 
commitments, and provides for labour-cost savings of EUR 265 million a year, which will 
be returned to employees if the company does not introduce its planned new products. 
After the current restructuring, there will be no compulsory redundancies before 2015.
In some other multinationals pre-existing agreements which anticipate restructuring and 
specify a framework for handling the issues arising (see Chapter 6) may have been invoked 
to help address effects of the crisis.
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schemes of this sort have long existed 
in the majority of EU-15 Member 
States, and many have been extended 
or adapted during the crisis, while a 
number of central and east European 
Member States have introduced such 
schemes for the first time (as has the 
Swedish manufacturing sector, by 
agreement). Company agreements 
may be required for the implementa-
tion of the schemes, as in Denmark 
and Germany, for example.
The simplest form of agreement on 
short-time work essentially sets out the 
details of the arrangements and the pay 
guarantees for the employees involved, 
often providing for additional payments 
from the company. Examples of such 
agreements can be found at: Danfoss 
and Grundfos in Denmark; STX in 
France; BASF, BMW in Germany; Ast 
ThyssenKrupp and Ilva and Case New 
Holland in Italy; and Sandvik, Scania 
and Volvo in Sweden; Dacia-Renault in 
Romania; Hyundai in the Czech Repub-
lic; and Opel in Hungary. An interesting 
example from Italy was the negotiation 
at Gima and Verlicchi of additional pay-
ments to workers on short-time work or 
temporarily laid off, to compensate for 
the psychological, emotional and social 
problems caused. Agreements on short-
time work may also provide employ-
ment guarantees, as at DAF Trucks 
in Belgium and the Netherlands and 
Renault in France, or deal with train-
ing during unworked hours, as at Manz 
Automation, Salzgitter Flachstahl and 
Schott in Germany, Embraco in Italy 
and Dassault Aviation PSA Peugeot 
Citroën, Renault and Renault Trucks in 
France. Short-time work may be used as 
part of a package of measures to prevent 
or mitigate job losses, as at MAN Nut-
zfahrzeuge and Schaeffler in Germany 
and Indesit in Italy.
Several of the Italian cases — Anto-
nio Carraro, Embraco, Fincibec, 
IMER International, Piaggio Aprilia 
and Rimor — relate to ‘solidarity 
 agreements’ (contratti di solidarietà), 
a statutory arrangement whereby, in 
companies facing economic difficulties, 
employees’ collective working time may 
be reduced (with state compensation 
for half of the income loss) in order to 
avoid redundancies (which are prohib-
ited during the agreements’ term).
Aside from short-time work, some 
agreements provide for the use of 
other working time arrangements to 
prevent or reduce redundancies, nota-
bly forms of time accounts or banks, 
as at STMicrolectronics in France, 
ThyssenKrupp Nirosta in Germany 
and Michelin in Spain. In a number of 
French cases, such as Airbus, Bosch, 
Michelin and Snecma, such arrange-
ments were agreed specifically to 
prevent or reduce recourse to the stat-
utory short-time work scheme.
A number of company agreements 
provided for a pay trade-off, whereby 
employees make wage sacrifices in 
exchange for a management commit-
ment to maintain employment lev-
els or reduce the number of planned 
redundancies. The pay sacrifice may 
involve a cut in hours and accompa-
nying loss of wages, a pay freeze, a 
wage cut, a low increase or forgoing 
 bonuses. Examples of this approach 
include agreements at Honda, JCB, 
Jaguar Land Rover, Toyota and Vaux-
hall in the UK, Bosch, Carl Zeiss, 
Schaeffler and ThyssenKrupp Nirosta 
in Germany, ISD Dunaferr in Hun-
gary, Corus in the Netherlands, 
Seat in Spain and Lotos in Poland. 
 Employee  concessions may also relate 
to other matters in addition to pay, 
such as working time arrangements 
at Coca-Cola, Daimler (most plants) 
in Germany and Opel and Sony in 
Spain, or the termination of tempo-
rary  contracts at Siemens in Spain.
The employee side of the trade-off may 
not in all cases directly involve pay 
and hours. For instance, at Daimler’s 
 Sindelfingen plant in Germany, the 
quid pro quo for a long-term guaran-
tee of no compulsory redundancies 
involved measures to improve com-
petitiveness and efficiency, such as 
internal transfers and job flexibility, 
while increased flexibility and mobil-
ity also formed part of the trade-off at 
 Renault in Spain. The employer side of 
the trade-off may include promises or 
intentions to keep plants open or allo-
cate them production in future, as at 
Ford, Renault, Seat and Sony in Spain.
Agreed measures to cushion the effects 
of planned workforce  reductions and 
avoid compulsory redundancies com-
monly include one or more of the fol-
lowing:
incentives for voluntary departures, •	
as at Electrolux and Whirlpool in 
Italy, Nokia in Finland, Ford in 
Spain, and Schaeffler in Germany;
early retirement (full or partial), •	
as at Schaeffler and ThyssenK-
rupp Nirosta in Germany, and Ford 
and Michelin in Spain;
non-renewal of fixed-term con-•	
tracts, as at E.ON in Germany, 
Indesit and Whirlpool in Italy, and 
Opel in Spain;
internal and/or external redeploy-•	
ment, as at E.ON in Germany and 
the Netherlands, and Michelin in 
Italy; and
natural wastage, as at E.ON in Ger-•	
many and the Netherlands and 
ThyssenKrupp Nirosta in Germany.
Where redundancies occur, company 
agreements may provide for measures 
such as increased redundancy com-
pensation, income support for redun-
dant workers, training, outplacement, 
help for redundant workers to set up 
their own businesses, and priority 
for re-recruitment at the company 
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Table 3.4 Company-level crisis response agreements in manufacturing
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DAF Trucks BE Automotive 6/2009 X X X
Stomana Industry BG Steel 11/2008 X
Hyundai CZ Automotive 1/2009 X
Siemens CZ Transport equipment 8/2008 X
Danfoss DK Engineering 2/2009 X
Grundfos DK Pumps 3/2009 X
Vestas DK Wind turbines 2009 X
Nokia FI Mobile phone manufacturing 2/2009 X
Airbus FR Aerospace 12/2009 X
Bosch FR Auto parts 11/2008 X
Dassault Aviation FR Aerospace 6/2009 X
Michelin FR Tyres 2/2009 X X
PSA Peugeot Citroën FR Automotive 9/2009 X
Renault FR Automotive 4/2009 X
Renault Trucks FR Automotive 2/2009 X
Rhodia FR Chemicals 4/2009 X X
Snecma FR Aerospace 11/2008 X
STMicrolectronics FR Electronics 4/2009 X
STX FR Shipbuilding 2/2009 X
BASF DE Chemicals 1/2009 X
BMW DE Automotive 1/2009 X
Bosch DE Auto parts 12/2009 X X
Carl Zeiss DE Optical equipment 6/2009 X X
Coca-Cola  
Erfrischungsgetränke DE Soft drinks 3/2010 X X X
Daimler DE Automotive 4/2009 X X
Daimler DE (Sindelfingen plant only) Automotive 12/2009 X X
E.ON DE Energy 8/2009 X
InBev DE Beverages 6/2009 X X X
MAN Nutzfahrzeuge DE Automotive 1/2009 X X X
Manz Automation DE Automation technology 4/2009 X
Salzgitter Flachstahl DE Steel 1/2009 X X
Schaeffler DE Ball-bearings 5/2009 X X X
Schott DE Glass 2009 X
Siemens DE Electronics 2/2009 X X
ThyssenKrupp Nirosta DE Stainless steel 9/2009 X X X X
ISD Dunaferr HU Steel 11/2008 X X
Opel HU Automotive 4/2009 X
Antonio Carraro IT Tractor production 1/2010 X X
Ast ThyssenKrupp IT Steel 4/2009 X
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Bosch IT Auto parts 12/2009 X X
Case New Holland IT Agricultural machinery 9/2009 X
Electrolux IT Domestic appliances 9/2008 X X X
Embraco IT Compressors 2009 X X
Fincibec IT Ceramics 4/2009 X X
Gima IT Automation systems 4/2009 X
Ilva IT Steel 4/2009 X
IMER International IT Construction machinery 2/2010 X X
Indesit IT Domestic appliances 7/2009 X X X
Michelin IT Tyres 12/2008 X X
Piaggio Aprilia IT Automotive 1/2010 X X
Rimor IT Automotive 9/2009 X X
Verlicchi IT Automotive 4/2009 X
Whirlpool IT Domestic appliances 12/2008 X X
Villeroy & Boch LU Ceramics 7/2009 X
Corus NL Steel 4/2010 X X
DAF Trucks NL Automotive 6/2009 X X X
EO.N NL Energy 12/2009 X
Lotos PL Oil 2/2009 X X
Alcatel-Lucent RO Telecoms equipment 12/2009 X
Dacia-Renault RO Automotive 2008 X
Ford ES Automotive 10/2009 X X X
Michelin ES Tyres 11/2008 and 12/2009 X X X X
Nissan ES Automotive 2/2009 X X
Opel ES Automotive 3/2010 X X X X
Renault ES Automotive 9/2009 X X
Seat ES Automotive 3/2009 X X
Sony ES Electronics 1/2009 X X
Sandvik SE Engineering 6/2009 X X
Scania SE Automotive 3/2009 and 12/2009 X X
Sony Ericsson SE Electronics 9/2008 X
Volvo SE Automotive 3/2009 X X
Honda UK Automotive 5/2009 X X
Jaguar Land Rover UK Automotive 3/2009 X X
JCB UK Construction equipment 10/2008 X X
Toyota UK Automotive 3/2009 X X
Vauxhall UK Automotive 10/2009 X X X
Sources: See Box 3.1, plus Zagelmeyer (2009) for Carl Zeiss, Daimler and InBev.
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in  future. Examples of agreements 
on these issues include Whirlpool in 
Italy, Alcatel-Lucent in Romania, Sto-
mana Industry in Bulgaria, Villeroy 
& Boch in Luxembourg, InBev and 
Schaeffler in Germany, Siemens in the 
Czech Republic and Sony Ericsson in 
Sweden.
Three of the seven cases where agree-
ments have been concluded in dif-
ferent countries within the same 
multinational company exhibit a 
degree of similarity. Those at DAF 
Trucks’ operations in Belgium and the 
Netherlands both address the use of 
the state short-time working scheme 
and provide employment guarantees. 
The 2009 Michelin agreements in Italy 
and Spain both envisage mobilising 
a range of measures to secure work-
force reductions, including financial 
assistance for those affected (while 
the Michelin agreement in France 
focuses more on preserving jobs and 
employees’ incomes through working 
time adjustments). The agreements 
at E.ON in Germany and the Neth-
erlands derive from the same corpo-
rate cost-reduction programme; both 
envisage a range of measures to avoid 
compulsory redundancy, including 
maintenance of pay and job security 
for employees moving to outsourced 
operations. At Renault, however, the 
objective of maintaining employ-
ment is addressed through differ-
ing mechanisms: short-time work 
in France, but wage concessions and 
increased flexibilities in Spain. There 
was also little similarity between the 
agreements at: Bosch in France, Ger-
many and Italy; Siemens in the Czech 
Republic and Germany; or Opel in 
Hungary and Spain (2).
2 However, the Opel agreement in Spain was 
followed, after this report was completed, by similar 
agreements on cost-cutting and workforce reductions 
in Opel/Vauxhall operations in countries such as 
Germany and the UK, as part of the implementation of 
a Europe-wide restructuring plan, which also involved 
a European-level agreement in May 2010 (Box 3.9).
 Disputes and unsuccessful 3.3.2.3. 
negotiations
The sectoral and company agreements 
outlined above represent, of course, the 
successful outcome of negotiations. 
They will have involved disagreements 
and, in some cases, conflicts before 
their conclusion: as Glassner and Keune 
(2010: 19) observe, ‘disagreement and 
conflict are in many cases key elements 
of the process that leads to negotiated 
responses’. Unsuccessful negotiations 
are, however, harder to quantify.
At sector level, instances of failure 
to agree, and even conflict, over cri-
sis response measures are difficult to 
identify. In German printing, the 2009 
bargaining round was conflictual, fea-
turing a number of warning strikes, and 
resulted in employers failing to obtain 
an opening clause for companies with 
financial difficulties, or an extension of 
working hours. In Austria’s metalwork-
ing sector deadlock in the 2009 nego-
tiations — accompanied by threats of 
industrial action — was overcome by 
concluding an agreement on wages and 
referring employer proposals for more 
flexible working time arrangements 
to further negotiations. These subse-
quently failed to reach agreement by 
the deadline of March 2010. Early 2009 
saw a high-profile dispute in UK engi-
neering construction (which is covered 
by a sector agreement) over issues that 
were exacerbated by the recession. 
Several hundred workers employed by 
construction contractors at the Lindsey 
oil refinery, owned by Total, started an 
unofficial strike. The dispute centred 
on the award of a contract to an Italian 
company, which planned to use its exist-
ing workforce on a posted basis (about 
whose pay and conditions there was lit-
tle transparency), and consequent loss 
of employment  opportunities for the 
UK workforce.
At company level, crisis-induced 
restructuring has frequently been the 
source of contestation — conflicts 
preceded a number of the agreements 
identified above, for example — and 
not all negotiations ended in agree-
ment. Amongst the agreements in 
Table 3.3, Glassner and Keune (2010) 
report that industrial action was taken 
by the workforce prior to agreements 
being concluded at Case New Holland 
and Indiset in Italy, and at Siemens in 
the Czech Republic. The protracted 
negotiations at InBev’s operations 
in Germany saw a warning strike 
(Zagelmeyer, 2009), while planned job 
losses resulted in a longer strike at the 
same company’s Belgian operations 
(ended by an agreement to suspend the 
restructuring pending further nego-
tiations). Elsewhere, disagreements 
stopped short of actual conflicts. For 
example, Danish unions were reported 
to be critical of the absence of training 
measures for workers laid-off tempo-
rarily under the agreements at Danfoss 
and Grundfos. The parties may also 
manage to agree on one set of meas-
ures, but subsequently fail to agree on 
others. At ISD Dunaferr in Hungary, 
after successful agreement in 2008 on 
trading cuts in pay and benefits for 
employment guarantees the parties 
failed to agree in 2009 on working time 
reductions and further pay cuts, as a 
result of which the company imple-
mented redundancies. An example of 
an unresolved negotiation, involving 
conflict, comes from Goodyear Dun-
lop in France, where the court ruled 
that the company had not properly 
informed the works councils over its 
restructuring plan, and ordered that it 
be re-negotiated. Lasme, an automotive 
component supplier in Italy, is an exam-
ple of a negotiation with an unsuccess-
ful outcome. Following management’s 
closure announcement in September 
2009, an agreement was concluded 
which envisaged relocation of half of the 
workforce to another company. This, 
however, was rejected by the workforce 
who called for the relaunch of Lasme 
(http://www. ildiariodellavoro.it).
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More generally, the effects of the crisis 
have prompted new forms of action 
together with the (re)appearance of 
older forms of conflict. In disputes 
surrounding proposed site closures, 
instances of ‘bossnapping’, in which 
senior managers (including from the 
parent company) are taken hostage 
on company premises by the work-
force, and threats to blow-up pro-
duction facilities, gained prominence 
in France during the course of 2009. 
In Italy, as part of a factory occupa-
tion at Insee opposing the proposed 
closure of the plant in the spring 
of 2009, workers climbed up and 
remained on the company’s crane for 
several days. This novel action was 
followed by similar ‘rooftop’ protests 
by the workforce at other companies 
threatened with redundancies and/
or closure. Also in Italy, a successful 
four month mobilisation against the 
closure of Alcoa’s production opera-
tions in Sardinia, and near Venice, 
saw the island’s main airport occu-
pied and road blockades, as well as 
other actions. 2009 also saw the re-
appearance of factory occupations 
in the UK, a tactic rarely used in 
the past quarter century. Instances 
included the occupation of two of the 
three UK sites of automotive compo-
nents manufacturer Visteon, spun-
off from Ford in 2000 and which filed 
for bankruptcy, and the UK wind-
turbine manufacturing facility of 
Danish-based Vestas. A common fea-
ture of the cases involved would seem 
to be the remoteness of the corporate 
managers taking closure decisions. 
Local management were no longer 
a relevant interlocutor for the work-
force, who through these new kinds 
of action aim to raise the profile of 
the dispute with the authorities and 
public opinion (Marginson, 2010; 
Pernot, 2009).
A notable development during 
the crisis has been the apparently 
increasing propensity of EWCs and 
 European-level trade union federa-
tions to organise Europe-wide pro-
tests against  restructuring and job 
losses in multinationals, and to inter-
vene in national cases (see Box 3.10). 
Amongst the multinational compa-
nies where EWCs mounted protest 
actions, sometimes in conjunction 
with European industry federations, 
were: Alcaltel-Lucent, AreclorMit-
tal, Areva, Bosch, Continental, E.ON, 
General Motors Europe, Hewlett 
Packard/EDS, Saint-Gobain, Siemens, 
Thyssen-Krupp and Valeo.
Summary3.3.2.4. 
Within the production and manu-
facturing industries, instances of 
the mobilisation of sector negotia-
tions to respond to the crisis, either 
in the form of additional, specific 
agreements or through the inclu-
sion of crisis response measures 
in regular collective agreements, 
were identified in eight countries: 
 Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. These are all countries in 
which multi-employer bargaining 
arrangements generally contain pro-
cedural provisions which effectively 
govern the relationship bargaining 
at the sector and company levels. In 
terms of industries, metalworking 
predominates (combined with other 
manufacturing sectors in the cases of 
Denmark and  Sweden), with some 
representation from chemicals.
There was a degree of cross-border 
convergence in the measures envisaged 
in either kind of agreement. Amongst 
the specific crisis response agreements, 
cases in France, Germany and Sweden 
dealt with short-time work, including 
training for the workers concerned, 
and cases in France and Germany dealt 
with employee leasing. Concerning 
the crisis response measures included 
in regular agreements, support for 
 redundant workers was a common 
theme in Danish manufacturing and 
several sectors in Italy. The agreements 
in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden introduced innovative 
ways of permitting greater flexibility 
and/or decentralisation in pay setting. 
A different kind of procedural inno-
vation characterised the agreement in 
Italian pharmaceuticals, with a new 
company-level process for accessing 
assistance, retraining and outplace-
ment measures for redundant workers.
The only apparent link to any EU-
level social partner initiatives in 
a particular sector concerns the 
chemical sector, where measures in 
the French and Italian sector agree-
ments on using the time available 
under short-time work, or temporary 
lay-off, to improve workforce skills 
through training build on one of the 
key points in the EMCEF–ECEG 
joint declaration (see Box 3.8). Links 
between different levels of negotia-
tion nationally were more apparent, 
including between the cross-sector 
and sector level in the three countries 
where this is relevant. The Belgian 
metalworking agreement (as was 
generally the case in 2009–10 sectoral 
agreements in Belgium) reflected the 
provisions of the national cross-sec-
tor agreement for 2009–10 (see 3.2.1 
above), the agreement in the Dutch 
light engineering sector reflected the 
pay moderation approach agreed at 
cross-sector level (see 3.2.1 above) 
and the French chemicals sector 
accord between employers and the 
public authorities, supported by the 
unions, mobilised the inter- sector 
framework agreement on training 
(see Box 3.2). Public intervention 
in the form of statutory short-time 
work schemes directly or indirectly 
prompted the relevant negotiations in 
some countries. The role of the secto-
ral agreements in triggering further 
negotiations at company level was 
also apparent. Such  company-level 
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agreements were required to imple-
ment: the short-time work scheme 
introduced by the agreement in Swed-
ish manufacturing; the new models 
of compensation introduced by the 
agreements on  short-time work in 
German metalworking; the employee 
leasing scheme agreed in German 
metalworking; and the company-
level measures assisting redundant 
workers in the Italian pharmaceuti-
cals sector.
Box 3.10: The response to the crisis of European-level workers’  
representatives in multinational companies
Given the scale of company restructuring caused or accelerated by the economic crisis over 2008–09, it would be surprising if most of the 
900 or so multinational companies with a European works council (EWC) were not affected. As transnational restructuring is an essential 
part of the remit of EWCs, a high volume of information and consultation (I & C) on the issue might be expected during the crisis. However, 
as there is no systematic monitoring of the day-to-day activities of EWCs, information tends to emerge only when some notable agreement 
or dispute arises, rather than on less dramatic I & C exercises. Bearing this caveat in mind, information from the sources listed in Box 3.1 
and from the websites of various trade union European industry federations (EIFs) provides some indication of the response to the crisis of 
EWCs and European-level union bodies in multinational companies.
Information and consultation
The information available provides numerous examples of I & C over crisis-related restructuring, at both ordinary and extraordinary EWC 
meetings. A notable proactive initiative in this regard occurred in the finance sector where, in September 2008, UNI europa Finance called 
for immediate meetings of all 51 EWCs in banking and insurance multinationals to discuss the impact of the crisis in the industry. There 
were, however, many cases where EWCs complained of inadequate I & C over restructuring, for example at Alcoa (USA, aluminium), Cytec 
(USA, chemicals), Hewlett Packard/EDS (USA, information technology), PPR (France, retail), Saint Gobain (France, glass) and Schering 
Plough (USA, pharmaceuticals). Many of the protests organised by EWCs and/or EIFs (see below) included demands for proper I & C.
Faced with company restructuring plans, a relatively common response of EWCs was to adopt a statement or opinion setting out their con-
cerns, opposition or counter-proposals. For example:
the Schering Plough EWC issued a statement to management in April 2009 requesting better information and proper consultation on the •	
transfer of production from an Irish site to plants in other European countries and over a forthcoming merger with Merck and planned 
job losses;
the Deutsche Post DHL (Germany, postal services and logistics) EWC agreed in June 2009 a statement calling on management to focus on •	
employee interests during restructuring, for example by avoiding redundancies and involving the EWC and national representative bodies 
at an early stage in planning;
faced with restructuring at ThyssenKrupp (Germany, steel), the EWC, the German IG Metall unions and national works councils issued a •	
joint statement in April 2009 calling for no compulsory redundancies, no pay cuts and maintenance of co-determination; and
the EWCs of Hewlett Packard and EDS, which were in the process of merging, adopted a joint resolution in March 2009 opposing pay cuts •	
proposed by management.
Protests
In a number of multinationals, opposition to restructuring plans and job cuts led to EWCs and/or EIFs calling European ‘days of action’ in 
protest. Examples included the following.
Alcatel-Lucent (France, telecoms equipment). In November 2009, the EWC called a European day of action to support the maintenance •	
of employment levels during restructuring.
ArcelorMittal (Luxembourg, steel). The EWC and EMF organised a European action day over planned job cuts in February 2009.•	
Areva (France, nuclear power). The EWC and unions organised a day of action in eight European countries in September 2009 against the •	
planned sale of the energy transmission and distribution division.
Bosch brakes division (Germany, auto parts). In February 2009, the EMF coordinated a European action day, involving workers in France, •	
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Germany, demanding reassurances and dialogue over the future of the division.
Continental (Germany, tyres). In protest at a French plant closure and job losses in Germany, the EWC organised a demonstration by •	
French and German workers at the annual shareholders meeting in April 2009.
E.ON (Germany, energy). The EPSU supported an action day against a company cost-reduction and outsourcing programme organised •	
by German unions in June 2009, and union representatives from E.ON companies in the UK, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Hungary and Romania participated.
General Motors/Opel (USA, automotive). The EWC and EMF helped organise a demonstration in September 2009 against the closure of •	
an Opel plant in Belgium, involving workers and union representatives from Germany, the UK, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Hungary.
Hewlett Packard/EDS. The Hewlett Packard and EDS EWCs and unions organised action days in November 2008 and January 2009 over •	
post-merger job cuts and a pay freeze.
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Saint Gobain. The EMCEF and member unions, with EWC support, organised a demonstration at company headquarters in May 2009 in •	
protest at restructuring and job cuts.
Siemens (Germany, electrical). In May 2009, the EMF organised a meeting of EWC and union representatives to coordinate opposition to •	
the company’s planned worldwide job cuts and demand more I & C. The meeting called for Europe-wide protests in support of a German 
demonstration and strike.
ThyssenKrupp (Germany, steel). In April 2009, the EMF called a Europe-wide demonstration, supporting a German union initiative, to •	
oppose job losses and closures.
Valeo (France, auto parts). The EWC organised Europe-wide protests, including brief stoppages in some countries (Germany, Czech •	
 Republic, Italy, Spain) in September 2008, against a restructuring plan and the partial closure of a German site.
EWC intervention at national level
There was some evidence of EWCs intervening in national restructuring cases. For example:
following the announcement of the merger of Polish subsidiaries of EDF (France, energy), with job losses, the EWC was consulted and •	
delivered a negative opinion in October 2009. It decided to follow up the implementation of the merger and its impact on employees, 
including in health and safety terms;
in response to threats of relocation of production from Spanish to French plants, in February 2009 the EWC at Renault (France, automo-•	
tive) expressed support for the Spanish workforce and stated that production sites must not be played off against each other, calling for a 
‘level playing-field’ approach for all plants;
at Federal Mogul (USA, auto parts), the EWC expressed opposition to a plant closure in Italy and called for national I & C and negotia-•	
tions; and
at an extraordinary meeting held to discuss a French restructuring plan, including job losses, in March 2009 the PPR EWC adopted an •	
opinion rejecting the plan and called on employees in Europe to mobilise against it.
These interventions sometimes had positive outcomes. For instance:
after the announcement by Whirlpool (USA, domestic appliances) of redundancies across Europe, in October 2008 the EWC and Euro-•	
pean trade union representatives called on management not to begin unilateral collective procedures for the planned redundancies, but 
rather to engage in talks in the countries concerned in order to find non-traumatic solutions. Whirlpool reportedly responded positively 
to the request and accepted the approach proposed. An agreement was reached in December to accompany redundancies in Italy;
at Mahle (Germany, auto parts), following the announcement of the closure of an Italian plant, local management was reportedly unwill-•	
ing to negotiate a severance plan. Following EWC intervention, a social plan avoiding compulsory redundancies was signed in December 
2009, and it was agreed that the EWC would monitor any further similar procedures; and
following an announcement by Corus (Netherlands/UK, steel) in December 2009 that it would mothball a UK steelworks, the EWC •	
(which had criticised the fact that no alternative plans had been discussed) reportedly contributed to a decision to set up a joint manage-
ment-union taskforce in UK to examine alternative solutions.
At British Airways (UK, civil aviation), the EWC agreed with management in July 2009 on principles to guide I & C on national-level busi-
ness reorganisation. These allow the EWC’s select committee to attend local meetings with staff in European countries subject to restructur-
ing. The EWC representatives have an advisory role, in order to seek to mitigate the impact of any foreseen redundancies. The aim was to 
safeguard workers’ I & C and representation rights in those countries where BA has only small numbers of employees, who are often not 
represented by works councils or trade unions.
Evaluation
Dealing with transnational restructuring is, or should be, one of the central roles of EWCs. The economic crisis has tested their ability to 
function as forums for meaningful I & C on restructuring and as a significant actor in defence of employees’ interests in such circumstances. 
The patchy nature of the data means that it is not yet possible to assess the extent to which they have measured up to this test. However, a 
number of observations can be made on the basis the information that is available.
The perennial complaint that many EWCs are not provided with full and timely I & C — an issue addressed in the framing of the 2009 recast 
EWCs directive (see Chapter 7) — was underlined in a number of cases (and was the subject of several court cases, notably at Continental 
and Dunlop in France). However, irrespective of the quality of I & C, there are indications that many EWCs have been taking on a more 
active role. There seems to have been a tendency for more EWCs to adopt joint positions on restructuring and, in particular, to organise or 
coordinate (often in conjunction with EIFs) Europe-wide protests and actions. Further, a number of EWCs have shown an increased capac-
ity to intervene at national level, especially in terms of promoting I & C and negotiation over restructuring.
What has clearly not occurred to any significant degree is the negotiation of European-level agreements dealing with crisis-related restruc-
turing. The only known examples are the agreements between ArcelorMittal and the EMF and between General Motors Europe and its 
EWC — see Box 3.9 for details.
Finally, the vast majority of known cases of EWCs taking on an active role in response to restructuring come from the manufacturing sector 
and within manufacturing predominantly from metalworking. The services sector is very weakly represented.
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There was considerably more evi-
dence of agreed crisis response actions 
at company and establishment level 
(though little at the European level in 
multinational companies). Of the com-
pany agreements identified, the EU-15 
predominate, accounting for around 
90 % of the agreements, with Spain and 
the UK prominent as well as the eight 
countries in which sector agreements 
are also found (notably Germany, Italy 
and France). Around 85 % of these 
agreements were in the metalworking 
(including steel) sector, and nearly half 
of these were in the automotive seg-
ment. The role of  sector agreements in 
prompting further negotiation at com-
pany level is again apparent. There was 
a clear link between company agree-
ments on short-time work and sectoral 
agreements on the topic in countries 
such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. At com-
pany level, Zagelmeyer (2009) observes 
that where agreements cover opera-
tions at two or more sites, then cen-
tral bargaining structures have been 
established for the first time, as at Carl 
Zeiss, or  strengthened, as at Daimler 
and InBev.
A majority of the agreements related 
exclusively or in part to short-time 
work, either subsidised under state- or 
social partner-supported schemes or, 
less commonly, largely uncushioned 
(as in the UK cases). Such agreements 
were identified in many countries, 
but seemed particularly common 
in France, Germany and Italy. The 
second largest category of company 
agreements involved ‘concession bar-
gaining’, with trade-offs under which 
employers provide some form of 
employment guarantee in return for 
employee sacrifices in terms of pay and 
conditions. This approach appeared 
particularly prominent in Germany, 
Spain and the UK. The next largest 
category, most frequent in France 
and Germany, covered other work-
ing time arrangements to  prevent or 
reduce redundancies, or avoid short-
time work. Another substantial body 
of agreements — found largely in 
Italy, Germany and Spain — provided 
for measures to cushion the effects 
of planned workforce reductions 
and avoid compulsory redundancies. 
The fifth and smallest category of 
agreed actions was compensation and 
 assistance for redundant workers.
Private services3.3.3. 
Sector level3.3.3.1. 
Specific sectoral collective agreements 
intended to tackle the employment 
effects of the crisis were identified in 
two countries: Italy and the Nether-
lands — see Table 3.5. Both of the Italian 
agreements included provisions aimed 
at supporting redundant workers and 
those on short-time work or temporar-
ily laid off because of the recession. The 
banking agreement related to an exist-
ing employer-funded sectoral ‘solidar-
ity fund’, which finances benefits and 
training for workers temporarily laid 
off or on short-time working and early 
retirement for redundant workers. The 
accord increased benefits for workers on 
short time and added a new scheme to 
provide benefits to redundant workers 
not covered by the usual state income-
support measures, along with train-
ing. The new benefits are co-financed 
by the fund and individual employers. 
In the event of a company recruiting 
the workers concerned, it is allocated 
the benefits. The retail agreement also 
provided for the possibility of a secto-
ral top-up to state benefits for workers 
temporarily laid off or on short-time 
working. However, it was essentially a 
procedural agreement, promoting ini-
tiatives aimed at preventing job losses, 
notably through the creation of special 
local committees and company/local 
bargaining on issues such as train-
ing and work organisation (adapting 
the provisions on this issue set out in 
the sectoral collective agreement for 
retail). Further, the accord promotes 
timely information on emerging com-
pany problems and commits the par-
ties to joint monitoring of the progress 
of the crisis.
The two Dutch agreements focus 
mainly on preventing or mitigating 
job losses. The agreement covering 
car dealerships focused on keeping 
vulnerable workers in employment 
during the crisis by deploying sec-
toral funds. If companies continued 
to employ older workers threatened 
by redundancy until they qualify for 
early retirement, they would receive 
a subsidy of EUR 10 000, along with 
EUR 5 000 as a contribution to their 
future pension, Further, the accord 
provided support for trainees threat-
ened with losing their position 
before completing their training. In 
road haulage, the agreement sought 
to avoid compulsory redundancies 
among drivers in the face of reduced 
demand for labour during the reces-
sion. It provided for older workers 
faced with redundancy to be guaran-
teed access to early retirement, and 
allowed for greater working time flex-
ibility and a right for employers to 
decide when days off are taken (these 
provisions required a company-level 
agreement for implementation). The 
parties also agreed to set up a ‘mobil-
ity centre’ to redeploy surplus drivers 
within the sector.
The inclusion of specific crisis 
response actions in regular collective 
agreements on pay and conditions 
featured in agreements was identi-
fied in just three sectors, one each 
in Belgium, Italy and Sweden — see 
Table 3.6. The Swedish case relates 
to two agreements, for white-collar 
and professional staff respectively, in 
engineering and architectural consul-
tancies, which provide for flexibility 
and decentralisation in pay setting. 
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The one-year white-collar agreement 
provided for a general 2.3 % pay rise, 
but local agreements could reduce 
this increase in the light of company 
circumstances, while the accord (for 
the first time) provided no individual 
pay rise guarantee for employees. The 
two-year agreement for professional 
staff provided for the same pay provi-
sions as the white-collar agreement in 
the first year, but left all pay bargain-
ing to the company level in the second 
year, with no sectoral guideline. The 
agreement in Belgian banking, which 
along with others in private service 
sectors observed the pay moderation 
guidelines specified in the 2009–10 
cross-sector agreement (see 3.2.1 
above), introduced additional crisis 
response measures. It provided for: 
increased training activity, especially 
for older and vulnerable workers; out-
placement support for all redundant 
workers (previously just those aged 
over 45); enhanced severance pay-
ments in cases where companies do 
not observe redundancy procedures; 
the maintenance of early retirement 
schemes; and a higher limit on the 
proportion of the workforce that can 
take a full or part-time career break. 
Further, reflecting the financial cri-
sis, the agreement provides for the 
development of better information 
and consultation for works councils 
over banks’ activities, especially those 
entailing risk. The relevant provisions 
of the agreement in Italian tourism 
(like the specific agreements in bank-
ing and retail) seek to support redun-
dant workers and those on short-time 
work or temporarily laid off because 
of the recession, in this case using an 
 existing national joint fund.
Table 3.5: Specific sectoral crisis response  
agreements in private services
Country Sector Date Details
Italy Banking December 2009
Agreement on new fund to provide income  support 
(with employer contribution) for redundant  workers 
not entitled to state schemes, plus training, and 
changes to existing ‘solidarity fund’, including 
increased benefits for workers on short-time work  
or temporarily laid off.
Italy Retail June  2009
Agreement on a ‘pact for work’ to become part of the 
regular sectoral agreement. Provides for promotion 
of initiatives to prevent job losses, e.g. through the 
creation of special local committees, and the pos-
sible use of sectoral resources, in addition to those 
 available at national level, to support short-time work 
and temporary lay-offs. Also promoted company 
and local bargaining to respond to recession, e.g. on 
work organisation and training, plus information on 
company problems and monitoring of situation.
Netherlands Car dealerships
April  
2009
Agreement on package of measures to keep  vulnerable 
workers in employment during the crisis, through 
temporary measures financed by the sector, including 
incentives to retain older workers and training.
Netherlands Goods haulage 2009
Agreement on avoiding compulsory redundancies 
through access to early retirement for some groups 
of older workers facing redundancy and  working 
time organisation/flexibility. Also provided for 
future  creation of a ‘mobility centre’ to promote 
 redeployment of surplus staff.
Sources: See Box 3.1.
Table 3.6: Crisis response measures in regular  
sectoral agreements in private services
Country Sector Date Details
Belgium Banking October 2009
Inclusion in 2009–10 agreement of provisions on 
employment security (e.g. higher severance  payments 
where employers fail to observe redundancy 
 procedures), outplacement, maintenance of early 
retirement schemes, training and information  
for works councils on financial risks.
Italy Tourism February 2010
Inclusion in 2010–13 agreement of a commitment 
for the sector’s national joint employment fund to 
spend 30 % of its funds on supporting the income 
of workers in enterprises in financial difficulty or 
being  restructured. Also a provision extending 
support  during lay-offs and short-time work, or on 
 redundancy, to seasonal workers.
Sweden
Engineering 
and 
architectural 
consultancies
September 
2009
Inclusion in one-year 2009–10 agreement for 
 white-collar staff of provision allowing downward 
divergence from sectoral pay increase by local 
 agreement in firms facing difficulties, and omitting 
usual individual pay rise guarantee. The two-year 
agreement for professional staff contains same 
 provisions in the first year, but leaves all pay  
increases to local negotiations in the second year.
Sources: See Box 3.1.
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Company level3.3.3.2. 
Table 3.7 provides summary infor-
mation on 20 cases of specific crisis 
response agreements concluded at 
company or establishment level (fuller 
details are provided in Appendix, Table 
3.A2). The measures used correspond 
largely to those in manufacturing 
(though there seems to be an absence 
of special working time arrangements 
to prevent or reduce redundancies, or 
avoid short-time work). Thus, there are 
cases of agreements that:
provide for the use of a form of •	
short-time work, as at Italtel and 
Telecom Italia in Italy (in both cases, 
to reduce planned job losses), Aus-
trian Airlines (to cut costs), Brus-
sels Airlines in Belgium, Lufthansa 
Cargo and TUI in Germany;
trade sacrifices in pay and employment •	
conditions for employment guaran-
tees, as at TNT in the Netherlands, 
Loxam in France, G4S Cash Services 
in the UK, Arcandor and Deutsche 
Post in Germany (where guarantees 
on outsourcing were included in the 
employer side of the trade-off);
mitigate planned job losses, avoiding •	
compulsory redundancies through 
voluntary departures (as at Commerz-
bank in Germany, Italtel in Italy and TP 
in Poland), early retirement (as at Aer 
Lingus in Ireland and Commerzbank), 
redeployment (as at Telecom Italia and 
TP) or natural wastage (as at Austrian 
Airlines and Commerzbank); and
provide assistance for redundant •	
workers (as at Alitalia in Italy, Dub-
lin Airport Authority and TP).
Seven of the agreements, all at air-
lines, provided for employee sacri-
fices aimed at cutting costs, and at 
ensuring the survival of the com-
pany, but without the ‘trade-off ’ of an 
explicit employment guarantee. The 
sacrifices included: pay cuts at Ali-
talia, Austrian Airlines, British Air-
ways, Czech Airlines, LOT and SAS; 
job losses at Aer Lingus, Alitalia, 
Austrian Airlines, British Airways 
and LOT; changes in terms and con-
ditions of employment at Alitalia and 
Aer Lingus (for staff required to reap-
ply for their jobs); increased working 
hours at British Airways; and short-
time work at Austrian Airlines. An 
unusual agreement at Dublin Airport 
Authority provided that employees 
would be reimbursed for their pay 
sacrifices if various  company  recovery 
targets were met.
Table 3.7: Company-level crisis response agreements in manufacturing
Company Country Sector Date
Short-time 
work (intro-
duction/con-
ditions)
Employee 
concessions 
(pay, hours, 
etc.)
Employment/
production 
guarantees
Alternatives 
to compulsory 
redundancies
Redundancy 
assistance
Austrian Airlines AT Civil aviation 1–6/2009 X X X
Brussels Airlines BE Civil aviation 10/2009 X
Czech Airlines CZ Civil aviation 2009 X
SAS DK/NO/SE Civil aviation 2009–10 X
Loxam FR Machinery hire 12/2008 X X X
Arcandor DE Tourism and retail 10/2008 X X
Commerzbank DE Banking 7/2009 X X
Deutsche Post DE Postal services 10/2009 X X
Lufthansa Cargo DE Civil aviation 2/2009 X
TUI DE Travel 3/2009 X X
Aer Lingus IE Civil aviation 11/2008 X X
Dublin Airport 
Authority IE Civil aviation 2010 X X X
Alitalia IT Civil aviation 9/2008 X X
Italtel IT Telecoms 6/2009 X X X
Telecom Italia IT Telecoms 7/2009 X X
TNT NL Postal services 3/2009 X X
LOT PL Civil aviation 10/2009 X
TP PL Telecoms 10/2008 X X
British Airways UK Civil aviation 6/2009 X
G4S Cash 
Services UK Cash transit 2009 X X
Sources: See Box 3.1 plus Zagelmeyer (2009) for Arcandor.
113
Chapter 3: Negotiating the crisis: social partner responses
 Disputes and unsuccessful 3.3.3.3. 
negotiations
An example of an unsuccessful negotia-
tion is provided by the French IT serv-
ices sector, where employers and trade 
unions failed to agree in 2009 on the 
introduction of a sector-specific form 
of short-time work, owing to differences 
over issues such as remuneration for 
unworked hours and the circumstances 
in which the scheme could be used.
There was considerable conflict around 
many of the agreements at airlines, 
including Alitalia, Aer Lingus, British 
Airways, LOT and SAS. The agreements 
at British Airways and SAS cover some 
groups in the workforce only; nego-
tiations over similar crisis response 
measures involving other groups were 
unsuccessful or remain unresolved. 
Agreement could not be reached at all 
in similar negotiations at Finnair, whilst 
at Olympic Airways government plans 
to restructure and privatise the com-
pany were the focus of extensive protest 
action by trade unions. In the postal 
sector, restructuring plans announced 
by Österreichische Post were the focus 
of trade union protest action and in the 
UK management plans to restructure 
the Royal Mail were the focus of rolling 
strike action in late 2009, with a negoti-
ated settlement finally being concluded 
in March 2010.
In contrast to manufacturing, there 
is, however, little indication of novel 
forms of conflict becoming a feature 
in the private service sectors. Europe-
wide protests organised by EWCs 
and/or European-level trade union 
federations were also little in evidence 
in private services (see Box 3.10).
Summary3.3.3.4. 
The few instances of sector agree-
ments identified as containing crisis 
response measures, either in the form 
of  additional, specific agreements 
or through changes or additions to 
regular collective agreements, were 
restricted to Belgium, Italy, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden. Two of the agree-
ments were in the banking sector.
The agreements in Italy dealt with 
similar themes, as did those in the 
Netherlands, but unlike manufactur-
ing there was little evidence of any 
common cross-border themes. The 
one exception is the agreements in 
Swedish architectural and engineer-
ing consultancy, where the provision 
in the two-year agreement for profes-
sional staff to decentralise bargain-
ing to company level resemble those 
in the Finnish technology sector (see 
Table 3.3). Procedural innovation 
was also in evidence with the Italian 
banking agreement, overhauling an 
existing bipartite fund, and the Ital-
ian retail agreement, with new joint 
monitoring activities of the initiatives 
involved. The agreements in Dutch 
road haulage required implementa-
tion through company agreements. 
The latter accord also provided for a 
new structure to redeploy surplus staff, 
whilst the Belgian banking agreement 
envisaged new information and con-
sultation methods for works councils.
None of the agreements had any 
known link to EU-level social partner 
initiatives in the sector concerned. At 
national level, the Belgian banking 
agreement was expressly linked to the 
cross-sector agreement, but this was 
not the case with the two Dutch agree-
ments. The Belgian, Italian (banking 
and retail) and Swedish agreements 
all entailed subsequent company-level 
negotiation for the measures  envisaged 
to become effective.
At company level, crisis response 
agreements were mainly concentrated 
in the civil aviation and posts and 
telecommunications sectors. No rele-
vant European-level agreements were 
identified in multinational compa-
nies. Over a third of the agreements, 
all in civil aviation, related to com-
pany cost-reduction programmes and 
provided for a range of employee sac-
rifices — on jobs, pay, conditions and 
working time — without, it appears, 
employment guarantees in return. 
Half of the remaining agreements also 
provided for pay cuts or freezes, but in 
return for guarantees of employment. 
Other than employee concessions, 
the most common specific theme in 
the agreements was the avoidance of 
compulsory redundancies in planned 
workforce reductions through volun-
tary departures, early retirement, etc. 
Short-time work featured relatively 
little (and then mainly as a form of 
workforce reduction) perhaps because 
in many countries state schemes do 
not apply to, or are not appropri-
ate for, the services sector (or white-
collar workers). Measures to support 
 redundant  workers were rare.
Assessment3.3.4. 
The cases examined here have been 
identified from a range of transna-
tional secondary sources (see Box 
3.1). The picture they present is of a 
fairly limited agreed response to the 
crisis at sector level, with few agree-
ments reached and these mainly 
found in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
and in the manufacturing industries 
(especially metalworking). Company-
level agreements are more numerous, 
but again concentrated in a relatively 
small number of countries — princi-
pally Italy, Germany, France, Spain, 
Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Poland 
and the Netherlands — and in manu-
facturing (again, particularly metal-
working). At both levels, there seem 
to have been few agreements in the 
Member States of central and south-
eastern Europe or in some of the 
 Mediterranean countries.
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Is this picture an accurate reflection of 
the social partners’ response to the cri-
sis, or more a result of imbalances in 
the sources of data used? With regard 
to the scale of the response, there are 
indications from a number of countries 
that in reality there have been consid-
erably more agreed crisis response 
actions than the specific cases identi-
fied above. At sector level, in  Belgium, 
many of the sectoral collective agree-
ments signed within the framework 
of the cross-sector agreement for 
2009–10 included specific crisis-
related provisions on matters such as 
short-time work and training, as well 
as following the cross-sector agree-
ment’s general ‘anti-crisis’ approach 
(e.g. in terms of pay moderation) 
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ 
eiro/2009/10/articles/be0910019i.
htm). An analysis of the recent round 
of multiannual sector negotiations 
concluded in Denmark, finds that 
many mirror the innovative provi-
sions in the manufacturing sector 
agreement (Table 3.2) (Due and Mad-
sen, 2010). Many agreements signed 
in the Netherlands in 2009 included 
an increased focus on training, often 
in relation to short-time work. At the 
company level, there is evidence that 
crisis response agreements have been 
much more prevalent than indicated 
by the cases presented here, at least 
in some countries. For example, the 
findings of a representative survey of 
companies with 20 or more employ-
ees and a works council conducted by 
the Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwis-
senschaftliches Institut, WSI), pub-
lished in November 2009, indicated 
a widespread use of crisis response 
measures in German firms, many of 
which require a works agreement. For 
instance, 30 % had used working time 
accounts to reduce effective working 
time, 20 % had introduced short-time 
work, 14 % had redeployed employees, 
13 % had adjusted schemes for paid 
leave, 11 % had cut pay and 5 % had 
cut benefits. As in Germany, short-
time working schemes of various types 
require a company-level agreement for 
their introduction in countries such 
as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy 
and Sweden: the generally high level 
of short-time work in these coun-
tries during 2009 implies a consider-
able number of such agreements. For 
example, in Sweden more than 170 
new local agreements on temporary 
lay-offs were reported to have been 
reached within six weeks of the con-
clusion of the manufacturing sector 
short-time work scheme (Eurofound, 
2009). Another potential source of 
agreements during the recession is the 
statutory requirement or encourage-
ment in a number of countries, such 
as Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden, to 
negotiate over ‘social plans’ or similar 
agreements on measures to accom-
pany or mitigate planned collective 
redundancies. In addition, a number 
of company agreements concluded 
during the 2000s have addressed the 
anticipation and management of 
restructuring and change. Pre-exist-
ing agreements of this kind may have 
helped the companies concerned to 
deal with the crisis.
Overall, agreed crisis response actions 
are likely to have been somewhat more 
common than the cases presented 
above: at sector level in at least Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands; and at company level 
in at least Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
However, there is little to suggest that 
there are significant numbers of agree-
ments that have not been captured by 
the information sources consulted 
in most of the post-2004 Member 
States — which in many cases have 
low bargaining coverage and/or a nar-
row bargaining agenda — or in EU-15 
Member States such as Greece and 
Portugal.
In accounting for differences across 
countries, two of the factors identi-
fied in Figure 3.1 are influential: the 
nature of industrial relations insti-
tutions; and the presence of spe-
cific public policy measures aimed 
at maintaining employment, in the 
form of short-time work schemes. 
The countries in which sector-
 bargaining arrangements have been 
mobilised include nearly all of those 
where there are procedural provisions 
which effectively frame and constrain 
subsequent company-level negotia-
tions. Conversely, where tightly spec-
ified articulation provisions are not 
a feature of multi-employer bargain-
ing, as in Spain, Greece and Portugal 
and some central and south-eastern 
Member States, sector-level arrange-
ments have not been mobilised. The 
incidence of company-level agree-
ments would appear to have been 
higher amongst countries with multi-
employer bargaining arrangements 
than those with single-employer 
arrangements. One reason is that sec-
tor (or inter-sector) agreements may 
specifically promote, or even require, 
further negotiation at company level, 
as is the case with short-time work 
schemes in several countries. A sec-
ond is that by providing a framework 
for negotiation at company level, the 
success or otherwise of a negotia-
tion and the nature of the agreement 
concluded at company level becomes 
less dependent on specific power bal-
ances within the company (Glassner 
and Keune, 2010). Amongst those 
countries with single-employer bar-
gaining arrangements it is noticeable 
that the incidence of agreements is 
highest in the UK, where collective 
bargaining coverage is also compara-
tively higher. Turning to the interac-
tion between public policy measures 
and social partner actions, the role of 
short-time work schemes in prompt-
ing or requiring the conclusion 
of agreements has evidently been 
 important, as noted above.
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In sectoral terms, the considerable 
variations between, and within, the 
production and private service sectors 
are also attributable to the influence 
of a third factor, namely the economic 
situation (see Figure 3.1) in addition to 
that of industrial relations institution 
and of specific public policy measures. 
The impact of the crisis on manufac-
turing has been more severe than on 
private services, as Chapter 2 showed. 
Within manufacturing, metalworking 
and the automotive segment of the 
sector in particular, has been espe-
cially hard hit. So too, however, have 
the chemicals and textiles sectors, in 
both of which social partner actions 
at sector and company level seem less 
widespread than in metalworking. 
Given the considerable impact of the 
crisis on construction, the absence of 
agreements is noticeable and suggests 
that there have been few attempts 
to mitigate the employment conse-
quences in the sector. Amongst the 
service sectors, transport — which 
accounts for the largest proportion of 
agreements — is amongst the hardest 
hit. Given, however, the impact of the 
crisis on financial services, and bank-
ing in particular, more activity might 
have been anticipated; likewise with 
retail distribution, which was also 
hard hit.
Turning to industrial relations institu-
tions, collective bargaining coverage 
is generally higher, and trade union 
organisation stronger, in manufac-
turing than in services. These also 
help account for the variation evident 
within manufacturing and services, 
respectively. In services, for instance, 
transport and communications are 
sectors where collective bargaining 
coverage is comparatively high and 
trade union organisation strong. A 
further institutional consideration 
within manufacturing is the extent 
to which sector agreements in met-
alworking had already been progres-
sively opened up to create scope for 
company negotiations in the sector 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2004). In 
terms of public policy measures, the 
key crisis-management tool of short-
time working, which has been an 
important impetus to negotiations, 
is largely a manufacturing-specific 
phenomenon; in many of the relevant 
countries, schemes do not extend to 
the service sectors.
Sector differences are evident in the 
issues dealt with by agreements at 
both sector and company levels. At 
sector level, agreements on short-time 
work, pay decentralisation/flexibil-
ity and employee leasing are mainly 
found in manufacturing, while most 
agreements on employment main-
tenance/security and redundancy 
support are found in private serv-
ices. Training, however, is a frequent 
‘transversal’ theme (e.g. for employees 
on short time, or redundant workers) 
in agreements in both broad sectors. 
At company level, there are wide dif-
ferences between manufacturing and 
private services. Short-time work 
is dealt with by a majority of agree-
ments in manufacturing, but by only 
a handful of those in private services 
reflecting the differential application 
of statutory short-time work schemes 
between the two (see above). In man-
ufacturing, agreements on employee 
concessions are frequently accompa-
nied by an employment guarantee of 
some description, including contin-
ued production at the site in ques-
tion in some cases. Agreements which 
entail employee concessions, includ-
ing short-time working, in return 
for employment guarantees are par-
ticularly prevalent in the automotive 
industry. This kind of trade-off sug-
gests that the agreements concluded 
have an integrative dimension to the 
outcomes specified (Sisson, 2001). In 
services the picture is more mixed, 
with employment guarantees featur-
ing in only a minority of agreements, 
mainly those concluded in banking, 
post and telecommunications. In con-
trast, the agreements in civil aviation 
focus on cost-reduction measures 
entailing employee concessions, with 
no offsetting guarantee on employ-
ment, and seem designed to ensure 
the company’s survival. The distribu-
tive dimension is predominant in 
these ‘survival’ agreements.
The counterpart of divergence in 
social partner actions between sectors 
is a measure of convergence across 
countries within them (Katz and Dar-
bishire, 2000). The sectoral pattern of 
incidence and issues addressed simul-
taneously signify common tendencies 
across countries within sectors. For 
example, the company agreements 
concluded in the automotive industry 
and in civil aviation bear consider-
able similarity in the respective provi-
sions they contain. Such convergence 
was particularly noticeable in the 
local agreements concluded in differ-
ent countries in four multinational 
companies. From the information 
available, it is difficult to establish the 
extent and nature of any coordination 
between companies, the trade unions 
and works councils representing 
workforces, within industries. Most 
plausible would seem to be a form of 
pattern setting which reaches across 
borders (3). The outcomes, if not the 
processes involved, are suggestive of 
a ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation of col-
lective bargaining within particular 
industrial and service sectors.
The evidence of any ‘vertical’ Euro-
peanisation of collective negotia-
tions and social dialogue, in which 
national and local social partner 
actions are framed by European-
level agreements, recommendations 
or guidelines, is mainly confined 
to company level. Just one instance 
was identified where national sector 
agreements (in two countries) have 
3 See Traxler and Brandl (2009) on cross-border 
pattern setting in wage determination.
116
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010
a seeming link to an EU-level social 
partner initiative in the industry con-
cerned, namely chemicals. Although 
there have been significant develop-
ments in institutional capacity and 
activity at European sector level in 
recent years (Pochet et al., 2009), this 
would not seem to (yet) extend to 
exercising an influence on the fram-
ing of agreements at national level. 
The three European-level agreements 
identified in multinational compa-
nies implied subsequent negotiations 
at national or local level to implement 
some of their provisions. Several 
cases in which EWCs had intervened 
in national-level developments were 
also identified. Links between the 
European and lower levels of indus-
trial relations in multinationals were 
most evident in examples of EWCs 
(and/or European-level trade union 
federations) organising Europe-wide 
protests against restructuring.
At national level, amongst the coun-
tries with multi-employer bargain-
ing arrangements, ‘vertical’ links 
between negotiations at cross-sector 
(where relevant), sector and company 
levels were apparent amongst those 
countries in which there are com-
prehensive provisions governing the 
relationship between negotiations at 
different levels. Between the cross-
sector and sector levels, this was most 
apparent in Belgium but less so in the 
Netherlands, though the Dutch agree-
ments could be argued to reflect the 
broad crisis response approach agreed 
in bipartite and tripartite national 
accords. Sector agreements in Fin-
land, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Sweden required implementation 
by company-level agreements or pro-
moted bargaining at company level. 
Of the company agreements identi-
fied, a number were clearly negoti-
ated wholly or in part to implement 
short-time working schemes agreed 
at sector level, as in Swedish manu-
facturing, or to implement schemes 
endorsed by the social partners at 
national level, as in  Germany and 
 several other countries.
Conclusion3.4. 
Through the processes of social dia-
logue, concertation and collective 
negotiation, employers and trade 
unions have played a prominent role in 
addressing the impact of the crisis at the 
cross-sector, sector and company levels. 
The chapter has also found considerable 
cross-country and cross-sector varia-
tion in the incidence and nature of these 
negotiated and concerted responses. 
Conversely, this indicates that unilateral 
employer responses have most likely 
been widespread in a range of countries. 
These include most of the countries with 
single-employer bargaining arrange-
ments, i.e. most of the central and east 
European Member States, Cyprus, 
Malta and the UK, and those coun-
tries whose multi-employer bargaining 
arrangements do not specify a clear link 
between the sector and company levels, 
such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Bul-
garia and Romania. Unilateral employer 
responses are almost certainly consider-
ably more prevalent in private services 
than in the production sectors.
Towards accounting for the pattern of 
variation, the respective influence of 
the four sets of factors, identified at 
the outset (see Figure 3.1), framing the 
extent to which responses to the crisis 
have been negotiated or concerted can 
now be assessed. Overall, the economic 
situation at economy-wide level and 
the presence of institutionalised capac-
ity for concertation and/or negotia-
tion at cross-sector levels seem not to 
have exercised clear-cut influence. The 
influence of the economic situation 
between and within broad sectors, of 
public policy — in both the broad and 
specific aspects identified in Figure 
3.1 — and of other industrial relations 
institutions is, however, marked. That 
of the strategic choices of the social 
partners is — at sector and company 
levels in particular — difficult to deter-
mine, given the nature of the data on 
which the chapter has mainly drawn.
The magnitude of the crisis at 
 economy-wide level does not appear 
to have conditioned whether the social 
partners have attempted to conclude 
bipartite or tripartite agreements at 
the cross-sector level. Neither does it 
seem to have greatly affected whether 
the outcome was successful or unsuc-
cessful. Sectorally, the contrasting 
economic situation of the production 
and private service sectors, and of indi-
vidual sectors within them, is, however, 
broadly consistent with the observed 
pattern of negotiated responses. Both 
aspects of public policy identified exer-
cise a distinct influence on the pattern. 
Whether or not, and how far, govern-
ments have involved the social partners 
— or the social partners have sought to 
be involved — in the framing of anti-
crisis measures acts as a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for attempts 
at tripartite cross-sector agreements. 
Specific public policy measures, in the 
form of the massive intervention repre-
sented by the short-time work schemes 
implemented in many Member States 
(including some for the first time), 
have been both a focus for social part-
ner involvement at national level and a 
trigger for negotiating activity at sector 
and company levels in manufacturing 
(although not services where they do 
not generally apply).
The first of the two public policy con-
siderations also points to the role of 
strategic choices at cross-sector level, 
by governments and by the social part-
ners. Further indication of the influence 
of the strategic choices exercised at this 
level by employers and trade unions is 
apparent in the instances, first, of those 
central and east European countries 
where agreements have not previously 
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been concluded and, second, those 
western European countries where 
agreements have not been concluded, 
even though institutional capacity to 
do so exists. At sector and company lev-
els, the pattern of agreements suggests 
that social partner strategies have been 
shaped, although not determined, by 
institutional arrangements for indus-
trial relations (see below) as well as by 
large-scale public policy intervention in 
the form of statutory short-time work 
schemes. Beyond this, the role of the 
strategic choices exercised by employ-
ers and trade unions is illustrated by 
the finding that company-level agree-
ments can also be reasonably promi-
nent in the absence of one or both of 
these supportive factors, as in Spain or 
the UK.
Of the institutional dimensions of 
industrial relations identified at the 
beginning of the chapter, the influ-
ence of one is not clear-cut whereas 
that of the other three is much more 
apparent. The first is the presence and 
nature of institutional arrangement 
for cross-sector arrangements for 
negotiation or concertation. As noted 
above, cross-sector accords have been 
concluded, or talks commenced but 
were unsuccessful, in some, but not 
all, EU-15 countries where such insti-
tutional capacity already existed. But 
they have also been concluded in 
some central and east European coun-
tries where there is little or no history 
of doing so. Second, the distinctions 
between multi-employer and single-
employer arrangements and, third, 
the level of collective bargaining 
coverage (which is related) are both 
confirmed as salient. The workforce 
coverage of sector crisis response 
agreements, where they have been 
concluded, will have greatly exceeded 
those of the company agreements 
which have been the focus of activ-
ity in countries with single-employer 
arrangements. Moreover, sector (and 
cross-sector) agreements have had the 
effect of prompting further negotiated 
actions at company level in several 
EU-15 countries. As a result, the inci-
dence of company agreements seems 
to have been higher under multi-
employer than under single-employer 
bargaining arrangements. Amongst 
the  countries with single-employer 
bargaining arrangements, the UK — 
which has the highest level of collec-
tive bargaining coverage — stands 
out has having a comparatively higher 
incidence of negotiated response at 
company level. Fourth, as between 
countries with multi-employer 
arrangements, the presence of effective 
multi-level governance arrangements 
specifying the relationship between 
agreements concluded at different lev-
els, emerges as crucial. Sector crisis 
response agreements are concentrated 
amongst those EU-15 countries where 
procedural provisions articulating the 
outcomes of collective negotiations at 
different levels are found. Where they 
are absent, as in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece and those central and south-
eastern Member States where sector-
level bargaining takes place, sector 
crisis response agreements are notice-
able by their absence. The incidence of 
company agreements is also lower. The 
implication is that unilateral employer 
responses are correspondingly more 
widespread. The crucial institutional 
distinction may not be between 
multi-employer and single-employer 
bargaining arrangements per se, but 
between multi-employer bargain-
ing arrangements which ‘organise’ 
bargaining at the different levels and 
those which do not — together with 
single-employer arrangements (Trax-
ler et al., 2001; Nergaard et al., 2009).
A thorough assessment of the balance 
between the integrative and distribu-
tive elements of the crisis response 
agreements surveyed requires an 
analysis of greater depth than that 
undertaken here. Two main infer-
ences can be drawn from the present 
evidence. First, the package nature 
of most of the cross-sector accords is 
indicative of an agenda of sufficient 
scope to enable the parties to engage 
in the trade-offs which underpin the 
inclusion of integrative as well as dis-
tributive elements to the outcome of 
negotiations. Likewise, the majority 
of crisis response sector agreements 
also entail a package of measures. Sec-
ond, there is nonetheless considerable 
variation in the mix between elements 
across sectors. A key indicator of an 
integrative element to the outcome 
of crisis response negotiations is the 
inclusion of some form of employ-
ment guarantee against cost-reduction 
measures. This was evident amongst 
the majority of agreements in the pro-
duction sector, but not amongst those 
in private services — where in civil 
aviation in particular outcomes were 
more straightforwardly distributive. 
Variation in the mix is also appar-
ent amongst companies concluding 
agreements within the same industrial 
sector. 
Insofar as the crisis has invoked nego-
tiated or concerted responses, where 
otherwise governments or employ-
ers might have acted alone, a final 
issue is the sustainability of recent 
developments. On this too it is dif-
ficult to reach a definitive answer. At 
cross-sector level, the most notice-
able development has been the con-
clusion of accords in several central 
and east European countries where 
they were hitherto unknown. These 
accords are ad hoc; there is no indica-
tion at present that the parties intend 
further negotiations, or agreements, 
to follow. Yet, neither can the parties 
unlearn the process that they have for 
the first time successfully engaged 
in. Amongst the Visegrad countries 
at least, where social dialogue insti-
tutions are more robust than in the 
Baltic states (Meardi, 2010), the likeli-
hood of their attempting to conclude 
an agreement again is greater than it 
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was before. At sector level, a striking 
feature in several of the crisis response 
agreements in Finland, Germany and 
Sweden is provisions which trans-
fer to, or enhance, competence for 
wage setting at company level. In this 
respect, the crisis may prove to have 
further accelerated the long-running 
trend towards ‘ organised’ decentrali-
sation (Traxler et al., 2001). At sec-
tor and company levels, the expiry 
of the short-time work schemes is 
likely to have a marked effect, given 
their impact in prompting further 
negotiation on measures to main-
tain employment. At company level, 
as the crisis prolongs, the successful 
renewal of agreements which have 
already been concluded cannot be 
assured. The basis for the trade-offs 
which they entail can be eroded: the 
economic situation may preclude 
the renewal of an employment guar-
antee, for example. Alternatively, a 
more rapid recovery in output than 
anticipated may lead the workforce to 
press for  agreements to be re-opened, 
so as to recuperate earlier sacrifices. 
Either way, the problem is likely to be 
less acute where company negotia-
tions arise as a result of agreements at 
higher level than when they are free 
standing. The institutional security 
provided under organised decen-
tralisation to company-level nego-
tiators leaves them less exposed to 
asymmetric outcomes to such ‘down-
side’ and ‘upside’ risks than where 
 single-employer bargaining prevails.
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Table 3.A1: Company-level crisis response agreements in manufacturing
Company Country Sector Date Details
DAF Trucks Belgium Automotive June 2009 Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, plus early retirement, along with partial guarantee on no redundancies.
Stomana Industry Bulgaria Steel November 2008
Agreement on social package to accompany 300 redundancies, including: 
training; severance payments of four to 10 months’ pay; additional financial 
support for redundant workers; and a commitment to rehire redundant work-
ers if the company’s situation improves. 
Hyundai Czech Republic Automotive
January 
2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme at Nosovice 
plant, providing for higher than statutory pay compensation for employees.
Siemens Czech Republic
Transport 
equipment 
August 
2008
Agreement on enhanced redundancy package in case of plant closure or 
special bonus payments in case of transfer of ownership. 
Danfoss Denmark Engineering February 2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working (‘work-sharing’), based on 
publicly funded scheme regulated by sectoral agreement.
Grundfos Denmark Pumps March 2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working (‘work-sharing’), based on 
publicly funded scheme regulated by sectoral agreement.
Vestas Denmark Wind turbine manufacturing 2009
Agreement on three-week summer shutdown, with compulsory holiday and 
abolition of Sunday shifts, to deal with fall in orders. 
Nokia Finland
Mobile  
telephone 
manufacturing
February 
2009
Scheme developed with unions and employee representatives to promote 
voluntary departures through financial incentives and avoid redundancies.
Airbus France Aerospace December 2009 Agreement on using annual leave to avoid recourse to short-time work. 
Bosch France Auto parts November 2008
Agreement on reducing recourse to short-time work through use of accumu-
lated time off, recalculation of annual leave and training. 
Dassault Aviation France Aerospace June 2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme, dealing with 
pay guarantees (partly compensated through ‘solidarity’ contribution from 
unaffected employees) and training.
Michelin France Tyres February 2009
Agreement on collective working time account, whereby workers were granted 
paid days off during period of low demand in 2009 and work off the days owed 
in future years, with short-time work only used if this scheme is insufficient.
PSA Peugeot 
Citroën France Automotive
September 
2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme, dealing with 
pay and training for the workers affected.
Renault France Automotive April 2009
‘Crisis social contract’, which aims to maintain employment levels through 
the widespread use of short-time work, with guarantees on pay and training 
provision.
Renault Trucks France Automotive February 2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme, dealing with 
pay (partly compensated through employee ‘solidarity’ fund) and training for 
the workers affected.
Rhodia France Chemicals April 2009 Agreement on pay during short-time work and flexibility measures to deal with crisis. 
Snecma France Aerospace November 2008
Agreement on employees taking accumulated time off and advance annual 
leave entitlement during period of low demand to avoid short-time work and 
loss of pay. 
STMicrolectronics France Electronics April 2009
Agreement on ‘employment plan’ to maintain job during crisis through 
measures including incentives to work part time, long-term training leave, 
sabbatical leave and external postings.
STX France Shipbuilding February 2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme, dealing with 
pay for the workers affected.
BASF Germany Chemicals January 2009
Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, with additional pay-
ments for employee on short time.
BMW Germany Automotive January 2009
Agreement to secure jobs through use of short-time working, with additional 
payments for employees on short time.
Appendix 
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Company Country Sector Date Details
Bosch Germany Auto parts December 2009
Agreement providing for pay cuts of 1 % to 1.5 % in 2010 in exchange for 
employment guarantees, in context of extensive short-time working.
Carl Zeiss Germany Optical  equipment June 2009
Agreement on deferring wage increase and suspension of bonus payments in 
exchange for a no redundancy guarantee. [Zagelmeyer, 2009]
Coca-Cola Erfrisc-
hungsgetränke Germany Soft drinks
March 
2010
Agreement providing guarantees of no compulsory redundancies before 2012, 
no enforced geographical mobility and an effective end to outsourcing, in 
return for working time flexibility and pay moderation.
Daimler Germany Automotive April 2009 Agreement on cost-cutting package, with workers making concessions on working time and pay in return for a limited job guarantee. 
Daimler
Germany 
(Sindelfingen 
plant only)
Automotive December 2009
Agreement providing long-term guarantee of no compulsory redundancies in 
return for measures to improve plant’s competitiveness and efficiency, such as 
internal transfers and job flexibility.
E.ON Germany Energy
August 
2009
Agreement on implementation of cost-reduction programme, including guar-
antee of no compulsory redundancies with workforce reduction to be achieved 
through phased and full early retirement, non-renewal of fixed-term contracts, 
voluntary departures with compensation, natural wastage and redeployment. 
Also provided for maintenance of pay and conditions for employees in out-
sourced services, and contained measures on training and apprenticeships.
InBev Germany Beverages June 2009
Agreement over enhanced severance terms in case of compulsory redundancy, 
increased compensation for short-time work, preceded by a moratorium on 
employment reductions. [Zagelmeyer, 2009]
MAN  
Nutzfahrzeuge Germany Automotive
January 
2009
Job security agreement, introducing short-time work accompanied by mora-
torium on redundancies, additional payments and training (with incentives) 
for those on short time, plus sabbaticals and employee leasing.
Manz Automation Germany Automation technology April 2009
Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, with training during 
unworked hours.
Salzgitter  
Flachstahl Germany Steel
January 
2009
Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, with training during 
unworked hours and use of working time accounts to reduce income losses.
Schaeffler Germany Ball-bearings manufacturing May 2009
Job security agreement preventing compulsory redundancies before 30 June 
2010 (up to 4 500 job losses had been mooted) if personnel cost reductions of 
EUR 250 million can be achieved through a range of agreed measures. These 
included cuts in working hours and pay, expanded use of short-time work, 
voluntary redundancies, partial retirement, cuts in one-off payments and the 
establishment of ‘transfer companies’.
Schott Germany Glass 2009 Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, with additional pay-ments and obligatory training during unworked hours.
Siemens Germany Electronics February 2009
Agreement on use of state short-time working scheme, with additional pay-
ments for employee on short time, use of accumulated time off before resort 
to short time and internal transfers between plants.
ThyssenKrupp  
Nirosta Germany Stainless steel
September 
2009
Agreement on ‘future security’ providing for pay freeze, mitigating job losses 
through partial early retirement and natural wastage, guarantees on appren-
ticeship and long-term time savings accounts.
ISD Dunaferr Hungary Steel November 2008
Agreement on cuts in pay and benefits in exchange for no redundancies dur-
ing 2009.
Opel Hungary Automotive April 2009 Agreement on short-time working, with partial pay compensation.
Antonio Carraro Italy Tractor  production
January 
2010 ‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work to prevent redundancies.
Ast ThyssenKrupp Italy Steel April 2009 Agreement on wage and rights guarantees for employees affected by short-time work and temporary lay-offs.
Bosch
Italy 
(Modugno 
plant)
Auto parts December 2009
Agreement guaranteeing employment levels (with temporary lay-offs and short-
time work used where necessary) and production until end of 2011, despite the 
recession, and introducing pilot scheme to reduce CO2 emissions at the plant.
Case New Holland Italy Agricultural machinery
September 
2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working and future negotiations on 
restructuring.
Electrolux Italy Domestic  appliances
September 
2008
Agreement on cushioning effects of restructuring through rotating use of 
state income-support measures, incentives for voluntary redundancies and 
part-time working.
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Company Country Sector Date Details
Embraco Italy Compressor manufacturing 2009
 ‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work for half of workforce, 
with company organising training for employees during unworked hours, 
aimed at enhancing their multi-skilling.
Fincibec Italy Ceramics April 2009 ‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work to prevent redundancies.
Gima Italy Automation systems April 2009
Agreement on additional payments to workers on short time or temporarily laid 
off, to compensate for the psychological/emotional/social problems caused.
Ilva Italy Steel April 2009 Agreement on wage guarantees for employees affected by short-time work and temporary lay-offs.
IMER  
International Italy
Construction 
machinery
February 
2010 ‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work to prevent redundancies.
Indesit Italy Domestic appli-ances July 2009
Agreement (with involvement and support of regional authorities) on pre-
venting planned plant closure through short-time working, mobility, training 
and early retirement.
Michelin Italy Tyres December 2008
Framework agreement on restructuring of Italian sites, providing for internal 
or external redeployment of redundant workers, including re-employment in 
new operations, internal mobility (with financial assistance), plus income sup-
port, outplacement and help for workers to set up businesses.
Piaggio Aprilia Italy Automotive January 2010
‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work to prevent redundancies, 
with skills maintenance.
Rimor Italy Automotive September 2009 ‘Solidarity agreement’ providing for short-time work to prevent redundancies.
Verlicchi Italy Automotive April 2009 Agreement on additional payments to workers on short time or temporarily laid off, to compensate for the psychological/emotional/social problems caused.
Whirlpool Italy Domestic appli-ances
December 
2008
Agreement on measures to mitigate planned job losses, through non-renewal 
of fixed-term contracts, incentives for voluntary redundancies and income 
support for redundant workers.
Villeroy & Boch Luxembourg Ceramics July 2009
Agreement on ‘employment maintenance plan’ to accompany the closure of 
a plant. The plan involves training, guidance and re-employment assistance 
(externally and within the company), including the creation of a ‘qualification 
centre’, ‘employment exchanges’ and a ‘professional coaching cell’.
Corus Netherlands Steel April 2010 Agreement guaranteeing no compulsory redundancies before October 2012, in exchange for low pay increases in 2010 (increases for 2011 to be negotiated later).
DAF Trucks Netherlands Automotive June 2009
Agreement on application of state short-time working scheme, dealing with 
issues such as maintenance of full pay (in return for giving up some holiday 
entitlement) and employment guarantees for workers involved.
E.ON Netherlands Energy December 2009
Agreement on implementation of cost-reduction programme, including 
guarantee of no compulsory redundancies, with workforce reduction to be 
achieved by various alternative means including moving employees to sub-
contractors. Maintenance of pay and conditions for employees in outsourced 
services for five years. 
Lotos Poland Oil February 2009
Agreement on anti-crisis cost-reduction plan, including pay freeze to help 
avoid job losses.
Alcatel-Lucent Romania Telecoms equipment
December 
2009
Inclusion in company agreement (first at firm) of redundancy compensation 
scheme and specific payments for employees affected by restructuring.
Dacia-Renault Romania Automotive 2008 Inclusion in company agreement of provisions on pay guarantees during short-time working.
Ford Spain Automotive October 2009
Inclusion in company agreement of measures to mitigate planned job losses 
at Almussafes plant, through voluntary redundancies (with possible re-
employment) and retirements, plus moderate pay increases, with company 
guarantees on future production.
Michelin Spain Tyres
November 
2008 and 
November 
2009
Agreement in 2008 on avoiding redundancies during 2009, mainly through 
working time cuts and use of hours banks. Agreement in 2009 to implement 
planned workforce reduction in 2010 through early retirements with financial 
assistance.
Nissan Spain Automotive February 2009
Agreement on a feasibility plan which entailed the termination of a substan-
tial number of temporary workers’ employment in exchange for the future 
allocation of production to the Catalan operation. 
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Company Country Sector Date Details
Opel Spain Automotive March 2010
Agreements to implement 900 planned job losses (as part of Europe-wide 
restructuring plan) in a ‘socially responsible’ way, targeting them at workers 
on fixed-term contracts and providing re-employment opportunities for those 
who lose their jobs. Agreement also reached on moderate wage increases over 
four years and greater working time flexibility.
Renault Spain Automotive September 2009
Four-year ‘pact for employment and competitiveness’ in Spanish operations, 
which provides for low pay increases, increased flexibility and mobility, and 
lower wages for new recruits, in exchange for the future allocation of produc-
tion to the sites.
Seat Spain Automotive March 2009
Agreement on two-year pay freeze aimed at guaranteeing employment by 
attracting new allocation of production.
Sony Spain Electronics January 2009
Agreement on a two-year pay freeze and a 40-hour increase in annual work-
ing time, in return for company commitment to keeping the site open at least 
until the end of 2010, and cutting planned redundancies by two-thirds.
Sandvik Sweden Engineering June 2009 Agreement to avoid planned redundancies through short-time working (applying national scheme), with some pay compensation.
Scania Sweden Automotive
March and 
December 
2009
 ‘Crisis’ agreement to avoid redundancies through short-time working (apply-
ing national scheme), with some pay compensation (increased to full compen-
sation by December agreement).
Sony Ericsson Sweden Electronics September 2008
Agreement on social plan to accompany redundancies, including increased 
notice periods, time off to find new jobs, specific measures for older workers, 
outplacement support and priority recruitment.
Volvo Sweden Automotive March 2009
Agreement to avoid redundancies through short-time working (applying 
national scheme).
Honda UK Automotive May 2009 Agreement reducing pay for 10 months in return for a company guarantee preserving jobs.
Jaguar Land Rover UK Automotive March 2009 Agreement on working time cuts and wage freeze to avoid redundancies.
JCB UK
Construction 
equipment 
manufacturing
October 
2008
Agreement on cutting working time and pay in order to prevent some 
 two-thirds of planned job losses.
Toyota UK Automotive March 2009 Agreement on cuts in working time and pay to save jobs.
Vauxhall UK Automotive October 2009
Agreement on pay freeze and voluntary redundancies to secure future of 
plants.
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Table 3.A2: Company-level crisis response agreements in private services
Company Country Sector Date Issues
Austrian Airlines Austria Civil aviation January to June 2009
Series of agreements on cost-reduction measures aimed at enabling takeover 
by Lufthansa. Measures include job losses (mostly through outsourcing and 
natural wastage), pay cuts and short-time work.
Brussels Airlines Belgium Civil aviation October 2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working, with compensation based 
on sectoral scheme.
Czech Airlines Czech Republic Civil aviation 2009
Agreements on cost-reduction measures affecting various groups of staff, 
including cuts in pay.
SAS
Denmark/
Norway/
Sweden
Civil aviation 2009–10 Agreements on cost-reduction measures affecting various groups of staff, including pay cuts.
Loxam France Machinery hire December 2008
Agreement on working time and pay cuts to maintain employment, plus 
incentives for voluntary departures.
Arcandor Germany Tourism and retail
October 
2008
‘Pact for the future’, providing no-redundancy guarantee in return for 
cost-reduction programme, including cuts in bonuses and holiday pay. 
[ Zagelmeyer 2009]
Commerzbank Germany Banking July 2009
Agreement in July (post takeover of Dresdner Bank) providing guarantee of 
no compulsory redundancies before 2013, if sufficient workforce reduction 
achieved through voluntary departures (with incentives), phased early retire-
ment and natural wastage. 
Deutsche Post Germany Postal services October 2009
Inclusion in regular agreement of pay freeze in exchange for guarantees on 
outsourcing and redundancies.
Lufthansa Cargo Germany Civil aviation February 2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working for ground staff, with 
partial pay compensation.
TUI Germany Travel March 2009
Agreement on introduction of short-time working, with partial pay compen-
sation, and senior staff not affected by short time taking ‘solidarity’ pay cut.
Aer Lingus Ireland Civil aviation November 2008
Agreement on cost-reduction measures, including workforce reduction 
through early retirement or voluntary redundancy, while half of ground 
operations staff had to leave the company and reapply for positions on lower 
terms and conditions.
Dublin Airport 
Authority Ireland Civil aviation 2010
Agreement on pay cuts averaging 5.5 % (except for low-paid staff) and reduc-
tions in benefits, plus job cuts (with enhanced severance payments) as part of 
company recovery plan. Pay cuts will be restored in future if recovery targets 
are met.
Alitalia Italy Civil aviation September 2008
Agreements on post-takeover restructuring plan, including state financial 
support for redundant workers, changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and reductions in pay for some groups of staff.
Italtel Italy Telecoms June 2009
Agreement to avoid a number of planned redundancies through the use of 
short-time work (partly based on ‘solidarity agreements’) and temporary lay-
offs, plus incentives for voluntary departures.
Telecom Italia Italy Telecoms July 2009
Agreement to avoid a number of planned redundancies through redeploy-
ment, training and the use of short-time work (based on ‘solidarity agree-
ments’) with pay and service guarantees.
TNT Netherlands Postal services March 2009
Agreement providing for pay cuts for some grades in exchange for three-year 
guarantee of no compulsory redundancies.
LOT Poland Civil aviation October 2009
Agreement on cost-reduction measures, including cuts in bonuses and job 
losses.
TP Poland Telecoms November 2008
Inclusion in regular ‘social pact’ for 2009–11 of incentives for voluntary 
departures (with outplacement assistance), plus internal mobility measures.
British Airways UK Civil aviation June 2009 Agreement on cost-reduction measures affecting pilots, including cuts in pay and allowances, increased working time and a number of job losses.
G4S Cash Services UK Cash transit 2009 Agreement on reduced pay rise in return for redundancy mitigation measures.
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Introduction4.1. 
The context in which wages in 
Europe are negotiated has under-
gone important changes in the last 
decade. The ongoing globalisation 
of the economy, the deepening of 
the internal market and its expan-
sion to the 12 new Member States 
that joined the EU between 2004 
and 2007 have intensified competi-
tion in product and service markets 
and increased cross-border mobil-
ity. As a result, countries and work-
ers are increasingly in competition 
with each other for jobs and invest-
ment, creating pressure on labour 
costs and modifying the power rela-
tions between employers and work-
ers (Keune, 2008).
The European monetary union 
(EMU) was also deepened and 
expanded during the 2000s. By creat-
ing a common currency and common 
monetary policy EMU has created 
monetary stability in the euro area, 
evidenced during the present eco-
nomic and financial crisis. However, 
it has also limited the range of adjust-
ment mechanisms available to coun-
tries to adjust to asymmetric shocks, 
and placed increasing reliance on 
wage adjustments (Dyson, 2006). In 
addition, through its requirements 
as regards public expenditure and 
public debt criteria it creates pressure 
on wage levels, in particular in the 
public sector.
Concerning wage setting and 
its objectives, since the 1970s, 
 solidaristic and productivity-ori-
ented wage bargaining has gradually 
been replaced by competition-ori-
ented wage bargaining (Schulten, 
2002; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). 
This has involved a shift of emphasis 
in wage bargaining from the pursuit 
of more egalitarian wage structures 
and the decoupling of wages from 
the specific circumstances of the 
individual company in favour of 
industrial and/or occupational soli-
darity, towards a stronger role for 
the market and for the competitive 
requirements of individual compa-
nies. It has also resulted in a wide-
spread practice of wage moderation 
in which real wage growth is kept 
below productivity growth. Wage 
moderation has been a consistent 
feature of wage setting in the past 
two decades and, since its incep-
tion, in the euro area in particular 
(Keune, 2008; Ebbinghaus, 2004). 
One manifestation has been the 
continuous decline of the labour’s 
share of total income in the EU. In 
the EU-15, the labour income share 
of GDP fell from 69.9 % in 1975 to 
57.8 % in 2006; amongst the 12 new 
Member States, the labour income 
share has been on a downward 
trend since the mid-1990s, with 
the exceptions of the Czech Repub-
lic, Cyprus, Malta and Romania 
(European Commission, 2007). The 
decline of the labour income share 
has been accompanied by growing 
wage inequality and the wages of 
the low skilled have been particu-
larly affected (ibid.).
In this context, there has been ongo-
ing debate in Europe over whether 
more wage flexibility is needed and/
or desirable. Wage flexibility con-
cerns the extent to which wages 
respond to market forces, that is 
the extent to which they can vary 
in response to changes in labour 
demand and supply, or accord-
ing to individual, collective or firm 
performance, or following changes 
(shocks) in the macroeconomic 
environment. The degree of wage 
flexibility depends to a large extent 
on the prevailing wage-setting insti-
tutions, including the level and 
coverage of collective bargaining, 
the power relations between trade 
unions and employers, the presence 
and prominence of performance-
related pay systems, the minimum 
wage, etc. These institutions may 
set limits to the influence of market 
forces, for example by compressing 
wage structures, constraining wage 
differentiation according to skills 
or to region, preventing downward 
wage adjustments, or reducing the 
responsiveness of wages to price and 
productivity developments.
It is often argued that wage-setting 
institutions in many European 
countries are too rigid, and that 
this results in insufficient wage 
 differentiation, lower cost competi-
tiveness for firms involved in glo-
bal competition, lower workforce 
motivation and productivity, an in 
the end to higher unemployment 
(in particular for the low skilled 
by pricing them out of the labour 
market) and/or lower economic 
growth (e.g. OECD 2006; Arpaia 
and Pichelman 2007). Others, how-
ever, call for caution, pointing to 
the potential detrimental effects of 
Setting wages is one of the key functions of industrial relations systems. In the 
 context of the economic crisis and the debate about wage flexibility, the decen-
tralisation of collective wage bargaining has continued to advance in most EU 
countries. At the same time, variable pay systems are providing an additional 
element of wage  differentiation. In this environment, minimum wages could have 
an important role in providing a wage floor, yet the evidence shows that statutory 
minimum wages have had little effect on the incidence of low pay and growing 
wage inequality.
This chapter is based on a draft by Maarten Keune of the Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS, University of Amsterdam).
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increased wage inequality on the 
quality of work and fairness, on 
collective wage-setting structures, 
on equality and social cohesion or 
on principles such as equal pay for 
equal work (e.g. Vaughan-White-
head 2010; ILO 2008).
The ambition of the present chapter 
is not to settle the wage flexibility 
debate. Rather, the intention is to 
review developments concerning 
three important institutional aspects 
of wage setting that are closely related 
to the debate on wage flexibility: (i) 
the extent to which collective wage 
bargaining has been decentralised; 
(ii) the extent to which variable pay 
systems are used; and (iii) the role of 
the minimum wage.
The decentralisation of wage bar-
gaining, from (inter-) sectoral, or 
multi-employer, level to company, 
or single-employe, level has for 
many years been proposed as one 
of the measures to increase the 
responsiveness of wages to local 
conditions, to strengthen the inter-
national competitiveness of firms 
and to improve macroeconomic 
performance (OECD 1994, 2006). 
The rationale for multi-employer 
bargaining has been questioned fol-
lowing the increase of international 
competition in particular, which, it is 
argued, makes it less feasible to take 
wages out of competition within the 
relevant product market (Arrow-
smith and Marginson, 2008). At the 
same time, the evidence concerning 
the impact of collective bargain-
ing  structures on  macroeconomic 
 performance in general and on 
aggregate employment and unem-
ployment in particular remains 
fragile and inconclusive (OECD, 
2006; European Commission, 2006; 
Aidt and Tzannatos, 2005). Also, 
trade unions and in many cases 
employers’ organisations and gov-
ernments as well, are reluctant to 
make radical changes to bargaining 
structures. They fear that the effect 
would be increased wage differen-
tiation or that company bargain-
ing would place too big a burden 
on small- and medium-sized com-
panies. The chapter finds that in 
most countries where higher-level 
(sector and/or inter-sector) wage 
bargaining dominates there has 
been little change in bargaining 
arrangements for wages during the 
2000s. Exceptions are Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark and Germany where 
decentralisation of wage bargaining 
arrangements has been a prominent 
feature. There has, however, been a 
more generalised decentralisation 
across the EU concerning negotia-
tions over additional pay elements, 
including the (increasing) use of 
variable pay systems.
Variable pay systems (VPS) increase 
wage flexibility by linking wages 
more closely to individual, group or 
company performance. VPS are fre-
quently expected to increase moti-
vation, productivity and innovation, 
while for some they are an instru-
ment to improve the redistribution of 
wealth and the strengthening of eco-
nomic democracy. Although the evi-
dence on these issues is mixed, this 
has not detracted from the interest 
in VPS. There are major differences 
in the incidence of VPS between 
countries and also between sectors 
and companies of different sizes. 
Whilst employers have tended to 
embrace VPS, the views of employee 
representatives and of trade unions 
towards them are mixed with differ-
ences apparent  between and within 
countries. The use of VPS seems to 
be increasing over time,  representing 
a specific form of flexibilisation of 
wage setting.
The minimum wage is a key fac-
tor that constrains wage flexibil-
ity by setting a wage floor in the 
labour market. Depending on its 
level, the minimum wage can limit 
wage inequality as well as the inci-
dence of low pay. This is especially 
relevant since trade union density 
and the level and coverage of col-
lective agreements, factors that are 
negatively correlated with wage ine-
quality (e.g. European Commission 
2008, Chapter 3), are under pres-
sure. The chapter establishes that 
low pay affects one out of every six 
workers in the EU and its incidence 
is higher in the countries where 
company bargaining dominates and 
coverage of collective agreements is 
low. Yet a statutory minimum wage 
is no guarantee against low pay: 
a further finding is that the coun-
tries with the highest level of low 
pay all have a statutory minimum 
wage. There are some possible con-
nections and interactions between 
these three institutional aspects of 
wage setting. VPS almost always 
operate at company, or establish-
ment, level and have hence added 
to the pressure to open up scope for 
company bargaining within sector 
agreements. The weakened capacity 
of sector-level collective bargain-
ing arrangements in some coun-
tries, notably Germany, to provide 
comprehensive workforce coverage, 
together with the growing use of 
opening clauses in collective agree-
ments in several countries, have 
heightened attention on the need 
for other e.g. statutory means to 
provide a minimum wage floor. This 
attention is further strengthened by 
the low and declining coverage of 
collective bargaining in countries 
with single-employer arrangements, 
a group that has been significantly 
 augmented as a result of the 2004 
and 2007  enlargements. The chapter 
concludes, however, that the capac-
ity of statutory minimum wages to 
counter the effects of growing wage 
inequality and the problem of low 
pay is  limited.
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The level of collective 4.2. 
wage bargaining: 
a trend towards 
decentralisation?
The importance  4.2.1. 
of different bargaining 
levels
The main distinction that is generally 
made when considering the levels 
at which collective bargaining takes 
place is between single-employer 
bargaining at the company or local 
(establishment) level and higher-
level, multi-employer bargaining, 
often at the level of a sector or branch. 
The two levels can also combine, 
when the multi-employer agreement 
sets out a framework that is further 
developed at company level, or when 
at company level derogations from 
higher-level standards are possible, 
for example in times of economic dif-
ficulties. Recent cross-country data 
charting the relative importance of 
the various bargaining levels come 
from the 2009 European Company 
Survey (ECS), a representative survey 
of establishments with 10 or more 
employees in 30 European countries 
(see Box 4.1) (1). According to the ECS, 
of all employees in Europe covered 
by any type of agreement, 61 % fall 
under a higher (sector and/or inter-
sector) level agreement (Chart 4.1). 
This includes 7 % where there is a 
company-level agreement as well as 
the higher one (so-called ‘ two-tier 
bargaining), and 5 % where the 
 higher-level agreement contains 
scope for derogations at company 
level. For 38 % of employees, the com-
pany is the sole level of  bargaining.
1 Thanks to Gijs van Houten of the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions for providing the ECS data used 
in this chapter.
Box 4.1: The European Company Survey
The European Company Survey (ECS) is a large-scale establishment survey carried out 
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
The first ECS was carried out in 2004–05 and the second in 2009. The ECS 2009 covers 
30 countries: the EU-27 plus Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey. The ECS is based on interviews with management and employee representa-
tives in companies with 10 or more employees. In total, interviews were carried out in 
27 160 establishments. The number of interviews per country ranges from almost 350 
in Malta, the smallest EU economy, to around 1 500 in the EU’s larger economies. In 
all establishments, a management interview was carried out. In addition, an interview 
was sought with the chairperson of the employee representative body — if one existed. 
This resulted in 6 569 interviews, which represents about 50 % of all companies in 
the sample that had employee representatives. The survey data are representative of 
establishments with 10 or more employees from all sectors of activity, except for agri-
culture, fishing, activities of households and extraterritorial organisations. The survey 
covers organisations from both the private and public sectors.
The ECS 2009 covers different forms of working time flexibility (flexitime and work-
ing time account systems, part-time work, overtime work and work at unusual hours), 
the application of non-permanent employment contracts (external flexibility), aspects 
of wage flexibility as well as modes of enhancing the employability of staff for different 
tasks (functional flexibility). Moreover, the survey investigates the general structures 
and practices of collective bargaining and company-level employee representation 
in Europe, shedding light on the different channels of representation, on available 
resources and on the impact of social dialogue on company decisions in different 
areas. The findings provide a unique insight into company strategies as well as into 
workplace social dialogue structures and practices. The ECS is also a unique source 
of European-wide comparative company-level data on the use of variable pay systems 
(VPS).
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2010).
Chart 4.1: Employees falling under different levels of collective 
 agreements, 2009 (establishments with 10 or more employees)
 
Chart 4.1: Employees falling under different levels of collective 
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There is great diversity across 
Europe, however. Company-level 
bargaining is dominant (i.e. covers 
above 50 % of the total of employees 
covered by any type of agreement) 
in the UK and 11 of the 12 new 
Member States (the exception being 
Slovenia). Higher-level bargain-
ing, including two-tier  bargaining 
and higher-level agreements with 
derogation clauses, is dominant in 
the EU-15 (except for the UK) and 
Slovenia. Two-tier bargaining fea-
tures most prominently in terms of 
employees covered in Italy, Sweden 
and Denmark; while Ireland and Ger-
many have the highest  percentage of 
employees covered by higher-level 
 agreements which contain deroga-
tions (see also below) (2).
2 In Ireland, there are only few sectoral collective 
agreements and they do not tend to include 
derogations. However, in the survey respondents 
probably refer to the national social pacts which have 
included an inability-to-pay clause since 2003, which 
also includes key conciliation and dispute-settling 
functions for the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) 
and the Labour Court (van Klaveren forthcoming). 
Table 4.1: Employees falling under different levels of collective agreements,  
private and public sector, 2009 (% of total employees covered by any type  
of agreement, establishments with 10 or more employees)
 Local or company Local or company and higher level Higher level with derogation Higher level
 Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public
EU-27 44 26 6 8 6 5 44 62
AT 17 37 12 7 1 6 69 51
BE 29 11 8 7 9 2 55 80
BG 77 58 4 12 2 9 17 22
CY 76 56 3 4 1 7 20 33
CZ 86 90 5 2 1 1 7 7
DE 38 4 4 1 13 10 45 86
DK 31 5 21 9 6 8 42 78
EE 85 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 14 n.a.
ES 28 27 4 5 4 1 63 67
FI 17 6 7 8 2 3 73 83
FR 52 23 5 5 1 2 42 69
EL 46 21 7 2 1 3 45 74
HU 72 67 6 6 2 6 20 21
IE 44 8 1 1 26 16 29 74
IT 18 15 19 40 1 1 63 44
LT 94 95 0 1 0 0 6 3
LU 28 3 17 3 5 4 51 90
LV 69 79 4 6 16 7 11 9
MT 82 n.a. 0 n.a. 1 n.a. 17 n.a.
NL 36 20 0 4 14 7 49 69
PL 95 55 0 3 1 2 3 40
PT 22 4 5 4 2 0 71 92
RO 91 71 2 4 0 1 6 25
SE 33 17 15 21 4 3 48 59
SI 55 10 10 3 4 1 32 86
SK 87 58 5 7 3 11 5 23
UK 69 26 4 7 4 5 23 62
Source: ECS 2009.
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Important differences also emerge 
when comparing the public and the 
private sector, with bargaining being 
noticeably more decentralised in the 
latter (Table 4.1). On average, for the 
private sector, of those employees cov-
ered by any type of agreement, bar-
gaining is exclusively at company or 
establishment level for 44 %. In con-
trast, this is the case for only 26 % in 
the public sector. In some countries, 
single-employer bargaining hardly 
features at all in the public sector; 
5 % or less if public sector employ-
ees are covered by local agreements 
in Portugal, Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg. The main exceptions 
to the broad picture are Austria and 
Latvia where there is substantially 
more local bargaining in the public 
than in the private sector. Conversely, 
higher-level bargaining is much more 
widespread in the public sector than 
in the private sector: of all public sec-
tor employees covered by any type of 
agreement 75 % fall under a higher-
level agreement as compared to 56 % 
of private sector employees.
The differences in the importance of 
the various bargaining levels between 
countries and between the public and 
private sector have important implica-
tions. Two issues are of major signifi-
cance here. One is that higher-level 
bargaining leads to more equal wages 
and working conditions in the com-
panies or organisations falling under 
such agreements, taking a number of 
standards out of competition in the 
respective sector. Conversely, com-
pany-level bargaining allows for the 
definition of wages and working con-
ditions in line with the specific cir-
cumstances of the respective company 
or organisation, leaving more space 
for tailored competitive strategies, 
which foster wage inequalities.
The other is that there is a clear 
link between the dominant level 
of  bargaining and the percentage 
of  employees covered by collective 
agreements. The coverage of col-
lective bargaining in the countries 
where company-level bargaining is 
dominant is markedly below that of 
the countries where higher-level bar-
gaining is dominant (the only excep-
tion being Romania). In the former 
group coverage falls between about 15 
and 55 %, while in the second group 
it ranges from about 60 to 100 %. 
Multi-employer agreements by them-
selves already cover large numbers of 
companies or establishments that are 
directly part of the agreement. In addi-
tion, in a number of countries collec-
tive agreements can also be extended 
to cover entire sectors or branches, 
substantially increasing their coverage 
in this way (see Chapter 1).
Developments over time 4.2.2. 
and across countries
As discussed in Chapter 1, decen-
tralisation has been an important 
feature of developments in industrial 
relations in Europe in recent decades. 
The most extreme form of decentrali-
sation follows from a decline in the 
coverage of collective agreements, 
resulting in more individual bargain-
ing between employer and employee 
or to the unilateral definition of wages 
and working conditions by employ-
ers. Chapter 1 showed, however, that 
across the EU collective bargaining 
coverage has been relatively stable 
over the 2000s, with only a slight 
 decline. More commonly decentrali-
sation takes the shape of a shift in 
emphasis between bargaining levels, 
with the importance of company- 
or local-level collective bargaining 
gaining at the expense of sectoral 
collective bargaining, or of sectoral 
bargaining gaining at the expense 
of inter- sectoral bargaining. Decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining 
towards company level is seen as a 
way of flexibilising wage setting and 
linking wages more closely to the 
 competitive position and require-
ments of individual companies. In 
terms of the process involved, Traxler 
(1995) distinguishes between organ-
ised decentralisation — increased 
scope for company-level bargaining 
but within the framework of rules 
and standards set by higher-level 
agreements — and disorganised 
decentralisation, that is, the replace-
ment of higher-level bargaining by 
company bargaining.
Amongst the EU-15, the UK under-
went a process of disorganised decen-
tralisation during the 1980s and 
1990s, as sector-level, multi- employer 
agreements were almost entirely dis-
placed by single-employer, company 
or local-level, bargaining arrange-
ments in the private sector. As a 
result, bargaining coverage declined 
from 70 % in 1980 to 34.8 % in 2007. 
To some extent developments in 
the central and east European (CEE 
countries) Member States in the early 
1990s can also be viewed as a rapid 
process of disorganised decentralisa-
tion. Although before 1990 sectoral 
bargaining never played an impor-
tant role in most of CEE countries 
and collective bargaining has always 
taken place mainly at company level, 
the central state had an important 
influence on wage setting and cov-
erage rates were high. After 1990, in 
most CEE countries central elements 
disappeared from the wage-setting 
process (with the important excep-
tion of the minimum wage) and 
coverage rates declined rapidly. The 
main exception was Slovenia, where 
a continuous series of inter-sector 
social pacts and extensive sectoral 
 bargaining have played a key role in 
wage setting (Stanojevic, 2010) (3).
3 Sectoral bargaining plays a substantial role as well 
in Slovakia; however, its significance has been declining 
recently as the number of multi-employer agreements 
concluded declined from 53 in 2004 to 37 in 2008 and 
the number subject to legal extension fell from eight to 
two in the same period (Cziria 2008; 2010).
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Organised decentralisation is largely 
an issue for the EU-15, where (inter) 
sectoral bargaining continues to play 
a major role. However, developments 
in the 2000s have not extended to 
all of these countries, and in those 
where a measure of (further) decen-
tralisation has taken place, the extent 
of any change differs. Most profound 
has been the process of organised 
decentralisation of wage bargaining 
in the Nordic countries, and further 
organised decentralisation, but also 
the appearance of a disorganised 
dimension, in Germany. In Sweden, 
until the late 1980s private sector 
wage bargaining was undertaken at 
the central level, moving down to the 
sectoral level in the 1990s. In recent 
years, however, wage bargaining has 
continued to take place at the sector 
level in only a minority of sectors; 
more and more actual pay levels are 
determined at the local level within 
the context of sectoral guarantees 
concerning e.g. the minimum pay 
rise (Stokke, 2010). Similarly, in 
Denmark, following a process of 
decentralisation which started in the 
early 1990s, most employees are cov-
ered by sectoral agreements that now 
only set the sectoral minimum wage, 
leaving the rest up to local bargain-
ing (Stokke, 2010; Ilsøe et al., 2007). 
In both countries wages can vary 
substantially between enterprises in 
the same sector. In Finland a tradi-
tion of 40 years of centralised wage 
agreements came to an end in 2007 
as the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries decided not to participate 
further in central negotiations. As a 
result, wage bargaining moved down 
from the central level to the sectoral 
level. One of the key rationales for 
Finnish employers to press for such 
decentralisation was to enlarge the 
scope to introduce variable pay sys-
tems (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 
2008). In Slovenia too, bargaining 
seems to be moving down from the 
inter-sector to sectoral level, with the 
tradition of central agreement look-
ing to have come to an end following 
the expiry of the most recent accord 
in 2009 (see Chapter 1).
Germany has also experienced a 
marked decentralisation of bargain-
ing in the past decade, resulting in 
a significant shift of responsibilities 
from the sectoral level to the level of 
the company (Bispinck, 2008). The 
organised dimension to this process is 
driven by several mechanisms. First is 
the increased use of variable pay sys-
tems and in particular profit-related 
bonuses (see next section). Second 
is the increased use of opening and 
hardship clauses which allow com-
pany agreements to derogate from 
 collectively agreed standards. Tradi-
tionally such clauses were designed 
for companies suffering from acute 
but temporary economic  difficulties. 
In recent years, however, this has 
changed. The key agreement in this 
respect was the Pforzheim Agree-
ment concluded in the metalworking 
and electrical industry in 2004, which 
allowed deviations from collectively 
agreed standards in certain cases in 
order to maintain and improve com-
petitiveness, innovative capability 
and investment (ibid.). Hence, open-
ing clauses are now not only accessi-
ble for companies in acute economic 
difficulties but also for companies 
that more generally suffer from com-
petitive pressures. As a result, the use 
of such clauses rapidly rose from 70 
company-level derogation agree-
ments in 2004 to 730 agreements in 
early 2009 (Chart 4.2); around 70 % 
of these agreements include deroga-
tions concerning wages (Bispinck 
and Schulten, forthcoming). Simi-
larly in the chemical industry deroga-
tions concerning wages have been on 
the increase, from 6 in 1997 to 28 in 
2003 to 115 in 2009 (ibid.). Thirdly, 
the number of sectoral collective 
agreements that have been legally 
extended has fallen steadily, from 
408 in 1991 to 242 in 2005 (Bispinck, 
2008). Fourthly, the coverage of col-
lective agreements has fallen sharply 
since the mid-1990s also because of 
the growing  propensity of employers 
to leave, or not join, employers’ asso-
ciations (see Chapter 1). In combina-
tion, these two factors have reduced 
the significance of the sectoral agree-
ments and brought a disorganised 
element to the process of decentrali-
sation in Germany.
Chart 4.2: Number of company-level deviations from sectoral 
 agreements in metalworking in Germany by quarter, 2004–09
Chart 4.2: Number of company-level d viations from ectoral 
agreements in metalworking by quarter, 2004–09
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In other EU-15 countries there has 
not been such a pronounced trend 
towards decentralisation of wage 
bargaining over the past decade. In 
Italy the picture has not changed 
much over the past 15 years. Since 
the conclusion of the July 1993 Pact, 
cost of living related wage increases 
have been negotiated at the sectoral 
level while company-level bargain-
ing has dealt with additional pay ele-
ments linked to productivity, quality 
and competitiveness improvements, 
or company economic performance 
(Pedersini and Coletto, 2009). The 
incidence of such company bargaining 
has not, however, extended beyond 
30 % of the private sector workforce 
and the take-up of the territorial alter-
native (potentially more attractive 
than company-specific negotations to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises) 
has been low. This may change in the 
near future, however. In January 2009, 
a number of employers’ organisations 
including the main Confindustria 
confederation, concluded the frame-
work agreement for the reform of the 
collective bargaining system with two 
of the three main trade union organi-
sations, UIL and CISL. The agreement 
was sponsored by the government 
which also signed it as the employer in 
the public sector. It promotes certain 
types of decentralisation of collective 
bargaining. Most importantly, it pro-
vides the possibility to introduce open-
ing clauses permitting  company-level 
collective  bargaining — or territo-
rial-level bargaining — to change in 
pejus the standards of sectoral agree-
ments,  including wages, in order to 
deal with situations of economic cri-
sis and restructuring, or to promote 
economic and employment growth. 
The largest trade union confederation, 
CGIL, refused to sign the agreement 
considering that it would break the 
integrity of the national bargaining 
structure and weaken workers’ protec-
tion (Pedersini, 2009). For the moment 
it is not yet clear if the agreement will 
indeed lead to more decentralisation 
of collective bargaining, as the oppo-
sition of the largest trade union may 
prove to be a major obstacle to its 
implementation.
In France, the so-called 2004 Fillon 
law enacted a reform intended to 
further the decentralisation of col-
lective bargaining. The law reversed 
the traditional favourability princi-
ple, which stated that lower-level col-
lective agreements could not deviate 
from higher-level agreements to the 
detriment of the employee. It pro-
vides that lower-level agreements 
can deviate from higher-level agree-
ments unless this is specifically 
forbidden. In doing so, it explicitly 
aims to promote company-level 
bargaining. Nonetheless, under the 
Fillon law the favourability prin-
ciple remains in force in respect of 
four themes which are exempted 
from derogation at company level: 
minimum wages; job classifica-
tions; supplementary social protec-
tion measures; and multi-company 
and cross-sector vocational training 
funds (Ramos Martin, forthcom-
ing). As a result, the possible effects 
of on wage bargaining are limited 
to additional wage elements which 
are not exempted, such as perform-
ance-related pay, shift allowances 
child-birth allowances, seniority 
payments, etc., the basic features of 
which have been commonly agreed 
at sectoral level. An evaluation of 
the impact of the reform published 
by the Ministry of Labour Social 
Relations and Solidarity in 2008 
finds that there have been no notable 
changes in the levels at which bar-
gaining takes place and that employ-
ers and trade unions continue to 
follow well-established practices 
(Dufour, 2008).
In Austria the sector level remains 
firmly established and decentralisa-
tion is limited. Some wage flexibility 
is provided by the so-called ‘distribu-
tion option’, part of the metalwork-
ing collective agreement since 1997 
(Adam, 2009a). Under this provision, 
the works council and the employer 
can redistribute a certain amount of 
the total wage bill at company level. 
For example, in 2007, 0.3 % of the 
actual wage increase could be dis-
tributed flexibly, in line with certain 
criteria (e.g. compensation for espe-
cially low incomes or high perform-
ance, reduction of the gender-related 
pay gap, etc.) to be agreed upon by 
the parties to the works agreement. 
More recently, an obligatory ‘distri-
bution pot’ (Verteilungstopf) was 
included in the metalworking collec-
tive agreement, effective as of 2010, 
under which the employer is obliged 
to distribute a fixed amount of the 
total wage bill among the employees 
based on three criteria: work per-
formance (including social skills); 
improvements of the company’s pay 
structure in favour of low pay; and 
equal treatment of female and male 
workers (ibid.). Compared to the 
Nordic countries and Germany, how-
ever, this amounts to a highly limited 
form of decentralisation; the basic 
wage is still firmly set at the secto-
ral level. Similarly, in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Spain decentralisa-
tion has hardly affected the predomi-
nant role of sector and intersectoral 
wage bargaining in determining the 
basic wage.
This does not mean, however, that in 
the latter countries no  decentralisation 
of wage setting has taken place. 
As  discussed in the following section, 
variable pay systems regulating addi-
tional pay elements related to indi-
vidual or company performance are 
growing in importance across Europe. 
Similarly, in a number of countries 
cafeteria-type arrangements under 
which employees can exchange a 
defined part of their wages for addi-
tional free time or additional pension 
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contributions play an increasing role 
at the company level. The basic fea-
tures of such types of flexible wage 
setting may still be defined in sectoral 
collective agreements, but their actual 
outcomes depend on the performance 
of companies or individuals and in the 
case of cafeteria plans also on the pref-
erences of the latter.
The present economic and finan-
cial crisis has intensified the debate 
on the decentralisation of wage 
bargaining in some countries (see 
Chapter 3).The fact that the impact 
of the crisis differs strongly between 
companies even within the same 
sector has brought current sector 
wage-setting arrangements under 
renewed pressure, as in Austria for 
example (see Box 4.2). In the Nor-
dic countries and Germany there 
are a number of examples of crisis-
induced organised decentralisation, 
with sectoral agreements providing 
for additional opt out possibilities 
related to the crisis (see Chapter 3; 
also Glassner and Keune 2010). In 
Ireland, a long tradition of national-
level pay agreements has come to 
an end as government, unions and 
employers’ organisations could not 
come to agreement on wage policy 
during the crisis (see Chapter 3). For 
the moment voluntary coordination 
of wage bargaining between unions 
and employers governs wage setting, 
which may point to a return to cen-
tralised pay agreements at some point 
in the future. Elsewhere amongst the 
EU-15, however, the crisis does not 
seem to have led to, or created pres-
sure for, further  decentralisation of 
wage bargaining.
Variable pay systems4.3. 
A second issue which is of paramount 
importance for wage flexibility is 
that of variable pay systems (VPS). 
Under variable pay systems, on top 
of the basic wage, workers receive 
 performance-related variable pay ele-
ments that are dependent on the per-
formance of the company as a whole, 
of the team to which a worker belongs, 
or of the individual worker. VPS have 
for many years been a hotly debated 
issue. The classical economics ques-
tions in this debate are to what extent 
monetary  incentives can improve firm 
 performance and workers’ productiv-
ity, skills, motivation and involvement 
in process and product innovation, 
and what the role of such incentives is 
in attracting and retaining core staff 
(e.g. Lazear, 2000; Blinder, 1990; Cox, 
2005;  Robinson and Wilson, 2006; 
Marsden and French, 1998). Closely 
related is the question to what extent 
VPS are an instrument of flexibilisa-
tion in terms of adjusting wage costs 
to firm performance and in particu-
lar in reducing wage costs in times of 
economic hardship. An alternative to 
these efficiency-based approaches are 
those dealing with the contribution 
of profit sharing and employee share 
ownership to the redistribution of 
wealth and the strengthening of eco-
nomic democracy (e.g. Gold, 2003; 
Standing, 1999). Finally, there are an 
increasing number of studies trying 
to map and explain the emergence 
of VPS from a more institutional-
ist perspective and to understand 
the respective roles of public policy, 
workers’ representatives and man-
agement (Pendleton et al., 2002; Ner-
gaard et al., 2009; Kabst et al., 2006; 
 Vaughan-Whitehead et al., 1995).
The debates on variable pay, and in 
particular on the efficiency-based 
approaches, are rather inconclusive: 
whereas many studies point to a pos-
itive relationship between VPS and 
 productivity or firm performance, 
 others shed doubt on these results, 
finding that there is no or even a 
negative relationship, whilst yet oth-
ers identify factors conditioning any 
relationship. There is also a lack of 
comprehensive comparative data 
and research.
Box 4.2: The Austrian wage bargaining  
system under strain because of the crisis
In Austria, the Federation of Austrian Industry (Industriellenvereinigung, IV) recently 
called for Austria’s common practice of multi-employer agreements to be replaced by 
 company-level settlements. Such a change would signify a breach of Austria’s traditional sys-
tem of annual sectoral collective bargaining. IV argued that any wage increases  concluded 
at sectoral level would substantively threaten those enterprises currently operating at a loss 
due to the economic crisis. IV’s demand was strongly rejected by the trade unions, which 
called for the conclusion of sector agreements providing for decent increases in wages as a 
means of sustaining domestic purchasing power and therefore economic activity (at a time 
of sharp decline in exports and investment expenditure). After a series of unsuccessful 
negotiating rounds in several sectors of the economy during April and May 2009, the trade 
unions accused the employers of apparently adopting a concerted strategy of obstruct-
ing wage negotiations. As of mid-May, talks in about 10 sectors employing some 400 000 
workers were deadlocked, including electronics, textiles, road haulage, paper, chemicals, 
information technologies and graphic design. Five of the strongest trade unions organised 
a demonstration on 13 May, involving some 25 000 participants, with the aim of pressuris-
ing the employer side to return to the negotiating table.
For the moment, it seems that the Austrian system of sectoral wage bargaining will survive 
this crisis. In November 2009 the pattern-setting metalworking industry concluded a new 
sectoral agreement, after protracted negotiations. The agreement sets a real wage increase for 
the sector of about 1 %, similar to previous years. It also includes a commitment from the side 
of the trade unions to enter into negotiations with the employer side on working time flex-
ibility and to present proposals on how to render working time more flexible in the sector.
Source: Adam (2009b, 2010).
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This section draws on new compara-
tive data from the European Company 
Survey (ECS) on the use of various 
types of VPS in Europe across the 
EU. It identifies differences between 
countries, sectors and enterprises of 
different sizes and considers some 
of the factors which might account 
for cross-country differences in par-
ticular. The ECS data also throw light 
on the motives management has 
for implementing VPS and on the 
respective position of employee rep-
resentatives towards these schemes. 
The focus is on the use of three 
major types of VPS: individual and 
team-based  performance-related 
pay (PRP), profit sharing (PS) and 
employee share ownership (ESO) (4). 
Since the ECS provides data only for 
one point in time, reference will be 
made to other sources to gain some 
indication of developments over time 
in the use of VPS. The discussion is 
largely confined to the private sec-
tor since PS and ESO, with Box 2.1 
briefly comparing the situation in the 
public sector.
The incidence of VPS  4.3.1. 
in the private sector
Variable pay systems (VPS) are 
a widespread, although far from 
 universal, feature of contemporary 
pay systems in the EU. Across the 
EU-27, one of more types of VPS are 
found in 44.5 % of companies with 
10 or more employees, employing 
56.6 % of employees. Conversely, this 
means that just over half of compa-
nies,  employing just  under half of the 
relevant workforce, do not use any 
from of VPS (Chart 4.3). Of the three 
types of VPS distinguished above, 
performance-related pay, based on 
individual or team performance, 
4 Unfortunately, for performance-related pay, 
the ECS did not differentiate between traditional 
output-based schemes and more recent appraisal-
based schemes. 
is by far the most frequently used: 
Chart 4.3 shows that 37.2 % of 
companies employing 47.5 % of 
employees have some form of per-
formance-related pay. This reflects 
the widespread belief that perform-
ance pay leads to higher productivity 
and improved company perform-
ance, even though, as noted above, 
there is no consensus on this rela-
tionship amongst the many stud-
ies undertaken. Much lower is the 
incidence of employee financial 
participation through profit shar-
ing schemes (14.0 % of companies, 
employing 20.9 % of employees) and 
employee share ownership schemes 
(4.6 % of companies, employing 
7.9 % of employees). Set against 
the initiatives from the European 
 Commission to promote  employee 
 financial  participation, these latter 
figures seem low (5).
The occurrence of VPS in the EU is 
closely related to three key  factors: 
5 As early as 1989, the European Commission 
included employee financial participation among the 
priority objectives of its action programme for the 
implementation of the Community Charter of Basic 
Social Rights of Workers, followed by a Commission 
recommendation on this issue (1992) and a 
Commission ‘Framework for promoting employee 
financial participation’ in 2003 (Lowitzsch 2006). 
country, sector and size (a fourth fac-
tor concerns the public–private sector 
divide, see Box 4.3). Large differences 
in the use of VPS can be observed 
between countries (Chart 4.4). 
For example, while in the Czech 
Republic as many as 71 % of com-
panies use PRP schemes, in Hun-
gary only 19.8 % of companies do 
so. Similarly, profit sharing is used 
in 35 % of French companies but 
only in 2.9 % of Italian companies, 
whilst employee share ownership is 
found in 12.9 % of Danish compa-
nies but only in 0.9 % of Lithuanian 
ones. The main factor explaining 
these differences may concern dif-
ferent  institutional contexts, i.e. 
different rules and regulations that 
govern the use of VPS. For example, 
the high level of PRP in the Czech 
Republic is likely to be linked to the 
fact that the Czech Labour Code, 
unique in the EU in this respect, 
specifically encourages performance 
pay. Indeed, it stipulates that ‘wages 
and pay shall be provided according 
to the complexity, responsibility and 
strenuousness of work; according to 
the difficulty of  working conditions; 
according to work performance and 
achieved work results’ (Arrowsmith 
and Marginson, 2008: 20). It also 
Chart 4.3: Types of VPS, EU-27, 2009
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provides for binding rules regard-
ing extra pay and personal bonuses 
whereby consistently high levels of 
performance may be rewarded with 
an individual bonus of up to 50 % 
of the pay tariff of the highest wage 
level in the particular pay grade 
(ibid.). In Slovenia, where the inci-
dence of PRP schemes is also high, 
it is the social agreement between 
the national social partners for the 
period 2007–09 that advocated relat-
ing wages to productivity (ibid.). 
Similarly, the high level of profit 
sharing in French companies results 
from the fact that the country has 
a mandatory profit sharing scheme 
for companies with a workforce of 
over 50 since the 1960s. This scheme 
requires companies to set aside a stat-
utorily defined percentage of their 
profits for distribution to employees 
(van het Kaar and Grünell, 2001). In 
Denmark, multiple options and tax 
benefits serve to promote employee 
share ownership and ESO schemes 
are increasingly subject of collective 
bargaining. Through such statutory 
or collectively agreed regulations 
and promotional measures the state 
and the social partners can play a 
decisive role in promoting the use 
of VPS.
There are also clear differences in the 
use of variable pay schemes between 
sectors (Chart 4.5). The three types of 
VPS are most prevalent in financial 
intermediation followed by real estate 
and business services, and by trade 
and repair. Conversely, in health and 
social work, public  administration 
and defense, and education, only lim-
ited use of VPS is evident. The sectors 
with a high incidence of VPS often 
have a long tradition of individual 
and collective financial incentives. 
In  addition, financial intermedia-
tion and business services have faced 
a tight labour market for highly 
 educated labour in many countries 
in recent years, leading to the use 
of bonuses to attract employees and 
rewards improvements in  education 
and training (van het Kaar and 
Grünell, 2001).
Turning to size, the use of all three types 
of VPS increases  continuously with 
the employment size of  establishments 
(Chart 4.6).  Comparing companies 
with 10-19 employees to those with 
500 or more employees, the inci-
dence of PRP schemes in the largest 
 establishments is twice that in the 
smallest. For PS and ESO schemes, 
the respective differences are 2.3 
and 3.6 times. Amongst enterprises 
with 250 or more employees, over 
60 % apply PRP schemes, some 27 % 
use PS schemes and some 13 % have 
ESO schemes, all far above average. 
This is not surprising: designing and 
 implementing VPS schemes often 
requires substantial management 
Chart 4.4: Types of VPS by country, 2009 
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involvement, administrative capac-
ity, expertise in HRM techniques, etc. 
(Cox, 2005). Larger companies are 
more likely to have these resources 
than smaller ones. This is also consist-
ent with findings that multinational 
companies have, in many countries, 
been among the main promoters of 
variable pay schemes (Marginson and 
Meardi, 2009).
These differences by size also point to 
the fact that the percentage of com-
panies using such schemes says little 
about the percentage of employees 
covered by them. Because VPS are 
more widespread amongst larger com-
panies, the percentage of employees 
covered is consistently higher than the 
percentage of companies (as shown in 
Chart 4.3). 
Management motives 4.3.2. 
and employee 
representatives’ attitudes
The ECS gives some insight into the 
motives management has for the 
introduction of VPS. In particular it 
has identified the reasons why man-
agements decide to introduce such 
schemes. Chart 4.7 reports the find-
ings for profit sharing schemes (6). 
The most important management 
motive for the use of profit sharing 
is to increase staff motivation: more 
than 60 % of managers see this objec-
tive playing a large role in the deci-
sion to adopt profit sharing schemes 
and over 20 % see it playing at least 
some role in this respect. Between 40 
and 50 % of managers see profit shar-
ing as an important instrument to 
boost employee productivity, improve 
employee involvement in  process 
and product improvements, and 
attract and keep  well-qualified staff. 
Another 20 to 30 % see these three 
objectives play some role in adopting 
profit sharing schemes. Cost contain-
ment does not emerge as a salient 
rationale: some 60 % of managers 
say that the reduction of wage costs 
in periods when economic activity 
slackens plays little role in adopt-
ing profit sharing schemes. Hence, 
from the perspective of management, 
such schemes are primarily oriented 
towards improving the functioning 
of human resources and assuring the 
continued availability of personnel of 
the appropriate quality.
Trade unions have varying positions 
on VPS, both between and within 
countries. Concerning between-
 country differences, in some coun-
tries (e.g. Ireland or Italy) unions 
see VPS as a way to give employees a 
share in favourable company results, 
with the Irish unions seeing vari-
able pay also as a way of broadening 
6 Comparable data on the other two types of VPS 
were not available.
Box 4.3: comparing VPS in the public and private sector 
VPS are by no means the prerogative of the private sector. In the public sector more than 
one-third (36 %) of establishments use at least one type of VPS. This is well below the 
respective figure for the private sector (44.6 %) but still important. The major difference 
from the private sector is that VPS in the public sector is largely confined to performance 
related pay (PRP). PRP schemes are used in 33 % of public sector establishments, close 
to the 37.2 % figure for the private sector. Forms of financial participation by employees 
are scarce, reflecting the different ownership and non-profit status of many public sector 
ogranisations. Even so, almost 6% of public sector establishments reported profit sharing 
(PS) schemes and 2 % employee share ownership (ESO) schemes. 
VPS in public and private establishments,  
EU-27, 2009 (% establishments)
Public Private
PRP 33.0 37.2
PS 5.7 14.0
SO 2.0 4.6
No VPS 63.9 55.4
Source: ECS 2009.
Chart 4.6: VPS by company size, EU-27, 2009 
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employee ‘stakeholding’ in the enter-
prise; while in others (e.g. Belgium 
and France), unions believe that 
workers should not have to shoul-
der the burden of corporate risk 
through variable pay (van het Kaar 
and Grünell, 2001). Trade unions 
also fear that VPS may affect basic 
wages, lead to greater wage inequal-
ity and potentially undermine soli-
darity and principles like equal pay 
for equal work. In most central and 
east European Member States trade 
unions accept VPS elements as long 
as long as they are paid on top of 
collectively agreed wages; although 
in the Czech Republic (where the 
incidence of PRP schemes is the 
highest in the EU) the policy of the 
main trade union confederation, 
ČMKOS, is to increase base wages as 
a proportion of earnings and thereby 
to reduce the variable proportion 
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2008).
The position of company-level 
employee representatives varies 
both across and within countries, 
with responses ranging from cau-
tious cooperation to confrontation 
with management, depending on the 
type of VPS in question, the institu-
tional context and the local power 
relations (Nergaard et al., 2009). As 
Chart 4.8 shows, in the central and 
east European Member States 50 % 
or more of company-level employee 
representatives are supportive of 
VPS, while — with the exception of 
Hungary — the percentages oppos-
ing VPS are low (7). At the other end 
of the spectrum, in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Finland the percentage 
of employee representatives sup-
porting VPS is below 30, while in 
particular in Sweden and Denmark 
the positions of employee repre-
sentatives are rather polarised with 
a substantial share supporting and a 
substantial share  opposing VPS.
Developments over time4.3.3. 
The ECS presents a picture of the 
situation concerning VPS at one 
moment in time and does not allow 
for comparisons over time. The con-
sensus in the literature is that the use 
of VPS has been increasing in recent 
years (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 
2008; Kersley et al. 2004; Welz and 
Fernándes-Macías 2008), including 
appraisal-based forms of PRP and 
forms of profit sharing and profit-
related pay. Not all types of VPS are, 
however, on the rise; in particular, 
the use of piecework, one of the 
most traditional forms of perform-
ance pay, is in decline. This follows 
changes in job requirements, which 
increasingly emphasise quality, flex-
ibility and teamwork (Arrowsmith 
and Marginson, 2008).
7 The data available did not allow a differentiation 
according to the different types of VPS.
Chart 4.7: Management’s motives  
for introducing profit sharing schemes
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Chart 4.8: Attitude of company-level employee  
representatives towards VPS, by country, 2009
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Growth in the use of VPS reflects 
the growing interest in variable pay 
arrangements on the part of employ-
ers (see above). In some countries, 
institutional factors have also been 
important, as indicated earlier. The 
growth of VPS has prompted, and 
been facilitated by, the decentralisa-
tion of pay setting. As Arrowsmith 
and Marginson (2008) show, VPS 
are only to a limited extent regu-
lated by multi-employer agreements, 
through general recommendations 
or procedures, and are more usually 
left to company-level negotiation 
or determination. The result, the 
authors argue, has been unilateral 
implementation of schemes by com-
panies, more marked in some coun-
tries than others, as well as their 
introduction through negotiations 
with local trade unions or works 
councils. The increasing use of vari-
able pay may then undermine the 
relevance of sector-wide collective 
agreements, while also contributing 
to the further individualisation of 
employment relations.
The minimum wage4.4. 
Low pay and wage 4.4.1. 
inequality
The minimum wage is relevant to 
the issue of wage flexibility as it sets 
limits to wage flexibility by estab-
lishing a wage floor in the labour 
market. Depending on the level at 
which the minimum wage is set it 
may also play an important role 
in containing wage inequality and 
low pay. The generalised decline of 
trade union density across Europe, 
combined in some countries with a 
declining coverage of collective wage 
bargaining and/or the decentralisa-
tion of wage bargaining, factors that 
are negatively correlated with wage 
inequality (European Commission, 
2008, Chapter 3), make the mini-
mum wage all the more relevant in 
this respect. Other factors too are 
leading to increasing concern about 
wage inequality and low pay, includ-
ing the rise of non-standard flexible 
employment contracts and the grow-
ing use opening clauses in collective 
agreements in certain countries, 
in particular Germany (see above). 
Worries concerning low pay are fur-
ther strengthened by the increased 
mobility of labour within the EU 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 2008). In 
countries receiving migrants from 
central and eastern Europe, it is 
often feared that these workers will 
be forced to accept low pay and that, 
in turn, this will result in downward 
wage pressure for domestic workers. 
In sending countries, low pay is seen 
(or this was the case at least until 
the onset of the crisis) as a motive 
for outward migration, resulting in 
shortages of workers and skills.
The incidence of low pay and the 
extent of wage inequality vary sub-
stantially across the EU, as Chart 4.9 
shows. The chart also shows a clear 
positive correlation between the two 
indicators. In the countries where 
wage inequality is highest, low pay is 
also most widespread. Low pay, here 
referring to full-time employees in 
enterprises with 10 or more employ-
ees who are paid at, or below, two-
thirds of the median wage, averages 
17.2 % for the EU-27. This repre-
sents one out of every six employees. 
If part-time employees and employ-
ees in small enterprises were to be 
included in the calculation, this 
percentage would most likely be 
substantially higher. Low pay affects 
more than a quarter of employees 
in four countries: Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Lithuania and Latvia, reaching 
30.9 % in the latter. The propor-
tion affected is below 15 % in the 
Nordic countries, Belgium, France, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Italy, 
all countries where multi-employer 
bargaining domina tes and/or exten-
sions of collective agreements by the 
state play a crucial role. With only 
a few exceptions low pay and wage 
inequality are higher in countries 
where company-level bargaining 
dominates and coverage of collec-
tive agreements is low, while both 
are lower in countries where higher-
level bargaining dominates and 
coverage rates are high. The most 
Chart 4.9: Wage inequality and low pay, full-time employees 
 in enterprises with 10 or more employees, 2006 
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Table 4.2: The statutory minimum wage  
in 20 EU countries, per hour, 2002–09 (euro)
 2002 2009 Growth Real growth
BG 0.3 0.71 1.37 0.52
RO 0.19 0.83 3.37 1.12
LT 0.71 1.4 0.97 0.47
HU 1.03 1.47 0.43 – 0.03
LV 0.49 1.47 2 0.86
PL 1.02 1.7 0.67 0.43
SK 0.88 1.7 0.93 0.47
EE 0.7 1.73 1.47 0.8
CZ 1.28 1.82 0.42 0.19
PT 2.1 2.71 0.29 0.14
SI 2.28 3.41 0.5 0.11
MT 3 3.67 0.22 0.05
ES 2.68 3.78 0.41 0.14
EL 2.83 4.05 0.43 0.18
UK 4.6 6.43 0.4 0.2
BE 7.05 8.41 0.19 0.02
NL 7.4 8.47 0.14 0
IE 5.97 8.65 0.45 0.19
FR 6.67 8.71 0.31 0.15
LU 7.46 9.49 0.27 0.06
Source: ECS.
The hourly minimum wage is calculated in different ways, depending on the country. 
In the countries where it exists, the statutory hourly minimum wage for adults is used. 
Where this is not available, the statutory monthly minimum wage for adults and the average 
collectively agreed weekly working time provided by the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory is used to calculate the hourly minimum wage (see http://www.eurofound.
europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1004039s/tn1004039s.htm#hd1). In case the latter is not available 
the statutory working week is used. For further details see: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/
ta_mindestlohndatenbank.pdf.
striking exception here is Germany 
where, at 19.6 %, low pay is above 
the EU average and only just below 
the level in some of the countries 
where company bargaining domi-
nates, including the UK and Poland. 
This may well result from the disor-
ganised element that has emerged in 
Germany where collective bargain-
ing has been further decentralised 
(see the first main section).
Wage inequality, here defined as the 
ratio between the 90th and the 10th 
decile in the distribution of wages, 
is lowest in Denmark (ratio of 2.3) 
and highest in Latvia (ratio of 6.0). 
Again, wage inequality tends to be 
greatest where company bargaining 
dominates and collective bargaining 
coverage is lower. Conversely, it is 
lowest where higher-level bargaining 
dominates and collective bargaining 
coverage is higher. In contrasting 
ways, the Czech Republic and Portu-
gal would seem to be the main excep-
tions to this pattern (see Chart 4.9).
The statutory  4.4.2. 
minimum wage
Minimum wages can be set by law or 
by collective agreements. Statutory 
minimum wages are the most common 
mechanism. Twenty out of 27 Member 
States have a statutory minimum wage 
and in some of the other seven there 
is debate over the desirability of intro-
ducing a statutory minimum wage or 
devising, or strengthening, functional 
equivalents.
The presence of a statutory minimum 
wage does not, however, necessarily 
lead to a lower incidence of low pay: 
the seven countries with the highest 
level of low pay all have a statutory 
minimum wage. The absolute level of 
the statutory minimum wage, its rela-
tive value as compared to the average 
wage and its enforcement are the key 
factors determining the extent to 
which minimum wages provide an 
effective floor in the labour market. 
Table 4.2 and Chart 4.10 respectively 
show the levels of the hourly and 
monthly minimum wages for the 20 
EU countries with a statutory mini-
mum wage for the years 2002 and 
2009. The large differences in the 
level of the minimum wage across 
countries are striking, with the high-
est minimum wage in euro terms 
(both hourly and monthly)  being 
more than 10 times higher than the 
lowest. In 2009, the hourly  minimum 
wage ranged from EUR 0.71 in 
 Bulgaria and EUR 0.83 in Romania 
to EUR 8.71 in France and EUR 9.49 
in  Luxembourg. Monthly mini-
mum wages, range from EUR 122.7 
in  Bulgaria, to EUR 1 641.7 in 
 Luxembourg. In purchasing power 
parity the range becomes smaller 
because of price differences but the 
highest monthly minimum wage is 
still almost six times as high as the 
lowest minimum wage. The repercus-
sions are important: the six countries 
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with the lowest hourly minimum 
wage are also the six that have the 
highest incidence of low pay and they 
are among the eight countries where 
wage inequality is highest.
In general the central and east Euro-
pean Member States have lower 
minimum wages than the EU-15, 
with Slovenia being somewhat of 
an exception. Nonetheless, the two 
groups of Member States should not 
be considered as internally homog-
enous. Amongst the EU-15, the 
Portuguese minimum wage of 2009 
amounts to only 28.6 % of that of 
Luxembourg, whilst amongst the 
central and east European Mem-
ber States the Romanian minimum 
wage amounts to only 24.3 % of the 
Slovenian one. When observing the 
growth over time of the minimum 
wage, a clearer difference emerges 
between the two groups of Mem-
ber States in the pattern of growth 
over time. Both in nominal and in 
real terms minimum wage growth is 
higher in central and east European 
Member States than in the EU-15. 
Over the period 2002–09, the real 
minimum wage per hour increased 
by 80 % in Estonia, by 86 % in Latvia 
and by 112 % in Romania. The excep-
tion was Hungary, where real growth 
over this seven-year period was just 
below zero. Amongst the EU-15 the 
highest real growth over this period 
was in the UK (20 %), well below 
that in most of central and eastern 
Europe, while in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands there was 
hardly any growth. Over time, then, 
the gap between the two groups of 
Member States has been reducing, 
albeit slowly.
Following the onset of the crisis, this 
trend would seem, however, to have 
come to a halt. It might have been 
expected that the real value of statu-
tory minimum wages would have 
been maintained or even increased 
so that they could effectively perform 
their protective function in particular 
in the countries with the lowest mini-
mum wages (and where low pay is 
most widespread). However, data from 
WSI’s minimum wage database show 
that in 2009 the hourly minimum 
wage saw its real value decline in nine 
countries. In some cases this decline 
was quite substantial (e.g. 5.6 % in 
Romania and 4.2 % in  Lithuania). 
These countries include eight of the 
central and east European Member 
States (the exceptions being Slovenia 
and Slovakia), whilst the ninth is the 
UK. With the exception of the Czech 
Republic, these are all countries where 
low pay is already relatively high.
Turning to the relationship between 
the statutory minimum wage and 
average wages, in 2008 the level of 
the statutory minimum exceeded 
50 % of the average wage only in 
Luxembourg and Malta, whereas in 
10 countries it amounted to less than 
Chart 4.10: Monthly minimum wage in 20 EU counties,  
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Box 4.4: A European minimum wage policy  
to guarantee decent wages?
In recent years there has been a growing debate on whether or not minimum wages 
should also become a focus of EU-level policy (Schulten, 2008, Vaughan-Whitehead, 
2010). Several prominent EU policymakers, such as Luxembourg Prime Minister and 
President of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker and the former European Com-
mission President Jacques Delors have called for a European minimum wage policy, 
according to which every employee should be entitled to a decent wage.
The idea of a European minimum wage policy was discussed for the first time in the 
1970s when the Council of Europe tried to define the ‘right to a fair remuneration’ 
which was laid down in the Council’s European Social Charter from 1961. At that 
time the Council proposed a definition according to which a fair wage had to be at 
least 68 % of the national average gross wage. The Council developed a new threshold 
in the 1990s which determined that a fair wage has to be at least 60 % of the national 
average net wage.
At EU level the first debate on a European minimum wage policy came with the adop-
tion in 1989 of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers. 
This states that ‘workers shall be assured of an equitable wage, i.e. a wage sufficient to 
enable them to have a decent standard of living’. In 1993 the European Commission 
published an ‘opinion on an equitable wage’ in which it demanded the Member States 
to ‘take appropriate measures to ensure that the right to an equitable wage is protected.’ 
It emphasised that ‘the problem of low pay is an issue in all countries of the European 
Community’ and that ‘the persistence of very low wage levels causes problems of equity 
and social cohesion, which could be harmful to the effectiveness of the economy in the 
long term’ (European Commission, 1993). In reaction to the Commission’s activities 
the European Parliament demanded more binding European guidelines for national 
minimum wages and encouraged all Member States ‘to establish a minimum wage that 
amounts to a certain proportion of the national average wage’ (European Parliament, 
1993). More recently, the European Parliament returned to the issue in 2008 and called 
‘on the Council to agree an EU target for minimum wages … to provide for remunera-
tion of at least 60 % of the relevant … average wage’ (European Parliament, 2008).
Considering the large differences in the absolute value of the minimum wages, a 
European minimum wage policy is not about the harmonisation of minimum wages 
towards a single European rate. Instead it aims to set up common standards at EU 
level, which, for example, might guarantee that national minimum wages are not fixed 
below a certain percentage of national average wages. As noted by the European Parlia-
ment, in many EU countries ‘the minimum wage is set very low or at below subsistence 
level’ (European Parliament, 2007: 469), as relative minimum levels wage are often 
well below 50 % of average wages. There is also growing awareness in many Member 
States of the problem of low pay, and several have started to develop strategies for more 
substantial increases of minimum wages in a mid-term perspective. A European mini-
mum wage policy might be able to support such policies in order to make sure that all 
employees in Europe receive a decent wage.
This box was contributed by Thorsten Schulten, Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(WSI) in the Hans-Böckler Foundation
40 % of the average wage (Chart 4.11). 
This underlines that in a significant 
group of countries the level at which 
the statutory minimum is set most 
likely means that it has only a lim-
ited impact on low pay. Moreover, 
the minimum wage seems unable to 
keep up with average wage develop-
ments in the labour market. Between 
2002 and 2008 the minimum wage 
lost some terrain to the average 
wage in 11 countries, most strongly 
in Ireland (a decline of 8 percentage 
points), Hungary (– 5.4 percentage 
points) and the Netherlands (– 5.1 
percentage points). Conversely, the 
minimum wage increased by more 
than the average wage in only five 
countries, in particular in Spain 
(6.9 percentage points) and Poland 
(6.1 percentage points). Recent 
reductions in the real value of the 
statutory minimum wages in some 
countries (see above) suggest that 
the dominant tendency for mini-
mum wages to fall behind average 
wages may be further spurred by 
the present crisis. As a result, in 
a number of countries the statu-
tory minimum wage may see its 
key role as a protective floor in the 
labour market decline, or cease to 
be of significance at all, with all the 
 associated consequences for low pay 
and wage inequality.
Minimum wages through 4.4.3. 
collective agreements
In Germany, Italy, Denmark, Austria, 
Sweden, Finland and Cyprus there is 
no general statutory minimum wage. 
In Cyprus, a statutory minimum 
wage exists for a limited number of 
occupations only (sales staff, cleri-
cal workers, auxiliary healthcare staff 
and auxiliary staff in nursery schools, 
crèches and schools). Elsewhere, the 
setting of minimum wages has tra-
ditionally been left largely to trade 
unions and employers who define 
minimum wages in collective agree-
ments, mainly at the sectoral level. 
In Germany the Minister for Labour, 
under the Arbeitnehmer-Entsend-
egesetz (Postal Workers Law), can 
make a collectively agreed minimum 
wage binding on all employment in 
a sector, irrespective of whether or 
not the employer is directly bound 
by a sectoral collective agreement. 
Such minimum wages exist now for a 
limited number of sectors, including 
construction, but remain controver-
sial as shown by the case of the postal 
sector. Collectively agreed minimum 
wages for the postal sector, set in a 
collective agreement between Ver.di 
and the Postal Services Employers’ 
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Association (in which Deutsche Post 
is the largest and most influential 
member), were legally extended by 
the government to the entire sector 
in late 2007. However, the competi-
tors of Deutsche Post challenged the 
sectoral minimum wage in court. The 
court ruled against the government’s 
action, on the grounds that parties 
to other collective agreements in the 
sector had not had access to the pro-
cedure adopted, leaving the sector 
without a generally applicable mini-
mum wage (Vogel, 2010).
One consequence of collectively 
agreed instead of statutory minimum 
wages is that minimum wages may 
not be uniform, but differ by sec-
tor and possibly also by type of job 
or by region. For example, in Ger-
many, in 2009, the relevant collec-
tive agreement set a minimum wage 
of EUR 863 for a salesperson with-
out experience in the bakery sector 
in eastern Germany, while agree-
ment concerned set a minimum of 
EUR 1 844 for a skilled steelworker 
without experience in both eastern 
and western Germany (WSI, 2010). 
And in sectors where trade unions 
are weak, collectively agreed mini-
mum wages may be low as compared 
to similar countries with a statutory 
minimum. For example, the mini-
mum wage of EUR 863 in the bak-
ery sector in eastern Germany is 
well below the statutory minimum 
wages of more than EUR 1 300 in 
France, Belgium and the Nether-
lands. Moreover, those parts of the 
labour market not covered by collec-
tive agreements may lack any mini-
mum standard.
Nonetheless, collective agree-
ment would seem to be an effective 
mechanism for establishing mini-
mum wages in most of the countries 
concerned. Compared to the EU 
average, the incidence of low pay is 
low in five of these seven countries 
(Chart 4.9). The Nordic countries 
have among the lowest levels of low 
pay in the EU and in Italy and Austria 
low pay is also below the EU aver-
age. High trade union membership, 
combined with extensive coverage 
of collective agreements, results in 
relatively low level of wage inequal-
ity and discourages the emergence 
of very low wages. The major excep-
tion is  Germany where, as discussed 
above, the incidence of low pay and 
wage inequality are above the EU 
average. In response, German trade 
unions have been campaigning for 
a national, cross-sectoral statutory 
minimum wage of EUR 7.50 intended 
to provide workers not covered by 
collective agreements with a decent 
minimum wage level, which would 
also set a floor for sectoral mini-
mum wage negotiations (Bispinck, 
2008). The minimum wage has been 
a concern elsewhere too. In Austria 
unions and employers have been 
concerned that a substantial group of 
the employed workforce had a gross 
wage below EUR 1 000 per month, 
with estimates varying from 20 000 
to 100 000 employees (Hofbauer 
and Adam, 2009). To tackle this 
problem, the Austrian Trade Union 
Federation and the Austrian Fed-
eral Economic Chamber concluded 
an agreement which establishes a 
minimum wage of EUR 1 000 as of 
1 January 2009, and which covers 
almost the entire private sector. The 
number of private sector employees 
earning below EUR 1 000 is reported 
to have fallen to a few hundred as a 
consequence (ibid.). The minimum 
wage has been an issue of debate in 
Sweden as a direct result of the rul-
ing of the Court of Justice (CJEU) 
in the Laval case. Finally, and going 
beyond the divide between statutory 
and collectively agreed minimum 
wages, in recent years there has been 
a lively debate about the possibility 
to introduce a European minimum 
wage policy (see Box 4.4).
Conclusions4.5. 
Wage flexibility and the role of wage-
setting institutions in fostering or 
limiting such flexibility have been at 
the core of the European economic 
and labour market debate for some 
time. This chapter has reviewed three 
types of  wage-setting  institutions 
that are important in determining 
the extent of wage flexibility: the level 
at which collective wage  bargaining 
takes place and the extent to which 
it has been  decentralised over the 
last decade; the use of variable pay 
systems (VPS); and the minimum 
wage and its relation to low pay and 
wage  inequality.
Company-level bargaining domi-
nates in the UK and the new Member 
States which entered the EU between 
2004 and 2007, with the exception 
of Slovenia. Higher-level  bargaining 
 dominates in the EU-15 (except 
the UK) and Slovenia. Amongst 
the countries where higher-level 
bargaining dominates, the 2000s 
have seen significant decentralisa-
tion of wage-setting arrangements 
in Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
Germany. In Finland, the main 
development concerns a move from 
central-level bargaining to sector-
level bargaining, while in the other 
three countries the scope for com-
pany bargaining has been enhanced 
at the expense of the sector level. 
This decentralisation has largely 
been ‘organised’ since the increased 
role for company-level bargaining 
remains within a framework of rules 
and minimum standards set at the 
sectoral level. However, in Germany 
elements of disorganised decentrali-
sation are also present, as the cover-
age of collective agreements declines 
with falling level of employers’ asso-
ciation membership and decreased 
use of extension arrangements. 
The process of decentralisation in 
these countries seems to have been 
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 accelerated during the present eco-
nomic and financial crisis.
In most other countries where higher-
level wage bargaining dominates, little 
change can be observed in the bargain-
ing arrangements for basic wages over 
the 2000s. In these countries the social 
partners would seem to prefer stability 
in collective bargaining systems and 
to continue with practices that have 
proven their value. In some of them, 
such as Italy and France, changes have 
been made to the regulations govern-
ing collective bargaining with the aim 
of promoting decentralisation, but 
as yet this has not led to significant 
changes to wage bargaining in prac-
tice. An exception is Ireland, where 
the long tradition of national-level 
pay agreements has been broken as 
the government, unions and employ-
ers’ organisations could not come to 
agreement on wage policy in the face 
of the crisis (see Chapter 3). The above 
concerns the setting of basic wages. 
There has, however, been more gener-
alised decentralisation across the EU 
in negotiations concerning additional 
pay elements, including the various 
types of VPS.
Today, more than half of the EU work-
force falls under some form of VPS. 
The most frequently used type of VPS 
is performance-related pay, with profit 
sharing and employee share owner-
ship schemes being substantially less 
widespread. There are large differ-
ences in the incidence of VPS schemes 
between countries, in part according to 
country-specific rules and regulations 
promoting VPS through specific pro-
visions in labour legislation, tax regu-
lations or agreements between social 
partners. VPS are utilised more widely 
in certain sectors (financial interme-
diation, business services, wholesale 
and retain) than in others (health and 
social work, education). They are also 
more widespread amongst larger than 
smaller enterprises.
The use of VPS seems to be increas-
ing over time, representing a specific 
form of flexibilisation of wage set-
ting. For managers, VPS schemes are 
attractive as a means to improve the 
functioning of human resources and 
to attract and retain good quality per-
sonnel. Employee representatives have 
mixed opinions about VPS, differing 
strongly across countries. In the cen-
tral and east European Member States 
a majority of employee representatives 
supports VPS, while in some of the 
EU-15 less than one third do so.
Low pay remains a serious problem 
in the EU and affects one out of every 
six workers in enterprises with 10 or 
more employees. The level of low pay 
is closely related to the level of wage 
inequality. In general, both are higher 
in the countries where company bar-
gaining dominates and coverage of 
collective agreements is low; they are 
both lower in countries where higher-
level bargaining dominates and cover-
age rates are high. The most noticeable 
exception to this is Germany.
In 20 of the 27 Member States a 
statutory minimum wage exists, 
with its value in 2009 ranging from 
EUR 122.7 in Bulgaria to EUR 1 641.7 
in  Luxembourg. A statutory minimum 
wage is, however, no guarantee against 
low pay: the countries with the high-
est level of low pay all have a statutory 
minimum wage. It is the level of the 
minimum wage that determines the 
extent to which it constitutes an effec-
tive wage floor in the labour market. 
In particular in a number of the new 
Member States its level is too low to 
perform this function. While in the 
long run, the level of the minimum 
wage in the central and east European 
Member States is slowly getting closer 
to that of the EU-15, in 2009, in the 
midst of the crisis, the real value of 
the minimum wage declined in many 
of these countries. More generally, in 
over half of the countries concerned, 
the statutory minimum wage lost 
value compared to the average wage 
during the 2000s. This suggests a 
declining capacity to prevent low pay 
from emerging.
In the seven countries without a 
general statutory minimum wage, 
minimum wages are largely set 
in sectoral collective agreements. 
Amongst these countries low pay is 
not widespread, with the important 
exception of Germany. Here, in cer-
tain sectors, the minimum wage is 
set at comparatively low levels and 
decline in the  coverage of collective 
agreements is leaving large groups 
of workers without the protection 
of a minimum wage. As a result, the 
desirability of a statutory minimum 
wage has become the subject of con-
siderable debate.
Finally, although major differences 
between countries exist, the general 
tendency across countries is towards 
wage-setting arrangements that pro-
vide for more wage flexibility. Where 
change takes place in bargaining 
systems it results almost invariably 
in further decentralisation of wage 
bargaining. There is a marked ten-
dency towards flexibilisation of wage 
systems through more extensive use 
of VPS. At the same time, there has 
been a parallel tendency for the inci-
dence of low pay to increase, partly 
as a result of declining collective 
bargaining coverage. The efficacy 
of statutory minimum wages — and 
in Germany collectively agreed sec-
toral minima — to counteract this 
tendency has been shown to be in 
doubt. While these developments 
may have certain advantages from 
an efficiency point of view, they 
may also lead to undesirable social 
consequences. Searching for the 
right balance between, on the one 
hand, efficiency and, on the other 
hand, equity and solidarity is one of 
the core dilemmas of the  European 
 social model. 
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Introduction 5.1. 
The Europe 2020 strategy confirms 
that the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, the increase in the share of 
renewables in final energy consump-
tion and energy efficiency are among 
the key policy priorities of the EU. 
More and more, the move to a low-
carbon economy has been recognised 
as an environmental, social and eco-
nomic necessity. The whole economy 
faces far-reaching changes, and policies 
and restructuring related to climate 
change will impact on employment, 
skills composition and working condi-
tions. Therefore, they have come onto 
the agenda of social partners across 
Europe. This chapter will review how 
social partners at national and EU level 
are addressing employment and social 
issues related to climate change through 
their different roles in policymaking: 
influencing policy, autonomous regu-
lation and promoting implementation.
It will show that climate change poli-
cies and the transition to a low-carbon 
economy not only represent new topics 
for social dialogue, but that they can-
not be readily compared to dialogue 
over traditional employment issues. 
Nonetheless, they are increasingly 
being taken into account in social 
partners’ core activity, in particular 
concerning restructuring and profes-
sional skills development. In addition, 
social partners not only try to influence 
policymaking, but can also contrib-
ute directly to the transition required 
through autonomous social dialogue, 
in particular at company level, and 
through concrete initiatives involving 
training, campaigns or research and 
innovation projects. 
The chapter focuses on social partners’ 
activities concerning policies on, and 
contributing to, greenhouse gas emis-
sion reduction, renewable energies and 
energy efficiency, i.e. measures that are 
directly linked to the de-carbonisation 
of the economy and which are likely to 
have a very big impact on the economy 
in the years to come. However, social 
partners do not always distinguish 
between environmental protection, 
general resource efficiency and climate 
change mitigation measures. In reality 
they are intertwined. In addition, the 
challenges posed by the adaptation to 
the changing climate are important for 
policymakers and social partners alike. 
For example, workplaces will have to be 
adapted to changing climate conditions 
and working practices in some sectors, 
for example agriculture, will undergo 
significant change. Green jobs are also 
high on the political agenda and many 
new companies and jobs are being cre-
ated. The chapter is concerned with 
the broader process of greening the 
economy that involves important shifts 
in the economy and the labour market. 
Activities aimed at mitigation and the 
industrial relations of green jobs — for 
example whether they are covered by 
social dialogue and collective agree-
ments — are, however, beyond the 
scope of the chapter.
This chapter will start with an over-
view of the most important EU cli-
mate change policy developments and 
research on their consequences on 
employment and skills. The second 
section will introduce the conceptual 
framework for analysing social partners’ 
roles in policymaking in order to lay the 
ground for a review of their activities at 
national and European level, in section 
three and four respectively. Given the 
emphasis on the EU level, the chapter 
also provides an overview of the posi-
tions taken by European social partners 
on climate change policies.
Policies for a 5.2. 
low-carbon economy 
and their employment 
consequences
EU climate change 5.2.1. 
policies
Climate change represents one of the 
greatest environmental, social and 
economic threats facing the planet. 
The European Union is working 
actively for a global agreement to 
control climate change and is taking 
domestic action to achieve substan-
tial reductions in its own contribution 
since the early 1990s. It is also devel-
oping a European strategy for adapt-
ing to climate change. The European 
Union has long been at the forefront 
of international efforts to combat cli-
mate change and was instrumental in 
the development of the two United 
Nations climate treaties, the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto 
Protocol, agreed in 1997.
In 2000 the European Commission 
launched the European climate change 
programme (ECCP) which has led to 
The transition to a low-carbon economy is likely to involve structural changes across the 
whole economy. Social consensus and coordinated strategies will be crucial to grasp the 
opportunities and alleviate the potential social costs in some sectors or regions. Social 
dialogue plays an important role in this and — despite large differences between coun-
tries — the transition to a low-carbon economy is coming onto the agenda of social 
partners at national and EU level. They draw attention to the business and employment 
consequences of policy choices and they have often pushed for a green recovery from the 
crisis. Workplace social dialogue on low-carbon economy issues is spreading although 
collective bargaining addressing such issues remains rare. Finally, social partners them-
selves contribute to the transition through training initiatives, campaigns, research and 
innovation, and the promotion of quality and environmental labels.
Chapter 5:  Industrial relations and the transition  
to a low-carbon economy
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the adoption of a wide range of new 
policies and measures. Each Mem-
ber State has also put in place its own 
domestic actions. Countries develop 
their own mix of policies, through a 
combination of regulation, taxation 
and other national policy. The pro-
gramme’s pioneering instrument is 
the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS). The EU ETS is a ‘cap and trade’ 
system that helps to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in a cost-effective way. 
Allowing participating  companies to 
buy or sell emission allowances puts 
a price on emissions and ensures that 
cuts can be achieved at least cost.
In 2007 the European Council endorsed 
an integrated approach to climate and 
energy policy. EU leaders set a series of 
demanding climate and energy targets 
to be met by 2020, which are known 
as the 20/20/20 targets: (1) a reduction 
in EU greenhouse gas emissions of at 
least 20 % below 1990 levels; (2) 20 % 
of EU energy consumption to come 
from  renewable resources; (3) a 20 % 
reduction in primary energy use, to be 
achieved by improving energy efficiency. 
This commitment is being implemented 
primarily through the EU climate and 
energy package of 2008, which com-
prises a revised EU ETS, a framework 
for national actions in the sectors not 
covered by the ETS and binding targets 
for renewable energies (see Box 5.1).
The EU has also offered to increase its 
emissions reduction to 30 % by 2020, 
on condition that other major emit-
ting countries in the developed and 
developing worlds commit to do their 
fair share under a future global climate 
agreement. This agreement should 
take effect at the start of 2013 when 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period will have expired. The Copen-
hagen Accord reached in December 
2009 represents only a step towards 
such an agreement. The EU is press-
ing for a global deal that is ambitious, 
comprehensive and legally binding.
With Europe 2020, the EU’s strategy 
for jobs and smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth for 2010 to 2020, the 
European Council confirmed the EU’s 
commitment to a low-carbon economy. 
Europe 2020 is a framework for the EU 
to mobilise all of its instruments and 
policies and for the Member States to 
take enhanced coordinated action. In 
particular the up-coming flagship ini-
tiative ‘resource efficient Europe’ will 
support the shift towards a resource effi-
cient and low-carbon economy through 
the EU 2050 roadmap for a low-carbon 
economy, EU financial instruments, a 
framework for the use of market-based 
instruments, a series of EU initiatives 
mainly in the energy and transport field, 
and recommendations for coordinated 
national measures. It will highlight a 
more efficient use of resources includ-
ing raw materials such as fuels, minerals 
and metals but also food, soil, water, air, 
biomass and ecosystems, which has to 
be addressed coherently.
Box 5.1: EU climate and energy package 2008
In January 2008 the European Commission proposed binding legislation to implement the 
20/20/20 targets. This ‘climate and energy package’ was agreed by the European Parliament 
and Council in December 2008 and became law in June 2009. The core of the package 
comprises four pieces of complementary legislation.
A revision and strengthening of the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): a single EU-1. 
wide cap on emission allowances will apply from 2013 and will be cut annually, reduc-
ing the number of allowances available to businesses to 21 % below the 2005 level in 
2020. The free allocation of allowances will be progressively replaced by auctioning, 
and the sectors and gases covered by the system will be somewhat expanded.
An ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ governing emissions from sectors not covered by the EU 2. 
ETS, such as transport (except aviation, which will join ETS in 2012), farming, waste 
and housing: under the decision each Member State has agreed to a binding national 
emissions limitation target for 2020 that reflects its relative wealth.
Binding national targets for renewable energy which together will lift the average 3. 
renewable share to 20 % by 2020 (more than double the 2006 level of 9.2 %): at least 
10 % of transport fuel must be renewable (biofuels, hydrogen, ‘green’ electricity, etc.). 
Biofuels must meet agreed sustainability criteria.
A legal framework to promote the development and safe use of carbon capture and 4. 
storage (CCS): CCS is a promising family of technologies that capture the carbon diox-
ide emitted by industrial processes and store it in underground geological formations 
where it cannot contribute to global warming. The technical and economic viability of 
its use as an integrated system has, however, yet to be shown. The EU therefore plans to 
set up a network of CCS demonstration plants by 2015 to test its viability, with the aim 
of commercial uptake of CCS by around 2020.
Further elements:
a regulation requiring a reduction in CO•	 2 emissions from new cars to an average of 120g 
per km, to be phased in between 2012 and 2015 and further to 95g per km in 2020; and 
a Regulation requiring a reduction in CO2 emissions from vans. 
revised EU guidelines on state aid for environmental protection.•	
A decision to fund the large-scale demonstration of low carbon energy technologies from •	
the sale of 300 million emission allowances held in the New Entrants Reserve (NER) of 
the EU Emissions Trading System. 
Energy efficiency
The climate and energy package creates pressure to improve energy efficiency but does 
not address it directly. This is being done through the EU’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
2007–12. It provides for the adoption of measures to improve the energy performance of 
products (eco-design), buildings and services, to improve the yield of energy production 
and distribution, to reduce the impact of transport on energy consumption, to facilitate 
financing and investments in the sector, and to change behaviour.
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Employment  5.2.2. 
and climate change
There is much talk about green jobs. 
Indeed, jobs that contribute to pre-
serving and restoring the quality of 
the environment are both necessary 
for the sustainable development of 
the planet and promising in terms 
of employment potential. Defining 
such jobs is difficult (see for example 
Employment in Europe, 2009, p. 109f; 
Box 5.2 on UNEP/ILO definition).
More widely the transition to a low-
 carbon economy is likely to involve 
structural change across the whole 
economy. There are four main employ-
ment shifts: new jobs will be created, 
for example in manufacturing pollu-
tion-control devices; some jobs will 
be substituted, for example in shifting 
from fossil fuels to renewable sources, 
or waste incineration to recycling; 
some jobs may be eliminated without 
replacement; and a large share of jobs, 
such as plumbers, electricians, con-
struction workers, will evolve (UNEP 
et al., 2008: 43). In addition, not all jobs 
that contribute to the low-carbon econ-
omy would be considered as green in 
the first place, for example in upstream 
supplier industries. Even in the case of 
new industries and technologies, such 
as wind and solar power generation, 
the supply chain consists largely of tra-
ditional industries like iron and steel 
and manufacturing of installations.
The overall employment balance will 
depend on how many jobs are created 
and lost in a wider range of sectors, 
such as energy, transport or construc-
tion, agriculture, manufacturing and 
services (direct effect), the balance of 
jobs in sectors contributing inputs to 
these sectors (indirect effect) and on 
employment gained or lost throughout 
the economy from higher or lower con-
sumer spending (relative price effect) 
and from productivity gains related 
to lifting barriers to innovation or to 
investments (macro-economic effect). 
The Employment in Europe 2009 report 
provides an overview of research on 
climate change and employment (Euro-
pean Commission 2009, Chapter 3). 
It concludes that economic modelling 
shows that the transition to a low-carbon 
economy should have no, or a slight posi-
tive, impact on the overall employment 
level (at least in the long run). It will, 
however, have different effects across 
economic sectors, skill types and regions. 
In addition, the transition to a low carbon 
economy is likely to stimulate innova-
tion, boost employment in fast develop-
ing “green technology” sectors and open 
up new export opportunities. 
The Commission’s impact assessment 
on its proposal for the climate change 
package estimated net employment 
effects of 0.05 % (creation of 110 000 
jobs) to – 0.09 (loss of 200 000 jobs) 
by 2020 (European Commission, 
2008a). The most complete study on 
renewable energies for the EU pre-
dicts that reaching the 20 % target for 
the deployment of renewable energies 
will have a net employment impact 
— depending on the model used — 
of either 400 000 additional jobs until 
2020 and 545 000 to 656 000 until 
2030, or more than 400 000 in 2020 
and just 59 000 to 128 000 until 2030 
under a model that makes a conserv-
ative assumption about the reaction 
to increased energy cost (European 
Commission, 2009a). An ETUC-led 
study demonstrates how impacts 
differ depending on the sector. For 
example, it estimates that reaching 
the 20/20/20 targets will mean that 
175 000 jobs will be lost in the steel 
sector by 2020, but that net employ-
ment in the machinery and electrical 
equipment sector could rise by up to 
670 000 and by about 250 000 in its 
supplier industries (ETUC, 2009a).
Therefore, the important question 
about the future of employment is less 
the gross creation of new, green jobs, 
but the incremental and broad green-
ing of the whole economy including 
the transformation of many profes-
sions that will need a new skills com-
position. This is a complex affair and 
available research provides too little 
information on the likely distribu-
tion of employment effects. But in 
contrast to other structural drivers of 
change some anticipation is feasible 
since climate change related poli-
cies result from political decisions. 
More knowledge needs to be built 
up in understanding the dynamics. 
In particular, there will be specific 
consequences for each sector which 
makes the sector the prime level of 
intervention.
Box 5.2: Green jobs description by UNEP and ILO
‘Green jobs reduce the environmental impact of enterprises and economic sectors, ultimately 
to levels that are sustainable. (…) ‘Green jobs’ (means) work in agriculture, industry, services 
and administration that contributes to preserving or restoring the quality of the environ-
ment. Green jobs are found in many sectors of the economy from energy supply to recycling 
and from agriculture and construction to transportation. They help to cut the consumption 
of energy, raw materials and water through high-efficiency strategies, to de-carbonise the 
economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to minimise or avoid altogether all forms 
of waste and pollution, to protect and restore ecosystems and biodiversity. Green jobs play a 
crucial role in reducing the environmental footprint of economic activity. This reduction is 
gradual and the different jobs contribute to different degrees. Workers manufacturing fuel-
efficient or hybrid cars, for example, contribute less to reducing emissions from transport 
than those working in public transport systems. Moreover, what is considered fuel-efficient 
today will no longer qualify in 10 years’ time. The notion of a green job is thus not absolute, 
but there are ‘shades’ of green and the notion will evolve over time.’
UNEP et al. (2008a), Green jobs: Towards decent work in a sustainable, low-carbon world — 
Policy messages and main findings for decision-makers.
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Policymakers and social partners have 
turned their attention to the role of 
skills in the low-carbon transition. In 
fact, skills shortages could become bot-
tlenecks impeding the rolling out of 
new technologies and the ‘first mover’ 
advantage that this could bring. A 
mismatch of existing skills and new 
demand could cost both firms and 
workers dearly. There is a consider-
able debate about how job profiles will 
change (Ecorys 2008; Cedefop 2009; 
GHK, 2009). Most likely some skills 
will become obsolete, for example util-
ity meter reading services due to ‘smart’ 
household meters that automatically 
relay data to utility companies. Many 
occupations will see their skills mix 
change, for example learning to use 
new, sustainable materials, installing 
new materials and devices in construc-
tion, or learning to assess the environ-
mental impact or the ‘carbon-footprint’ 
in production processes. Lastly, new 
occupations will also emerge, such as 
solar energy technician, eco-designer 
or biofuels technician. Often these 
‘green-collar’ occupations require 
higher levels of qualification, particu-
lar related to STEM subjects (science, 
technology, engineering and math-
ematics). The shortage of these skills 
and the general decline in take-up of 
training in technical areas in the EU is 
of great concern.
The European Commission launched 
in 2008 a joint policy initiative, ‘New 
Skills for New Jobs’, that offers support 
to EU Member States, regions and 
social partners to develop more effec-
tive ways to analyse and predict which 
skills will be required in tomorrow’s 
labour markets and, with this knowl-
edge, develop and adapt education 
and training so that workers gain the 
skills required. It provides the oppor-
tunity for countries to learn from each 
other and share solutions by pooling 
their efforts at the European level, as 
well as with other international organ-
isations on the themes related to skills 
 upgrading, matching and anticipation. 
One element will be the network-
ing of so-called sector skills councils 
or observatories through which the 
actors on the ground (national and 
regional authorities, social partners 
and education and training institu-
tions) try to anticipate skills needs 
developments. Bottom-up initiatives 
will provide particularly important 
responses to the need for adjustments 
such as filling skills gaps. Social dia-
logue is a key element in the develop-
ment of these initiatives (Medhurst, 
2010).
The roles of social 5.3. 
partners in labour  
market governance —  
the analytical framework
Social partners play an important 
role in the economy as a whole and in 
labour market governance in particu-
lar. They have also demonstrated that 
they have the capability to engage with 
new policy issues. The Industrial Rela-
tions in Europe 2008 report showed 
how high-quality industrial relations 
provided a key resource for the Lisbon 
Strategy over the last decade by adding 
flexibility to its implementation and 
by mobilising support for bottom-up 
solutions in several areas: active labour 
market policies, training and the entry 
of young people in the labour market, 
lifelong learning, working hours and 
time flexibility, reconciliation of work 
and private life and working condi-
tions. It concluded that these issues 
have become part of the social partners’ 
agenda at various level and that various 
instruments, often based on an interac-
tion between collective bargaining and 
law, but also information exchange, 
best-practice diffusion, benchmark-
ing or joint administration and fund 
management were being  utilised. In 
 comparison with the recent Lisbon-
related entries on the social dialogue 
agenda, and even more so with the tra-
ditional bargaining issues of pay and 
working time, the shift to a low-carbon 
economy is of a different nature.
Social partners act first and foremost 
where they have direct competences, i.e. 
the distributions of benefits, rights and 
obligations of workers and employees. 
They can directly influence them by 
committing their members to certain 
actions. The issues concerned relate 
directly to the functioning of the labour 
market. Trade unions and employers 
organisations are the main actors on 
some issues and interact strongly with 
the state on further issues such as labour 
market policy and social security.
In contrast, the transition to a low-
carbon economy concerns the impact 
of the economy (and of society as a 
whole) on the climate. Policies are 
mostly driven from outside the work-
place and industrial relations but 
impact on them. In some respects, it is 
about the distribution of benefits and 
costs between conventional economic 
growth and the current generation, on 
the one side, and the global climate and 
future generations, on the other. The 
state is the main actor involved and 
mobilises regulatory, market-based 
and financial instruments. The whole 
of society is directly affected by this 
policy field, which is thus characterised 
by a larger number of actors, including 
environmental NGOs amongst others. 
It is in the management of the employ-
ment consequences where industrial 
relations play a prime role.
Nonetheless, in analysing the role of 
social partners, the Industrial Rela-
tions in Europe 2008 report provides 
a useful starting point with its three-
fold schema of the broad functions of 
social partners (1).
1 Based on a scheme by Jelle Visser, Amsterdam 
Institute for Labour Studies.
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Social partners can act, alone 1. 
or jointly, as special interest 
groups and influence policymak-
ing through lobbying activities, 
responses to consultations, exer-
cising political influence or enter-
ing into negotiations with the 
government. One specific form of 
influencing policy is the conclu-
sion of a social pact, i.e. a tripartite 
agreement between government 
and the social partners.
Trade unions and employers can 2. 
regulate employment relations 
themselves either through bind-
ing agreements or ‘softer’ guide-
lines. This can happen at company, 
sector, or national level. This is 
well established in the domain 
of wages, working hours and 
working conditions, but has also 
expanded to other areas. There is 
also interaction between collec-
tive bargaining and public policy 
which can take different forms: 
(a) autonomous agreements/ 
guidelines implemented without 
interference of public authori-
ties; (b) sponsored agreements the 
implementation of which depends 
on the support and intervention 
of the government or legislator; 
(c) dependent (implementation) 
agreements which follow, and 
implement, a particular law, reform, 
government policy, or  higher- level 
agreement/guidelines.
Trade unions and employers (orga-3. 
nisations) can be involved, alone 
or jointly, in the implementation of 
policies. This may happen through 
the co-management of policies with 
public authorities, by joining labour 
market boards, training councils 
or insurance funds under public 
supervision. This involvement may 
also take an advisory character, 
without assuming the responsibil-
ity for the adopted  decisions and 
their execution.
Activities concerning the low-carbon 
economy might not fit neatly into 
this schema. In particular, the find-
ings presented below suggest that, 
as institutions comparable to labour 
market boards do either not exist in 
the climate change policy field, or 
that social partners have no specific 
role to play in them, the third cat-
egory should be recast as ‘activities 
promoting implementation’ through 
which the social partners contrib-
ute to the implementation of poli-
cies or the achievement of objectives 
of public interest (e.g. energy effi-
ciency improvements), for example 
by organising training or campaigns. 
These activities may be developed in 
an autonomous way or in coopera-
tion with public authorities.
Social dialogue has an important 
role to play: it helps to create con-
sensus for climate change related 
policies that are often unavoidable, 
but which can create opposition. A 
stable and reliable policy framework 
is essential for investment decisions 
and the preparation of the work-
force. In addition, a shared analysis 
of employment opportunities and 
challenges by social partners can 
contribute greatly to a well-managed 
and socially just transition.
Anticipating and managing restruc-
turing processes and skills devel-
opment have already become an 
important part of industrial relations 
in Europe. The challenge arising from 
the transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy is to ‘mainstream’ it into restruc-
turing and skills policies. Social 
partners also have the possibility to 
facilitate innovation and negotiate 
solutions for change which are to the 
benefit of workers and businesses. 
The transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy also raises questions about social 
 justice between those who benefit 
and those who might lose out in the 
short term.
Social partners’ 5.4. 
activities related  
to the transition  
to a low-carbon economy  
at national level
This section provides an overview of 
how social partners address the transi-
tion to a low-carbon economy accord-
ing to the three-way schema of the 
roles of social partners in economic 
and social governance. It is based on 
reports (2) from all Member States (and 
Norway) for a comparative analytical 
report of the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Work-
ing Conditions on the industrial rela-
tions implications of the greening of 
the economy (Eurofound, 2009) and 
on other sources, including the first 
seminar of the cross-industry Euro-
pean social partners’ project on the 
employment consequences of climate 
change policies (see Section 4.2.1.). 
The comprehensiveness of the availa-
ble information varies from country to 
country. Accordingly, this section iden-
tifies the main trends up to 2009 and 
provides examples, rather than giving 
an exhaustive pan-European account 
or mounting a  comparative analysis.
Given the nature of the issue of climate 
change in relation to industrial rela-
tions, it is not surprising that lobbying 
is an important part of social partners’ 
work, and that self-regulation remains 
rare, except for the company level. 
However, social partners initiated, and 
contributed to, a wide range of activities 
in support of the transition to a low-
carbon economy, including training 
and counselling, campaigns, research, 
environmental labels and others.
2 The study aimed to not only map social partners’ 
activities and climate change related policies, but 
also national policies and institutions, also on 
environmental policy in general. 
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Influencing policy5.4.1. 
In almost all countries social partners 
deal with low-carbon economy issues 
at the stage of policy formulation 
where they express their positions 
on policy proposals either through 
institutionalised tripartite bodies or 
‘multipartite’ bodies dealing with sus-
tainable development, or by direct 
lobbying on draft legislation. Exam-
ples of own-initiative policy propos-
als economy can also be found and in 
particular trade unions have driven 
the debate on a green recovery from 
the crisis. Various forms of lobbying 
were reported in all Member States 
with the exception of Cyprus, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
It is difficult to draw general conclu-
sions on the content of lobbying as it 
differs depending on the country and 
also on the sector. Employer repre-
sentatives are, in principal, in favour 
of policies aimed at a low-carbon 
economy, but they insist on cost-
 effective policy options, investment in 
infrastructure, the promotion of green 
technology exports, a level playing 
field internationally, voluntary com-
mitments, CSR, or incentive meas-
ures. In some Member States, such as 
Poland, employers’ organisations ask 
government to intensify domestic cli-
mate change policies and better coor-
dinate them in a coherent strategy. 
There are also examples of opposition 
due to fears of cost increases and com-
petitive disadvantages, for example, 
expressed by the Confederation of 
Portuguese Industry (CIP) in its criti-
cism of governmental measures for 
renewable energies and energy effi-
ciency (Naumann, 2009).
The same problems of generalisation 
apply to the views of trade unions. 
These range from a strong commit-
ment to the low-carbon economy to 
rather indifferent approaches, com-
mon amongst the new Member States, 
to opposition, as in the case of trade 
unions in Poland’s coalmining and 
power sectors. In general, trade unions 
insist on a just transition that includes 
dialogue, skills adaptation and invest-
ment in green job creation and infra-
structure. Most trade union lobbying 
initiatives support policies for a low-
carbon economy unless there is a risk 
of job losses. On several occasions, 
trade unions went further than their 
employers’ counterparts, for example 
the German metal workers union, IG 
Metall, issued a joint statement with 
the Federal Ministry of Environment 
in 2008 calling for an ambitious regula-
tion on CO2 emissions from new cars 
and recently Spanish trade unions sup-
ported the adoption of a more ambi-
tious EU emission reduction target 
of 30 %. Trade unions often prefer reg-
ulation and are wary of ‘greenwashing’ 
(Eurofound, 2009: 11).
Observers of some Member States 
draw attention to the fact that, both 
within the employer and trade union 
camps, some divergence of position 
can be found, in particular between 
sectors. At one extreme are groups 
with an interest in an accelerated tran-
sition towards a low-carbon economy 
(e.g. renewable energy technologies or 
technologies improving energy effi-
ciency). At the other end are energy 
intensive sectors and those produc-
ing traditional sources of energy that 
often find themselves in opposition 
to climate change mitigation policies, 
unless there are compensating meas-
ures. Social partners in services sec-
tors are much less vocal, except maybe 
in the IT sector, although an impact 
can also be expected there (Dupres-
soir, 2009).
Joint lobbying activity by social partner 
organisations is the exception rather 
than the rule and was reported only in 
Germany and Austria. Many elements 
of the Austrian environmental and 
economic action plans originate from 
joint social partner proposals, such 
as the implementation of the Mas-
terplan Sustainable Energy and the 
Energy and Climate Protection Fund. 
The Confederation of German Trade 
Unions (DGB) and the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI, the inter-
est organisation of German business) 
issued a joint declaration on energy 
policy in 2006 in which they noted 
their disagreement on nuclear energy 
policy, but declared a common inter-
est in strengthening a national energy 
mix policy, promoting the export of 
renewable energy technology and of 
investments in power stations and 
energy networks. In 2008 they issued 
a joint call for an EU climate change 
Table 5.1: Examples of collective lobbying activities
Employers’ 
organisations
Bulgaria: in a 2009 joint declaration of five (out of six) nationally representa-
tive employer associations. Alternative energy is considered to be the key 
priority of the economy and must be part of the future social agreement.
Trade unions
Denmark: the United Federation of Danish Workers (3F) and the Danish 
Metalworkers Union (Dansk Metal) appealed to government to invest in 
alternative energy, collective transport, or renovation of old public buildings 
in order to reduce the impacts of the crisis.
Italy: the General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL) and Legambiente 
— a joint document putting forward proposals on how to cope with the crisis, 
by using the employment potential of the green economy (2009).
The Netherlands: the Dutch Trade Union Federation (FNV), Christian Trade 
Union Federation (CNV) and Federation for Managerial and Professional Staff 
(MHP) published a Social and Green Investment Plan to cope with the crisis. 
Economy should be stimulated by investments among others in greener pro-
duction, reduction of energy use, increase in wind energy, green VAT rates, etc.
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package that balances climate and 
industrial policy consideration.
Unilateral lobbying is far more wide-
spread; with individual or sectoral 
initiatives outnumbering those involv-
ing coalitions of different employers’ 
organisations or of trade unions. Indi-
vidual lobbying initiatives of employers’ 
associations outnumber those by trade 
unions. The economic crisis has driven 
the majority of recent lobbying initia-
tives (see Table 5.1 for examples). Trade 
unions, especially, called for more green 
investments as a part of anti-crisis meas-
ures. In many social partner anti-crisis 
action plans some green proposals can 
be found even if the main focus of the 
document is not ‘green’, e.g. the 10-point 
action plan of the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions (ICTU). Another goal of collec-
tive lobbying was to shift green issues 
higher on the agenda. For instance five 
of the six Bulgarian employers’ associa-
tions signed a joint declaration in 2009 
that alternative energy is an issue which 
should become part of the future social 
agreement.
Several organisations formulated their 
own proposals on the transition to a low-
carbon economy. The Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI) has recently 
taken a proactive stance in favour of a 
fast transition to the low-carbon econ-
omy. It set up a Climate Change Task 
Force consisting of senior figures in 
British industry, has published reports 
dealing with climate change issues and 
has actively promoted renewable energy 
(Broughton, 2009). Another issue of 
concern to both sides of industry is the 
need to invest in the right skills for a low-
carbon economy. For example, the CBI 
also made recommendations on how 
to improve the supply of STEM skills 
(Eurofound, 2009: 11). The Employer 
Confederation of Romanian Indus-
try (Conpirom) also made a number 
of proposals e.g. to deter imports of 
second-hand vehicles, which are pol-
luting, to renew the motor vehicle fleet 
and to grant subsidised interest loans for 
renewable energy investments (Ciutacu, 
2009). The Slovenian Chamber of 
 Commerce and Industry included the 
low-carbon economy as part of its white 
paper on competitiveness in 2008.
Trade unions also developed their green 
policy proposals, with unions in Scan-
dinavian countries being particularly 
active. For instance, the Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO Sweden) has 
been promoting investments in CO2 
reduction and supporting green invest-
ments mainly in technology develop-
ment for a long time and formulated its 
own energy policy programme in 2007. 
The Swedish Confederation of Profes-
sional Employees (TCO) did likewise 
(Olsson, 2009). In the Netherlands, 
in February 2009, three Dutch trade 
union federations published an invest-
ment plan to boost both employment 
and sustainability. With regard to econ-
omy greening, they proposed a number 
of relevant measures and drew attention 
to the need for labour market measures, 
schooling and subsidies for R & D in the 
context of economy greening. Impor-
tantly, the plan contains both greening 
and labour market measures (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010). The Spanish 
CCOO has developed a national action 
plan for renewable energies. One of 
the few examples of tripartite concer-
tation in Germany is the Alliance for 
Work and the Environment, which 
started as a partnership between the 
government, construction employers, 
trade unions and non-governmental 
organisations during a recession in the 
building sector in 2001. The idea of 
creating jobs through energy-saving 
investment in buildings was first pro-
posed by the DGB. The subsequent 
programme helped to retrofit apart-
ments through subsidised loans, while 
creating sustainable jobs and improv-
ing social conditions. Sectoral trade 
unions accompanied the programme 
with information campaigns on 
 energy-saving home improvements. 
During the recent economic crisis, 
the government granted additional 
 resources (Kraemer, 2009).
Crisis-driven initiatives more often fea-
tured on the lobbying agenda of trade 
unions than employers’ organisations. 
In many countries, social partners called 
for public investment to be channelled 
into energy saving, green technology 
promotion and renewable energies in 
order to stimulate employment (see also 
Table 5.1). For example, of the Spanish 
trade union confederation CCOO’s 
proposals for a stimulus package, a 
EUR 500 million fund for incentives for 
eco-efficient building renovation was 
taken up by the government (Nikolova, 
2009: 4). The Belgian recovery plan took 
up a proposal from the ABVV/FGTB 
trade union confederation for an ‘alli-
ance work- employment’ (including the 
social partners, the building sector and 
public authorities) to develop measures 
to stimulate the green economy in the 
long term (van Gyes, 2009). This ini-
tiative is being followed up at regional 
level. Czech and Slovak trade unions in 
the construction sector have called for 
similar initiatives (in line with the EU-
level  social dialogue; see Section 4.1.2).
A specific means of lobbying in the 
field of climate change is the coopera-
tion that social partner organisations, 
and especially trade unions, have 
developed with environmental NGOs 
in several Member States. For example, 
in Belgium and Spain trade unions and 
environmental NGOs advocate jointly 
agreed solutions, also cooperate in 
campaigns or ‘to take the streets’.
Cooperation in tripartite  
and ‘multipartite’ institutions
It appears that the standard tripartite 
social dialogue bodies have addressed 
the employment consequences of 
the low-carbon economy in a few 
Member States. Issues related to the 
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low-carbon economy are addressed 
in tripartite structures when social 
partner competences are at stake, i.e. 
 restructuring of skills needs stem-
ming from climate change policies. 
But from the evidence available, 
there is little sign of the ‘mainstream-
ing’ of the low-carbon economy into 
‘standard’ industrial relations. In 
the majority of cases, then, climate 
change issues are tackled in an ad hoc 
and somewhat marginally fashion, in 
tripartite structures.
There are, however, exceptions. 
For instance, sustainable develop-
ment and environmental policy are 
amongst the themes regularly cov-
ered by advisory reports of the Dutch 
Social and Economic Council (see 
Box 5.3). The Belgian Central Busi-
ness Council and National Labour 
Council ( CRB-CCE/NAR-CNT) 
has responded to a request from the 
Employment Minister for a joint anal-
ysis on ‘green jobs’ in 2009/10 (state 
of affairs and shared views). Spain has 
seen the establishment of a tripartite 
climate change table, established 
in 2005 in order to jointly monitor 
the National Allocation Plan (NAP) 
under the first round of the EU ETS, 
and to develop proposals on how to 
manage the changes that it would 
bring about. It is complemented by 
round tables in seven ETS sectors 
and by one non-ETS sector round 
table. According to trade unions, the 
round tables have improved transpar-
ency and communication, and also 
synergies between industrial, climate 
change and energy policies, although 
discussions have not always been suf-
ficiently followed up.
In contrast, the participation of 
social partners in “multipartite bod-
ies” is much more widespread, being 
reported in half of all Member States 
(see  Table 5.2). These are mostly 
Sustainable Development Coun-
cils or Environmental Councils, or 
advisory bodies of governments or 
parliaments. Their voice is mostly 
advisory; however, the scope of the 
issues they address is broad as they 
often participate in drafting various 
national environmental and/or sus-
tainable development programmes 
and strategies (see Box 5.4 on the 
Finnish example). Members are usu-
ally representatives of state authori-
ties and social partner organisations, 
environmental NGOs, and individual 
researchers and experts. Less often 
there are also representatives of con-
sumers’ organisations, churches or 
the media. This underlines that gov-
ernments consider a wider range of 
actors as having legitimate interest in 
this policy field.
There are also ad hoc multipartite 
structures in some Member States con-
vened at different times to help create 
a consensus around sustainable devel-
opment measures. In France, in 2008, 
the social partners agreed together 
with the government, local authori-
ties and environmental NGOs in the 
Grenelle environnement on a series of 
measures, including greenhouse gas 
emission cuts and energy efficiency. 
The follow-up included two legislative 
packages, and the sustainable devel-
opment council was transformed into 
the National Committee for Sustain-
able Development and the follow-up 
of the Grenelle environnement. The 
forum also resulted in negotiations 
to enlarge the competences of Work-
place Health and Safety Commit-
tees (CHSCT) to include sustainable 
 development  issues (see Section 3.2).
Box 5.3: Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SEC)
SEC is the main statutory tripartite body in the Netherlands. It consists of equal numbers of 
employee representatives, employer representatives and independent members appointed 
by the government. Its main function is to advise the Dutch government and parliament 
on social and economic issues. In the last decade, the Council formulated extensive posi-
tion papers on energy policy, agriculture, sustainable development and consumption, and 
globalisation. Two recent advisory reports deal explicitly with climate change and sustain-
able energy: Towards a sustainable energy policy (2006) and Advice on nuclear energy and 
sustainable energy (2008). The SEC also expressed its position on the European climate 
policy, as part of the 2009 consultation on the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Council believes 
that better coordination of environmental, climate and energy policy, as well as rooting 
them in the Lisbon Strategy, would promote ecological innovations. The biggest challenge 
— global warming — requires a solution on the global level. Europe should therefore sup-
port extension of the ETS.
Box 5.4: Finnish National Commission  
on Sustainable Development (FNCSD)
The Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development was established in 1993 by 
the government in order to coordinate and promote sustainable development. It acts as an 
important forum where different stakeholders present their ideas, goals and programmes. 
Various issues are on the agenda of FNCSD — climate change, renewable energy and eco-
efficiency, global poverty and population growth. The commission has played an active 
role in the preparation of different sustainable development programmes and strategies, 
including the National Strategy for Sustainable Development launched in 2006.
Various social actors participate both in the definition of the contents and implementation 
of the measures, in what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Finnish model’ that combines 
broad-based, multi-stakeholder participation with high-level political leadership. The 
commission is chaired by the Prime Minister and consists of representatives from all sec-
tors of Finnish society, i.e. the parliament, public administration including local authori-
ties, social partners, NGOs, interest groups representing different sectors of society and the 
media. (Jokivuori, 2009)
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The management of employment con-
sequences plays a role in the Forum for 
a Just Transition that the UK govern-
ment established in December 2009. 
Its remit is to ‘advise and provide over-
sight on the rapid economic and social 
transition to a low-carbon future.’ It 
was one of four strands of the govern-
ment’s low-carbon industry strategy, 
adopted in July 2009, which brings 
stakeholders together to promote new 
industrial opportunities across the UK 
regions and devolved administrations. 
Representatives from industry, the 
Energy Intensive Users Group, trades 
unions, education and skills groups, 
and consumers sit on the forum organ-
ised by the Department for Business, 
 Innovation and Skills (3).
Autonomous regulation5.4.2. 
Collective bargaining on issues related 
to climate change is unusual. But social 
dialogue at the company level on issues 
like energy efficiency and emission cuts 
seems to be slowly spreading.
Exceptions come from Spain and Bel-
gium. In Spain, mobility plans and 
energy efficiency were included in the 
national negotiation guidelines for 
lower level bargainers for 2010 to 2012. 
3 http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/Detail.aspx?Release
ID=408630&NewsAreaID=2
Although the recommendation is one 
of the weaker ones in the guidelines it 
is the first time that such issues were 
included on the agenda. The Belgian 
National Labour Council concluded, 
in 2009, a sponsored agreement, i.e. 
depending on a decision by the state 
for full implementation, on the intro-
duction of ecocheques as a form of 
pay increase in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis. The ecocheque is a wage 
premium, which has been exempted 
from social security contributions, 
for the purchase of environmentally-
friendly and sustainable consumer 
goods. The basis was the 2009–2010 
cross-industry agreement that was 
adopted in conjunction with the gov-
ernment’s plan to relaunch the coun-
try’s economy and maintain workers’ 
purchasing power at the end of 2008. 
However, the scheme’s impact in envi-
ronmental terms does not seem to be 
positive and it created administrative 
costs. This experience demonstrates 
the limits of isolated measures and 
the advantages of environmental tax 
reforms that shift fiscal burden from 
labour to energy on the large scale. 
At company level, trade union and/
or works council delegates, in some 
Member States, have information, 
consultation and negotiation rights 
on the company’s energy and environ-
ment policy, often via the extension of 
the competence of health and safety 
committees. e.g. in Belgium (Dupres-
soir, 2009: 23) and France (see above). 
This constitutes an example of bipar-
tite regulation of questions related 
to the low-carbon economy at the 
 workplace level.
In Germany, company agreements 
between management and works 
council on environmental issues 
appeared as early as the late 1980s. 
Since then trade unions and compa-
nies have more systematically con-
cluded sectoral collective agreements 
that enlarged the information, consul-
tation and co-determination rights of 
works councils in respect of the cor-
porate environmental management 
decisions. This rule was generalised by 
the 2001 revision of the Works Con-
stitution Act. The German IG Metall 
argues that works council members 
can rebalance cost-cutting approaches 
with a one-sided focus on labour costs 
in favour of cost-cutting on energy 
and resource expenses (Kristof et al., 
2009). Because employees and their 
representatives know their workplace, 
the processes and the products, they 
can contribute specific knowledge 
to management’s efforts to increase 
 resource efficiency.
A 2006 agreement in the Italian chem-
ical industry provides a rare exam-
ple of a collective agreement which 
extends workplace social dialogue to 
environmental issues. The agreement 
enhanced the competences of the rep-
resentative for safety already estab-
lished and regulated by law, extending 
the scope of these to environmental 
issues. The representative is informed 
and consulted on the objectives for 
environmental improvement and the 
level and nature of investments, on 
various initiatives (for site reclama-
tion, on energy savings and improv-
ing environmental performance, on 
corporate monitoring systems and 
management systems certification) 
Table 5.2: ‘Multipartite’ bodies in EU Member States
Austria Climate summits
Belgium Federal Sustainable Development Council
Czech Republic Council of the Government for Sustainable Development
Germany Council on Sustainable Development
Denmark Environmental Economic Council
Finland Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development
France National Committee for Sustainable Development and the follow-up of the Grenelle environnement
Hungary National Sustainable Development Council
Portugal National Sustainable Development Council
Slovenia Council for Sustainable Development at the Government Office for Growth
Spain National Climate Change Council
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and on management of health, safety 
and environmental aspects through-
out the product life cycle (Auriemma, 
D’Ercole, 2008: 66f, 97f).
The British TUC has introduced envi-
ronmental employee representatives, 
so-called ‘green reps’. One of the goals 
of its Green Workplaces project was 
the establishment of new represen-
tation structures which could work 
towards energy saving and emis-
sion cuts in the enterprise. The most 
important part of the project was 
training for environmental employees’ 
representatives. Amongst the compa-
nies where ‘green reps’ were trained, 
social dialogue and collective bargain-
ing dealing with energy efficiency has 
 developed (see Box 5.5).
Indeed, the value of employee involve-
ment in company’s environmental 
management is widely shared, which is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Brit-
ish employers’ organisation CBI itself 
produced a guide for companies look-
ing to set up employee engagement 
programmes focused on sustainable 
development. It provides practical tips 
and case studies in order to inspire com-
pany specific schemes (CBI, 2009).
Promoting 5.4.3. 
implementation of policies
Institutions where social partners’ 
competences are needed in order to 
implement decisions — either for co-
management or advice — exist for 
labour market policy (labour market 
boards), or training (sector councils). 
Climate change related policies do not 
rely on the shared appreciation of the 
issue by employers and trade unions. 
But public authorities look to enlist 
specialist knowledge that is mostly held 
by companies and their sectoral organ-
isations. It can therefore be expected 
that employers’ organisations are rep-
resented in bodies that define technical 
specifications related to climate change 
and environmental  policy. This is illus-
trated in Section 4.1.3 for the case of 
the implementation of the EU ETS at 
the European level.
The active contribution of the social 
partners to implementation takes other 
forms and these can be divided into 
three groups: (1) training and counsel-
ling; (2) awareness raising; (3)  other 
promotional activities, where social 
partners promote research, environ-
mental labels or technical solutions.
Over the last few years, at least one of 
these activities was identified in virtu-
ally every Member State. Activities are 
mainly observed in those countries 
where green issues are well established 
and trade unions and employers per-
ceive the transition to a low-carbon 
economy as both a challenge and an 
opportunity for business and employ-
ment. These social partner activities 
often involve cooperation with, or 
are financially supported by, public 
authorities, as reported in about one 
third of Member States.
Training and counselling5.4.3.1. 
When it comes to a smooth transition 
on the labour market, an adaptable 
labour market, vocational education 
and training (VET) and skills fore-
casting play an important role. VET 
has traditionally been part of indus-
trial relations in the Nordic countries, 
 Germany, Belgium Luxembourg, 
 Austria and the Netherlands. In addi-
tion, social partners’ involvement in 
the occupational training system in an 
advisory or delivery role has spread in 
the last years all over the EU (see Euro-
pean Commission, 2009: 58–63). Initial 
analysis of the  European  cross-industry 
Box 5.5: The UK TUC ‘Green Workplaces’ project  
and ‘green reps’
From 2006 to 2008, the TUC ran two ‘Green Workplaces’ projects which focused on energy 
saving and reduction of emissions in the workplace and on raising awareness of climate 
change. The TUC was also exploring ‘how environmental action at work could contribute 
to the potential for a “transformational change” in the organisational efficiency or effec-
tiveness of unions’ (TUC, 2010a: 29).
Initially, case studies were carried out in various companies and organisations where trade 
unions took steps to make the workplaces ‘greener’. Trade unions carried out staff surveys 
and organised, together with environmental organisations, open days and events for the 
public. Training for environmental employees’ representatives, (so-called ‘green reps’) was 
one of the most important parts of the project. Green reps learned how to build new work-
place structures (e.g. joint environment committees), to negotiate formal agreements and 
to conduct own workplace energy audits. During the project, green reps were also sup-
ported to negotiate green matters with management (TUC, Carbon Trust, 2008). Well over 
one thousand green reps have been trained and a more or less formalised company-level 
social dialogue established in a range of organisations. For example, trade union green reps 
signed an agreement with their employers at Bristol City Council about delivering green 
policies leading to reduction of CO2 emissions of the organisation (1).
According to the final report (TUC, 2010a), the projects involved were effective in building 
capacity of the trade unions to address this agenda. Furthermore, communication between 
trade unions and managements improved. Best practices identified in the projects indicate 
that whilst a joint and consistent union approach towards management is important in 
order to build good industrial relations, the engagement and support of senior manage-
ment is crucial for the success of green initiatives. In cases where formal structures of 
union involvement (e.g. environmental committees) were established and time-off for rep-
resentatives’ activities granted, progress was faster.
1 http://www.greenworkplacessouthwest.org.uk/?p=705
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social partners’ members survey (see 
Section 4.2.1) shows that the skills 
dimension of the low-carbon economy 
has entered all activities of guidance 
to workers, training curricula and 
anticipation of skills needs in many 
countries. The most active sectors are 
construction and renewable energies 
and this work is mostly being done in 
cooperation with public authorities. 
This means that the transition to a 
low-carbon economy has made its way 
into this traditional field of activity of 
social partners. For example, the Bel-
gian region Wallonia has established a 
dedicated environmental training cen-
tre with social partners’ involvement 
that includes energy management and 
renewable energy and has started to 
include environmental aspects in the 
curricula of all training centres (http://
www.formation-environnement.be). 
However, this aspect has not been fur-
ther researched for this report.
Training for workers and their repre-
sentatives on issues like energy and 
resource efficiency, pollution pre-
vention, new green technologies and 
green skills is a well-established social 
partner measure in Member States 
where the issue has been already high 
on their agenda, e.g. in Denmark, 
Belgium or Germany, but also Spain. 
Elsewhere, it is in the initial stage of 
development. While training activi-
ties are provided more often by trade 
union organisations, advisory services 
are a domain of employer associa-
tions. They are usually organised uni-
laterally by individual social partner 
organisations targeted to specific sec-
tors or types of enterprise.
For example, the DGB and the German 
Ministry of the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) have been running a project 
called ‘resource efficiency in firms’ 
since 2008. Members of work councils 
and employees are trained to recognise 
and implement ways to improve energy 
efficiency. The training is part of a pro-
gramme leading to a certified degree as 
‘efficiency expert’. The concept estab-
lished in the pilot project is expected 
to be suitable for application in other 
areas (Kraemer, 2009). Training for 
‘green reps’ in the UK is also supported 
by government grants (see Box 5.5). In 
some countries, trade unions take care 
of further training of their members. 
For instance, the Danish Metalwork-
ers Union (Dansk Metal) includes in 
its educational programmes skills that 
are needed in ‘green tech’ (Jorgensen, 
2009). The Swedish Association of Sci-
entist (Naturvetarna) organises coach-
ing for members to be able to sell new 
green skills on the job market (Olsson, 
2009). Employer associations often 
offer training programmes and coun-
selling related to climate change, energy 
savings, green technologies, environ-
mental protection and related legal 
matters. Employers’ associations which 
provide training courses on energy sav-
ings for members include the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber (WKÖ) or 
Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s 
Corporations (IPOSZ). Educational as 
well as advisory services are provided 
for members by others, including Bel-
gium’s FEB (http://www.energyeffi-
ciency.be), the CBI, Ireland’s IBEC, the 
Swedish SN and GZS  Slovenia.
Awareness raising5.4.3.2. 
Social partners often collaborate with 
public authorities on various aware-
ness-raising campaigns, including 
conferences and workshops, publish-
ing brochures and leaflets or creating 
special websites. Employers’ organi-
sations and trade unions seem to be 
equally active and some initiatives are 
taken jointly. These campaigns are pri-
marily targeted at members but often 
also the public at large.
The United Federation of Dan-
ish Workers (3F) advocates ‘energy 
 strategies in enterprises — based on 
worker involvement’. It published a 
brochure to encourage bottom-up ini-
tiatives. The aim is to motivate work-
ers to propose energy-saving initiatives 
at their workplace. Advice to workers 
includes how to identify areas where 
energy efficiency can be improved, 
how to communicate and present new 
ideas to management, define common 
targets, prepare action plans, imple-
ment and evaluate strategies. The 
TUC has launched monthly online 
newsletter and organises an annual cli-
mate change conference (Broughton, 
2009b). Spanish unions collaborate 
with national and regional authorities 
and NGOs on the promotion of renew-
able energy sources which includes 
a general awareness campaign, the 
promotion of the national renewable 
energy research and development plan 
and efforts to increase workers’ aware-
ness on the use of renewables (ETUC, 
2005: 42). As early as 1990, the Ger-
man Mining, Chemical and Energy 
Trade Union (IGBCE) established the 
first union environmental founda-
tion in Europe, the Foundation Work 
and Environment. The foundation has 
been committed to the promotion of 
humane workplaces and environmen-
tal and living conditions in an advanced 
industrial society. Since its inception, it 
has supported projects, studies, train-
ing and consulting, events and a regu-
lar environmental award to implement 
these goals (Kraemer, 2009).
Agoria, one of Belgium’s largest sectoral 
employers’ organisations (metalwork-
ing and technology industries) has set 
up a ‘green companies’ campaign in 
order to highlight the job potential of 
‘green’ technology (Van Gyes, 2009). 
In order to inform member companies 
about climate policy and eco-innova-
tions, the German Association of the 
Automotive Industry (VDA) published 
a brochure on ‘environmental manage-
ment in the supply chain of the auto-
motive sector’ ( Kraemer, 2009).
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Employers’ organisations campaigns 
are often linked to the promotion of the 
environmental side of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). For example, the 
Confederation of Finish Industries 
(EK) coordinates a business network 
to disseminate business practices and 
it has also published a company guide 
on how to self-evaluate CSR perform-
ance (Jokivuori, 2009). FEDIS, the 
Belgian commerce employers’ organi-
sation, was the first sector organisation 
which reached an agreement in 2009 
with the Federal Minister for Climate 
and Energy to organise a campaign on 
environmentally friendly consump-
tion. (Van Gyes, 2009)
Research, environmental 5.4.3.3. 
labels and other promotional 
activities
In addition to training and campaign-
ing there is a large range of concrete 
actions that social partner organisa-
tions in Europe take to facilitate the 
shift to a low-carbon economy, includ-
ing research, and quality and environ-
mental labels. German social partners 
appear to be particularly active in 
research. In order to promote techno-
logical innovations and research, in 
2009 German BDI together with the 
Federal Ministry BMU launched an 
award for technological innovation in 
climate and environmental protection 
(Kraemer, 2009). This type of activity 
can be found also in countries where 
the low-carbon economy is not high 
on the agenda. For example, the Fed-
eration of Greek Industries (SΕV) runs 
the Sustainable Development Council 
which supports research and studies 
on environmental issues. The Spanish 
trade union confederation CCOO and 
its Institute for Work, Environment 
and health (ISTAS) set up a Reference 
Centre for Renewable Energies and 
Employment in 2006. Its purpose is the 
monitoring and analysis of develop-
ments concerning renewable energy, 
employment creation and related skills 
(http://www.istas.ccoo.es).
The Swedish trade union LO and the 
Swedish National Society for Road 
Safety have jointly set up the organi-
sation QIII ‘Quality of road transport 
contracts’ which has developed a pro-
curement tool and awards the QIII 
quality certificate that assesses the sup-
ply chain of heavy road transport pro-
viders according to three criteria: the 
working environment; safety and; the 
environment. Currently used by more 
than 100 manufacturing and retail 
companies, the scheme’s assessment 
determines which companies may or 
may not be awarded freight contracts 
(http://www.q3.se; Dupressoir 2009). 
The Swedish Confederation of Profes-
sional Employees (TCO) incorporates 
a company called ‘TCO Development’ 
(http://www.tcodevelopment.com) 
which is responsible for the TCO cer-
tification system. It certifies IT equip-
ment that has been designed for the 
benefit of both the user and the envi-
ronment (Olsson, 2009).
The Danish social partners organise a 
so-called ‘Energy camp’ which brings 
together social partners, researchers 
and company managers. Participants 
develop concrete climate change ini-
tiatives to the benefit not only of the 
participants but also as recommenda-
tions to national policymakers, such as 
a regional-level roadmap for biofuels 
in local public transport (Jorgensen, 
2009). Spanish trade unions (UGT-
Aragon) surveyed the way workers 
came to work in industrial sites in the 
region in order propose to local and 
regional authorities to adapt public 
transport to the benefit of workers and 
the climate.
Conclusions5.4.4. 
The considerable variation in the 
nature and extent of social partner 
activities on climate change, evident 
from this review of recent initia-
tives, can be related to a number of 
 influences. First of all, the number 
of years that climate change policies 
have enjoyed the attention of social 
partners, government and the public 
seems to correlate with the approach 
taken. While in many EU15 Member 
States environmental protection and 
climate change have been high on 
the agenda for many years and social 
partners have been reflecting green 
issues in their activities for a long 
time, in other countries the issue is 
still rather new. This is mostly the 
case in the EU12 and also some of the 
southern European countries.
Second, while some EU Member 
States and their social partners are 
pioneers in environmental protection 
and climate change mitigation policies 
and actions, EU policy has also been 
important in stimulating the crea-
tion of national policies and conse-
quently on actions of social partners. 
The Spanish social dialogue tables on 
climate change, and the lobbying by 
social partners in almost all Member 
States in relation to the EU’s 2008 cli-
mate change package, illustrate this. 
EU climate change policy and its con-
sequences are important drivers for 
shifting the issue higher on the agenda 
in the majority of EU Member States.
Third, how national social partners 
deal with the issue depends also on 
national industrial relations regimes. 
Only in Member States where social 
partner organisations have a certain 
degree of operational capacity do 
their activities regularly reach beyond 
reactive lobbying. National traditions 
are also reflected in this policy area. 
For example, in Germany, a concrete 
and intense company-level social 
dialogue is facilitated by numerous, 
rather disconnected sectoral initia-
tives. National, cross-industry dia-
logue and coordination are, however, 
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not  prominent. In the Netherlands, 
environmental and energy policy fea-
ture high on the agenda of the SEC. 
Conversely, bipartite and unilateral 
lobbying initiatives are far less impor-
tant; social partners usually refer to 
SEC positions. Similarly, in Belgium, 
the search for consensus and tripar-
tite cooperation has enabled all actors 
to address the employment conse-
quences of climate change policies in 
the tripartite social dialogue. In the 
UK, the work of green representatives 
is particularly prominent in the public 
sector and in utility companies where 
trade union density is strong com-
pared with most of the private sector.
An interesting aspect of trade union 
involvement with the transition to a 
low-carbon economy is that it some-
times forms part of a trade union 
renewal strategy. This is most promi-
nent in the case of the green trade 
union representatives of British trade 
unions and, in several countries, the 
cooperation with environmental 
NGOs that can attract the interest of 
employees that might otherwise not 
become active, or indeed members. 
This is consistent with the embrace 
of ‘social movement unionism’ by 
some trade unions towards achiev-
ing renewal. Under this approach 
trade unions expand their objectives 
to include non-work issues (e.g. race, 
ethnicity, gender and environment) 
and advance positions as independent 
stakeholder representing larger social 
interests in democratic politics (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006: 30f).
Despite the many examples cited in 
this section, in the majority of Mem-
ber States the low-carbon economy 
and its employment consequences 
appear to remain marginal items on 
the agenda of social partners. This 
reflects two things. First, national 
authorities are dominant actors in 
this field, i.e. they are either addressed 
through lobbying or they cooperate 
with or fund social partner organisa-
tions in informational and awareness-
raising activities. Second, unilateral 
action prevails, which may be due to 
the fact that social dialogue has not 
yet established a consensus on areas 
of common interest and has not yet 
established procedures and instru-
ments to jointly regulate or promote 
steps to a low-carbon economy.
European social 5.5. 
partners’ activities 
related to the transition 
to a low-carbon economy
In parallel with the national level, 
influencing policymaking is the most 
dominant activity of the social part-
ners at EU level. The European social 
partners in six sectors have issued 
joint opinions and some have started 
to study the consequences of the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy and 
related best practices in their autono-
mous bipartite dialogue. As yet, there 
are no instances of bipartite autono-
mous regulation at European level. At 
the company level, however, there are 
a few transnational agreements which 
address climate related issues.
Influencing policy5.5.1. 
Unilateral activities5.5.1.1. 
Cross-industry European  
social partners
The ETUC made the issue of climate 
change a priority of its sustainable 
development strategy in 2002. It drew 
up a first ‘union proposal for a Euro-
pean policy on climate change’ in 
2004 (ETUC, 2004), followed by the 
adoption of positions on proposed EU 
climate change legislation, including 
the Green Paper on energy efficiency 
(2005), revision of the EU Emissions 
trading directive (2007), the climate 
change and energy package, and its 
proposal concerning CO2 emissions 
from new passenger cars (2008). It 
contributed position papers to sev-
eral Conferences of Parties (COP) of 
the Kyoto Protocol, in which it called 
for the addition of a labour and social 
dimension to the international climate 
change regime.
In parallel with some national trade 
unions, the ETUC joined a civil soci-
ety coalition, as of 2001, with the 
European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB) and the Platform of Euro-
pean Social NGOs (Social Platform). 
Each year, the three organisations 
issue common recommendations 
for a social and sustainable develop-
ment of Europe to the EU Council’s 
Spring Summit. Their 2008 contribu-
tion focused on the social and envi-
ronmental dimension of the energy 
and climate package. In 2009, these 
organisations created the Spring 
Alliance, a broad civil society net-
work that adopted a manifesto on the 
Europe 2020 Strategy, which included 
the call for green and quality jobs.
The climate change package was also 
the occasion, in 2008, for a joint decla-
ration with one of the cross- industry 
European employers’ organisation, 
CEEP. The ETUC and CEEP warmly 
welcomed the package, in particu-
lar the announced involvement of 
the social partners, and expressed 
their willingness to contribute to the 
expected transition with their experi-
ence, their organisational structures 
and their ability to find solutions for 
undertakings and workers via social 
dialogue in order to anticipate and 
avoid negative effects or at least to 
mitigate them. The two social part-
ners also called for a coordinated ini-
tiative by Member Sates on skills for 
a low-carbon economy.
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The ETUC’s position is summed up in 
its resolution ahead of the Copenha-
gen climate summit (ETUC, 2009) as 
‘there is (…) an urgent need to launch 
the third European industrial revolu-
tion based on green, sustainable and 
decent jobs and massive investment in 
low-carbon technologies’. It advocates 
an ambitious, binding and compre-
hensive international agreement, but 
insists on strong provisions to safe-
guard European companies’ interna-
tional  competitiveness so as to ensure 
that businesses in countries without a 
strong emissions programme do not 
receive an unfair advantage. It also sets 
out ‘just transition’ principles: tripar-
tite social dialogue, green and decent 
Box 5.6: European social partners’ positions on climate change policies–ETUC
‘The ETUC demands that workers and their representatives be considered as crucial players with whom the European Union must engage 
in a dialogue and negotiate the transition to a low-carbon economy that will provide sustainable jobs and social progress.
Therefore, in summary, the ETUC demands:
an ambitious, binding and comprehensive international agreement aiming to limit the global rise in temperatures to maximum 2 °C, in •	
accordance with the scenarios laid down by the IPCC, reducing at least 25 % to 40 % by developed countries, by 2020, below 1990 levels;
an enhanced European contribution to finance the global mitigation of climate change;•	
to improve European governance, support the ambition of the European recovery, specifically by implementing stronger Community •	
policies in the industrial and research fields;
climate change legislation must contain strong provisions dealing with international competitiveness in order to ensure that nations that •	
lack a strong emissions programme do not receive an unfair advantage;
free allocations of quotas to energy intensive industries exposed to international competition, provided that they are based on the best •	
available technologies and are complementary and not alternative to a border compensation mechanism to be activated from 2013 if glo-
bal distortion of competition is not corrected.; the introduction of genuine carbon traceability (…). The search for international sectoral 
agreements is the main solution, but carbon traceability constitutes a technical condition for their establishment and a powerful incentive 
for their implementation;
to create a European agency charged with setting the benchmarks and the generalised carbon traceability of all products. This agency •	
should be open to social partners;
to fix clear rules for the carbon market with appropriate legislative instruments, in order to avoid speculations on rates and excessively •	
erratic fluctuations, and to forge ties between the European market and the other regional markets; (…)
to promote global and coordinated R & D initiatives; (…)•	
a European low-carbon industrial policy based on a dynamic of Community industrial coordination that will transcend intra-European •	
divisions and the damaging effects of the demands for short-term profitability from industrial investments.
Just transition and high-quality jobs
A European low-carbon transition strategy must be based on ‘just transition’ principles: dialogue between government, industry and trade unions 
and others on the economic and industrial changes involved; green and decent jobs; investment in low-carbon technologies; new green skills.
National, regional and sectoral studies on the policies linked to climate change and their impact on employment and labour markets need •	
to be systematically conducted.
At European level the creation of a permanent instrument to ensure the anticipation of socioeconomic transition is urgently needed, to •	
coordinate existing instruments such as sectoral councils and reinforce dialogue between the social partners and public authorities. In this 
framework the EU must commit itself to the challenges of industrial restructuring with which the new Member States are confronted.
This coordinating instrument would receive sustainable development impact studies and will be able to participate in the definition of the •	
specification of legislation as well as the implementation and follow-up.
European technology platforms developing low-carbon technological products and processes should ensure the participation of trade •	
unions in their governance systems (…).
The creation of an international fund and of a European fund to facilitate the development of technologies producing low-carbon emis-•	
sions and of technologies based on energy efficiency and renewable energies in the developing countries, as well as to develop employment 
policies based on social protection, the promotion of decent work and public services.
(…)•	
Skills monitoring and matching policies should be reoriented towards the anticipation of these changes.
A fair transition guaranteeing the creation of bridges designed to help workers in shrinking sectors to find jobs in expanding sectors, while •	
protecting their wages, their working conditions and their trade union organisations.
‘Every workplace can be a green workplace. There is mounting evidence that unions are taking action to tackle climate change. Therefore, we ask for 
new and extended rights relating to the protection of health and of the environment at work, and for the provision of training and skills related.’
ETUC (2009), Climate change, new industrial policies and exiting the crisis, Brussels.
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jobs,  investment, new green skills, 
with an emphasis on anticipation and 
management of change, and new and 
extended rights relating to the protec-
tion of health and of the environment 
at work (see Box 5.6). Following the 
onset of the financial and economic 
crisis, the ETUC linked recovery 
measures to a green industrial policy 
and called for more support for work-
ers that are negatively affected by a 
shift to a low-carbon economy (a ‘low-
carbon economy  adaptation’ fund).
BusinessEurope has always given 
detailed input on all aspects of EU 
climate and energy policy at political 
and technical level. It broadly supports 
the EU climate change objectives, but 
insists that industry’s international 
competitiveness and energy security 
should not be harmed by unilateral EU 
action. It is of the view that Europe has 
the potential to position its economy 
to take advantage of the global shift to 
a low-carbon economy, but that it also 
faces major challenges.
In the field of climate change, Busi-
nessEurope acts within the Alliance 
for a Competitive European Industry 
together with three sectoral European 
employers’ organisations (Euratex, 
Eurelectric, Eurofer) and eight other 
industry associations. The declared 
objective of this alliance is ‘to pro-
mote the competitiveness of European 
industry on a global scale and to help 
address Europe’s radical transforma-
tion towards a sustainable and low-
carbon future’. The Alliance regularly 
addresses technical positions to the EU 
Institutions and Member States repre-
sentatives.
BusinessEurope’s positions on the 
ECCP and international climate nego-
tiations (see Box 5.7) are to a large 
extent similar to those of the ETUC. 
However, it does not advocate border 
compensation mechanisms, such as a 
carbon tax on imports, and insists on 
the maximum amount of free allow-
ances permitted in the revised ETS 
 Directive from 2013 oriented towards a 
realistically achievable benchmark (4). 
BusinessEurope argues that European 
businesses have already implemented 
expensive CO2 emission cuts and that 
Europe cannot provide the solution 
alone. This has to include all sectors 
and regions in the world through 
multilateral agreements in order to 
avoid carbon leakage. It insists on a 
transparent comitology procedure, 
i.e. discussions with Member States’ 
administrations on technical implant-
ing measures, with close  consultation 
with stakeholders.
4 Under the ETS an exception is made for 
installations in sectors that are found to be exposed 
to a significant risk of ‘carbon leakage’, i.e. the risk 
of increased emissions if companies relocated 
production to areas outside the EU that are not 
subject to comparable emission constraints. 
Installations in these sectors receive 100 % of their 
share in the annually declining total quantity of 
allowances for free, but will be benchmarked against 
the best achievers in their (sub-)sector.
In terms of employment, Business-
Europe opposes a division between 
‘green jobs’ with growth potential on 
the one hand and ‘brown jobs’ on the 
other hand. Instead, the intercon-
nection between sectors and a wider 
process of the greening of jobs, has 
to be taken into account. ‘Conven-
tional industries enable green sectors 
to develop environmentally friendly 
products whereas ‘green sectors’ 
facilitate adoption of new innova-
tive technologies in the production 
processes of conventional industries’. 
It argues for employment and social 
policy measures aimed at improving 
flexibility accompanied by efficient 
public employment services, active 
labour market policies and training. 
Companies and workers must be able 
to adapt quickly to new markets, pro-
duction processes and job opportuni-
ties. It warns of a fast developing skills 
mismatch and observes that European 
Companies are already struggling 
Box: 5.7: European social partners’ positions on climate 
change policies — BusinessEurope
In the view of BusinessEurope, for companies it is essential to operate in a predictable EU 
policy framework which integrates climate protection, energy security as well as competi-
tiveness concerns. The EU policy agenda should include in particular:
implementation of the revised EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), ensuring that it does •	
not hurt the competitiveness of European industry;
fostering a truly global and balanced climate agreement, including the world’s major emitters;•	
development of an overarching EU energy policy, creating the clear strategic framework •	
needed for definition of a coherent and effective climate policy;
strengthening of EU research and capabilities in low-carbon technologies;•	
full exploitation of the cost-effective energy efficiency possibilities that fall within the •	
ambit of business, consumers and the public sector;
facilitation, reform and expansion of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms (clean develop-•	
ment mechanism and joint implementation) to make a contribution to climate protection.
‘The fight against climate change will remain at the highest level of priorities. European 
business has made great efforts to reduce CO2 emissions under the Kyoto protocol rules. 
It is committed to continue doing so. Climate change will not be solved by EU unilateral 
actions and cannot be driven only by rules. If the European Union wants to lead in the fight 
against climate change, it should put a much greater emphasis on technology. European 
Companies have a lot to offer! But much more could be done with appropriate policies to 
address obstacles to innovation, skills shortages, lack of venture capital, and under-devel-
opment of entrepreneurship. (…) Renewable energies, nuclear power, carbon capture and 
storage and other new technologies are essential to meet the challenges of security of sup-
ply and climate change.’
BusinessEurope (2009), ‘Go for growth — An agenda for the EU for 2010–14’, Brussels.
164
Industrial Relations in Europe 2010
with  shortages in particular of STEM 
skills, for example electrical engineers 
in the  renewable energy sector. VET 
and life-long learning policies should 
be  oriented towards adapting mid-
level qualifications to the low-carbon 
economy, for example in the building 
sector. In order to improve anticipa-
tion, closer collaboration between 
higher education institutions, schools 
and businesses should be fostered 
(BusinessEurope, 2010).
CEEP commented on the Commis-
sion’s initial proposal for the energy 
and climate package on just one occa-
sion. However, it regularly takes posi-
tions on transport and energy policy. 
In 2006, it also issued a joint statement 
with the ETUC on climate change 
policy and its consequences for social 
partners (see above).
UEAPME is also less prominent in the 
public discussion on climate change, 
but is very active in influencing poli-
cies with direct relevance for SMEs 
like energy market regulation, energy 
and eco-efficiency, or energy perform-
ance of buildings. It also contributed 
to the stakeholder consultations in the 
run-up to the ETS review and issued 
a position paper for the Copenhagen 
climate summit that also insisted on 
ambitious and clear commitments 
from other industrialised but also 
from emerging and developing coun-
tries. In 2009, UEAPME adopted 
a position paper on the impact of 
climate change on employment. In 
its view, SMEs are rarely directly 
affected by the main instrument, the 
ETS Directive, but indirectly through 
demand and electricity price effects. 
However, SME dominated sectors like 
building or renewables have employ-
ment growth potential, in contrast for 
example to road transport. In order 
to realise these transitions, measures 
for the management of change and its 
social consequences — as also elabo-
rated by the European social partners 
(see Chapter 6) — should take the 
low-carbon dimension into account. 
Problematic sectors need to be identi-
fied and measures to facilitate transi-
tions, training and support services to 
business and innovation put in place. 
Public authorities should inform com-
panies and workers about the conse-
quences of climate change in order 
to enable them to prepare and adapt. 
Adopting the flexicurity principles 
should make workers and businesses 
fit for transitions. Skills shortages are 
identified as likely barriers for SMEs 
investing in expanding activities.
Sectors
European organisations representing 
workers and employers in different 
industry sectors are prominent in try-
ing to influence climate change related 
policies at EU level. Most of this lobby-
ing is individual or in coalitions of busi-
ness organisations and trade unions 
respectively. On the employer side, the 
activities of the Alliance for a Com-
petitive European Industry have been 
mentioned above. On the trade union 
side, the European Metalworkers’ Fed-
eration (EMF) and the European Mine, 
Energy and Chemical Workers’ Feder-
ation (EMCEF) are particularly vocal. 
On the whole, European trade union 
organisations tend to be less involved 
in technical working groups in the 
European climate change programme 
than their employer counterparts and 
have rarely replied to consultations on 
specific legislation.
Sector specific trade union policy 
positions are often similar to indus-
try organisations, as demonstrated 
through the joint statements outlined 
in Section 5.4.1.3 below. But in addi-
tion, Europe’s trade unions stress the 
need for a just transition that includes 
dialogue with government and public 
authorities, investing in green tech-
nologies, and anticipation of skills 
needs and related training. For exam-
ple, in particular the EMF advocates 
the establishment of European sec-
toral skills councils in order to make 
skills forecasting more specific for the 
needs of specific sectors, in particular 
regarding skills needs for the low-
 carbon economy.
Structured social partners’ 5.5.1.2. 
input in the EU climate 
change policymaking at 
technical and political level
As explained in Section 3.3, climate 
change related policy itself relies  rather 
on technical expertise of business 
associations than on a dialogue with 
and among social partners. The ECCP 
established the practice of technical 
working groups for the involvement 
of stakeholders in the preparation and 
implementation of legislation and poli-
cies. This included a working group 
on the ETS review and — following 
the adoption of the climate change 
package — several working groups on 
implementing measures that are to be 
taken by the Commission after agree-
ment of the Council (comitology), like 
auctioning of emission allowances, or 
the allocation of free allowances and 
the definition of benchmarks. The con-
cerned sectoral business organisations, 
but also BusinessEurope, take an active 
part in these working groups, whereas 
trade unions are hardly engaged in this 
process. However, different Commis-
sion services regularly consult both 
sides of industry in their European 
sectoral social dialogue committees on 
climate change, energy, transport and 
other policies.
The Commission acknowledged in 
its communication proposing the cli-
mate change package that ‘the process 
of change to a low-carbon economy 
will also need to be accompanied by 
the appropriate involvement of social 
partners, in particular at  sectoral  level’ 
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(European Commission, 2008b). The 
ETUC (once jointly with CEEP), 
UEAPME and the European Social 
Dialogue Committees for the Steel, 
Gas and Chemicals Sectors have 
asked the Commission to establish a 
dedicated consultation mechanism 
in different statements so that the 
employment situation can be moni-
tored and exchanges facilitated with 
all concerned services of the Com-
mission. The European cross-industry 
social partners requested jointly to be 
systematically consulted by the Com-
mission on the employment conse-
quences of climate change related 
policies at the Tripartite Social Sum-
mit in October 2008. The Commission 
currently works with them on practi-
cal options for a dedicated consulta-
tion mechanism that adds value to 
consultation processes already avail-
able under the ECCP, the European 
sectoral social dialogue and other sec-
tor-specific stakeholder groups.
Joint opinions of European 5.5.1.3. 
sectoral social dialogue 
committees
European social partners in eight sectors 
have agreed on joint positions linked to 
the transition to a low-carbon economy 
in their official European social dia-
logue (see Table 5.3). The proposal for 
the EU climate and energy package was 
instrumental in triggering the European 
social  dialogue in this field.
In 2008, the European social partners 
in the steel, chemicals and extrac-
tive industries sectors adopted joint 
positions on the climate and energy 
package and, in particular, on the 
ETS Directive, thus adding weight to 
the largely converging positions they 
had taken individually on different 
occasions. Each of these statements 
points out the specificity of energy-
intensive industries and insists on 
an  ambitious, comprehensive and 
 binding  international agreement, 
and on the immediate identification 
of sectors at risk of carbon leakage so 
as to avoid prolonged uncertainty for 
investment. Other European sectoral 
social dialogue committees drew the 
attention of EU institutions to sector 
specific concerns. The construction 
industry pointed out the significance 
of energy efficiency of buildings 
and lobbied for measures that will 
 stimulate the necessary investment. 
Social partners in the wood sector 
warned of the consequences of pref-
erential treatment of the use of woody 
biomass for energy production as 
against its use as a raw material for 
wood based products. The European 
social partners in the railway sector 
jointly called on the  Commission to 
speed up its work on a review of the 
Eurovignette Directive that should 
ensure the internalisation of external 
costs to the environment and health 
caused by road freight transport.
Table 5.3: Joint opinions of European sectoral social dialogue committees
Steel — EMF and Eurofer
Commission proposal for the revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (26.6.2008)•	
EU climate change policy (25.5.2010)•	
EMF and Eurofer called upon the decision-makers in the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to improve the proposal on the 
revision of the EU ETS so as to ensure a fair balance between climate change measures and competitiveness and high-quality jobs. They high-
lighted eight points, which reflect the general stance of industry, for example the immediate identification of sectors at risk of carbon leakage so as 
to avoid prolonged uncertainty for investments, as well as a few steel industry specific considerations.
In the follow-up to the Copenhagen climate summit, EMF and Eurofer warned of a unilateral EU energy reduction target of 30 % and put the focus on an 
international global verification and monitoring methodology. EU financial support should be conditional on third countries’ participation in monitor-
ing. They also call for border adjustment or other measures as the ultima ratio and increased corporate and private investment. For the first time, both 
sides of industry call for ‘accompanying measures to manage the social consequences of the EU ETS’. There was a ‘need for a sectoral strategy, developed 
in concert with the social partners as well as public authorities, to maintain employment and promote training and skills development for workers’.
Chemical industry — EMCEF and ECEG
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (29.9.2008)•	
The European Chemical Employers Group (ECEG) and the European Mine, Energy and Chemical Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) draw attention to 
the specificity of the chemical industry, insisted on the risks for energy intensive industries and on the necessity to identify immediately the sectors at 
risk of carbon leakage. They also state that ‘in case of compensation measures at EU borders, the complexity of most of value chains prevents efficient 
protection against competitive distortion for all downstream products’. Finally, they also ‘urge the Commission to create a tripartite European body 
(Administration/Trade Union/Employers) for dialogue and regular monitoring of sectoral evolution and contribution to energy policy’.
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Extractive industries — EMCEF and Euromines, Eurocoal, IMA Europe, APEP
COP 15 and its impact on EU extractive industries (19.11.2009)•	
EU Commission’s climate package of 23 January 2008 (21.5.2008)•	
The extractive industry social partners argued that location of industry within Europe depends on realistic, achievable and internationally agreed 
targets and instruments (international agreement), a reliable framework of industrial innovations and investment (speedy identification of sectors 
at risk of carbon leakage and free allocation based on sector specific benchmarks; no restrictions to joint implementation and clean development 
mechanism; special treatment of efficient existing installations) as well as competitive prices (measures for electricity prices). Given that European 
power plant technology is a world leader in efficiency the steady replacement of old coal fired power plants by new ones should not be put at risk.
In their joint position on COP 15 the social partners insisted that the goals and objectives of climate policy must also live up to social and 
economic realities and requirements, as they could otherwise not be achieved. The European extractive industry expressed deep concern about 
the EU adopting climate change measures unilaterally. They recalled the European extractive industry’s economic, social and environmental 
contributions and insisted on an EU negotiation position that would help to maintain industry ensure international competitiveness through an 
international emissions trading system and on transitional measures for European energy intensive industries.
Wood — EFBWW and CEI-Bois
European Commission’s proposal for a directive on renewable energy sources (10.6.2008)•	
Recognition of wood-based products as carbon stores with a positive contribution to climate change (24.10.2006)•	
The first time that a European social dialogue committee made a joint contribution related to the low-carbon economy was a joint statement advocating 
the recognition of wood-based products like furniture and elements of construction as carbon stores by European Federation of Building and Wood-
workers and the European Confederation of Woodworking Industries in 2006. They call for an end of subsidies to energy installations using woody bio-
mass under national biomass action programmes as this would distort the wood raw materials market and jeopardise wood-based industries. The same 
conflict between the use of woody biomass for energy production and its use as raw material products triggered the latest statement on the Renewables 
Directive in the EU energy and climate package. The social partners suggested a promotion scheme for products made of renewable materials and speak 
out in favour of sustainability criteria for biomass, which would be sustainable forest management in the case of woody biomass.
Construction industry — EFBWW and FIEC
The global economic crisis and its consequences for the European construction industry•	
Emerging from the crisis: Fostering growth and jobs for a sustainable construction industry (29.1.2010)•	
Call for quick actions to channel public investment into sustainable construction and support the prompt revision of the framework regulations of the 
cohesion policy, which allows raising the ceiling of how much Member States can spend from the Regional Development Fund on energy-efficiency 
improvements in buildings. EFBWW and FIEC encourage the drive towards zero-energy new buildings and underline the need for the emphasis for 
existing buildings to be put on insulation, heating equipment and the control of heating and air-conditioning systems. They request that the discus-
sion on the Energy-Efficiency of Buildings Directive and the objective of zero-energy should be extended to all existing buildings. In their joint opin-
ion on the crisis they insisted that the construction industry has a major role in reducing CO2 emissions as buildings being currently responsible for 
42 % of EU final energy consumption and producing about 35 % of all greenhouse emissions. They give their full support to the EU’s climate change 
package and insist on proper implementation through the necessary regulatory and application through financial instruments.
Rail transport — ETF and CER, EIM
Internalisation of external cost in transport for an acceleration of Community activities (17.4.2007)•	
Call on the Commission to speed up its work on a review of the Eurovignette Directive that should ensure the internalisation of external costs to 
the environment and health caused by road freight transport. In the view of the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), the Community 
of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) and the European Rail Infrastructure Managers (ERM) the Directive does not ensure 
a level-playing field with rail transport and hampers its development at the expense of social welfare and the environment. During the revision in 
2009, the European social partners have not reacted jointly.
Gas — EPSU, EMCEF and Eurogas
Joint submission to consultation on: ‘Towards a new energy strategy for Europe 2011–20’ (2010)•	
A joint response on the employment and social dimension of future energy policy. The Commission should devote more attention to this dimen-
sion and indicate likely employment consequences of different scenarios. The emerging skills and competency problems should be urgently 
addressed and the social partners should be involved in Commission impact assessments. While the social partners appreciate information given 
at their social dialogue committee meetings, they consider that the upcoming challenges require more structured consultation.
Electricity — EPSU, EMCEF and Eurelectric
Joint response to public consultation: ‘Towards a new energy strategy for Europe 2011–20’ (23.6.2010)•	
A joint response on the employment and social dimension of future energy policy. The Energy DG and social partners should explore ways to cooperate 
in addressing the social dimension of future energy policies based on the latter’s toolkits on restructuring and age management. The Commission should 
also define a process to involve social partners in the impact assessment of new policy measures. Based on their current study on job skills needs and a 
just transition to a low-carbon economy the social partners want the Energy DG to work together to identify measures to tackle job skills and needs.
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Autonomous European 5.5.2. 
social dialogue initiatives 
concerning the  
low-carbon economy
In addition to their activity aimed at 
influencing policy, European social 
partners have started to explore an 
autonomous sphere of action through 
their social dialogue or projects related 
to the low-carbon economy, i.e. they 
develop their own social dialogue 
agenda around the issue.
European cross-industry  5.5.2.1. 
social partners
The ETUC, BusinessEurope, CEEP 
and UEAPME included climate 
change in their work programme for 
2009–10. They have launched joint 
research on the employment dimen-
sion of climate change related policies 
(including ‘green’ jobs and impact on 
skills) and intend to develop a com-
mon view on this topic. The objective 
is to help the European social partner 
organisations to better understand the 
impact of climate change policies on 
labour markets and to assess what the 
role of the social partners at national 
level is or could be in this area. The 
idea is to identify positive examples of 
how companies and/or social partners 
approach the issue across a range of 
industries, sectors and/or regions. In 
addition, they aim to reach conclusions 
on the consequences for employment 
(policies) and general and/or specific 
skills development, which would con-
tribute to the EU’s ‘New Skills for New 
Jobs’ initiative. Based on this project 
the European social partners intend to 
develop ‘a joint approach to the social 
and employment aspects and conse-
quences of climate change policies 
with a view to maximising opportuni-
ties and minimising negative effects 
and to identify possible joint actions’ 
(European social partners’ autono-
mous work programme for 2009–10).
European sectoral social 5.5.2.2. 
partners
Low-carbon economy issues now fea-
ture on the work programme of eight 
out of 40 European social dialogue 
committees (agriculture, chemicals, 
construction, electricity, extractive 
industries, steel, furniture and wood), 
compared to only one in 2006 (steel). 
For example, the social partners in the 
postal services sector agreed to put 
‘environmental issues and impact on 
jobs’ on the work programme of their 
European social dialogue committee 
for the first time in 2010. Employers in 
particular had argued for the impor-
tance of the topic within the social dia-
logue committee. The social partners’ 
objective is to discuss green solutions as 
part of the environmental pillar of CSR. 
There is an increasing demand for green 
solutions in areas such as the reduc-
tion of CO2 emissions in operations, 
the reduction of energy consumption, 
responsible paper use, or the depletion 
of natural resources. An overarching 
question is how ‘green employment’ in 
the sector will impact on current jobs. 
The committee will subsequently share 
best practices among companies and 
trade unions based on a survey. Eure-
lectric and EMCEF are preparing a 
toolkit on how employers and unions 
can ensure a just transition through the 
project ‘Climate change, employment 
impact and just employment transition 
principles for the European electricity 
sector’ (2010/11). The toolkit will be 
developed from a report analysing the 
impact of measures to address climate 
change in the sector on jobs, skills and 
qualifications.
Trade unions in particular seem to use 
projects to lay the ground for a more 
substantial social dialogue on the 
transition to a low-carbon future. For 
example, a transnational partnership 
of mining trade unions around the 
Trade Union of Mining and Energy 
Workers of Hungary explores the 
‘future of miners and the role of social 
partners — climate change and their 
impact for employment in the mining 
industry’ (2009/10). The EMF aims 
to improve transnational exchange 
among employees’ representatives and 
trade unions in the European wind 
energy industry sector through its 
project ‘Stronger workers’ represen-
tation in the European wind energy 
sector’. It wants to organise workers, 
create European trade union networks 
and improve transnational informa-
tion, cooperation and participation 
of employees. The project was initi-
ated by the German IG Metall and is 
executed together with trade unions 
from France, Spain and Denmark. 
The European social partners in agri-
culture, EFFAT and GEOPA-COPA 
explore the economic, environmental 
and social consequences of climate 
change in agriculture, in particular in 
the Alpine regions and with regard to 
water  supply in Europe (2009/10).
The low-carbon economy has thus 
entered the European social dialogue 
over the last five years, even if it remains 
largely restricted to the influencing of 
policymaking. As mentioned in Part 2, 
a low-carbon economy implies transi-
tions in all sectors, but in some they 
are more immediate than in others. 
Of those that are likely to be affected, 
only the European social partners in 
the transport sectors have so far not 
made the low-carbon economy a topic 
of their social dialogue.
European company level5.5.2.3. 
A small number of transnational texts 
negotiated by trade unions and man-
agement at company level include pro-
visions on environmental protection 
and climate change. In the period from 
mid-2007 to late 2009 such provisions 
are found in eight out of the 49 joint 
texts concluded worldwide (Commis-
sion calculation). These  provisions, 
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which are usually one aspect among 
others addressed in the texts, com-
monly refer to the reduction of the 
environmental impact of the com-
pany’s operations at large. For exam-
ple, Statoil Hydro and ICEM/Industri 
Energi (International Federation of 
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General 
Workers’ Unions and its Norwegian 
member) agreed measures to ‘cooper-
ate to ensure that StatoilHydro activities 
are carried out with the fullest possible 
regard for the environment’ as early as 
1998. The text also addressed human 
rights, industrial relations and health 
and safety questions. Union delegates 
from countries where Statoil Hydro has 
operations receive ‘appropriate train-
ing in health, safety and environmental 
best practices’. Other examples are the 
texts concluded at Enel, Arcelor Mittal, 
Lafarge, SCA, or  Freudenberg (non-
exhaustive list). 
The 2009 international framework 
agreement concerning the social 
responsibility of the EDF Group 
addresses also environmental protec-
tion, but furthermore includes explic-
itly ‘exemplary actions by EDF Group 
companies and employees in the area 
of the environment, in particular in 
the fight against climate change and 
the preservation of biodiversity’ as 
well as ‘the promotion of energy eco-
efficiency for clients and within the 
companies of the Group’.
Conclusions5.6. 
The transition to a low-carbon econ-
omy is both a necessity and an oppor-
tunity for business, employment and 
the quality of life. It will have a pro-
found impact on large parts of the 
labour market and throughout a wide 
range of sectors, in terms of employ-
ment structures and skills needs, and 
needs to be well-managed. A European 
Employment Observatory Review 
 concluded recently that most countries 
lack a strategic direction and an opera-
tional set of instruments to fulfil this 
task (European Commission, 2010). 
Social partners have demonstrated 
that they can contribute to this transi-
tion and they certainly have an impor-
tant role to play in the management of 
the  employment consequences.
Drawing on the conceptual framework 
used in the 2008 Industrial Relations 
Report to analyse the role of the social 
partners under the Lisbon Strategy, 
the chapter has distinguished, and 
reviewed, three main forms of social 
partner intervention on climate change 
issues: influencing policy and lobbying; 
regulation through agreements and 
‘softer’ guidelines; and activities to sup-
port implementation of climate change 
policies and practices. Social partner 
initiatives have largely focused on the 
first and third of these, with as yet 
 relatively few examples of the  second.
The state remains the main actor pro-
viding the framework through poli-
cies in the areas of climate changes, 
energy efficiency, transport, state sub-
sidies, taxes, etc. Therefore, first and 
foremost, social partners have drawn 
attention to the expected business and 
employment impact of policy initia-
tives and try to shape them. Employers’ 
organisations appear to provide more 
regular and specific input, including 
of a technical nature. Trade unions 
tend to concentrate on the main 
policy issues and insist on the antici-
pation and management of employ-
ment impacts. The transition to a 
low-carbon economy differs, however, 
from sector to sector and it is notice-
able that in many sectors both sides 
of industry often reach joint positions 
which identify their specific concerns. 
The transition creates winners, losers 
and pressure on many sectors and/or 
professions. Therefore, tensions and 
conflicts can arise not just between 
management and labour but between 
sectors or between the social partners 
and the legislator. This raises the par-
ticular challenge for employer and 
trade union confederations of closing 
the ranks between ‘greener’ and ‘tradi-
tional’ sectors. The organisational den-
sity of employers’ and trade unions is 
stronger in ‘traditional’ industries and 
energy intensive sectors, and fears of 
job loss combined with concerns over 
a loss of international competitive-
ness may lead to resistance to climate 
change initiatives. In contrast, the 
ongoing change is seeing the emer-
gence of new companies, and even 
new sectors, and raises the challenge 
of organising firms and workers and 
establishing social dialogue in these 
companies and sectors. 
What distinguishes social partners 
from other interest groups is their 
capacity to enter into agreements and 
commit their members to implement-
ing them. Although collective agree-
ments addressing climate change issues 
are as yet rare, workplace and company 
social dialogue on energy efficiency 
and saving as well as other green issues 
is spreading, including through some 
transnational agreements. To date also, 
climate change tends to be addressed 
as one amongst a range of issues within 
relevant agreements.
High-quality industrial relations, 
characterised by representative organ-
isations with strong capacities and 
expertise, wide coverage of collective 
bargaining and social dialogue, strong 
employee participation at the work-
place and relationships based on trust 
and mutual respect can contribute to 
resolving a range of problems, includ-
ing restructuring, employment transi-
tions and skills mismatches. From this 
perspective, the challenges thrown 
up by climate change adaptation and 
mitigation are similar to those arising 
under other structural changes in the 
economy, which social partners have 
successfully addressed over the  recent 
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period. In this context, the recent 
examples from Belgium, Spain and 
the UK of tripartite or ‘multipartite’ 
dialogue on the anticipation of the 
opportunities and challenges that the 
low-carbon economy entails signal a 
proactive and coherent orientation to 
the transition. 
In terms of activities to support the 
implementation of low-carbon poli-
cies and practices, in many Member 
States the social partners are making 
an impressive contribution through 
training initiatives, campaigns, 
research and promotion of  quality 
and environmental labels. In this 
respect, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations act as partners for pub-
lic authorities and also for civil soci-
ety organisations. The extent to which 
they play this role depends clearly on 
their administrative capacities.
The commitment expressed at the EU 
level to dialogue over the economic 
and employment consequences and 
implications of climate change is 
striking. European social partners at 
cross-industry level and in a number 
of sectors have started to study these 
issues and to address them in their 
autonomous dialogue and in joint 
statements to the EU institutions. 
At national level, large differences 
remain between the social partners’ 
positions and actions in different 
Member States. For many the low-
carbon economy is not yet a priority. 
Which role social partners play con-
tinues to depend on the economic 
and social framework conditions in 
the country and on the organisation 
of industrial relations. Nonetheless, 
there is a clear trend towards pay-
ing increased attention to the tran-
sition to a low- carbon economy in 
 industrial relations in Europe.
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Introduction6.1. 
The dialogue between the representa-
tives of management and labour is 
one of the fundamental pillars of the 
European social model and its promo-
tion is enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 
as an objective of the EU’s social 
policy. To this end, autonomous dia-
logue at the level of the EU between 
the social partners — trade unions 
and employers’ organisations — takes 
place within the framework of social 
dialogue committees. These commit-
tees are the place where both sides of 
industry are consulted on relevant EU 
policy initiatives and impact assess-
ments, and where they can discuss 
issues of common interest, launch 
joint actions or negotiate binding 
agreements that could become EU 
legislation. The cross-industry social 
dialogue committee is the forum for 
discussing topics that affect workers 
and employers across the entire econ-
omy, while issues concerning specific 
sectors of the economy are on the 
agenda of the 40 sectoral social dia-
logue committees in existence today. 
These sectoral committees cover more 
than three quarters of the European 
workforce, so that almost 145 million 
employees throughout the EU come 
under their remit. Taken together, 
the cross-industry and sectoral social 
dialogue committees are vital compo-
nents of the EU’s governance structure 
in employment and social policy.
The past two years have seen a 
continuation of the trend towards 
 increasing coverage of the economy 
by sectoral social dialogue commit-
tees. Three new committees have 
been launched during 2010 at the 
joint request of the respective Euro-
pean social partners. 2010 has thus 
seen the first meetings of the Euro-
pean social dialogue committees 
European social dialogue continued to deliver tangible outcomes for workers and 
employers across Europe in the past two years, with a record number of binding 
agreements being signed and implemented. The economic crisis was at the fore-
front of discussions between social partners, leading to a number of joint actions 
but also to disagreements. With the creation of several new committees, the trend 
towards increasing coverage of the economy by sectoral social dialogue has continued 
 unabated, showing that the interest among European social partners in this instru-
ment remains high.
Chapter 6: European social dialogue developments 2008–10
Box 6.1: Principles of European social dialogue
The important role of the social partners as representatives of management and labour 
in the governance of the European Union and in the European social model is rec-
ognised in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Lisbon Treaty), complementing 
national social dialogue and industrial relations systems. The new Article 152 at the 
beginning of the Treaty’s social policy title makes it incumbent on the European Union 
as a whole to promote the role of social partners and to facilitate their dialogue. The 
role of the Tripartite Social Summit, which regularly brings together the cross-indus-
try social partners with the European Commission and the Council Presidency at the 
highest levels, is also acknowledged in the Treaty. In addition, according to Article 154 
(ex Article 138 TEC), the European Commission has a specific duty to promote the 
consultation of the social partners and to take measures to support social dialogue. In 
this context, the Commission must consult the social partners twice on each legislative 
proposal in the social policy field: first on the possible direction of EU action, and in 
a second stage on the content of the Commission’s proposal. At each of these stages, 
in addition to submitting joint or separate opinions and recommendations, the social 
partners have the option to inform the Commission that they wish to start formal 
negotiations on the matter under consultation. The social partners then have nine 
months to reach an agreement, during which time the Commission cannot proceed 
with its own proposal.
The process of negotiating binding agreements at EU level is laid down in Article 155 
of the Treaty (ex Article 139). The cross-industry and sectoral social partners are free 
to conclude agreements either in response to a Commission consultation or of their 
own initiative, and once a text is adopted at the level of the European social part-
ners, the Treaty foresees two possibilities for implementation. First, agreements can be 
implemented in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management 
and labour and the Member States, which means that the responsibility for imple-
mentation falls primarily on the national social partners (autonomous agreements). 
The European social partners play a primary role in monitoring the implementation 
of such autonomous agreements. Second, the social partners can make a joint request 
to the Commission to submit their agreement to the Council for a decision. In prac-
tice, this procedure results in a Council directive containing the social partner agree-
ment and the European Parliament is informed. Just like any other directive, it is then 
the obligation of the Member States to ensure the implementation of the agreement’s 
provisions, and the Commission will monitor the corresponding transposition. As an 
alternative to national transposing legislation, Article 153 of the Treaty (ex Article 
137) permits a Member State to entrust national social partners with the implementa-
tion of a directive’s provisions. While the European social partners are not prevented 
from concluding autonomous agreements on any subject matter of their interest, the 
option of implementation by Council directive is only possible for agreements in the 
social policy field as defined in Article 153 of the Treaty (ex Article 137).
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in the metal, paper and education 
sectors, while the European social 
dialogue for central (government) 
 administrations may soon be formal-
ised following a two-year test phase. 
Furthermore, social partners in the 
agro-food industry and sports sec-
tor are currently respectively explor-
ing the possibility of a sectoral social 
dialogue committee.
This chapter reports on the main 
developments in European social 
dialogue during the past two years. 
These were anything but ‘business 
as usual’ as a result of the economic 
crisis. European social dialogue 
commonly deals with a wide variety 
of topics, ranging from skills devel-
opment to health at work and gen-
der equality. In the last two years, 
however, the economic crisis has 
forced its way onto the agenda of the 
 European social partners and into 
many a discussion around the dia-
logue table. The present chapter will 
therefore first review the activities of 
the cross-industry and sectoral social 
dialogue committees in response to 
the crisis and the related topics of 
restructuring, training and skills. The 
second section then summarises the 
activities of the committees in other 
fields, such as health and safety, cor-
porate social responsibility, sustain-
able development, gender equality 
and the reconciliation of personal 
and professional life. Further infor-
mation on recent developments in 
European sectoral social dialogue is 
available in the publication ‘Euro-
pean sectoral social dialogue: recent 
developments — 2010 edition’, which 
contains detailed summaries for each 
of the sectors engaged in social dia-
logue at European level (1).
1 Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/social/Blob
Servlet?docId=6008&langId=en
The crisis  6.2. 
and European social 
dialogue
The activities of the European social 
dialogue committees that are related 
to the economic crisis can be broadly 
classified into two categories. First, 
brought about by the urgency and 
severity of the recession, some social 
partners undertook immediate joint 
actions that specifically addressed the 
crisis. Second, in many committees, 
much ongoing activity assumed par-
ticular relevance in light of the crisis, 
such as joint actions in the fields of 
restructuring, change management, 
labour market and employment issues, 
training, skills development and flexi-
curity. Besides the activities of the 
European social dialogue committees 
analysed in this chapter, further activ-
ity, and measures, to address the crisis 
at a European level were taken by the 
social partners within multinational 
companies through European works 
councils (see Box 6.3 and Boxes 3.9 
and 3.10 in Chapter 3).
Joint action on the crisis6.2.1. 
The most severe economic crisis in 
the history of European integration 
has become a topic for discussion in 
all of the social dialogue committees, 
although some of the sectors were less 
affected than others and the impacts 
differ greatly between industries, 
as Chapter 2 shows. Accordingly, 
the way in which social partners 
addressed the crisis at the level of 
European social dialogue has varied 
widely since 2008. Some commit-
tees decided that there was no added 
value to be gained from attempting to 
undertake joint actions or analysis in 
response to the crisis. Despite inten-
sive efforts, in March 2009 the cross-
industry social dialogue committee 
failed to agree on a joint declaration 
Box 6.2: Commission staff working document  
on the functioning of European sectoral social dialogue
After more than a decade of experience with European sectoral social dialogue, the 
European Commission published a staff working document in mid-2010, assessing 
the functioning of the sectoral social dialogue committees and proposing possible 
improvements (SEC(2010) 964).
The European sectoral social dialogue committees were set up by the Commission 
on the basis of the Commission decision of 20 May 1998 in order to strengthen the 
sectoral dimension of European social dialogue, in accordance with Articles 154 and 
155 of the Treaty (ex Articles 138 and 139). Since 1998, the Commission has created 
40 sectoral social dialogue committees, which cover 145 million workers in Europe 
and sectors of crucial importance (such as transport, energy, agriculture, fisheries, 
maritime policy, public services, etc.). These committees have issued around 500 texts 
of varying legal status — going from joint opinions and responses to consultations, to 
agreements that have been implemented through European directives and have thus 
become part of EU legislation. Despite the overall success of these committees, there 
is still room for improvement. Through this document, the Commission intends to 
encourage the European and national sectoral social partners to fully use their area 
of negotiation, reinforce their administrative capacity and create synergies between 
sectors. Within this framework, the European Commission also encourages the inte-
gration of new players as well as better participation of representatives from the new 
Member States.
The full text of the Commission staff working document on the functioning and 
potential of European sectoral social dialogue is available online (http://ec.europa.eu/
social/BlobServlet?docId=5591&langId=en).
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on actions to address the crisis. This 
was due to fundamental differences 
about the causes of the economic cri-
sis, which resulted in equally incom-
patible positions with respect to the 
immediate measures to be  adopted. 
Within the context of the more 
medium-term and  forward-looking 
Europe 2020 strategy, however, the 
social partners achieved consensus 
around a joint statement in June 2010 
(see Box 6.4).
At the same time, a number of  sectoral 
social dialogue committees  decided 
that joint action was indeed  warranted. 
As a result, agreement was reached on 
joint statements or declarations in 
the chemical  industry,  construction, 
road transport,  commerce, live 
 performance and regional and local 
government  sectoral social dialogue 
committees, each addressing the cri-
sis and measures to mitigate its effects 
and taking account of the specificities 
of the sectors. In addition, the social 
partners in the banking sector have 
Box 6.3: European social dialogue at the company level
In addition to European social dialogue at cross-industry and sectoral level, dialogue between the representatives of management 
and labour also takes place at the level of transnational companies, including through European works councils. Since 2000, a rapidly 
increasing number of texts have been concluded between the management of a company and workers’ representatives on a variety of 
issues and cover establishments and/or undertakings located in several countries. The Commission’s services have recorded about 
200 joint transnational texts in 100 companies employing together 9.8 million employees. The conclusion of transnational company 
agreements is a key factor in the development of the European actors’ future capacity to conduct a social dialogue in keeping with the 
increasingly transnational nature of company organisation, and the need to anticipate change and have strategies to deal with it.
The 200 or so texts include worldwide international framework agreements on fundamental rights and social responsibility as well 
as texts addressing specific European issues such as anticipation of change and management of restructuring, development of joint 
health and safety standards, common strategies on equal opportunities, mechanism for transnational financial participation, rules 
on cross-border data protection, joint principles on human resources policy, training or mobility. In general, the conclusion of tran-
snational texts appears to be a European-driven process, as the vast majority of companies that have concluded such agreements are 
headquartered in Europe. European works councils play a key role in concluding these texts, as almost all transnational agreements 
relating to Europe bear their signatures (see Chapter 7 for legal details and developments regarding the European Works Council 
Directive). 
Of the transnational texts addressing specific European issues, the anticipation of change and management of restructuring has not 
only been prominent but also the focus of innovative measures. Some agreements have addressed concrete restructuring proposals 
and plans. For example, the series of agreements concluded at General Motors Europe have been instrumental in avoiding plant 
closures, mitigating redundancies and distributing them more evenly. In the event that closures and redundancies take place, other 
agreements have provided measures for internal or external employment redeployment and/or guarantees over terms and conditions 
for employees being transferred. A recent example is the 2010 agreement between the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) and 
Alstom and Schneider Electric concerning the consequences of the takeover of Areva’s transmission and distribution businesses.
Further agreements elaborate a framework of principles for handling, and a range of measures to address, any restructuring that 
might occur. The broader objective is to realise restructuring in a socially responsible manner. An example is the 2009 agreement 
between EMF and ArcelorMittal, which also envisages a role for social dialogue in anticipating potential restructuring. An anticipa-
tive dimension is foremost amongst another group of agreements, whose objective is to anticipate change and its likely impact on jobs 
and skills across companies’ European operations. For example, the 2010 agreement between the European Public Services Union 
(EPSU) and GDFSuez provides, through observatories and social dialogue, for forward-looking management of jobs and skills in 
every European subsidiary of the group.
Against the background of an increasing internationalisation of corporate activity, and given the particular responsibilities of the EU 
in this regard, there is a need to promote and support the further development of transnational company agreements as a means to 
anticipate and manage change in a socially responsible manner. Given the absence of any framework for transnational agreements, 
questions have been raised concerning in particular the transparency of the texts concluded, the actors involved, the legal nature, the 
effects and the dispute settlement of such agreements, whenever they go beyond the status of general declarations of principle.
An expert group was set up in 2009 by the Commission, bringing together representatives of the social partners and Member States, 
with the aim to look into the questions raised by the development of transnational company agreements and design actions that might 
help to promote and support further development in this area. Practical, legal and political questions related to the discrepancies 
between the transnational scope of the agreements and the national norms and references are amongst the questions being considered 
by this group. The European Commission also commissioned a study on international private law aspects and dispute settlement 
related to transnational company agreements and launched a study on the legal effects of company agreements. The Commission 
also provides financial support to related projects by the social partners. In addition, a searchable online database on transnational 
company agreements is under development.
Further information on transnational company agreements can be found online (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&lan
gId=en&intPageId=214).
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initiated an exchange on the impact of 
the financial crisis in an extraordinary 
meeting between the social partners 
in early 2009.
In chemicals, the European Chemi-
cal Employers’ Group and EMCEF 
adopted a joint declaration on the glo-
bal economic crisis in May 2009. This 
highlighted the severe effect of the cri-
sis on the chemicals sector and called 
for a series of measures to maintain 
and restore activity, competitiveness 
and employment in the sector. These 
included: support for companies and 
employees in facilitating short-time 
working and temporary lay-offs, so 
as to avoid permanent job loss; facili-
tating the use of such ‘downtime’ for 
training aimed at enhancing work-
force capabilities and adaptiveness; 
ensuring access to adequate credit 
and finance; stimulating economic 
activity through investment in public 
infrastructure, support for innovation 
consistent with sustainable develop-
ment and investment in education 
and skills; implementation of health 
and safety (REACH) regulations, and 
energy and climate change mitiga-
tion policies, in ways which accord 
greater prominence to the competi-
tiveness of the sector than hitherto; 
securing long-term access to energy 
supplies at predictable prices; fur-
ther investment in logistical infra-
structures across Europe; ensuring 
the effective functioning of the single 
market and combating protectionist 
tendencies amongst Member States 
and  internationally.
The social partners in construction, 
FIEC and EFBWW, adopted a joint 
declaration on the global economic 
crisis and its consequences for the 
sector in June 2009. Noting that the 
direct and indirect (amongst supplier 
industries) effects of the recession in 
construction activity threatened the 
jobs of 26 million workers, the state-
ment called for the public authorities 
at European, national and regional 
levels to adopt a number of concrete 
measures to sustain the sector. These 
included: accelerating public invest-
ment plans, including those in infra-
structure projects; boosting funding 
to speed up investment in energy-effi-
cient new building and improvements 
in existing buildings; ensuring access 
to loans and mortgages for house 
purchase and renovation; boosting 
provision of social housing; putting 
in place temporary unemployment 
schemes aimed at maintaining work-
ers’ income levels and facilitating 
training; and restoring stability to 
the financial system and bringing it 
under an effective regulatory system. 
In January 2010, FIEC and EFBWW 
followed up their earlier declaration 
with a ‘joint appeal’ to the EU and 
Member States, ahead of the Spring 
European Council, to step up action 
to foster the development of a sus-
tainable construction industry. They 
argued that current economic recov-
ery and stimulus programmes were 
insufficient and did not provide the 
long-term flow of public investment 
needed for the sustainable develop-
ment of construction. The social 
partners therefore called for priority 
investments in: energy-saving and 
–energy-efficient buildings and sys-
tems, and green public infrastruc-
ture; enhanced vocational training 
facilities for the construction sector; 
R & D and innovation; and access to 
credit for companies and individuals.
In road transport, the social partners 
— IRU and ETF — concluded a joint 
statement on the impact of the crisis 
on the sector in May 2009. This drew 
attention to the sharp decline in 
 activity, up to 50 % in some segments 
of the sector, and associated loss of 
employment involving an estimated 
140 000 temporary or permanent 
lay-offs across the EU. The statement 
proposed a six-point recovery plan 
for the sector, including measures to 
ensure access to credit, implemen-
tation of employment- preserving 
schemes such as short-time working 
arrangements in all Member States, 
incentives for additional training, 
investment in clean vehicle tech-
nologies and investment in the road 
transport infrastructure.
In a ‘joint reaction’ to the economic 
crisis formulated in December 2008, 
EuroCommerce and UNI europa 
— the social partners in the com-
merce sector — called for action to 
sustain consumer purchasing power, 
and thereby economic activity in 
the retail and wholesale distribu-
tion sectors, and to provide access to 
credit at affordable cost for compa-
nies. They also called for measures 
aimed at preserving employment 
and improving the skills base in the 
sector through boosting training. In 
May 2009, the social partners in the 
live performance sector — Pearle 
and EAEA — concluded a joint 
statement that highlighted the grow-
ing impact of the crisis on the level 
of activity in the sector, first through 
a reduction in public demand for 
live events and second via increasing 
indications that EU Member States 
are contemplating reductions in the 
public financing of culture as part 
of austerity measures. The statement 
also expressed concern at the nega-
tive impact on mobility of perform-
ers and performances across borders 
within the EU. Perle and EAEA 
called for measures to restore con-
sumer confidence, improve access 
to finance and credit for the many 
SMEs operating in the sector, sustain 
public funding support for the per-
forming arts and facilitate renewed 
mobility across borders.
In the public services, CEMR-EP 
and EPSU — the social partners 
for regional and local government 
— addressed a joint message to the 
Spring European Council  meeting 
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in March 2009. Their statement 
drew attention to the social effects 
of the crisis, which increasingly 
confront regional and local govern-
ment, as well as to the need to sup-
port local economies and business 
activity. These increased demands 
came alongside deterioration in the 
finances of regional and local govern-
ment as a result of business closures 
and difficulties. The statement called 
for adequate financial resources to be 
made available so that regional and 
local government could meet these 
heightened demands, and stressed the 
importance of maintaining employ-
ment in the sector. CEMR-EP and 
EPSU sent a further joint statement 
to the European Council in February 
2010, reiterating their 2009 message 
and calling on the Member States to 
take a long-term perspective when 
coordinating their responses to the 
crisis and to reflect in their recovery 
plans sustainable development in all 
its dimensions. They underlined that 
is was unacceptable that many local 
and regional governments were con-
fronted with decreasing revenue at 
a time when demands were increas-
ing, and called for sustainable financ-
ing through socially just taxation 
and other revenue streams, sufficient 
to allow local and regional govern-
ments to make long-term investment, 
including the capacity to maintain 
and develop competent and moti-
vated staff.
As the crisis deepened and spread 
throughout 2009, a further number 
of social dialogue committees 
decided to address the issue. The 
social partners in the woodwork-
ing sector issued a joint declaration 
on the economic situation in their 
industry in late 2009, welcoming 
concrete measures taken in some 
Member States such as reduced VAT 
rates for construction and renova-
tion. In addition, they called for the 
advantages of wood products to be 
recognised in international negotia-
tions on climate change. In Novem-
ber of the same year the Committee 
in the Furniture Sector approved a 
joint declaration about the difficult 
economic environment, in which the 
social partners called upon Euro-
pean and national authorities to take 
measures improving access to credit 
and credit insurance particularly 
for SMEs and stimulating demand. 
They also asked the authorities to 
avoid placing unnecessary burdens 
on the furniture industry and to 
improve and restore the interna-
tional competitiveness of the EU 
furniture industry by imposing the 
same social, environmental, health 
and safety requirements on imported 
furniture as those that apply to the 
sector in the EU.
The social partners in the inland 
waterway transport sector agreed 
upon a joint sectoral contribution 
to the Commission’s consultation on 
the future of transport in November 
2009, where they took the opportu-
nity to highlight the challenges faced 
by the sector in the context of the 
economic and financial crisis. The 
amount of freight transported had 
dropped to an alarmingly low level, 
with some commodities seeing their 
volumes drop by 70 %. The impact 
of the crisis was doubled because 
many new ships were ordered well 
in advance to meet the projected 
increase in demand and were now 
being delivered at a moment of over-
capacity. The result has been a race 
to the bottom in freight rates.
In a similar vein, the social part-
ners in the contract catering sector 
decided to act in late 2008 after it 
became clear that the impact of the 
 economic crisis on the sector was 
higher than originally expected. 
EFFAT and FERCO, the  European 
social partner organisation, agreed 
to exchange information and to look 
for common points and solutions in 
the spirit of the ‘Guide to the eco-
nomically most advantageous offer 
in contract  catering’ (2006). This 
guide promotes the integration of 
social considerations in public pro-
curement in order to avoid that 
competition based on costs only 
has detrimental impacts on employ-
ment, training provision and work-
ing conditions in the sector (2).
In November 2009, the social part-
ners in the audiovisual sector issued a 
joint opinion on protecting creativity, 
innovation and jobs. The text stresses 
the huge potential of the internet as 
a source of growth — and jobs — for 
the audiovisual sector. However, in 
order to preserve this potential, the 
audiovisual industry needs adequate 
protection against internet piracy. 
The social partners therefore called 
upon the Commission to: under-
take a survey quantifying the eco-
nomic effects of misappropriation 
of protected works an performances 
via the internet; formally adopt a 
strong stance against unauthorised 
file sharing and of protected works 
and performances; and acknowledge 
the need for effective enforcement of 
creator’s rights.
In some committees, discussion is 
still ongoing with a view to reach-
ing agreement on joint texts. The 
social partners in the textile and 
clothing, tanning and leather and 
footwear social dialogue committees 
are preparing a joint, multi-sector 
declaration on industrial policy. 
They wish to highlight that employ-
ment in these sectors had been 
hit  disproportionately hard by the 
2 Similar guides on social considerations in 
public procurement had been produced by the 
social partners in private security (1999), cleaning 
services (2002) and textile and clothing (2005). Their 
experience was relevant for the work of the European 
Commission, which published a comprehensive 
guidance document to ‘Buying social: a guide to 
taking account of social considerations in public 
procurement’ (SEC(2010) 1258).
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 financial crisis, even if the decline 
in production no greater than the 
average for the wider economy. The 
social partners plan to underline 
that the social and employment situ-
ation in these three sectors remains 
in a critical situation and  requires 
urgent action.
Finally, a number of projects are cur-
rently being carried out by the social 
partners in various Member States 
and sectors with a view to develop-
ing strategies to address the crisis 
and its social and employment conse-
quences and prepare an exit towards 
a new era of sustainable growth and 
 development.
Box 6.4: Social partner contributions to the Europe 2020 strategy
On 24 November 2009, the European Commission launched a public consultation on Europe 2020, a strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth for the years 2011 through 2020. During the consultation period, around 1 400 contributions from interested 
parties were received, including many European and national social partners at both cross-industry and sectoral level. In general, 
social partners stressed the need to invest in innovation and upgrade the skills base of the European economy while calling for a 
broader perspective than that of the consultation document. They recalled in particular that quality education is a public responsi-
bility and that education is not only a tool for the economy, but also has a vital role for social cohesion, equality, active citizenship 
and cultural diversity. They moreover called upon the Commission to make the exit from the current economic and financial crisis 
the EU’s number one priority, accompanied by a better regulation of financial markets, a stronger growth-oriented policy coordina-
tion, a stronger focus on the qualitative dimension of employment, increased access to finance, reduction of administrative burdens, 
modernisation of social protection systems, a sound immigration policy, and a more effective fight against increasing inequalities, 
poverty and social exclusion.
More specifically, the ETUC felt that the Commission’s perception of the sustainable dimension of growth is focused on climate 
change and energy rather than on the labour market. According to the ETUC, the strategy fails to address today’s major concern 
(making our economy sustainable) and does not address immediate priorities, but rather builds a strategy on a too distant time-
frame. In view of the spring meeting of the European Council, the ETUC issued a ‘message to the EU and Heads of Government’ on 
18 March 2010, calling upon the summit to address immediate priorities such as a new EU recovery plan with an emphasis on growth, 
a programme to support Greece, strengthening financial regulation and the social dimension of the EU strategy. BusinessEurope 
shared the ETUC’s view that 2020 is too long-term focused and calls for a reinforced focus on the urgency of a strategy. Their com-
prehensive analysis can be found in the ‘Go for growth’ publication available on their website (http://www.businesseurope.eu).
Under the 2009–10 work programme of the cross-industry social dialogue committee, the European cross-industry social partners 
are targeting such issues as active inclusion, the employment dimension of climate change related policies and a joint contribution 
to the Europe 2020 strategy, which they presented on 4 June 2010.
In their joint document, the European social partners agreed that a rapid return to more and better jobs should be Europe’s first short-
term objective. They believe the following objectives will be crucial for a successful recovery on a long-term: reforming the global 
financial system, restoring and improving growth dynamics to create more and better jobs, promoting skills and entrepreneurship, 
revitalising the single market, developing an integrated EU industrial policy, supporting new means of financing for investment, 
combating poverty and inequality. They identify social cohesion as a precondition for a dynamic and sustainable economy.
As regards employment and social policies, social partners believe that the Europe 2020 strategy should therefore strike the right 
balance between measures to address the employment impact of the crisis and reforms aimed at addressing Europe’s medium- and 
long-term labour market challenges. In concrete terms, an increase in EU growth rate to an average of at least 2 % should be the 
aim in coming years.
The European cross-industry social partners called upon Member States to implement the right mix of policy measures addressing 
flexibility and security dimensions (labour law and contractual arrangements, effective and high-quality active labour market poli-
cies, lifelong learning policies, efficient and sustainable social protection systems, social dialogue) and to review, and if necessary 
adjust, the design of labour law, job protection systems and collective bargaining practice, in cooperation with social partners. They 
also called for a supportive public environment and access to high-quality, affordable and effective public services as a prerequisite 
of business development and people’s welfare and once more called for the application of the European Small Business Act, including 
the commitment to the ‘think small first’ principles.
With respect to governance issues, they called for a sense of collective responsibility and an appropriate European framework ena-
bling the Europe 2020 strategy to be implemented in a coordinated and consistent way, and for benchmarking in order to pin down 
structural weaknesses at national level. They called for a stronger involvement of the social partners at all levels (European, national, 
regional and local levels) in the design and in the monitoring of both European and national reforms strategies and for support in 
developing their capacity where needed. In particular, social partners must actively contribute to the design and implementation of 
policy measures addressing the flexibility and security dimensions.
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Restructuring  6.2.2. 
and change management
No matter what the macroeconomic 
circumstances, restructuring and the 
anticipation of change have often fea-
tured prominently on the agenda of 
European social dialogue committees. 
In times of crisis, change is acceler-
ated and the pressure to restructure 
increases for companies and workers 
alike. These topics therefore acquire 
additional urgency, as the representa-
tives of management and labour bring 
first-hand experience of the effects of 
the crisis to the dialogue table.
In this context, between 2005 and 
2009 the cross-industry social part-
ners carried out a project in 26 Mem-
ber States, which specifically looked 
at the role of the social partners at the 
national, sectoral, regional and enter-
prise levels in economic restructuring. 
The first phase of the project under-
taken in 2005 and 2006 covered the 
2004 accession countries of Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. During this 
phase, the role of the social partners 
in restructuring was examined against 
the background of the enormous tran-
sition from command to market econ-
omies and subsequent job growth in 
certain sectors resulting from the 
direct and indirect effects of increased 
foreign direct investment.
The second phase of the project (2007–
08) involved 10 more Member States: 
Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
The restructuring that took place in 
many sectors in most of these coun-
tries reflected the growing importance 
of services and a parallel reduction 
of employment in manufacturing 
associated with attaining world com-
petitiveness. Although job reductions 
took place, the overall background to 
 restructuring was one of economic 
and employment growth, with Europe 
as a whole adding 7 million new jobs 
over the period 2000 to 2005. The bur-
den of job loss did not, however, fall 
evenly between sectors and regions 
and there were often sharp distinc-
tions between those who gained and 
those who did not.
The third phase of the project took 
place against the background of the 
financial and economic crisis that took 
hold toward the end of 2008. Work 
during 2009 with the social part-
ners in Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Romania 
was dominated by the impact of the 
crisis and the design and adoption of 
anti-crisis measures, to the exclusion 
of virtually all other issues. A final 
seminar was held in January 2010 in 
Brussels, where a synthesis report of 
the five-year project was presented 
by the project consultant. The results 
showed that the active engagement 
of the social partners in the manage-
ment of change consistently improved 
performance in restructuring out-
comes. There were practical examples 
of excellence in each case, whatever 
the national system of employment 
relations.
A project on restructuring was also 
carried out by the sectoral social 
dialogue committee for the chemi-
cal industry. Many different types of 
restructuring were identified, such 
as relocalisation, delocalisation, clo-
sures, offshoring, expansions, merg-
ers, outsourcings, etc. All these types 
of restructuring are becoming more 
complex and different viewpoints on 
how to respond were expressed by 
the social partners. Contrary to ini-
tial intentions, it was not therefore 
possible to prepare general guide-
lines on restructuring in the sector. 
Separately, the committee issued 
joint statements by the social part-
ners criticising some EU policies on 
chemicals and on climate change, 
since they feared that these initia-
tives could potentially threaten the 
competitiveness of the EU chemical 
industry. In their response to the con-
sultation on the Europe 2020 strategy 
they in particular underlined the sec-
tor’s leading role in innovation and 
research, as well as its key contribu-
tion to the provision of high-quality 
employment and training.
To help employers and trade unions 
better manage restructuring pro-
cesses, the European social partners 
in the electricity sector published 
a toolkit for socially responsible 
restructuring, including a best prac-
tice guide. This toolkit analyses the 
context of the restructuring in the 
industry (liberalisation, technologi-
cal change), the importance of social 
dialogue and the transparency of the 
process. It addresses the questions 
of outsourcing, training needs, off-
shoring, lifelong learning and health 
and psychosocial issues. It offers a 
practical checklist for the design of a 
restructuring strategy and presents in-
depth case studies.
In postal services, the crisis has com-
pounded the ongoing decline in mail 
volumes due to electronic substitution 
and the opening of the market to cre-
ate additional pressure on established 
postal operators. Accordingly, the 
social partners in the sector treated the 
crisis as an integral part of their work 
on the evolution of the sector, discuss-
ing how postal services are regulated 
with respect to their employment and 
social dimension in different Member 
States, and working towards an up-to-
date mapping of this social regulation 
across the entire European Union.
In similar work, the social partners 
in the railway sector published a joint 
report in February 2009 on the impact 
of European rail freight restructur-
ing on employment. The fundamental 
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objective of this report was to provide 
input for social dialogue, achieved by 
the organisation of seminars and visits 
to freight sites in six Member States. 
This was the first time that the social 
partners have addressed the subject 
of rail freight restructuring and its 
impact on employment on a European 
scale. The social partners concluded 
that staff numbers in the sector have 
been cut substantially due to insuf-
ficient productivity improvements 
and a decline in the market share. 
Railway companies have, with some 
exceptions, introduced social support 
measures. Restructuring has taken 
place, new job configurations have 
emerged and training has fostered 
enhanced competencies. Outright 
dismissals have been avoided through 
redeployment and early retirement. In 
addition to these changes, the sectoral 
trade union federation ETF empha-
sised the spread of job insecurity, the 
increase in geographical mobility and 
in working time in certain Member 
States and the coexistence of different 
contractual status for workers within 
the same company. Employers placed 
their emphasis on the survival of their 
companies, performance improve-
ments and cost control, notably 
through greater flexibility in order to 
respond to demand more effectively 
and to withstand the impact of cycli-
cal economic changes, and on efforts 
to find solutions for employees. The 
social partners’ joint objective is to use 
social dialogue to strike a balance that 
will be acceptable for both parties, 
notably between the economic and 
the social perspectives, occupational 
and family life, etc. However, they fear 
that the pressure of lower transport 
prices in general and for rail transport 
in particular may make certain devel-
opments more difficult.
In the civil aviation social dialogue 
committee, the development of func-
tional airspace blocks was a key topic 
in the context of the major sectoral 
restructuring affecting air traffic 
 management (the ‘Single European 
sky’). The corresponding working 
group of the committee issued a joint 
statement within the framework of the 
European conference on functional 
airspace blocks, where the social part-
ners agreed to assess once a year the 
progress made by their members as 
regards the consultation of workers. 
To this end the social partners jointly 
drafted a first questionnaire to assess 
the consultation process concerning 
functional airspace blocks during the 
feasibility study. In their assessment, 
the social partners pointed out that 
more precise and joint definitions 
on involvement levels are needed, 
although in general an information 
process had been activated. Social 
dialogue needed to be reinforced in 
the implementation phases. The trade 
unions felt informed and involved 
but not always sufficiently consulted 
nor treated as real partners, leading 
to dissatisfaction with the way the 
views of the employees were consid-
ered. On the other side, the provid-
ers were of the view that the levels of 
involvement of staff representatives 
was adequate, since no decisions 
had yet been taken, and that further 
consultations were foreseen on the 
possible social consequences of the 
development of functional airspace 
blocks. Based on these results, the 
social partners suggested discussing 
possible joint recommendations in 
the social dialogue committee.
In a related development, the Air Traf-
fic Controllers European Unions Coor-
dination (ATCEUC) and the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) 
signed a cooperation agreement on 18 
June 2009 to set up the modalities of 
cooperation between the two work-
ers’ organisations. ATCEUC and ETF 
mutually recognise each other as social 
partners in the air traffic management 
(ATM) field and as organisations 
that  represent air traffic controllers at 
European level. ATCEUC recognises 
ETF as the organisation that repre-
sents all other ATM personnel at Euro-
pean level. This agreement will ensure 
ATCEUC’s involvement in the sec-
tor’s social dialogue structures, which 
is extremely relevant with regard to 
the social partners’ role in the ambi-
tious ‘Single European sky’ initiative 
to reform the architecture of European 
air traffic control.
In September 2009, the social partners 
in the live performance sector pre-
sented a joint statement on Creativity, 
innovation and the role of the cultural 
sector. While appreciating that the 
European Agenda on Culture places 
artists and their work at the centre of 
creativity and wealth creation within 
a knowledge society, they called upon 
the EU to take account of the partic-
ularities of the sector and the way it 
functions. The EU and Member States 
should embrace policies that allow 
the performing arts to develop and 
expand and make them a more attrac-
tive sector in which to work, includ-
ing: by assuring the sustainability of 
the sector through its inclusion in 
economic recovery plans designed to 
stimulate investment and create jobs; 
by addressing employment and social 
protection issues in the sector in the 
context of mobility.
Labour market  6.2.3. 
and employment
In October 2008, the European cross-
industry social partners started nego-
tiations on an agreement on inclusive 
labour markets, which were success-
fully concluded in December 2009. 
The framework agreement on inclu-
sive labour markets was presented 
on 25 March 2010 on the occasion 
of the Tripartite Social Summit. It 
represents their fourth European 
autonomous agreement signed in 
the last seven years. The agreement 
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provides an important input for the 
European  Commission’s own agenda 
on inclusive labour markets and for 
the Europe 2020 strategy. The social 
partners see the agreement as provid-
ing practical tools that may be useful 
at national level.
The aim of the framework agreement 
is to make full use of Europe’s labour 
force potential, improve job quality 
and increase employment rates in 
the face of demographic ageing (see 
Box 6.5 summarising the agreement’s 
main features). It covers persons who 
encounter difficulties in entering, 
returning to or integrating into the 
labour market as well as those who, 
although in employment, are at risk 
of losing their job, but does not tar-
get specific groups. The framework 
agreement recognises that achiev-
ing inclusive labour markets is a key 
concern involving the shared respon-
sibilities of employers, individuals, 
workers and their representatives.
As an autonomous framework agree-
ment, implementation will be the 
responsibility of national social part-
ners, who have three years to do so. 
Yearly tables summarising the ongo-
ing implementation of the agreement 
will be prepared by the cross-industry 
social dialogue committee. A full 
report on the implementation actions 
taken will be prepared by the social 
dialogue committee and adopted by 
the European social partners in 2014.
Also addressing the topic of employ-
ment, the social partners in the con-
struction sector signed a joint opinion 
on self-employment and bogus self-
employment in February 2010. The 
text recognises the joint responsibility 
of social partners to prevent and com-
bat bogus self-employment practices, 
including through: preventive meas-
ures (awareness raising; social con-
siderations in public procurement; 
improved administrative coopera-
tion; simplified administrative pro-
cedures); promotion of supply chain 
responsibility; and efficient puni-
tive measures. European, national 
and regional authorities are urged to 
develop a set of common criteria for 
guidelines to determine the nature of 
individuals’ employment status and 
thereby to prevent and combat bogus 
self-employment. In similar vein, 
the social partners in the hospitality 
 sector are monitoring the extent of 
undeclared and illegal working prac-
tices in the sector and the various 
ways of addressing the problem at the 
national level (best practices). They 
aim to agree on a joint opinion con-
cerning undeclared work.
Training and skills 6.2.4. 
development
The development of skills and train-
ing opportunities for workers is a key 
strategy to address the challenges 
resulting from industrial change and 
restructuring, to improve employ-
ability and to facilitate mobility, all 
of which become even more press-
ing during an economic recession. 
European social dialogue committees 
have therefore continued their work 
on these issues.
Box 6.5: Main features of the autonomous  
agreement on inclusive labour markets
With their agreement, the social partners commit to take concrete actions to help disadvan-
taged people to enter, remain and develop in the labour market. To this end, the agreement 
includes a number of specific measures to be taken by the social partners, among which are:
awareness-raising campaigns;•	
dissemination of information about availability of jobs and training schemes;•	
cooperation with the ‘third sector’ to support those who encounter particular difficulties •	
in relation to the labour market;
cooperation with education and training systems in order to better match the needs of •	
the individual and those of the labour market;
promoting vocational education and training and measures to ease the transition between •	
education and the labour market;
introducing individual competence development plans (in line with the framework of •	
actions for the lifelong development of competences and qualifications) jointly elabo-
rated by the employer and the worker, taking into account the specific situation of each 
employer, particularly SMEs and worker;
promoting the development of means of recognition and validation of competences;•	
improving the transferability of qualifications to ensure transitions to employment;•	
promoting more and better apprenticeship and traineeship contracts.•	
The agreement also contains a list of recommendations to public authorities and other 
actors, including:
development or upgrading of skills through tailored education and training;•	
equal access to health, education, housing and social security services as well as access •	
to the basic utilities that play an important role in alleviating and addressing the impact 
of social exclusion;
effective use of existing financial instruments, including the European Social Fund, to pro-•	
mote and fund policies aimed at the integration of disadvantaged people in employment;
improvement of the availability and quality of adequate training offers for individuals •	
and employers, in particular taking into account the needs of SMEs and of people with 
the least qualifications;
reinforcement of an active participation of adults in further education and training, •	
 independent of their previous educational attainments.
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In this context, in 2009 the social part-
ners in the personal services sector 
reached an autonomous agreement 
introducing European Hairdressing 
Certificates. These certificates will 
attest the skills and competencies of 
hairdressers and salon managers on 
a European level and will be entirely 
compatible with the European Quali-
fications Framework (EQF). To this 
end, the European social partners 
have set up a joint secretariat to check 
national training standards against 
the competencies required for obtain-
ing the European certificate and to 
administer the overall certification 
system. The certificates will be issued 
to individuals through the national 
social partner organisations in the 
hairdressing sector.
In agriculture, the social partners 
agreed on two general templates con-
cerning ‘plant grower’ and ‘livestock 
breeder’ to be integrated into the 
taxonomy on European skills, com-
petencies and occupations, which is 
currently being developed. This ini-
tiative of the European Commission, 
outlined in its ‘New skills for new jobs’ 
communication of December 2008, 
will link skills and competencies to 
occupations in order to enhance the 
quality and transparency of vacancy 
information to improve matching 
between job seekers and vacancies.
In the hospitality sector, the European 
social partners are aiming to imple-
ment the European Qualification and 
Skills Passport by elaborating the list of 
skills and identifying countries inter-
ested in participating in the experi-
mentation phase. The social partner 
would also like to continue coopera-
tion with other sectors working on 
skills and qualifications and to ensure 
compatibility with other passports/
systems (Europass, EURES, EQF).
Skills development is also a priority 
issue for the European social partners 
in the commerce sector. In 2008 and 
2009 they have translated and dissem-
inated — with the financial support 
of the EU — the interactive European 
Commerce Competence e-learning 
tool. Six qualification modules teach 
core competences that are common 
across Europe. Successful completion 
could be certified by competent bod-
ies in the Member States, provided 
further efforts in this area. The cer-
tification could supplement national 
qualifications and should be particu-
larly useful in those countries that 
have no elaborate sectoral vocational 
training system as yet. It should thus 
increase mobility and make qualifica-
tions more transparent.
In contract catering, the social part-
ners are working on a training tool 
for food hygiene in the framework 
of a joint project. The tool is being 
created in electronic form (internet 
based), although a printable version 
will also be made available. Addressed 
to workers, it would contain a test 
to check that individuals have pro-
gressed through the training manual. 
It is planned that the tool also contains 
visual elements and consists of differ-
ent levels of training. This multilin-
gual tool will remain on a basic and 
simple level, with additional specifica-
tions for further in-depth training on 
particular issues possible in the Mem-
ber States.
In 2008, the Europen social partners 
for the temporary agency work sector 
carried out a joint project on training 
opportunities for agency workers. The 
main objective of the project was to 
assess the role temporary-work agen-
cies may play in facilitating transitions 
in the European labour market by pro-
moting vocational training opportuni-
ties for temporary agency workers. It 
also aimed to identify good practices 
that could be used to improve and 
increase opportunities for training 
in the sector. In the follow-up, social 
partners adopted a joint declaration in 
December 2009 on training for tem-
porary agency workers, highlighting 
the key role played by social partners 
in facilitating skills upgrading.
In 2009 and 2010, the social partners 
in the construction sector jointly 
worked on two projects related to 
skills and training. The first of these 
aimed at having discussions, col-
lecting information and comparing 
the qualifications framework in the 
Member States at different levels. The 
aim is to make qualifications more 
transparent at the European level. 
The second project aimed to compare 
the different qualifications systems 
systems of eight Member States and 
possibly find a common definition of 
the term ‘bricklayer’.
In 2009, in a context of substantial insta-
bility due to restructuring, the social 
partners in the sugar sector focused on 
the need to improve employability in 
their industry. To this end they organ-
ised a conference on employability in 
October 2009 in Brussels in the frame-
work of a project co-financed by the 
European Commission. This project 
resulted in a definition of the concept 
of employability, highlighted good 
practices in the sugar and the agro-
food industry as well as from outside 
these sectors, made recommendations 
concerning success and employabil-
ity factors, listed skills that should be 
developed and that are required in 
the sugar sector, gave an overview 
of European and national financing 
possibilities in 20 sugar producing 
countries, and provided a practical dic-
tionary defining concepts connected 
with employability. This information 
is presented in the form of an interac-
tive  computer-based tool, allowing the 
content to be progressively enriched by 
new contributions. The tool is available 
in multiple languages on the website 
of the sugar social dialogue committee 
(http://www.eurosugar.org).
183
Chapter 6: European social dialogue developments 2008–10
In the railways sector, the social 
partners organised a conference on 
employability in 2008, designed to 
implement the joint recommenda-
tions on the concept within a rail 
context that they had approved in 
late 2007. This conference allowed 
employers, trade unions, experts and 
other stakeholders to exchange views 
on the current status of and progress 
in the implementation of the recom-
mendations. With the help of specific 
examples of good practice, partici-
pants discussed the significance of the 
employability approach for the Euro-
pean railway companies and their 
employees. The European social dia-
logue committee continues to work 
on this issue and to closely support 
and promote the process of imple-
menting the strategy of employability 
in the various national contexts.
Through the ground handling working 
group of the civil aviation social dia-
logue committee, the European social 
partners jointly organised a confer-
ence on best practices on training and 
qualifications in this part of the sector 
in Granada in 2008. The conference 
highlighted the evolution of the Euro-
pean ground handling sector and the 
link between training, safety and the 
quality of service. Following the con-
ference, the European social partners 
acknowledged that the development 
of staff skills is an essential factor to 
deliver safe and qualitative services. A 
priority is to recognise the proficiency 
of employees, thereby improving their 
employability and facilitating the 
adaptation of the companies, which 
are confronted by new challenges in 
an international economy. The Euro-
pean social partners generally agree 
that it is vitally important to their 
industry that workers have the neces-
sary skills and qualifications to meet 
the challenges of a sustainable aviation 
market. They have therefore decided 
to examine several examples of good 
practice in a study conducted in 2008. 
As a result, the social partners signed 
a joint declaration in 2009, outlining 
their common understanding and 
examining joint initiatives.
The public urban transport working 
group of the road transport sectoral 
social dialogue committee carried out 
a project on service quality and new 
career paths for drivers in European 
public urban transport. In this frame-
work, the social partners discussed a 
future-oriented competence profile 
for European urban transport driv-
ers. Such a competence profile should 
make it possible to adapt the structures 
of work organisation and qualifications 
to the requirements of a high serv-
ice quality in public urban transport 
and to improve professional develop-
ment possibilities for the employees of 
urban transport enterprises, especially 
for the driving staff. The social part-
ners are working towards a common 
statement on recommendations and 
the next steps for their ongoing social 
dialogue in this field.
In September 2009, the social part-
ners of the maritime transport sector 
together with the Universities of Lon-
don, Nantes and Groningen launched 
projects addressing the training and 
recruitment of seafarers. The aim of 
these projects is to identify train-
ing needs, to enhance the image and 
attractiveness of the sector, to promote 
quality working and living conditions 
at sea and to develop the career path 
of seafarers.
In October 2008, the social partners 
in the audiovisual sector decided to 
step up their work on training and 
mandated a sub-working group to 
examine the professions of journalism 
and sound technician focused on: the 
training needs in the two professions; 
the current availability of training at 
national level, including the establish-
ment of an inventory of the studies 
and work already available; and the 
likely developments in the two profes-
sions. The group would then use the 
review of the two professions to con-
sider how the sectoral social dialogue 
committee could make a contribution 
enhancing training provision within 
the audiovisual sector.
Also in 2008, the European social 
partners in the live performance sec-
tor set out a project on theatre tech-
nical training in the European Union. 
A consortium of experts undertook a 
survey and produced a comprehen-
sive report that was presented and 
discussed at a training forum that 
took place in March 2009. Taking up 
the conclusions of the report and the 
forum, the social partners adopted a 
training action plan which contains 
a series of joint actions social part-
ners engage to carry out in the area 
of training. Two key priorities are the 
building of a communication platform 
on theatre technical training and the 
realisation of a road show visiting dif-
ferent parts of Europe to inform stake-
holders on training opportunities and 
ways to develop training in the sector.
Faced with increasing globalisation, 
the social partners in the textile and 
clothing sector agreed on the cru-
cial importance of early anticipa-
tion employment trends and training 
requirements to optimise the manage-
ment of jobs and skills of European 
workers and thereby the performance 
of companies. In 2009, in the context of 
the European Commission’s proposal 
to establish sector councils for jobs and 
skills, they finalised a project studying 
good practices on the matter and the 
feasibility of establishing a network of 
currently existing skills observatories. 
In the follow-up, the social dialogue 
committee has started to explore the 
set-up and working arrangements of a 
possible sector council. Similarly, the 
education, commerce, postal serv-
ices and tanning and leather sectoral 
social dialogue committees have also 
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expressed interest in becoming pilot 
sectors for the proposed European 
skills councils.
When setting up the new European 
sectoral social dialogue committee for 
the metal industry in January 2010, 
social partners agreed to focus the 
committee’s work in two dedicated 
working groups: one on training and 
skills and one on international com-
petitiveness and employment. Finally, 
the new European sectoral social dia-
logue committee for the education 
sector, launched in June 2010, under-
lines the implications of increasing 
attention to education, training and 
human resources development in EU 
policymaking in general.
Flexicurity6.2.5. 
Flexicurity, bringing together flexibil-
ity and security, stands for a combina-
tion of reliable and flexible contractual 
working arrangements, adequate and 
sustainable social protection systems, 
lifelong learning strategies and effec-
tive labour market policies. The Euro-
pean Council agreed on common 
principles on flexicurity in December 
2007, and the onset of the crisis in 
2008 has considerably enlivened the 
debate about the appropriate policy 
mix of flexibility and security in spe-
cific situations. In the context of the 
Europe 2020 strategy, the social part-
ners play a key role in the definition 
and implementation of the second 
phase of the flexicurity agenda. The 
European social partners in the cross-
industry social dialogue committed 
in their 2009–10 work programme to 
‘jointly monitor the implementation 
of the common principles of flexicu-
rity, notably to evaluate the role and 
involvement of the social partners in 
the process and to draw joint lessons.’
The European social partners’ commit-
ment to monitor the  implementation 
of the EU common principles of 
flexicurity was also welcomed by the 
European Commission in its commu-
nication of 3 June 2009 on a ‘shared 
commitment for employment’. On 
the basis of this commitment and 
the recommendations on flexicurity 
expressed in the joint labour market 
analysis, European social partners 
have decided to undertake joint work 
together with their national affiliates 
on the implementation of the flexicu-
rity principles.
The main objective is to assess the role 
of social partners at different levels in 
the implementation of flexicurity. This 
project also aims to promote trust 
and mutual understanding between 
the social partners so as to facilitate 
the implementation of the flexicurity 
principles at national level. In under-
taking this project, European social 
partners are building on their experi-
ence and results of the EU-wide joint 
study on restructuring that took place 
between 2005 and 2010 (see above). 
The full results of the project will be 
available in spring 2011.
Other themes  6.3. 
in European  
social dialogue
Despite the economic crisis, the Euro-
pean social dialogue committees con-
tinued to work on a large number of 
other topics. Progress was achieved in 
a number of committees on issues of 
health and safety at work, freedom of 
movement in the EU single market, 
working conditions, corporate social 
responsibility and sustainable develop-
ment, and gender equality and recon-
ciliation of personal and professional 
life. The long-term question of demo-
graphic changes was also on the agenda 
of several sectors, as was the subject 
of capacity building of social part-
ner organisations. Finally, a number 
of committees have been involved in 
a multi-sectoral  initiative to combat 
third-party violence and harassment.
Health and safety6.3.1. 
Traditionally, the area of health and 
safety features at the top of the list of 
topics that the social partners address 
in the European social dialogue com-
mittees. Despite the urgency of the 
Economic crisis that developed in 
2008 and 2009, the European social 
partners continued their ongoing 
work on this important policy area.
One issue that was successfully tackled 
by social partners during the report-
ing period concerned injuries in the 
hospitals sector. Injuries caused by 
needles and other sharp instruments 
are one of the most common and 
serious risks to healthcare workers in 
Europe and represent a high cost for 
health systems and society in general. 
On several occasions the European 
Parliament had  expressed concern at 
the life- threatening risks to healthcare 
workers from contaminated sharp 
instruments, since the existing leg-
islation, in practical terms, did not 
address the risk arising specifically 
from working with these. On 6 July 
2006, Parliament adopted a resolution 
on protecting European healthcare 
workers from blood-borne infections 
due to needle-stick injuries, request-
ing the Commission to submit a legis-
lative proposal for a directive.
Pursuant to Article 154 of the Treaty 
(ex Article 138), before submitting a 
proposal for legislation, the Commis-
sion launched in 2006 and 2007 a two-
stage consultation of the European 
social partners. In a joint letter of 17 
November 2008, EPSU and Hospeem, 
who are the European social partners 
in the hospitals and healthcare sector, 
informed the Commission of their 
intention of negotiating a framework 
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agreement on the prevention of sharps 
injuries in their sector.
Consequently, the Commission sus-
pended the drafting of its legislative 
proposal, awaiting the result of the 
negotiation process. After five months 
of negotiations, on 17 July 2009 the 
European social partners signed an 
EU-wide agreement. The social part-
ners’ agreement aims to achieve the 
safest possible working environment 
for employees in the sector and pro-
tect workers at risk. Its goal is to pre-
vent injuries to workers caused by all 
types of sharp medical objects (includ-
ing needle sticks). For this purpose an 
integrated approach to assessing and 
preventing risks, as well as to training 
and informing workers, is envisaged.
Following the agreement’s signature, 
the social partners requested the 
Commission to submit the agree-
ment to the Council for a decision, in 
accordance with Article 155(2) TFEU 
(ex Article 139(2) TEC). On 26 Octo-
ber 2009, after verifying the represent-
ative status of the signatory parties, 
their mandate and the compliance of 
each clause with EU law, the Commis-
sion adopted the proposal for a Coun-
cil directive, containing the full social 
partner agreement as an annex. On 11 
February 2010 the European Parlia-
ment supported the proposed direc-
tive in a resolution, and on 8 March 
2010 the Council reached political 
agreement on its adoption (3). The 
directive is a fundamental step toward 
the improvement of health and safety 
of patients, workers and employers 
in the hospital and healthcare sector. 
When implemented, it will dimin-
ish the occurrence of accidents and 
infections. The use of foreseen risk 
assessment, prevention, protection 
and training procedures will help to 
3 Council Directive 2010/32/EU of 10 May 
2010 implementing the framework agreement on 
prevention from sharp injuries in the hospital and 
healthcare sector concluded by Hospeem and EPSU.
achieve this result. Member States 
must take the necessary measures to 
comply with this directive by 11 May 
2013 at the latest.
In early 2009, the social partners in 
the personal services sector notified 
the Commission of their intention to 
enter into negotiations on a European 
framework agreement on the preven-
tion of health risks in the hairdressing 
sector. Towards the end of 2009, the 
negotiating teams reached agreement 
on a first draft text, which foresees 
detailed provisions regarding the han-
dling of materials, protection of the 
skin and respiratory tracts. It also aims 
to prevent musculoskeletal disorders, 
improve the working environment 
and work organisation, ensure mater-
nity protection and deal with problems 
related to the mental load. The social 
partners have signalled their intention 
to ask the Commission to present their 
agreement to the Council for a deci-
sion, once the agreement has been rati-
fied and signed by the European social 
partners. In this way the agreement 
would be implemented by EU legisla-
tion, according to Article 155(2) of the 
Treaty (ex Article 139(2)).
Given the importance of the issue 
for the sector, for some time, social 
partners in the live performance sec-
tor have been discussing possibili-
ties for more concrete action in the 
area of health and safety at work. In 
March 2009, they decided to create a 
working group on risk assessment. It 
aims to: map tools and practices that 
already exist in the sector in various 
Member States; assess the possibility 
of developing a concrete risk assess-
ment tool/guidelines tailored for the 
live performance sector on the basis 
of existing practices.
During 2010 the social partners in the 
telecommunications sector are car-
rying out a project to examine good 
practices in relation to the promotion 
of mental well-being in their sector. 
By reviewing existing knowledge and 
practice and producing good-practice 
guidelines, they aim to prevent work-
related mental health disorders and 
reinforce the link between good work 
and good health.
The social dialogue committee for 
postal services adopted a joint dec-
laration on accident prevention in 
their sector in June 2009, highlight-
ing the activities of the social partner’s 
accident prevention working group 
and the results that were achieved 
through the collection and exchange 
of best practices at a conference in 
Budapest and a technical seminar 
in 2008 in Brussels. In the declara-
tion the social partners commit to 
further work on the issue of accident 
prevention, including the ongoing 
dissemination of best practices and 
broadening the scope of the remit of 
the working group to include health 
issues related to occupational safety 
and accident prevention. The social 
partners express their conviction that 
accident prevention calls for a shared 
responsibility on the part of compa-
nies, employees and their unions, and 
they emphasis the importance of pre-
ventative systems to reduce risk situa-
tions and accidents, while promoting 
a safer working environment.
Four of the recognised social partners 
within the European social dialogue 
committee for civil aviation, AEA, 
ECA, ERA and ETF, jointly organ-
ised a conference in October 2008, 
addressing the concept of workplace 
health promotion (WHP) for air crew. 
The social partners agreed that preven-
tion of work-related illness (including 
accidents at work, occupational dis-
eases and stress) and increased well-
being at the workplace are a benefit 
to both employers and employees in 
the civil aviation industry. The confer-
ence covered critical aspects of stress 
management for air crew, work-life 
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 balance and air crew development 
and training and their impact on work 
health. The European social partners 
will continue to work together on 
the improvement of WHP in carriers 
operating within the European Union. 
They recognise their joint responsibil-
ity in matters concerning WHP and 
encourage their affiliates to engage 
in regular procedures of information 
and consultation of trade unions and 
staff representatives, including, where 
possible, negotiations on promoting 
work health for air crew.
A few months later, in March 2009, the 
social partners in the sector adopted 
a ‘Charter and guidelines for a just 
culture in aviation’ for continuous 
improvement in aviation safety. From 
the social partner perspective, there 
is a need to develop an atmosphere 
of trust in which professionals and 
organisations are encouraged to pro-
vide safety-related information. The 
charter and guidelines are a concrete 
tool for employers and employees to 
create such an atmosphere of trust 
and thereby advance aviation safety. 
The signatory parties hope that the 
forthcoming draft regulation by the 
Commission on civil aviation acci-
dents and incidents investigation will 
strengthen ‘just culture’ principles.
In early 2010, social partners in the 
woodworking sector organised a con-
ference on the reduction of formalde-
hyde exposure in their industry, which 
resulted in the publication of a booklet 
of best practices and a joint declaration 
by the European social partners. A few 
weeks later, a conference on reducing 
dust was held, which also produced an 
overview of best practices and a joint 
declaration on the subject of working 
conditions and wood dust.
In a joint working group, the Euro-
pean social partners in the construc-
tion industry drafted a guide for a 
health and safety management system 
for the construction sector. Ten basic 
files with examples have been created 
for companies that don’t yet have such 
a management system, as well as for 
those companies that have introduced 
one and would like to develop it fur-
ther. The European social partners 
FIEC and EFBWW are also officially 
recognised as partners in the cam-
paign of the European Agency for 
Health and Safety at Work (OSHA) on 
risk assessment. Despite the improve-
ments observed in accident statistics 
over the last few years, the construc-
tion industry still records high levels 
of accidents and therefore health and 
safety is one of the highest priorities 
for the European social partners. In 
this context, they carried out a project 
on nanotechnologies in the Euro-
pean construction industry. Given the 
growing importance of nanotechnol-
ogies and their increasing use in the 
construction sector, the project aimed 
to address the health risks that may be 
associated with these technologies.
Similarly, the European social partners 
in agriculture actively took part in the 
OSHA campaign on  musculoskeletal 
disorders (MSDs). They insisted upon 
the necessity to install national observa-
tories on MSDs, in order to collect data 
and to come to a common definition of 
MSDs. The European social partners 
were also involved in a project on the 
prevention of MSDs in agriculture, 
which resulted in the development of 
informational material.
Social partners in the extractive 
industries committee carried out a 
project analysing trends in the causes 
of accidents and promoting relevant 
guidelines and best practices. In addi-
tion to collecting existing information 
and relevant industry experience, an 
in-depth study of five countries was 
launched (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Germany and Sweden) and to identify 
best practices. These will be dissemi-
nated among stakeholders, including 
young workers and subcontractors.
Other sectoral social dialogue com-
mittees also worked on problems of 
health and safety in their sectors. The 
social partners in the cleaning indus-
try identified threats to the health and 
safety of workers arising from the obli-
gation to clean a too large surface in 
insufficient time. In sea fisheries, risks 
to health and safety arise from the 
high age of fishing vessels, in a context 
where modernisation is constrained 
by the low income of fishermen. In 
maritime transport, the question of 
resources for investing in improve-
ments which help to guarantee the 
health and safety of workers was also a 
subject for discussion.
Box 6.6: Implementation of the European framework agreement on work-related stress
The cross-industry social partners presented their report on the implementation of the European framework agreement on work-
related stress in December 2008. This marked the end of the implementation period of this autonomous agreement that was adopted 
on 8 October 2004. The agreement had followed a Commission consultation and was to be implemented by the European social 
partners’ members in accordance with the procedures and practices of the industrial relations systems of the Member States, as 
specified under Article 155 (ex Article 139) of the EU Treaty. 
The aims of the framework agreement are to ‘increase the awareness and understanding of employers, workers and their representa-
tives of work-related stress’ and to ‘provide employers and workers with a framework to identify and prevent or manage problems of 
work-related stress’. In this agreement, the EU’s cross-sector social partners confirm that the rules of the Framework Directive on Safety 
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and Health at Work (89/391/EEC) also apply to stress as a risk factor. This means that the employer shall take the necessary measures 
to protect workers from work-related stress based on the general principles of prevention, including the provision of information and 
training. The agreement provides an action-oriented framework, with indications as to how stress-related problems can be detected, 
factors that have to be analysed in a risk assessment, and measures to prevent, eliminate or reduce stress problems at work.
National social partners implemented the framework agreement by national collective agreements or agreements on recommenda-
tions and guidance as well as complementary activities, such as the development of practical tools or surveys. This contributed to 
and took place in the context of increasing awareness about work-related stress, not only among management and workers, but also 
among public authorities, labour inspectorates, occupational health and safety agencies and health experts and practitioners. The 
initiatives taken by these actors — including legislation — interacted with those taken by social partners (see table).
At national level, the following results must be highlighted.
The agreement triggered or substantially accelerated social dialogue and policy development in 12 Member States where work-related •	
stress had mostly been an expert issue (1).
The agreement led to the creation and dissemination of practical guidance and tools in many Member States, including their adaptation •	
across borders.
Even in those countries where work-related stress had already been on the agenda, the framework agreement gave a boost to efforts to •	
raise awareness and to agree on guidance.
The agreement was followed by amendments to the regulatory framework in seven Member States (•	 2), bringing the number of Member 
States with a legal framework that explicitly addresses psychosocial risks and/or stress to 14.
The agreement was implemented by binding national collective agreements in six countries (•	 3).
As a result a set of principles and rules is now enshrined in a majority of Member States (either through legislation or through bind-
ing collective agreements) (4). In other Member States, social partners have concluded agreements that were not declared generally 
binding, or joint guidelines with a substantial, joint effort of awareness raising and follow-up (5).
However, shortcomings remain. As regards coverage, the Agreement has not been implemented in all Member States (6), and where 
social partners have chosen non-binding agreements and unilateral action, not all workers are covered (which is of particular rel-
evance in Member States where psychosocial risks are not explicitly addressed in the legal framework, and where stress is not fully 
recognised as an occupational health risk by all parties). As regards impact, this report identified 12 Member States in which social 
partners do not seem to have used to the full the potential of the Agreement for improving awareness and understanding of work-
related stress and the proposed solutions. (7) Substantial and joint efforts to improve awareness and understanding are essential, and 
may even offset the lack of a binding agreement and limited coverage. As regards the action-oriented framework, in some Member 
States, it is unclear whether workers and employers have easy access to a comprehensive action-oriented framework that covers all 
areas addressed in the Agreement (work organisation, working conditions, communication, and subjective social factors). (8) In addi-
tion, in many Member States, not all of the areas addressed in the Agreement are included in the national implementing measure. 
This means that there are persistent discrepancies in the levels of protection available across Member States, and that it is not pos-
sible to conclude that a minimum level of protection has been established throughout the EU. 
Worryingly, social partners in Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, and Malta have not reported on the implementation of the 
Agreement. This gives rise to heightened concern, given that social partners in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta did not report 
on the first European social partners’ autonomous agreement on telework either. Follow-up and reporting on the implementation of 
autonomous agreements across the EU is a minimum requirement, in line with Article 155(2) of the TFEU.
When the Commission launched its consultation of social partners in 2002, its objective was to improve protection for all workers 
throughout the EU. The EU social partners’ agreement’s objective was to provide a framework for better addressing work-related 
stress at the workplace level. It has certainly contributed to raising awareness, promoting a set of principles and rules and building 
consensus within the EU about the structural nature of work-related stress and the need for concerted responses to it. However, 
there is room for improvement, both at national and EU level, as regards extending protection, and further developing adequate 
responses to the challenge. There is therefore scope for all stakeholders to consider further initiatives to ensure that the objective 
is reached.
1 Czech Republic, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Norway.
2 Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Italy.
3 Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Romania, Iceland.
4  Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, UK, Iceland, Norway, Italy, France, Greece, Romania, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, Portugal, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Estonia.
5 Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic.
6  In Malta, Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia social partners have not reported follow-up to their general declarations concerning the implementation of the Agreement, 
which would complement the general legal framework in these countries.
7 Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
8 Estonia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia.
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The framework agreement on work-related stress is the second ever European autonomous agreement. Like with the first autono-
mous agreement on telework, it was expected that implementation measures would vary from Member State to Member State, as 
the responsibilities of the actors and the legal framework differ. The comparison (see table) reveals that in many Member States the 
same instruments have been used.
The European social partners reported challenges linked to the national industrial relations systems and to the issue of work-related 
stress. First, ‘in particular in the 12 new Member States, challenges were still encountered (…) due to the lack of experience with 
autonomous social partner negotiations and not fully developed social dialogue structures’ (European social partners (2008)). It 
can be added that low coverage of social dialogue in some Member States can be a challenge for the autonomous implementation 
of European agreements, in particular where agreements are not extended and recommendations and complementary measures are 
used. In addition, some of the European social partners’ member organisations have no direct responsibility in collective bargaining 
in Member States and/or have little authority over their affiliates that are active in sectors and companies (see Chapter 1). Second, 
discussions clarifying aspects like the distinction between work-related stress and stress emanating from outside the workplace, the 
distinction between individual and collective intervention, the difficulty of assessing stress levels and evaluating the work environ-
ment, the costs of risk assessments, or the need to raise awareness with the general public and also trade union officials and business 
leaders, complicated the implementation process.
Instruments chosen to implement the framework agreements  
on telework and work-related stress
Instruments chosen Telework Stress
Collective agreements at 
national level 
cross-
industry
extended by decree/binding erga omnes FR, BE, LU, EL (1)(2) FR, BE (
7), RO (6), 
EL (1)(2)
binding on signatory parties and their 
members IT, IS IT, IS
sectoral DK (3) DK (9), NL (10)
Agreements by social 
partners recommendations to lower bargaining levels FI and ES (
2) FI and ES 
Guidelines, 
recommendations
addressed mainly to lower bargaining levels as well as 
companies and teleworkers NL and SE (
2)
LU, NL, NO, SE
CZ (5), DE (5)
addressed mainly to individual companies and teleworkers UK, IE (
4), AT (5), 
LV (2) and NO (2)
Model agreements proposed by social partners/jointly promoted stress tools DE (5) and IE IE, AT, UK
Legislation
based on agreement between social partners PL
LV, IT, HU, SK, 
CZ (6), PTafter consultation of social partners HU, SK and CZ (
6)
no/little involvement of social partners PT and SI (6)
Mostly accompanying measures PT, DE
Joint declarations DE CY, PL, SI
No implementation yet/no information BG, CY, EE, LT, MT and RO
BG (8), EE (8), 
LT (8), MT 
NB: This table does not cover sector-specific or regional agreements reported by social partners which relate to a small number of sectors or 
regions only and which have sometimes been adopted prior to/without any reference to the telework framework agreement (e.g. DE, ES and 
AT). Furthermore, it does not cover individual company agreements. The existence of an explicit reference to stress of psychosocial risks in 
the national legal framework is not systematically taken into account. Incomplete or example-based reporting of individual instruments and 
the difficulty of identifying them in all Member States could distort the overall presentation.
1     Legal status not fully certain.
2     Mainly based on literal translation/translation in annex, i.e. little adaptation to national context.
3      Covers the industry, services, local, regional and national government sectors, is accompanied by guidelines and is supplemented by cross-industry 
agreement.
4     Implementation not finalised.
5     Unilateral instruments, i.e. not jointly adopted.
6     Partial implementation only.
7     1999, extended to public sector by legislation in 2007.
8     Explicit legal framework.
9     Local and regional administration, state sector.
10   Not a direct implementation measure.
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Freedom of movement6.3.2. 
On an invitation from Commissioner 
Špidla and the French Presidency of the 
European Union in October 2009, the 
European social partners of the cross-
industry social dialogue committee 
agreed to carry out joint work on the 
consequences of the Court of Justice’s 
rulings relating to economic freedoms 
and fundamental social rights of 
workers (the Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
and Luxembourg cases). The Euro-
pean social partners agreed that the 
impact of the four CJEU cases, which 
goes beyond the specific national situ-
ations which were at stake, called for a 
reflection at EU level.
The European social partners focused 
their work on the following issues: 
fair competition in the internal mar-
ket; obstacles to be removed and/or 
conditions to be put in place for free 
movement of services and workers; 
transparency and legal certainty; the 
principle of non-discrimination, the 
role of public authorities. The docu-
ment of 19 March 2010 summarising 
the conclusions of their joint work 
includes two sections: a first contain-
ing shared observations; and a second 
with separate contributions from, 
respectively, employers and trade 
unions. The social partners agreed on 
the following four points.
The ‘four freedoms’ regarding the •	
free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital need to be safe-
guarded and properly developed 
with a view to enabling higher lev-
els of prosperity and social devel-
opment in Europe. European social 
partners are committed to the full 
implementation of the free move-
ment principles to the extent that 
this takes place in a context of fair 
competition. To that end, accom-
panying measures have to be in 
place both at national and at Euro-
pean level.
The European social partners •	
recall that the principle of non-
 discrimination and equal treatment is 
a key principle in the internal market, 
applying to workers and companies 
alike. The Treaty (Article 45 TFEU, 
ex Article 39 EC) provides that free 
movement of workers entails the abo-
lition of any discrimination based on 
nationality as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of 
work and employment.
The Posting of Workers Directive •	
provides for minimum standards 
which must be observed to ensure 
respect for the rights of workers 
and a climate of fair competition. 
Although the European social part-
ners agree on this, they have differ-
ent views on whether these aims are 
achieved by the Posting of Workers 
Directive following its interpreta-
tion by the European Court of Jus-
tice. Whilst both sides recognise the 
need to compel service providers to 
comply with a nucleus of rules as 
defined in the host country, they 
disagree on the definition of this 
nucleus as well as on the possibil-
ity for trade unions and/or Mem-
ber States in the host country to go 
beyond this nucleus of rules.
The European social partners rec-•	
ognise the importance of better 
monitoring and enforcement of the 
Posting Directive, but have differ-
ent views about the degree to which 
this may solve the key problems 
arising from the CJEU cases.
The issue of the working environment 
and questions of mobility also figured 
on the agenda of several sectoral social 
dialogue committees. The social part-
ners represented in the sectoral dia-
logue committee for inland waterways 
transport published a joint opinion in 
August 2009 expressing their worries 
about the implementation of the new 
rules on the coordination of social 
security systems. They consider that 
the provisions of the ‘Agreement con-
cerning social security for Rhine boat-
men’ are those best suited to the needs 
of the industry and its employees and 
are convinced that the implementa-
tion of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
in inland waterways transport will 
prove impracticable.
In September 2009, the European social 
partners in the construction industry 
presented their new website on post-
ing of workers in the construction sec-
tor (http://www.posting-workers.eu). 
This website is the main outcome of a 
joint project co-financed by the Euro-
pean Commission, presenting infor-
mation on the applicable working 
conditions in the construction indus-
try in the EU Member States such as 
minimum wages, working time and 
health and safety provisions. On the 
one hand, the social partners clearly 
expressed their divergent opinions 
with regard to the need for a possi-
ble revision of the posting of work-
ers directive. On the other hand, they 
agreed on the need to improve imple-
mentation of the directive, includ-
ing through increased transparency, 
taking better account of the needs of 
SMEs and micro-enterprises as well as 
of the self-employed and through the 
strengthening of labour inspection. 
They see the website as a contribu-
tion to further developing the internal 
market and combating illegal prac-
tices. They also announced their joint 
commitment to develop an EU-wide 
social identity card for workers in the 
construction industry.
In 2008, the hospitals sector adopted 
a code of conduct and engaged in 
follow-up activity on ethical cross-
border recruitment and retention. 
The European social partners in the 
sector, Hospeem for the employers 
and EPSU for the workers, recognise 
the inequalities and unnecessary bur-
dens on healthcare systems, caused by 
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 unethical recruitment practices in the 
EU. The aim of the code of conduct is 
to promote ethical and stop unethi-
cal practices in cross-border recruit-
ment of health workers. To achieve 
this, the code specifies that employ-
ers and workers must cooperate and 
work with governments, regulatory 
and professional bodies and other rel-
evant stakeholders at local, regional 
and national level in order to protect 
the rights of workers and ensure that 
employers get highly qualified staff. 
In 2010, Hospeem and EPSU entered 
into negotiations with a view to adopt 
a framework of actions on recruit-
ment and retention.
In a project in the agriculture sector, 
the social partners gathered informa-
tion concerning administrative for-
malities from a majority of Member 
States, especially concerning the hous-
ing of seasonal workers in the  sector. 
The social partners in the private 
security sector found that the national 
provisions for their sector were not suf-
ficiently harmonised, leading to prob-
lems of mobility for workers between 
different countries. They have therefore 
launched a project to facilitate tran-
snational mobility and to prepare an 
informational toolkit for workers who 
would like to move between countries.
In order to analyse cross-border 
movement of temporary agency 
workers and the impact and imple-
mentation of the European direc-
tive on posting of workers and the 
new directive on temporary agency 
work, the social partners in the sec-
tor carried out a research project. 
They set up a European observatory 
on cross-border activities within tem-
porary agency work that was officially 
launched in December 2009. The 
European observatory will equip the 
European social partners with a bet-
ter understanding of the reality of 
cross-border activities within tem-
porary agency work (with a special 
focus on  existing regulation), gather 
and analyse good and bad practices 
with regard to cross-border activities 
and support the preparation of practi-
cal information tools for temporary-
work agencies and temporary agency 
workers wishing to work abroad.
Working conditions6.3.3. 
The social dialogue committee in the 
sea fisheries sector intends to open 
negotiations on the implementation 
of certain standards under the 2006 
ILO Fishing Convention into EU leg-
islation. Such action would strengthen 
the labour standards that had already 
been agreed at international level in 
2006 and make them mandatory for 
Europe. Working conditions and the 
image of the sea fisheries sector would 
be enhanced through this measure.
In the furniture sector, the social 
partners organised a conference in 
late 2008 on the improvement of the 
workplace environment and work-
ing conditions, which resulted in a 
booklet collecting several examples 
of best practices. A similar conference 
on enhancing the value of work in the 
sector in order to attract young peo-
ple was held in 2009, also producing a 
brochure of best practices.
At the 2009 plenary meeting of the 
railways sectoral social dialogue 
committee, the signatory parties to 
the 2004 autonomous agreement on 
a European drivers’ licence (CER and 
ETF) agreed on a joint declaration 
on the application of the agreement. 
As a number of provisions of this 
autonomous agreement are incor-
porated in Directive 2007/59/EC on 
the certification of train drivers, the 
declaration clarifies the modalities 
of application of the agreement. The 
declaration will act as a guideline for 
CER and the ETF members in the 
application of the agreement.
Corporate social 6.3.4. 
responsibility (CSR) and 
sustainable development
Corporate social responsibility was 
again on the agenda of several social 
dialogue committees during the past 
two years. The social partners in the 
sugar sector adopted a report each 
year on the implementation of CSR 
in the sugar industry, which regularly 
contains several examples of good 
practices in fields such as health and 
safety, restructuring, employability or 
training. In the hospitality sector, the 
social partners are collecting instances 
of good practice amongst businesses 
in order to implement their joint initi-
ative for improving CSR in the sector. 
In the same way, the social partners of 
the social dialogue committee for con-
tract catering are implementing the 
agreement on CSR in their sector.
In 2009 the social partners in the elec-
tricity sector signed a joint position on 
the social aspects of CSR in their indus-
try, referring to international standards 
of CSR. The social partners empha-
sised that any CSR policy must be fully 
integrated within the organisation. The 
social partners have closely followed 
the development of the Global Report-
ing Initative’s (GRI) electricity utility 
sector supplement to current report-
ing indicators, which would include 
additional benchmarks important to 
the industry. Reporting on the basis 
of these indicators will ensure that 
the electricity industry will continue 
to contribute to socially responsible 
and sustainable development, thereby 
promoting the well-being of citizens. 
European electricity companies are 
encouraged to take on board the indi-
cators, since the European social part-
ners recommended that they become 
a reference standard for the electricity 
industry in developing CSR policies.
The social partners in the tanning and 
leather sector adopted a  framework 
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agreement on social and environmental 
reporting standards for their industry 
in 2008. The agreement contains guide-
lines that aim at providing companies in 
the sector (mostly SMEs) with the tools 
to report regularly on their social and 
environmental performance, includ-
ing a template for such reports. Social 
partners have subsequently carried 
out a series of  Commission-supported 
projects with the objective of translat-
ing the agreement into all relevant EU 
languages, achieving a wide dissemi-
nation of the agreement and promot-
ing the use of the standard and the 
reporting template. Separately, in 2009 
the social partners agreed on a joint 
declaration on the deforestation of 
the Amazon rainforest, in which they 
express their solidarity with the objec-
tive of preserving the environment 
and avoiding irresponsible harm to 
the rainforest, and called for increased 
transparency in the supply chain for 
hides and skins. In their declaration, 
the European social partners stress the 
importance of improving the traceabil-
ity of raw materials in the supply chain 
in order to fulfil sustainability objec-
tives and also to meet objectives related 
to animal welfare.
In the textiles and clothing sector, 
the social partners are implementing 
a Commission-supported project to 
promote social dialogue in compa-
nies within the sector through a joint 
implementation of REACH, the EU’s 
regulation on chemicals and their 
safe use. The project is a response to 
social partners’ concern about how 
SMEs, and particularly those in the 
new Member States and candidate 
countries, will adapt to REACH. The 
project intends to provide training to 
social partner representatives on the 
consequences of REACH and how to 
implement this regulation. It includes a 
toolbox to explain REACH to employ-
ers’ and trade unions’  representatives 
in SMEs and the results will be dis-
seminated at a conference.
Furthermore, against the background 
of ongoing trade negotiations with 
countries/regions in Asia and Latin 
America in particular, the social dia-
logue committees of the textile and 
clothing, tanning and leather and 
footwear sectors held a joint meeting 
on trade negotiations and trade sus-
tainability impact assessments. In this 
context, the social partners recalled 
that a level playing field, including the 
enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and social and environmen-
tal legislation, were a precondition 
for competitiveness and sustainable 
development. They stressed the need 
for fair and equal rules and accom-
panying policy measures to mitigate 
possible adverse effects and ensure 
a fair distribution of the benefits of 
trade. The social partners expressed 
their hope that existing social dialogue 
structures such as the sectoral social 
dialogue committees would continue 
to be regularly informed and con-
sulted on trade policy issues, includ-
ing both impact assessments and the 
follow-up and monitoring of trade 
agreements, notably the sustainable 
development chapter.
Similarly, the social partners in the 
shipyards sector began joint work on 
the feasibility of adopting common 
social standards for their sector. Their 
aim is to contribute to create a level 
playing field in global trade in the 
shipyards sector with respect to social 
standards.
Gender equality 6.3.5. 
and reconciliation 
of personal and 
professional life
In June 2009, following nine months 
of negotiations, the European cross-
industry social partners signed a 
revised EU framework agreement on 
parental leave, to be implemented by 
a European directive. The resulting 
Parental Leave Directive (2010/18/EU), 
based on the social partners’ agree-
ment, was formally adopted by the 
Council on 18 March 2010. Member 
States have two years to transpose the 
new rights into national law.
The main provisions of the new agree-
ment and directive are:
longer leave — each parent will be •	
able to take four months off per 
child (compared to three months 
previously). The extra month can-
not be transferred from one parent 
to the other, thereby encouraging 
fathers to take their leave. In the 
past many working fathers have 
transferred their right to leave to 
the mother;
temporary changes to work sched-•	
ules — employees returning from 
parental leave will have the right 
to request changes to their working 
hours or patterns for a set period of 
time. In considering such requests, 
employers will be obliged to bal-
ance the needs of the employee as 
well as the company;
work contracts — the new rights •	
will apply to all workers, regardless 
of their type of contract (e.g. fixed-
term, part-time, agency workers); 
however, the possibility of a quali-
fication period of maximum one 
year is maintained;
no discrimination — an employee •	
applying for or taking parental leave 
will be protected not only against 
dismissal but also against less 
favourable treatment on grounds 
of taking parental leave.
The agreement also includes non-
binding references to the following:
importance of income in the take-•	
up of parental leave;
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reference to the ‘increasing diversity •	
of family structures’, while respect-
ing national law and practice;
encouragement for workers and •	
employers to maintain contact dur-
ing parental leave and to arrange 
reintegration measures in order to 
facilitate the return to work;
assessing the need for additional •	
measures for adoptive parents;
adjusting conditions for parents of •	
children with a disability or a long-
term illness.
All matters regarding the income of 
workers during parental leave are left 
for Member States and/or national 
social partners to determine. Several 
Member States already have provi-
sions on parental leave going beyond 
the previous EU minimum standard 
of three months. In any event, they 
will have to make sure they comply 
with the remaining provisions, such as 
on non-transferability, non-discrimi-
nation and return to work.
In 2009, the European social partners 
at cross-industry level have also con-
cluded the final evaluation report of 
their five-year framework for action 
on gender equality. This framework 
targeted four priorities: addressing 
gender roles; promoting women in 
decision-making; supporting work-
life balance; tackling the gender pay 
gap. This final report is based on 
annual national reports, which high-
light the key features of their work to 
promote the four priorities from 2005 
to 2009. The social partners intend to 
continue working on these priorities, 
use the good practice gathered in this 
process and build further on the joint 
work done.
Inspired by the experience of the 
cross-industry social partners, in 
December 2009 the social partners 
in audiovisual services set up a work-
ing group on gender equality with a 
mandate to negotiate a framework 
for action on gender equality in the 
audiovisual sector in the EU for adop-
tion by the sectoral social dialogue 
committee. This framework of action 
will focus on the following key areas: 
elimination of gender stereotypes; 
non-discrimination in recruitment; 
career development; training; equal 
pay and; reconciliation of private 
and professional life. In general, the 
working group’s objective is to further 
develop joint actions in this field and 
to enhance gender equality in the sec-
tor across the EU. The working group 
will: organise an exchange on existing 
policies on gender equality and high-
light good practices; and identify tools 
and actions to enhance gender equal-
ity in the workplace applicable across 
countries.
In 2008, the social dialogue com-
mittee for local and regional govern-
ments adopted guidelines on drawing 
up equality action plans, which aim to 
support regional and local initiatives 
on equality, and to encourage a joint, 
long-term and sustained approach 
to equality by members of the Euro-
pean social partners EPSU (workers) 
and CEMR (employers). As such it 
provides a framework to develop best 
practice and to check progress. An 
appendix to the guidelines sets out 
an equality checklist that can be used 
to assess equality performance over 
time. Equality plans are also a useful 
tool to help better implement equal-
ity legislation or other equality objec-
tives. A template for a gender equality 
plan is also proposed in an appendix 
to the guidelines.
Demographic change6.3.6. 
The social dialogue committee in the 
electricity sector prepared a toolkit in 
2008 on the promotion of age  diversity 
and age management strategies. This 
toolkit presented an analysis of the 
demographic challenge in the sector, 
and offered a set of tools for age man-
agement, focused on the recruitment 
and retention of older workers, the 
health and well-being of older workers, 
work-life balance and flexible work-
ing time, measures to recruit younger 
workers and preparation for exiting 
active working life and retirement. The 
toolkit underlined the role of social dia-
logue in the creation and implementa-
tion of age management strategies and 
the social partners’ conclusions were 
summarised in a 10-point plan for suc-
cessful age management in the sector. 
The European social partners recom-
mended this plan to their national 
affiliates as a starting point in creating 
effective age management strategies.
Similarly, in the insurance sector, 
the European social partners signed 
a joint declaration in 2010 on the 
demographic challenge, addressing a 
number of recommendations to the 
national level. National social part-
ners were encouraged to develop poli-
cies promoting work-life balance and 
lifelong learning and to recognise the 
importance of health and safety at 
work in this context.
Securing continued access to a skilled 
workforce is of vital importance for 
the long-term competitiveness of the 
shipyards sector. Due to demographic 
change, many older employees are 
expected to retire in the coming years, 
taking with them a wealth of experi-
ence, knowledge and competence. 
As a result, the demand for highly 
qualified engineers but also for highly 
skilled blue-collar workers is mount-
ing across Europe. The yards need to 
retain valuable and essential know-
how, recruit young people and skilled 
professionals and retrain employees 
to maintain their skills base and safe-
guard their long-term prosperity. In 
line with an anticipatory approach, 
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the shipyards sectoral social dialogue 
committee developed and launched 
its third joint project with the finan-
cial support of the European Com-
mission entitled ‘demographic change 
and skills requirements’ in 2008. The 
project comprised a research study 
and a subsequent workshop. The study 
analyses the present situation as well 
as the future changes in the workforce 
structure of European shipyards in 
order to assess the impact of the demo-
graphic change. It serves as a basis for 
establishing a strategy for future train-
ing and recruitment requirements. In 
June 2008, the study was presented at 
a workshop in the Netherlands, during 
which the social partners discussed 
the results, exchanged experience on 
existing initiatives and reflected on 
potential solutions for the future.
In 2009 the social partners in the gas 
sector prepared a toolkit and a study 
on demographic change, age man-
agement and competencies in the gas 
industry in Europe. The toolkit aimed 
to raise awareness and point to ways in 
which the social partners can address 
the implications of demographic 
change for the skills and competencies 
that are necessary to ensure the sec-
tor’s future competitiveness. It dem-
onstrates how companies can benefit 
from the skills and motivations of dif-
ferent age groups in the workforce and 
provide guidelines, information and 
good-practice approaches. The toolkit 
also contains several case studies, 
highlighting joint company — trade 
union approaches, including in the 
sector’s major companies. The toolkit 
thus underlines the role of social dia-
logue in the management of demo-
graphic change.
Box 6.7: Participation in sectoral social dialogue committee meetings — summary statistics
A maximum of 54 participants are invited to plenary meetings of sectoral social dialogue committees. This number is designed to 
permit the participation of one employer and one trade union representative per Member State, yet the actual composition of the 
delegations falls within the autonomy of the recognised European employers and trade union organisations on each social dialogue 
committee. As each participant in a social dialogue committee meeting represents the European social partner organisation rather than 
national social partners, there are no seats reserved for delegates of a particular Member State and the composition of the committees 
can change from meeting to meeting. In practice it is therefore uncommon to see delegations composed of exactly 27 members from 
each of the Member States.
The actually observed average number of participants in the plenary sessions of the sectoral social dialogue committees in the period 
2003–08 ranged between fewer than 20 participants in footwear, tanning and leather, inland navigation and textile and clothing — and 
less than 25 participants in the cleaning industry and in the commerce sector — to 40 or more in postal services, maritime transport, 
personal services, the chemical industry and professional football (the latter not being fully representative as only the launch event of 
the committee could be taken into account) (Chart 6.1). Low participation rates in some sectors reflects the limited presence of a sec-
tor amongst the EU Member States; this applies to the above four sectors with an average number of below 20 participants per plenary 
meeting. In other sectors which are present in all EU Member States, such as the commerce sector, however, the comparatively low 
participation rates could be a signal that the involvement of actors needs to be enhanced and/or the relevance of the agenda and work 
programme of the committee to be reviewed. The comparatively high participation rates in other sectors are indicative of, and go hand 
in hand with: the high relevance of the committee’s work for the national social partners, e.g. with regard to the liberalisation and evo-
lution of postal services or the EU legislation on chemical products (REACH); active negotiations of the social partners in maritime 
transport and personal services on agreements to be implemented in accordance with Article 155.
Similarly, the observed share of women among the participants of plenary meetings of the sectoral social dialogue committees reflects 
to a large extent the employment characteristics in the sector (Chart 6.2). It ranges from 10 % or less in woodworking, professional 
football, steel, shipyards and the sugar industry to 40–50 % in personal services, commerce, local and regional government and con-
tract catering, and more than 70 % in hospitals and healthcare.
The observed share of participants from the new Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively (12 new Member 
States) is an indicator not only of the importance of a sector in the new Member States and of social dialogue in it, but also of the 
successful integration of the social partners from the new Member States into the existing social dialogue structures. It ranges from 
less than 10 % in footwear, personal services, sea fisheries, the cleaning industry, shipyards, civil aviation, telecommunications, steel, 
insurance and banking to 25 % or more in tanning and leather, textile and clothing, furniture, railway, contract catering, the extractive 
industries and inland navigation (Chart 6.3). Social partners in some of the latter sectors, notably tanning and leather and textile and 
clothing, have carried out apparently successful, dedicated capacity-building projects to foster the integration of social partner repre-
sentatives from the new Member States into European sectoral social dialogue structures.
Finally, there is an important difference in the participation from employer and employee representatives across the various committees 
(Chart 6.4). This may reflect both diverging representativeness structures across sectors (with e.g. five or more employer organisations 
recognised as representative in sectors such as civil aviation, audiovisual services or extractive industries) as well as differences in the 
commitment and mobilisation of one or the other side of industry in a sectoral social dialogue committee. In construction and agricul-
ture, the participation rates are biased significantly towards employer representatives (making up two-thirds or more of the participants 
in plenary meetings), while in civil aviation, textile and clothing, shipyards, gas and banking two-thirds or more of the participants are 
from trade unions.
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Chart 6.1: Average number of participants per plenary session, 2003–08
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Chart 6.2: Share of women among the participants in plenary sessions, 2003–08
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Chart 6.3: Share of representatives from the 12 new Members States  
among the participants in plenary sessions, 2003–08
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Chart 6.4: Share of employer/employee representatives  
among the participants of plenary meetings, 2003–08
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Third-party violence  6.3.7. 
and harassment
Following the signature of the cross-
industry social partner framework 
agreement on harassment and violence 
at work in 2007, the European social 
partners in the hospitals, regional and 
local government, commerce and pri-
vate security services sectors (EPSU, 
Hospeem, UNI europa, Eurocom-
merce, COESS and CEMR) have been 
jointly exploring how the autonomous 
agreement could be complemented 
by a multi-sectoral approach to the 
specific area of third-party violence. 
In support of these discussions, two 
projects were launched to investigate 
how the problem has been tackled by 
social partners across the EU and to 
identify best practice. The results of 
these projects were presented at a con-
ference on 22 October 2009, where the 
participating European social part-
ners agreed on a draft commitment 
to develop a jointly agreed instrument 
that will set out the steps needed to 
prevent, identify and manage prob-
lems of third-party violence.
Since the conference, the European 
social partners, now joined by the edu-
cation sector (ETUCE, EFEE), have 
developed multi-sectoral guidelines 
to tackle third-party violence and har-
assment related to work, which were 
signed on 30 September 2010. These 
guidelines, building upon existing 
best practice in the sectors, set out 
the practical steps that can be taken 
by employers, workers and their rep-
resentatives/trade unions to reduce, 
prevent and mitigate problems. The 
guidelines will be promoted within 
the Member States at all appropriate 
levels taking account of national prac-
tices, through joint and/or separate 
actions. The relevant sectoral Euro-
pean Social Dialogue Committees 
will prepare a joint progress report in 
2012 and a final joint evaluation will 
be undertaken in 2013.
The European social partners in the 
commerce sector have developed 
a toolkit, ‘STOP IT! — preventing 
third-party violence in commerce’, 
aimed at directly helping  employees 
and employers to improve safety in the 
workplace. It is based on best practice 
Box 6.8: Texts adopted by the European social dialogue committees, 2002–10
The past two years have seen more binding agreements signed by European social partners than any previous two-year period and two of 
these agreements have been adopted as a Council directive in accordance with Article 155 of the Treaty (ex Article 139). At the same time, 
the past two years have seen a decline in the number of all other categories of non-binding documents, including process-oriented texts, 
joint opinions, declarations and tools. It should be noted, however, that the relatively small number of documents adopted in each two-year 
period in each category means that the comparisons across time should be treated with caution.
Overall, most of the outcomes of European social dialogue continue to be of a ‘soft’ nature, i.e. aim at raising awareness, disseminating good 
practice, helping to build consensus and confidence. Joint texts, presentations of good practices or common projects offer opportunities for 
social partners to learn from one another and build trust. There are a number of qualitative signs of a significant impact at national level, 
although it is not possible to document this with systematic quantitative data. The output and impact of European social dialogue should 
not, therefore, only be assessed by considering the number and type of texts.
Chart 6.5: Texts adopted by the European social dialogue committees, 2002–10
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from across Europe on how to deal 
with the issue of abusive behaviour 
and violence from customers in the 
workplace. It covers risk assessment, 
prevention, conflict management 
and stakeholder partnerships. It was 
presented to the public and national 
member organisations in October 
2009. Eurocommerce, the European 
employers’ organisation, had proposed 
to UNI europa commerce to jointly 
develop such a tool as an alternative 
to negotiating a binding autonomous 
agreement on the subject.
Capacity building 6.3.8. 
and social partner 
organisations
Several sectoral social dialogue com-
mittees continued their efforts to 
enhance the participation of stake-
holders from new Member States by 
supporting capacity building actions. 
In this context, in 2008 the social 
partners in the textile and clothing, 
footwear and tanning and leather 
sectors concluded an ambitious 
project on capacity building of their 
counterparts in the new Member 
States and also the candidate coun-
tries. This one-year project aimed 
at strengthening social dialogue in 
the sectors concerned with a view to 
encouraging the full participation of 
the sectoral social partners from new 
Member States and candidate coun-
tries in the European sectoral dia-
logue committees. The project’s main 
goal was to support sectoral social 
partners in the implementation of 
their national action plans, agreed 
upon in the course of a previous 
 capacity-building project that ended 
in 2007. Through this initiative, the 
European social partners lent their 
support not only to the development 
of national social partners’ capacities 
but also to the promotion of sectoral 
social dialogue in the new Member 
States and candidate countries.
This was also the objective of the Euro-
pean social partners in the temporary 
agency sector in organising a round 
table in Sofia in December 2009 to 
promote the sectoral social dialogue 
on temporary agency work in Bulgaria. 
This was the third activity of this kind 
after similar round tables organised in 
Poland (2006) and Hungary (2007).
Starting in 2007, the social partners 
in the audiovisual sector undertook a 
project in the new Member Sates pro-
moting social dialogue in the sector. 
They chose to adopt a step-by-step 
approach, providing information 
sessions and national roundtables 
for social partners from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia. It culminated in 
a regional seminar providing for an 
exchange on the structure and func-
tioning of  social dialogue in Prague 
in June 2008. Building on this expe-
rience, the European social partners 
wished to involve social partners 
from other new Member States in 
this capacity-building process and at 
the same time deepen the exchange 
of experience with a focus on indus-
trial relations and collective bargain-
ing. Actions under this new project 
again include national roundtables 
in order to mobilise social partner 
organisations.
After a capacity-building project tar-
geting Bulgaria and Romania, the live 
performance sector launched a simi-
lar project in 2009 for the southern 
Europe region, including new Mem-
ber States and candidate countries. 
The project aims to promote national 
social dialogue in the countries of the 
region concerned. Based on interviews 
carried out in 12 countries, a draft 
report on the state of social dialogue 
in the live performance sector was pre-
pared and presented at a conference 
which took place in Croatia in Feb-
ruary 2010. In their final declaration 
the European social partners called 
on the EU to encourage governments 
to create favourable conditions for an 
autonomous bilateral social dialogue 
in the countries of southern Europe 
and urged national governments to 
allow and encourage management 
and labour to organise, including free-
lance/self-employed workers.
Furthermore, the ITC-ILO is cur-
rently carrying out a project to assess 
the evolution and implementation of 
European sectoral social dialogue in 
the new Member States and candidate 
countries, with a focus on achievements 
and challenges in postal services, tele-
communications, construction, tour-
ism, the chemical, energy, metal and 
textile industries. Transnational semi-
nars involving local stakeholders from 
all new Member States and candidate 
countries took place in spring 2010, 
and the main results of the project will 
be disseminated at a social dialogue 
seminar at the end of 2010.
Conclusion6.4. 
This review of the main activities of 
the European social dialogue commit-
tees during the period 2008–10 has 
shown the vitality of this instrument 
of European governance, highlighting 
the key role that social partners play in 
shaping EU social policy and defining 
European social standards. The ongo-
ing interest of the European social 
partners in participating in European 
social dialogue, as evidenced by the 
continued creation of new sectoral 
social dialogue committees over the 
reporting period, is testament to their 
belief in the added value that social 
dialogue brings at the EU level, as a 
complement to national industrial 
relations systems.
The past two years have also shown 
that the social partners are increas-
ingly making fuller use of the space 
for autonomous action and the 
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 possibilities for negotiation that have 
been conferred on them by virtue of 
the Treaty. This is demonstrated by 
the four binding agreements that have 
been reached since August 2008 (4). 
The cross-industry social partners 
have successfully negotiated a revised 
agreement on parental leave, which 
4 A fifth text concerned the application of an 
autonomous agreement in the railways sector from 
2004 on locomotive drivers’ licences, clarifying that 
agreement’s relationship to subsequent EU legislation 
(see section on ‘working conditions’ above). 
has become an EU directive, while 
their recent agreement on inclusive 
labour markets will be implemented 
autonomously under the respon-
sibility of the national social part-
ners. The agreement on preventing 
sharps injuries in the hospitals sec-
tor became EU legislation through a 
decision of the Council, successfully 
contributing to improving the health 
and safety of healthcare workers in 
an area where the European Parlia-
ment had long called for action. The 
autonomous agreement on the intro-
duction of  European hairdressing 
certificates in the personal services 
sector will improve the transparency 
and comparability of the sector’s pro-
fessional qualifications across the EU. 
In addition, two further sets of nego-
tiations which may result in binding 
agreements are in progress. 
While these positive examples indi-
cate the potential of European social 
dialogue, the possibilities offered 
Box 6.9: Financial support
The European Commission’s promotion of European social dialogue includes financial support, mainly in the form of grants to 
social partners and other industrial relations stakeholders. On the basis of Article 154 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (Lisbon Treaty; ex Article 138), the most important financial programmes are the three headings in the EU budget 
earmarked for industrial relations and social dialogue, for information and training measures for worker’s organisations and, for the 
information, consultation and participation of representatives of undertakings. Further details on these funding opportunities can 
be found on the following website (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=86&langId=en).
Industrial relations and social dialogue
This budget heading supports the European social partners and other organisations active in the field of industrial relations to 
address the overarching challenges facing European employment and social policy as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy and in 
connection with EU initiatives to address the consequences of the economic crisis.
Each year, through a call for proposals with two application deadlines, the Commission supports around 80 projects led by the 
social partners and other organisations active in the field of industrial relations. These projects cover activities linked to the work 
programmes of the European cross-industry and sectoral social dialogue committees and measures undertaken to strengthen the 
social partners’ capacity, especially in the new Member States and candidate countries and which contribute to the development of 
European social dialogue (excluding national capacity-building activities which can be funded under the European Social Fund).
The total funding available under this budget heading in 2010 is EUR 16 million. Of this, EUR 14.15 million is awarded through the 
call for proposals. Other activities that are supported in 2010 include studies in the field of industrial relations and social dialogue 
and meetings of the European social partners, including the cross-industry and sectoral social dialogue committees.
Information and training measures for workers’ organisations
This budget heading provides support for information and training measures for workers’ organisations carried out by European, 
national and regional workers’ organisations.
Each year, through a call for proposals with one application deadline, the Commission supports around 30 projects in this field.
This budget heading also provides support to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and the European Centre for Workers’ 
Questions (EZA), which are the major European institutions providing training and research for European workers’ organisations. 
ETUI works with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and EZA works with the Christian workers’ organisations, 
which are also members of the ETUC.
The total funding available under this budget heading in 2010 is EUR 16.4 million. Of this, EUR 3.216 million is awarded through 
the call for proposals.
Information, consultation and participation of representatives of undertakings
This budget heading provides support for operations to ensure the conditions for fostering the development of employee involve-
ment in undertakings, by promoting the relevant EU legislation. This includes the directives on European works councils, on 
employee involvement in the European Company and European Cooperative Society, the directive establishing a general framework 
for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, the directive on cross-border mergers of limited liability and 
fostering transnational company agreements.
Each year, through a call for proposals with two application deadlines, the Commission supports around 45 projects in this field.
The total funding available under this budget heading in 2010 is EUR 7.3 million, all of which is to be awarded through the call 
for proposals.
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 Table 6.1: European social partner joint texts September 2008 to October 2010
Title Topic European social dialogue committee Type Date
Statement on health and safety aboard fishing vessels: 
for new vessels of unrestricted sizes Health and safety Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 8.9.2008
Joint statement on the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS)
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Chemical Industry Joint opinion 29.9.2008
Working in partnership through responsible care Health and safety Chemical Industry Tool 29.9.2008
Joint statement on workplace health promotion for  
air crew Health and safety Civil Aviation Declaration 17.10.2008
Framework of actions on gender equality —  
Third follow-up report 2008 Gender equality Cross-Industry
Follow-up 
report 12.11.2008
Joint press release: social dialogue on logistics Social dialogue Road Transport Declaration 2.12.2008
EFFAT-Hotrec joint statement on the continuation of 
their work on the ‘European qualification and skills’ 
passport’
Mobility Horeca Declaration 2.12.2008
Joint opinion on migration and mobility: challenges 
and opportunity for the EU education systems Mobility Commerce Joint opinion 12.12.2008
Demographic change in the electricity industry in 
Europe. Toolkit on promoting age diversity and age 
management strategies
Ageing workforce Electricity Tool 15.12.2008
Restructuring in the electricity industry: a toolkit for 
socially responsible restructuring with a best practice 
guide
Restructuring Electricity Tool 15.12.2008
Economic crisis: joint reaction of the social partners for 
commerce
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Commerce Joint opinion 18.12.2008
CEMR-EP/EPSU joint message to the Spring European 
Council 2009
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies
Local and Regional 
Government Joint opinion 27.2.2009
Working group — Education, training and lifelong 
learning — Joint declaration Employment Chemical Industry Joint opinion 2.3.2009
Charter and company guidelines on just culture Working conditions Civil Aviation Tool 31.3.2009
Joint declaration on training and qualification in the 
ground-handling sector
Training/lifelong 
learning Civil Aviation Declaration 5.5.2009
The impact of the financial crisis in the live 
performance sector. Joint statement by the European 
sectoral social partners ahead of the Employment 
Summit 7 May 2009
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Live Performance Joint opinion 6.5.2009
The social aspects of corporate social responsibility  
in the European electricity industry
CSR — Corporate 
social responsibility Electricity
Policy 
orientations 7.5.2009
by this framework have not yet 
been fully exploited in all cases. For 
instance, important sectors where 
large transnational companies are 
prevalent tend to pay less atten-
tion to the negotiation dimension of 
European sectoral social dialogue, 
as some of the social partners may 
prefer direct negotiation at company 
level, including with European works 
councils. Disagreements over sub-
stantive issues, such as in the assess-
ment of the causes of the crisis by the 
cross-industry social partners and a 
lack of trust between partners, have 
also prevented more progress from 
being made in some social dialogue 
committees.
Despite these difficulties in reach-
ing a uniform assessment of Euro-
pean social dialogue over the past 
two years, the European social part-
ners, both at the cross-industry as 
well as at the sectoral level, are the 
stakeholders that best know the 
conditions and problems that affect 
employers and workers in their 
sphere of action. They are there-
fore often best-placed to address the 
corresponding social policy issues. 
When they reach agreements at a 
European level such as those docu-
mented here, their action embodies 
the principle of social subsidiarity 
enshrined in the social policy title 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union: in the social 
policy field, negotiated agreements 
resulting from social dialogue can 
be a valid and useful alternative to 
regular EU legislative action.
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Title Topic European social dialogue committee Type Date
Joint opinion on the global economic crisis Economic and/or sectoral policies Chemical Industry Joint opinion 13.5.2009
Statement on the economic crisis Economic and/or sectoral policies Road Transport Joint opinion 14.5.2009
Joint declaration of the CER-ETF agreement on a 
European locomotive driver’s licence Working conditions Railways
Autonomous 
agreement 10.6.2009
Joint declaration on accident prevention in the postal 
sector Health and safety Postal Services Declaration 12.6.2009
Implementation of the 
ETUC/BusinessEurope/UEAPME/CEEP framework 
agreement on harassment and violence at work
Harassment Cross-Industry Follow-up report 16.6.2009
Cooperation agreement between ATCEUC and ETF Social dialogue Civil Aviation Procedural text 18.6.2009
European agreement on the implementation of the 
European hairdressing certificates
Training/lifelong 
learning Personal Services
Autonomous 
agreement 18.6.2009
Joint CANSO-ETF analysis of the ATM social dialogue 
FAB questionnaire Restructuring Civil Aviation Tool 30.6.2009
The global economic crisis and its consequences for the 
European construction industry 
Positive measures and concerns of the European social 
partners EFBWW and FIEC
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Construction Joint opinion 30.6.2009
Response to the second phase of consultation of the 
social partners under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty on 
reassessing the regulatory social framework for more 
and better seafaring jobs in the EU
Working conditions Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 8.7.2009
Joint declaration concerning social security provisions 
in inland waterways transport Mobility Inland Waterways Joint opinion 14.8.2009
Framework agreement on parental leave (revised) Gender equality Cross-Industry
Agreement 
Council 
decision
18.9.2009
Private security European sectoral social partners 
statement to expert group on cross-border transport of 
the euro cash
Social aspects of EU 
policies Private Security Joint opinion 28.9.2009
Creativity, innovation and the role of the cultural 
sector. A joint statement on behalf of the European 
sectoral social partners ‘live performance’ in the 
framework of the European Year of Creativity and 
Innovation 2009
Social aspects of EU 
policies Live Performance Joint opinion 30.9.2009
Toolkit. Demographic change, age management and 
competencies in the gas sector in Europe Ageing workforce Gas Tool 15.10.2009
Preventing third-party violence in commerce —  A toolkit Harassment Commerce Tool 21.10.2009
Implementing the framework agreement on prevention 
from sharp injuries in the hospital and healthcare sector 
concluded by Hospeem and EPSU
Health and safety Hospitals
Agreement 
Council 
decision
26.10.2009
Framework of actions on gender Gender equality Cross-Industry Follow-up report 13.11.2009
Joint declaration of the European social partners of the 
furniture industry, EFIC UEA and EFBWW calling on 
the European and national authorities to support the 
industry in its confrontation with the economic crisis
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Furniture Joint opinion 18.11.2009
Joint position of the social dialogue Extractive 
industries on COP 15 and its impact on EU extractive 
industries
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Extractive Industry Joint opinion 19.11.2009
Joint opinion on protecting creativity, innovation and jobs Economic and/or sectoral policies Audiovisual Joint opinion 30.11.2009
Joint sectoral contribution to the Commission’s 
consultation on the future of transport
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Inland Waterways Joint opinion 30.11.2009
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Title Topic European social dialogue committee Type Date
Training for temporary agency workers: joint actions 
developed by sectoral social partners play a key role in 
facilitating skills upgrading
Training/lifelong 
learning
Temporary Agency 
Work Declaration 3.12.2009
Joint statement of the social partners of the European 
leather industry on the Greenpeace report on the 
deforestation of the Amazon rain forest
CSR — Corporate 
social responsibility Tanning and Leather Declaration 15.12.2009
Contribution of the social partners to the Sectoral Social 
Dialogue Committee on Sea Fisheries Contribution of 
the social partners to the European Commission Green 
Paper Reform of the common fisheries policy
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 22.12.2009
Joint statement on demographical challenges of the 
insurance sector Ageing workforce Insurance
Policy 
orientations 26.1.2010
Emerging from the crisis Economic and/or sectoral policies Construction Joint opinion 29.1.2010
Joint statement to the European Council meeting  
11 February 2010 on the economic crisis
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies
Local and Regional 
Government Joint opinion 4.2.2010
Employment and bogus self-employment Economic and/or sectoral policies Construction Joint opinion 5.2.2010
Joint declaration of the social partners in the European 
woodworking industries Health and safety Woodworking Declaration 10.2.2010
Social partners’ statement on bluefin tuna Economic and/or sectoral policies Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 9.3.2010
ATM social partners position on the implementing 
rules of the performance scheme
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Civil Aviation Joint opinion 18.3.2010
Framework agreement on inclusivelabour markets Employment Cross-Industry Autonomous agreement 25.3.2010
‘Single European Sky II’ implementation — 
Consultation of ATM social partners Social dialogue Civil Aviation Joint opinion 30.4.2010
The new review of Directive 2003/88/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of  
4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time
Working time Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 21.6.2010
Eurelectric/EPSU/EMCEF joint response to the public 
consultation ‘Towards a new energy strategy for Europe 
2011–20’ 
Social aspects of EU 
policies Electricity Joint opinion 23.6.2010
Joint position paper of the European social partners 
in the construction industry on the findings of the 
high-level group (HLG) on the action programme 
for reducing administrative burdens in the European 
Union, COM(2007) 23 final
Working conditions Construction Joint opinion 30.6.2010
Opinion of the social partners on the potential unilateral 
increase of the EU GHG reduction target to – 30 % 
Sustainable 
development Extractive Industry Joint opinion 2.7.2010 
Joint recommendations for better representation and 
integration of women in the railway sector. Status and 
how to apply the joint recommendations 
Gender equality Railways Follow-up report 12.7.2010 
Common contribution of the social partners for commerce 
to some flagship initiatives of the ‘EU 2020: a European 
strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
Training/lifelong 
learning Commerce Joint opinion 4.8.2010 
Joint declaration of the European social partners in 
agriculture on the Commission’s communication 
COM(2009) 591 final ‘A better functioning food supply 
chain in Europe’ 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Agriculture Joint opinion 3.9.2010 
Protecting workers’ health against plant protection 
products/resolution Health and safety Agriculture Joint opinion 3.9.2010 
Joint declaration — European Union Association 
agreement — Euromed 
Economic and/or 
sectoral policies Agriculture Joint opinion 3.9.2010 
Towards a new European energy policy 2011–20 draft 
report of MEP Lena Kolarska-Bobinska 
Social aspects of 
Community policies Electricity Joint opinion 13.10.2010 
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Table 6.2: European social dialogue committees
Cross-industry social dialogue committees
Organisations representing workers Organisations representing employers Date of creation
ETUC
Liaison Committee Eurocadres and CEC
BusinessEurope
CEEP
UEAPME
1992
Sectoral social dialogue committees
Sectors Organisations representing workers Organisations representing employers Date of creation 
Agriculture EFFAT GEOPA/COPA 1999
Audiovisual UNI-MEI, EFJ, FIA, FIM EBU, ACT, AER, CEPI, FIAPF 2004
Banking UNI europa FBE, ESBG, EACB 1999
Central administrations TUNED EUPAN 2010
Chemical industry EMCEF ECEG 2004
Civil aviation ECA, ETF ACI-Europe, AEA CANSO, ERA, IACA, IAHA 2000
Cleaning industry UNI europa EFCI 1999
Commerce UNI europa EuroCommerce 1999
Contract catering EFFAT FERCO 2007
Construction EFBWW FIEC 1999
Education ETUCE EFEE 2010
Electricity EPSU, EMCEF Eurelectric 2000
Extractive industries (mines) EMCEF APEP, Eurocoal, Euromines 2002
Footwear ETUF:TCL CEC 1999
Furniture EFBWW UEA 2001
Gas EMCEF, EPSU Eurogas 2007
Horeca/tourism EFFAT Hotrec 1999
Hospitals EPSU Hospeem 2006
Inland waterways ETF EBU, ESO 1999
Insurance UNI europa CEA, BIPAR, ACME 1999
Live performance EAEA Pearle 1999
Local and regional governments EPSU CEMR 2004
Metal, engineering and technology-based 
industries EMF Ceemet 2010
Paper EMCEF CEPI 2010
Personal services UNI europa Coiffure EU 1999
Postal services UNI europa PostEurop 1999
Private security UNI europa CoESS 1999
Professsional football EPFL, ECA FIFPro 2008
Railways ETF CER, EIM 1999
Road transport ETF IRU 2000
Sea fisheries ETF Europêche/Cogeca 1999
Sea transport ETF ECSA 1999
Shipbuilding EMF CESA 2003
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Sectors Organisations representing workers Organisations representing employers Date of creation 
Steel EMF Eurofer 2006
Sugar EFFAT CEFS 1999
Tanning and leather ETUF:TCL Cotance 2001
Telecoms UNI europa ETNO 1999
Temporary agency work UNI europa Eurociett 1999
Textiles/clothing ETUF:TCL Euratex 1999
Woodworking EFBWW CEI-Bois 2000

205
Introduction7.1. 
The development of European 
employment legislation over the 
period 2008–10 was punctuated by 
important breakthroughs as well as 
uncertainties and drawbacks. The 
political context continued to be 
characterised by sharp differences 
of approach, not only between social 
partners but also among the key 
institutional stakeholders. While 
the European Parliament has, in 
several instances, recommended to 
the Commission to initiate legisla-
tive action in order to cope with 
emerging problems in the function-
ing of labour markets, the Council, 
now extended to 27 Member States, 
has grown increasingly reticent to 
expand the legislative acquis in the 
employment area.
In line with the better regulation 
agenda, the Commission has been 
increasingly engaged in strength-
ening the evidence basis of its leg-
islative proposals. Considerable 
resources have been invested in 
producing ex ante assessments of 
the social, economic and environ-
mental impact of new legislation. 
The administrative burden arising 
from existing EU legislation and 
from national transposing rules has 
been estimated. In the same vein, 
further efforts have been devoted 
to the ex post evaluation of EU leg-
islation in order to determine its 
economic and social impact and 
identify any outstanding issues jus-
tifying review.
During the period, the Commission 
continued to deploy significant 
efforts in monitoring the correct 
transposition and application of 
EU law in the enlarged European 
Union. It issued guides, communi-
cations and reports, commissioned 
studies and related projects and 
set up expert committees. It also 
continued to provide appropriate 
technical assistance aiming at the 
correct transposition of the rele-
vant EU legislation in the candidate 
countries.
In the area of labour law, a major 
breakthrough was the adoption on 
19 November 2008 of a new directive 
on temporary agency work, which 
provides for a significant increase in 
the legal protection afforded to tem-
porary workers while recognising 
the role of work agencies in bring-
ing greater flexibility to the labour 
market and providing job oppor-
tunities. The adoption of Directive 
2008/104/EC (1) put an end to a six-
year deadlock in the Council which 
centred on the issue of duration 
of the grace period during which 
user undertakings can be exempted 
from applying the principle of equal 
treatment. The directive awards an 
important role to solutions framed 
via national social dialogue.
1 OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9.
Another important development 
was the proposal and swift adop-
tion by the Council and Parliament 
of a recast European works councils 
 directive strengthening the infor-
mation and consultation rights of 
workers on transnational matters 
and clarifying a number of outstand-
ing legal issues; in the context of the 
crisis, its importance is particularly 
evident (2). The impetus for this pro-
posal was given by the Commission’s 
renewed social agenda of 2008 (3), 
which was built around three axes: 
opportunities, access and solidarity. 
This agenda identified the Commis-
sion’s priorities and set out a series of 
concrete measures to attain them as 
well as the instruments to be used to 
this end.
In addition, following a consulta-
tion of the European social part-
ners by the Commission the former 
decided to negotiate and subse-
quently agreed on the incorpora-
tion into the EU legislative acquis 
of a substantial number of provi-
sions contained in the 2006 ILO 
Maritime Labour Convention (4). 
The new directive (2009/13/EC) 
completes or amends existing EU 
provisions applying to the working 
conditions of seafarers, including 
working time. Furthermore, in the 
interests of clarity and rationality, 
the provisions regarding the protec-
tion of workers’ rights in the case 
of employers’ insolvency were con-
solidated in the insolvency directive 
(2008/94/EC).
A major setback was the  withdrawal 
of the Commission proposal to 
amend the working time directive 
(2003/88/EC), after the failure of 
the Council and Parliament to agree 
2 Directive 2009/38/EC of 6 May 2009 (OJ L 122, 
16.5.2009, p. 28).
3 COM(2008) 412 final of 2.7.2008.
4 See Chapter 4 of the Industrial Relations in Europe 
2008 report for details.
The past two years resulted in a mixed picture with respect to the development of 
 employment-related legislation at EU level. On the one hand, important advances 
were made with the adoption of directives on matters such as temporary agency 
work, the European works councils and the equal treatment of men and women 
in self-employment. Three directives resulted from social partner agreements: on 
 parental leave (cross-industry), on the prevention of sharps injuries (hospitals 
and healthcare sector) and on the working conditions of seafarers (maritime 
transport sector). On the other hand, major difficulties were encountered, among 
them the  failure of the revised working time directive and complications with the 
interpretation and  enforcement of the posting of workers directive.
Chapter 7: Review of European legislation 2008–10
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on a compromise proposal during 
the final conciliation procedure in 
April 2009. Introduced in 2004, the 
proposal aimed to identify a solu-
tion to the difficulties in implement-
ing CJEU rulings on the SIMAP and 
Jaeger cases, as well as addressing 
stakeholders’ claims in respect to the 
extension of the reference period for 
averaging weekly working time and 
the individual opt-out. The Commis-
sion responded to the failed concili-
ation by launching a comprehensive 
review of the directive including an 
extensive evaluation exercise and a 
first consultation of the European 
 social partners.
Another source of difficulties was 
the interpretation and enforcement 
of the posting of workers  directive 
(96/71/EC). In the wake of the 
CJEU rulings on Laval, Rueffert and 
 Commission v Luxembourg and, as 
a follow-up to the 2007 communi-
cation, the Commission decided to 
step up its efforts to facilitate admin-
istrative cooperation among Mem-
ber States and promote debate with 
stakeholders. In order to face up to 
such difficulties, the Commission is 
reviewing the implementation and 
interpretation of the legal frame-
work on posting of workers and has 
already launched several external 
studies on the legal and economic 
effects of the directive.
In the area of health and safety at 
work and in line with the commit-
ments of the EU strategy for health 
and safety at work 2007–12, the 
developments during the period 
aimed to ensure a regulatory frame-
work capable of continuously adapt-
ing to change while respecting the 
principle that legislation should 
be coherent, simple and effective 
and also meeting the objective of 
reducing the administrative burden 
on companies. An example of this 
concern was the adoption of a third 
list of indicative occupational limit 
values for chemical agents (Direc-
tive 2009/161/EU), which shows the 
determination of the Commission 
to keep the EU health and safety at 
work acquis in line with the most 
recent scientific data available.
An important achievement was 
the adoption of Council Direc-
tive 2010/32/EU implementing the 
framework agreement on preven-
tion of injuries from sharp instru-
ments in the hospital and healthcare 
sector, concluded by Hospeem and 
EPSU. The incorporation into the 
EU legislative acquis of the agree-
ment constitutes a significant con-
tribution to realising the safest 
possible working environment in 
the sectors concerned.
Two important contributions to the 
improvement and clarity of the EU 
regulatory framework, in line with 
the key priorities of the Commis-
sion’s better regulation agenda, were 
made through the adoption of two 
‘codification’ Directives 2009/104/EC 
on work equipment and 2009/148/EC 
on asbestos. A special mention should 
be made in the context of better reg-
ulation to the development of guides 
of good practice aiming at facilitating 
and improving the practical applica-
tion of certain health and safety at 
work directives such as noise, con-
struction, artificial optical radiation.
Concerning the area of employment-
related equality, the adoption of 
Council Directive 2010/18/EU imple-
menting the 2009 framework agree-
ment on parental leave concluded by 
the European social partners, demon-
strated the capacity of the social part-
ners — and the EU institutions — to 
build on the previous 1995 agreement 
(also implemented as a directive). The 
agreement strengthens and further 
clarifies the rights to leave of working 
parents (see Chapter 6 for details).
In another important development, 
the application of the principle of 
the right to equal treatment between 
men and women will be strengthened 
for those working in a self-employed 
capacity through Council Directive 
2010/41/EU. This was adopted on 
17 July 2010.
This chapter reviews the main devel-
opments concerning EU employment 
legislation between 2008 and 2010 
in three sections: labour law, health 
and safety at work and employment-
related equality legislation. In each 
section, measures with general 
application are reviewed first, fol-
lowed by those which are sector spe-
cific. Attention then turns to issues 
of implementation, monitoring and 
inspection. The concluding section 
then presents some future perspec-
tives for EU employment legislation, 
its further development and imple-
mentation.
Labour law7.2. 
Temporary agency 7.2.1. 
work
Temporary agency work has been 
growing steadily and currently 
accounts for about 1.7 % of total 
employment in the EU (5). The 
phenomenon is particularly wide-
spread in Member States such as the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands. With the goal 
of improving the working condi-
tions of the concerned workers, by 
application of the principle of equal 
treatment, Directive 2008/104/EC 
on temporary agency work (6) was 
adopted on 19 November 2008. It also 
aims to provide a suitable framework 
5 Cf. ‘The agency work industry around the world’, 
Ciett, 2010.
6 Cf. Note 1. 
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for temporary agency work to better 
contribute to the creation of jobs and 
to the development of flexible forms 
of work in the EU. 
The directive has to be transposed 
into national law by 5 December 
2011 at the latest. An expert group 
has been set up, composed of rep-
resentatives of national adminis-
trations, to facilitate the work of 
Member States’ administrations in 
transposing the directive.
Working time7.2.2. 
In 2004, the Commission had put 
forward a proposal (7) to amend the 
working time directive (2003/88/EC), 
following wide consultations. After 
four years of intense negotiations, the 
Council was able to adopt a common 
position. However, in April 2009, the 
Council and Parliament concluded 
that they could not reach agreement, 
7 Original proposal COM(2004) 607; amended 
proposal COM(2005) 246.
despite two readings and a concilia-
tion process. Several issues remained 
outstanding, the most intractable of 
all being the suppression of the pos-
sibility for individual workers to opt 
out from the weekly 48 hour limit. 
Other difficult issues included the 
extension to 12 months of the ref-
erence period for averaging weekly 
working time and the handling of 
the timing of compensatory rest 
periods and of on-call time.
Box 7.1: Main provisions of Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work
Equal treatment
From the first day of the worker’s assignment to a user undertaking, the basic working and employment conditions of the agency 
worker have to be at least those that would apply if he/she was recruited directly by that company to occupy the same job.
Equal treatment applies to pay, the duration of working time, overtime as well as to breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and 
public holidays, to the extent that these conditions are considered to be binding for workers of the user company.
For pregnant women and nursing mothers, any rules in force in the user undertaking concerning their protection will also be applica-
ble to agency workers. The same goes for the rules on equal treatment for men and women and on any action against discrimination 
based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, beliefs, disabilities, age or sexual orientation.
The directive allows for certain derogations from the principle of equal treatment, however, under strict conditions.
In some Member States, temporary agency workers may be offered a permanent contract of employment with the agency and con-•	
tinue to be paid between assignments. In certain circumstances, Member States may provide for an exemption from the principle 
of equal pay.
There are countries where agency work is regulated also or mainly by collective agreements between the social partners. After con-•	
sulting them, Member States may give them the option of concluding collective agreements establishing arrangements which may 
differ from equal treatment. The overall protection of agency workers has to be upheld in all circumstances.
Under stringent conditions and on the basis of an agreement concluded by the social partners, Member States may introduce dero-•	
gations from the principle of equal treatment. In this context, they may establish a qualifying period for equal treatment.
Improved access to permanent employment, collective facilities and vocational training 
Agency workers have to be informed of any vacant posts in the user undertaking. Temporary-work agencies cannot prevent agency 
workers from being hired by the user company once their assignment has terminated or charge the workers any fees on that occa-
sion.
Agency workers have access to all collective facilities in the user undertaking, in particular any canteen, childcare facilities and trans-
port services, under the same conditions as workers employed directly by the company, unless a difference in treatment is justified 
by objective reasons.
Member States have to take measures or promote social dialogue, in order to improve access to training for agency workers in the 
temporary-work agencies, even in the periods between assignments, as well as their access to training designed for the staff of user 
undertakings.
Representation of agency workers and information of workers’ representatives
Temporary agency workers are considered to be workers of the agency, for the purpose of setting up workers’ representatives bodies. 
However, Member States can also decide to take them into account as workers of the user enterprise.
The user enterprise must provide suitable information to its workers’ representatives’ body on the use of temporary agency workers 
when reporting on the employment situation in the undertaking.
Reduced prohibitions and restrictions on the use of temporary agency work
Prohibitions and restrictions on the use of temporary agency work are to be reviewed and suppressed unless they are justified on 
grounds of general interest. Such grounds relate in particular to the protection of agency workers, the requirements of health and 
safety at work or the need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented.
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This negative outcome created a 
difficult situation for several Mem-
ber States and for social partners at 
national level. The Commission con-
sidered this situation to be clearly 
unsatisfactory for governments, 
workers and businesses. In its view, 
it is necessary to review the working 
time rules in the EU on the basis of 
an impact assessment with a strong 
social dimension and a full-scale 
consultation of the social partners.
In this context, on 24 March 2010 
it adopted a communication on 
reviewing the working time direc-
tive, seeking the views of the social 
partners at European Union level in 
accordance with Article 154 of the 
TFEU, on the possible direction of 
EU action on this issue (8). At the 
same time, the Commission is con-
ducting a comprehensive review of 
the directive, which includes a thor-
ough evaluation of its provisions, in 
order to determine how they cope 
with the workplace realities of the 
early 21st century.
The Commission communication 
sets out the trends and prospects 
regarding working time, describes 
the current regulation in this area, 
announces the objectives of a com-
prehensive review of the EU directive 
and identifies the key issues arising 
in its application. Those concern in 
particular the following: (a) working 
hours; (b) on-call time; (c) flexibil-
ity on the averaging of weekly work-
ing hours; and (d) flexibility on the 
 timing of minimum daily and weekly 
rest periods.
The communication contains a list of 
specific questions on which the Com-
mission seeks the views of the Euro-
pean social partners. In parallel with 
this consultation, the Commission 
will carry out an extensive impact 
8 COM(2010) 106 final of 24.3.2010.
assessment, including an examina-
tion of the legal application of the 
directive in the Member States and 
a study of the social and economic 
aspects that are pertinent for a com-
prehensive review of the directive.
Directive 2008/94/EC  7.2.3. 
on the protection 
of employees in the 
case of employers’ 
insolvency
In times of crisis, when the number 
of insolvencies is increasing, Euro-
pean legislation on the subject 
becomes particularly relevant. In 
order to codify previous legislation 
in the interests of clarity and ration-
ality, Directive 2008/94/EC on the 
protection of employees in the case 
of employer’s insolvency was adopted 
on 22 October 2008, replacing the 
previous Directives 80/987/EEC and 
2002/74/EC.
This legislation aims to ensure the 
protection of workers in case of insol-
vency of their employer by requiring 
Member States to establish institu-
tions that guarantee the payment of 
unpaid salaries. The Commission 
plans to report on the implementa-
tion and application of the directive 
by the end of 2010. In addition, the 
Commission Green Paper on the 
future of pensions includes a ques-
tion about the protection of workers’ 
and pensioners’ interests, covered by 
complementary occupational pen-
sions, in the event of the employer’s 
insolvency.
Posting of workers7.2.4. 
Following on from its 2007 commu-
nication on the posting of workers, 
on 3 April 2008 the Commission 
adopted a recommendation on 
 reinforced cooperation in this area. 
The main  elements of this recom-
mendation were endorsed by the 
Council in June 2008, which invited 
the Commission to institutionalise 
the existing informal group on post-
ing of workers, transforming it into 
a committee of experts. This was 
subsequently set up through Com-
mission Decision 2009/17/EC of 
19 December 2008; a separate sub-
group was charged with developing 
an information exchange system. 
The expert committee has already 
started to address a number of dif-
ficulties in implementing and apply-
ing the posting of workers directive 
with the aim of clearing up outstand-
ing issues and building consensus.
Furthermore, in order to discuss and 
exchange views on the consequences 
of the recent rulings by the Court of 
Justice in this area (9), a forum on work-
ers’ rights and economic freedoms 
was organised on 9 October 2008, 
with wide participation from Member 
States, stakeholders and institutional 
actors. The forum fulfilled its objec-
tives in that it contributed to clarify-
ing the positions of the key political 
actors on the way forward for han-
dling the consequences of the rulings 
at both national and EU levels. Fol-
lowing an invitation from the Com-
mission and the French Presidency of 
the Council, in early 2010 the ETUC 
and BusinessEurope presented an 
analysis of the consequences of the 
rulings as seen from their respective 
perspectives (10).
In 2009 the Commission launched 
several ex post evaluation  studies (11) 
9 See Industrial Relations 2008 report, Chapter 6, 
box on main judgments of the CJEU in the field of 
labour law in 2006–07, p. 140. 
10 Report of 19 March 2010 on ‘Joint work of the 
European social partners on the CJEU rulings in the 
Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases’.
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?catId=626&langId=en under VT/2009/062 and 
VT/2009/062. See also pilot project VP/2009/015.
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on the application of the  posting of 
workers directive as part of a pilot 
project to investigate the actual 
working and living conditions of 
posted workers in all the Member 
States, including the social, eco-
nomic and legal aspects. The project 
is focusing on sectors with higher 
numbers of posted workers. In 
addition, the Commission granted 
financial support for several projects 
for the exchange of information and 
good practice in this area among 
stakeholders (especially the social 
partners) in 2009. Further support 
will be provided for the same pur-
pose in 2010.
As indicated in its Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth (12), the Commis-
sion is currently working to adapt 
the legislative framework, wher-
ever necessary, in line with ‘smart’ 
regulation principles, in the area of 
posting of workers. To this end, it 
will take into account, in particular, 
the findings of the aforementioned 
studies as well as European Parlia-
ment resolutions, European social 
partners’ analysis, the Monti report 
on re-launching the single mar-
ket (13) and the outcome of public 
consultations.
Rome I regulation7.2.5. 
The Rome I Regulation (EC) 
No 593/2008 on the law applica-
ble to contractual obligations (14), 
which was adopted on 17 June 2008, 
entered into force in its integrity on 
17 December 2009 and applies to 
contracts concluded after that date. 
The regulation updates and modern-
ises the previous Rome Convention 
12 COM(2010) 2020 of 3.3.2010.
13 Cf. Report on ‘A new strategy for the single 
market’ submitted by Professor Mario Monti to 
President Barroso on 9 May 2010.
14 OJ L 177, 4.7.2008.
(international treaty),  incorporating 
into EU legislation certain rules for 
determining the law that applies 
to contractual obligations in situ-
ations of a conflict of laws of dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The regulation 
includes a specific employment-
related provision, namely Article 8 
determining the law applicable to 
individual employment contracts. 
It incorporates important elements 
of the interpretation of the Rome 
Convention devised by the CJEU 
(the concept of habitual place of 
work and mandatory rules are par-
ticularly relevant in the context of 
employment contracts).
Employee involvement7.2.6. 
Recast European works 7.2.6.1. 
councils directive
On 2 July 2008, the Commission 
presented a proposal for a recast 
European works council  directive, 
which was adopted as Directive 
2009/38/EC (15) on 6 May 2009. 
This recast directive clarifies and 
strengthens the previous legisla-
tion from 1994 in several respects 
(see Box 7.2). Its provisions have to 
be transposed into national law by 
5 June 2011. The European Com-
mission published a leaflet to 
15 OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28.
Box 7.2: Main provisions of the recast European  
works council directive (2009/38/EC)
The establishment of EWCs
Central and local managements are responsible for providing the information which •	
allows negotiations to be opened.
The Special Negotiating Body•	  is composed of one representative per 10 % portion of the 
employees in a Member State. It has the right to meet alone before and after any meeting 
with the central management.
The competent European trade union and employers’ organisations are to be informed •	
of the start of negotiations. Trade unions are also among the experts on whom the SNB 
may call for assistance in the negotiations.
The operation of EWCs
The arrangements for informing and consulting employees have to be defined and imple-•	
mented in such a way as to ensure their effectiveness and to enable the company to take 
decisions effectively.
The transnational competence of EWCs is determined.•	
The concepts of information and consultation are more precisely defined.•	
The role of the select committee and the content of consultation are strengthened in the •	
subsidiary requirements.
Information and consultation at transnational (EWC) and national levels are to be linked •	
together. Arrangements to that effect are to be defined primarily by agreement.
Employees’ representatives have to be provided with training without loss of wages and •	
shall have the means required to apply the rights arising from the directive.
Employees’ representatives have to inform employees of the content and outcome of the •	
information and consultation procedure.
Adaptation clause and window of opportunities
The recast directive provides for a mechanism to adapt existing EWCs, where the struc-•	
ture of the undertaking or group of undertakings changes significantly.
Companies where agreements to establish new EWCs are concluded between 5 June •	
2009 and 5 June 2011 or where existing agreements are revised during this period are not 
bound by the new obligations introduced by Directive 2009/38/EC.
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inform  stakeholders (16) and set up 
an expert group with a view to assist 
Member States in their transposi-
tion of the new directive.
At the first stage consultation accord-
ing to Article 154(4) TFEU (ex Arti-
cle 138(4) of the EC Treaty), the 
European cross-industry social part-
ners (17) did not commence nego-
tiations, yet in August 2008 they 
adopted a joint position accepting 
the Commission’s proposal (18) as the 
basis of the revision and suggesting a 
limited number of changes. Against 
this background, the European Par-
liament and the Council were able to 
arrive at a first-reading agreement as 
early as December 2008.
European Private  7.2.6.2. 
Company Statute
On 25 June 2008 the Commission 
adopted its proposal for a Council 
regulation on the statute for a Euro-
pean private company (or Societas 
Privata Europaea — SPE) (19). The ini-
tiative creates a new European legal 
form intended to enhance the com-
petitiveness of SMEs by facilitating 
their establishment and operation in 
the single market. The provisions on 
employee participation contained in 
the proposal can be summarised as 
follows: the principle is that the SPE 
is subject to the rules on employee 
participation, if any, applicable in the 
Member State in which it has its reg-
istered office, with two exceptions:
(a)  in case of a cross-border merger, 
the rules on employee par-
ticipation in Regulation (EC) 
No 56/2005 apply;
16 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&la
ngId=en&pubId=348&type=2&furtherPubs=yes
17 ETUC, BusinessEurope, CEEP and UEAPME.
18 COM(2008) 419 final of 2.7.2008. 
19 COM(2008) 396 final.
(b)  in case of the transfer of reg-
istered office, specific rules 
apply: when the employees 
enjoyed participation rights in 
the home Member State (and 
not in the host Member State) 
and they represent one third of 
the total number of employees, 
negotiations should start (the 
rules on employee participa-
tion of the home Member State 
would apply if no agreement is 
reached).
On 10 March 2009 the European Par-
liament proposed a certain number 
of amendments including on the sub-
ject of employee participation. The 
Commission proposal is still pending 
before the Council.
Maritime sector7.2.7. 
Directive on Maritime  7.2.7.1. 
Labour Convention
In a pioneering development among 
sectors that are global in nature, the 
maritime shipping industry has seen 
considerable efforts to define and 
effectively enforce global minimum 
standards of employment and health 
and safety conditions of seafarers 
employed or working on board a 
seagoing vessel. The International 
Labour Organisation addressed this 
issue in the 2006 Maritime Labour 
Convention, and for its part the Coun-
cil adopted Directive 2009/13/EC 
on 16 February 2009 (20). It will 
enter into force simultaneously with 
the ILO Maritime Labour Conven-
tion (i.e. following ratification by 30 
states accounting for at least 33 % 
of world tonnage). Given that the 
EU-27 dispose of 28 % of the world 
fleet, the European Union can play a 
crucial role in accelerating its entry 
into force.
20 OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, p. 30.
This convention incorporates the vari-
ous conventions and recommenda-
tions on maritime labour adopted by 
the ILO since 1919 into a single con-
solidated text to serve as a basis for the 
first universal maritime labour code. 
The Commission actively participated 
in the work leading to its conclusion 
in February 2006. Subsequently, on 
7 June 2007 the Council adopted a 
decision (2007/431/EC) which, on 
the one hand, authorised Member 
States to ratify, in the interests of the 
European Community, the Maritime 
Labour Convention and, on the other 
hand, encouraged them to do so by 
30 December 2010.
The European legislation currently in 
force already covers most of the top-
ics regulated by the Maritime Labour 
Convention. In fact, in most instances 
the European legislation establishes 
higher standards in comparison with 
those of the convention. However, in 
a few cases the Maritime Labour Con-
vention proposes a more specific reg-
ulation or working conditions which 
are more favourable for seafarers.
The social partners of the maritime 
transport sector were consulted by the 
Commission on whether the relevant 
provisions of the Maritime Labour 
Convention should be incorporated 
into Community law and were asked 
to consider entering into negotiations 
with the aim of reaching an agreement 
concerning certain of its provisions. 
The social partners decided to engage 
in negotiations and, on 19 May 2008 
(in connection with the first Maritime 
Day), they signed a joint agreement 
on the 2006 Maritime Labour Con-
vention (21).
The social partners requested the 
EU to take the appropriate measures 
to implement their agreement as a 
Council decision, in accordance with 
21 See Chapter 4 of the Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2008 report for details.
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 Article 155 of the Treaty (ex Article 
139). Following this request, on 2 July 
2008 the Commission submitted a 
proposal for a directive. The Council 
reached political agreement regarding 
this proposal on 17 December 2008 
and formally adopted Directive 
2009/13/EC on 16 February 2009.
The incorporation of elements of 
the Maritime Labour Convention of 
2006 into Community law by means 
of  Directive 2009/13/EC will update 
the European legislation in force by 
the inclusion of those standards of the 
convention which are more favoura-
ble for seafarers. It is expected that the 
working conditions of seafarers will 
be improved, particularly as regards 
employment agreements, hours of 
work, repatriation, careers and skills 
development, accommodation and 
recreation facilities, food and catering, 
health and safety protection and medi-
cal care, and complaint procedures. At 
the same time the standards contained 
in the agreement of the social partners 
will be subject to the specific enforce-
ment mechanisms of EU law.
Improvements to the health and 
safety protection and medical care 
of seafarers are the subject of spe-
cific provisions in Article 4 of the 
social partners’ agreement. Regula-
tion 4.3 of the agreement requires the 
Member States to ensure that seafar-
ers are provided with occupational 
health protection and live, work and 
train on board in a safe and hygienic 
environment. Furthermore, national 
guidelines for the management of 
occupational safety and health on 
board ships shall be drawn up. Finally, 
each Member State shall adopt meas-
ures addressing, inter alia, the risk 
evaluation, training and instruction 
of seafarers, on-board programmes 
for the prevention of occupational 
accidents, injuries and diseases as 
well as requirements for  inspecting, 
 reporting and correcting unsafe 
conditions and for  investigating and 
reporting on-board occupational 
accidents. Regulation 4.1 and Stand-
ard A4.1 cover seafarers’ entitlement 
to access medical care, including 
essential dental care, on board ship 
and ashore. Closely related to health 
and safety at work are provisions of 
Article 3 of the agreement provid-
ing minimum standards concerning 
accommodation, recreational facili-
ties, food and catering for seafarers.
Review of the regulatory 7.2.7.2. 
social framework concerning 
seafarers — Exclusion  
of seafarers
Several labour law directives either 
exclude seagoing workers from their 
scope or authorise the Member States 
to do so (cf. Directives 2008/94/EC, 
94/45/EC, 2002/14/EC, 98/59/EC, 
2001/23/EC and 96/71/EC). The exist-
ence of the exclusions was mainly 
justified by national circumstances 
which made it particularly difficult, at 
the time when they were adopted, to 
apply the relevant directives to seago-
ing workers.
The Commission reviewed the per-
tinent legislation in order to identify 
the exclusions or derogations affect-
ing workers in maritime professions, 
the problems raised by practical 
application and the difficulties of 
interpretation of such legislation. It 
sought to determine to what extent 
action might be needed to improve 
legal protection for maritime profes-
sions in the EU. In view of the highly 
globalised context of most maritime 
sectors, it undertook such analysis 
against the background of the already 
extensive body of international con-
ventions and standards.
The Commission concluded that the 
exclusion of seafaring workers from 
the scope of some directives might not 
be entirely justified insofar as it did not 
appear to be accompanied by specific 
arrangements, more adapted to the 
concrete situation of such workers.
Following a first-stage consultation of 
the social partners in 2007 (22) and an 
in-depth analysis of their positions, 
the Commission carried out a second 
stage consultation, in which it sought 
the opinions of the social partners 
on a number of concrete solutions 
which would provide the basis for 
reviewing the exclusions regarding 
seafaring workers contained in the 
aforementioned directives. The sec-
ond stage consultation was concluded 
in December 2009. At the same time 
the Commission launched a study in 
order to gather empirical evidence 
relevant to an eventual legislative ini-
tiative and assess the impact of sev-
eral options.
Proposal of decision  7.2.7.3. 
on ratification of ILO’s 2007 
Fishing Convention
In line with the 2006 commu-
nication on decent work for all 
(COM(2006) 249), which included 
a Commission commitment to the 
promotion of up-to-date ILO conven-
tions, the Commission adopted, on 
27 May 2008, a proposal for a Coun-
cil decision (23) authorising Member 
States to ratify, in the interests of the 
European Community, the Work in 
Fishing Convention concluded in 
2007 by the International Labour 
Organisation (Convention 188). The 
decision also calls on the Member 
States to deploy efforts to ratify the 
convention as soon as possible, prefer-
ably before the end of 2012. Member 
States need the Council’s authorisa-
tion prior to  ratification, because the 
22 COM(2007) 591final ‘Reassessing the regulatory 
social framework for more and better seafaring jobs 
in the EU’.
23 COM(2008) 320 of 27 May 2008.
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convention includes rules in areas 
which fall under exclusive Commu-
nity  competence, namely the coordi-
nation of social security schemes.
The convention will replace some older 
ILO standards and is expected to rem-
edy the low rate of ratification of many 
conventions in the field of maritime 
labour. It sets minimum rules aiming 
at improving the working conditions 
on board fishing vessels in areas such 
as health and safety and medical care, 
rest periods, protection by a work 
agreement and social security. Thus, it 
is intended to help establishing a level 
playing field in one of the most global 
and dangerous occupations.
The European Parliament approved 
the proposal by legislative resolution 
of 14 January 2009. On 30 November 
2009 the Council reached a political 
agreement on this issue.
Facilitation  7.2.8. 
and monitoring  
of implementation  
in the Member States
Transposition/application 7.2.8.1. 
reports
In 2008, the Commission prepared 
a number of reports concerning the 
transposition and/or implementation 
of certain directives in the area of EU 
labour law. In particular, the following 
documents were adopted:
Report of 11 April 2008 on the •	
implementation of Article 8 of 
Directive 80/987/EEC (comple-
mentary pension rights in the event 
of insolvency of the employer);
Report of 17 September 2008 on •	
the implementation of Directive 
99/70/EC (fixed-term work) in new 
10 Member States (staff working 
document — SEC(2008) 2485) (24);
Report of 12 December 2008 on •	
the economic and social impact of 
Directive 2005/47/EC on working 
time of workers in the international 
rail sector.
In addition, the following reports are 
expected to be adopted in 2010:
Report on the transposition •	
and implementation of Direc-
tive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991 
supplementing the measures to 
encourage improvements in the 
safety and health at work of work-
ers with a fixed-duration employ-
ment relationship or a temporary 
employment relationship;
Report on the transposition and •	
implementation of Directive 94/33/
EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection 
of young people at work;
Report on the implementation •	
of Directive 2003/88/EC on the 
organisation of working time.
In the area of information and con-
sultation of employees (25), on 30 
September 2008 the Commission 
adopted a communication on the 
review of  Directive 2001/86/EC on 
 involvement of employees in the Euro-
pean Company (COM(2008) 591). 
The Commission, in agreement with 
the majority of Member States and 
the European social partners, con-
cluded that there is a lack of practical 
experience  regarding the application 
of the directive and that, therefore, it 
was too early to revise it.
24 This complements the Commission staff working 
document of 11 August 2006 on the implementation 
of Directive 1999/70/EC in the EU-15.
25 The Commission had adopted in 2008 a 
communication on the review of Directive  
2002/14/ EC (cf. Chapter 6 of 2008 IRR). 
However, the Commission identi-
fied some issues that deserved further 
consideration, and envisages carrying 
out a full examination and assessing 
the appropriateness/scope of an even-
tual revision of the directive. Such an 
assessment will be carried out in par-
allel with the reflection on potential 
amendments to the SE Statute, which 
in turn will build on the report on the 
application of the Regulation on the 
Statute for a European Company pub-
lished on 17 November 2010.(26)
As regards the European coopera-
tive society, a report on the review 
of Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 
22 July, supplementing the statute 
for a European cooperative society 
with regard to the involvement of 
employees, is expected to be adopted 
in 2010.
Monitoring of 7.2.8.2. 
implementation of directives
Following the 2007 studies on the 
implementation of the EU labour 
law acquis in the enlarged European 
Union, the Commission commis-
sioned new studies to cover the most 
recent countries which acceded to the 
EU, i.e. Romania and Bulgaria. These 
were finalised at the beginning of 
2010.
In line with its communication on 
applying Community law (27), the 
Commission continues to put great 
emphasis on monitoring the cor-
rect transposition and application 
of the labour law directives. Priority 
was accorded to dealing with three 
directives — Directive 99/70/EC on 
fixed-term work, Directive 97/81/
EC on part-time work and Directive 
2003/88/EC on the organisation of 
working time. Following complaints 
26 COM(2010) 676 of 17.11.2010.
27 COM(2007) 502 of 5.9.2007.
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or on the basis of its own findings 
and/or of the aforementioned studies, 
the Commission cooperated with the 
Member States concerned to resolve 
the issues that were raised. Where it 
was not possible to find a solution, it 
launched infringement proceedings 
for non-notification and/or incorrect 
implementation of EU legislation, 
which led in some cases to judgments 
by the Court of Justice.
Interpretation  7.2.9. 
of directives
The Court of Justice had the oppor-
tunity to interpret a number of provi-
sions of the EU directives in the field 
of labour law in several judgments 
rendered between May 2008 and Feb-
ruary 2010. Most of these judgments 
were rendered following preliminary 
questions submitted to the CJEU by 
national courts. Some were the result 
of infringement proceedings launched 
by the Commission.
The CJEU rendered four judgments 
relating to Directive 2001/23/EC 
(transfer of undertakings). The aim of 
this directive is to protect employees 
in the event of a change of employer 
and, in particular, to safeguard their 
rights. In Case C-313/07 (28) the 
Court clarified that the directive 
does not have effects on contracts 
other than employment contracts. In 
Case C-396/07 (29), the Court clari-
fied the effects of the termination of 
an employment contract because the 
transfer of undertaking involved a 
substantial change of working con-
ditions. In Case C-466/07 (30), the 
Court ruled that where the transfer 
28 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of  
16 October 2008, Kirtruna SL and Elisa Vigano v Red 
Elite de Electrodomésticos SA and Others.
29 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of  
27 November 2008, Mirja Juuri v Fazer Amica Oy.
30 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 
12 February 2009, Dietmar Klarenberg v Ferrotron 
Technologies GmbH.
only concerns part of an undertak-
ing, for the directive to be applica-
ble it is not required that this part 
retains organisational autonomy. In 
Case C-561/07 (31), the Court ruled 
that Italy had infringed the directive 
through its legislation on undertak-
ings in critical difficulties which 
relieved these undertakings from 
certain obligations resulting from the 
directive.
Two judgments concerned Directive 
80/987/EEC (32) (insolvency of the 
employer). This directive aims at the 
protection of workers in case of insol-
vency of the employer by requiring 
Member States to establish institu-
tions that guarantee the payment of 
unpaid salaries. In Case C-310/07 (33), 
the Court clarified the conditions 
for the competence of the guarantee 
institution in a Member State in case 
the insolvent company had activities 
in more than one Member State. In 
Case C-69/08 (34), the Court clarified 
the conditions that national law can 
impose limitation periods for claim-
ing the intervention of the guarantee 
institution.
As for Directive 2003/88/EC (work-
ing time), one judgment was issued 
by the CJEU. This directive lays down 
minimum general safety and health 
requirements for the organisation 
of working time. In Joined Cases 
C-350/06 and C-520/06 (35), the Court 
clarified the relationship between paid 
annual leave and sick leave.
31 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of  
11 June 2009, Commission of the European 
Communities v Italian Republic.
32 Directive 80/987/EEC has been repealed by 
Directive 2008/94/EC which codifies Directive 
80/987/EEC as amended by Directive 2002/74/EC.
33 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of  
16 October 2008, Svenska staten v Anders Holmqvist. 
34 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of  
16 July 2009, Raffaello Visciano v Istituto nazionale 
della previdenza sociale (INPS).
35 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 
20 January 2009, Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund (C-350/06) and Stringer and 
Others v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (C-520/06).
One judgment was delivered relat-
ing to Directive 97/81/EC (part-time 
work), one of the directives based on a 
European social partners’ framework 
agreement. This directive ensures that 
workers employed part-time receive 
comparable treatment to full-time staff 
on open-ended contracts. In Joined 
Cases C-55/07 and C-56/07 (36), the 
CJEU ruled that it precludes national 
legislation which requires that copies 
of part-time employment contracts be 
sent to the authorities within 30 days 
of their signature.
The CJEU rendered one judgment 
concerning Directive 1999/70/EC 
(fixed-term work). This directive 
establishes minimum requirements 
relating to fixed-term work, in order 
to ensure equal treatment of work-
ers and to prevent abuse arising from 
the use of successive employment 
contracts or relationships of this 
type. In Joined Cases C-378/07 to 
C-380/07 (37) the Court clarified the 
conditions for allowing successive 
employment contracts.
As for Directive 96/71/EC (posting 
of workers) one judgment is worth 
mentioning. This directive aims to 
remove the uncertainties and obsta-
cles impeding the free provision of 
services by increasing legal certainty 
and making it easier to identify the 
working conditions in the Member 
State to which the worker is posted 
which apply. In Case C-319/06 (38) the 
CJEU considered that  Luxembourg 
36 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of  
24 April 2008, Othmar Michaeler (C-55/07 and 
C-56/07), Subito GmbH (C-55/07 and C-56/07) 
and Ruth Volgger (C-56/07) v Amt für sozialen 
Arbeitsschutz and Autonome Provinz Bozen.
37 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 
23 April 2009, Kiriaki Angelidaki and Others v 
Organismos Nomarchiakis Autodioikisis Rethymnis 
(C-378/07), Charikleia Giannoudi v Dimos 
Geropotamou (C-379/07) and Georgios Karabousanos 
and Sofoklis Michopoulos v Dimos Geropotamou 
(C-380/07).
38 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of  
19 June 2008, Commission of the European 
Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
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had infringed the directive by 
imposing certain obligations on the 
employer which go beyond what is 
allowed by the directive.
One judgment was delivered concern-
ing Directive 91/533/EEC (informa-
tion on individual contract). This 
directive requires employers to inform 
employees in writing of the conditions 
applicable to the contract. In Case 
C-306/07 (39) the Court clarified the 
meaning of temporary contract for 
the purposes of the directive.
As for Directive 98/59/EC (collec-
tive redundancies), the CJEU deliv-
ered three judgments. This directive 
requires employers to consult staff 
39 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 18 
December 2008, Ruben Andersen v Kommunernes 
Landsforening.
representatives in the case of collec-
tive redundancies. It specifies the 
points which these consultations 
must cover and the useful informa-
tion which the employer is required 
to provide during the consultations. 
In addition, the directive establishes 
the procedure and practical arrange-
ments for collective redundancies. 
In Case C-12/08 (40), the Court clari-
fied that the directive allows national 
legislation that subjects the exercise 
of the rights of individual work-
ers to certain requirements. In Case 
C-323/08 (41), the Court clarified the 
scope of the directive in case of death 
40 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 
16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v 
Dervis Odemis and Others.
41 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 10 
December 2009, Ovido Rodríguez Mayor and Others 
v Herencia yacente de Rafael de las Heras Dávila and 
Others.
of the employer. For Case C-44/08 (42); 
see Box 7.3.
The CJEU delivered one judgment 
concerning Directive 2002/14/EC 
(information and consultation). This 
directive establishes a general frame-
work for informing and consulting 
employees. In Case C-405/08 (43), 
the Court clarified the extent of the 
protection granted to employees’ 
representative. 
Health and safety  7.3. 
of workers
Risks arising from 7.3.1. 
physical agents
Electromagnetic fields7.3.1.1. 
On 20 May 2010, the second-stage 
consultation of the social partners 
on a possible amendment of Direc-
tive 2004/40/EC was launched by the 
Commission.
Directive 2008/46/EC, amending 
Directive 2004/40/EC on minimum 
health and safety requirements 
regarding the exposure of workers to 
the risks arising from physical agents 
(electromagnetic fields), postpones 
by four years, until 30 April 2012, 
the deadline for the transposition of 
Directive 2004/40/EC to allow a full 
analysis of new information in this 
field. A first consultation of the social 
partners on possible new measures to 
be proposed was finalised in Octo-
ber 2009. This provided appropri-
ate  information for the preparation 
of the  second stage consultation. 
42 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 10 
September 2009, Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto 
AEK ry and Others v Fujitsu Siemens Computers Oy.
43 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 
February 2010, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening.
Box 7.3: Who should consult employees, and at what time, on 
collective dismissals in the case of a group of undertakings? 
An important judgment in the field of collective dismissals was rendered in Case C-44/08. 
In this case the executive council of the parent company of a group decided to make a 
proposal to the board of that company for disengagement from the group’s factory in 
Finland. A week later the board of directors decided to support the proposal, but no spe-
cific decision was taken in relation to that factory. On the same day, the subsidiary that 
owned the factory proposed consultations with the employees’ representatives, which 
took place for several weeks. At the end of this period the subsidiary’s board of directors 
took a decision to terminate the operations in Finland. The employees’ representatives 
challenged in the national court the information and consultation procedure followed 
since they considered that the decision to close the factory had been adopted before 
the start of the consultation procedure. The Finnish Supreme Court put a preliminary 
question to the CJEU and stayed proceedings. In its judgment, the CJEU ruled that the 
adoption within a group of undertakings of strategic decisions or of changes in activi-
ties which compel the employer to contemplate or to plan for collective redundancies 
gives rise to an obligation on that employer to consult with workers’ representatives. The 
CJEU considered that the consultation procedure must be started by the employer once a 
strategic or commercial decision compelling him to contemplate or to plan for collective 
redundancies has been taken. The CJEU also ruled that the obligation to start negotia-
tions does not depend on whether the employer is already able to supply to the workers’ 
representatives all the information required by the directive; the information can be 
provided during the consultations and not necessarily at the time when they start. More-
over, in the case of a group of undertakings consisting of a parent company and one or 
more subsidiaries, the obligation to hold consultations with the workers’ representatives 
falls on the subsidiary which has the status of employer only once that subsidiary, within 
which collective redundancies may be made, has been identified. Finally, the CJEU ruled 
that in the context of a group of undertakings, a decision by the parent company which 
has the direct effect of compelling one of its subsidiaries to terminate the contracts of 
employees affected by the collective redundancies can be taken only on the conclusion 
of the consultation procedure within that subsidiary, failing which the subsidiary, as the 
employer, is liable for the consequences of failure to comply with that procedure. 
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Depending on the outcome of the 
second stage consultation, the Com-
mission should be in a position to 
present a new  proposal for a directive 
during 2010.
Artificial optical radiation7.3.1.2. 
A guide to good practice for imple-
menting Directive 2006/25/EC on 
minimum requirements regarding the 
exposure of workers to risks arising 
from physical agents (artificial optical 
radiation) has been published.
This non-binding guide, fore-
seen under Article 13 of Directive 
2006/25/EC, aims to promote a good 
understanding of the provisions of 
the directive in order to ensure and 
maintain effective and sufficient 
conditions of protection for workers 
exposed to artificial optical radia-
tion. Its purpose relates to the ascer-
tainment and evaluation of risks, the 
correct selection and use of working 
equipment, the optimisation of meth-
ods and the introduction of protective 
measures (technical, organisational 
and of personal nature) according to 
the preceding risk analysis.
Noise7.3.1.3. 
A guide to good practice for the 
application of Directive 2003/10/EC 
on the minimum safety and health 
requirements regarding the exposure 
of workers to the risks arising from 
physical agents (noise) has been pub-
lished. This non-binding guide aims 
to facilitate the assessment of risks 
from noise exposure, thus reducing 
such exposure and promoting, for 
example, the purchase of quiet work 
equipment where possible. It assists 
companies, especially SMEs, with 
preventing occupational risks. It 
contains a number of good-practice 
examples.
Risks arising from 7.3.2. 
chemical agents
Third list of limit values7.3.2.1. 
On 17 December 2009, the Commis-
sion adopted Directive 2009/161/EU 
establishing a third list of indicative 
occupational exposure limit values for 
chemical agents.
Indicative occupational exposure limit 
values are health-based, non-binding 
values, derived from the most recent 
scientific data available and taking 
into account the availability of meas-
urement techniques. They set thresh-
old levels of exposure at such a level 
that, when repeated on a regular basis 
throughout a working life, the expo-
sure will not lead to adverse effects on 
the health of exposed persons and/or 
their progeny at any time, as far as can 
be predicted from the contemporary 
state of knowledge.
The new directive includes in its Annex 
19 chemical substances for which the 
Member States are now required to 
establish national occupational expo-
sure limit values, taking into account 
the European Union values. Member 
States must comply with this by 18 
December 2011 at the latest.
Classification, labelling 7.3.2.2. 
and packaging of chemical 
substances
On 9 December 2009, the first-stage 
consultation of the social partners at 
EU level was launched on the need to 
adapt EU directives to Regulation (EC) 
No 1272/2008 on classification, label-
ling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures. New requirements for the 
classification, labelling and packaging 
of chemicals arise from the adoption of 
Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 which 
implements, within the  European 
 Union, the United Nations Globally 
Harmonised System for Chemical 
Classification and Labelling.
Five EC directives on health and safety 
at work refer to chemical classification 
and labelling requirements. It is neces-
sary to amend these five directives to 
ensure that the current level of worker 
protection is maintained. The direc-
tives are Directive 98/24/EC (chemical 
agents), Directive 2004/37/EC (car-
cinogens and mutagens), Directive 
92/58/EEC (safety signs), Directive 
92/85/EEC (pregnant workers) and 
Directive 94/33/EEC (young people at 
work). The second-stage consultation 
is foreseen in the course of 2010.
Exposure to asbestos7.3.3. 
On 30 November 2009, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted 
Directive 2009/148/EC on the protec-
tion of workers from the risks related to 
exposure to asbestos at work (codified 
version) (44). In the interests of clarity 
and rationality, Directive 2009/148/EC 
incorporates in one text the texts of 
Directive 83/477/EEC on the protec-
tion of workers from the risks related 
to exposure to asbestos at work (sec-
ond individual directive within the 
meaning of Article 8 of Directive 
80/1107/EEC) and its amendments, 
i.e. Directives 91/382/EEC, 98/24/EC, 
2003/18/EC and 2007/30/EC.
Musculoskeletal 7.3.4. 
disorders
On the basis of the findings of a two-
phase social partner consultation car-
ried out under Article 154(4) TFEU 
(ex Article 138(4) of the EC Treaty) 
and, in the light of the results of a pre-
paratory study on the social-economic 
impact of various policy options, the 
44 OJ L 330, 16.12.2009, pp. 28–36.
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Commission is currently working on a 
proposal for new legislation to address 
all significant ergonomic risk fac-
tors at work and lay down minimum 
health and safety requirements for the 
protection of workers in all sectors 
of activity from work-related muscu-
loskeletal disorders (WRMSDs) and 
display-screen vision problems.
WRMSDs are one of the major safety 
and health problems facing the Euro-
pean Union today. They affect both 
women and men and all sectors of 
activity across the European Union. 
According to information from Euro-
stat (45), work-related MSDs are the 
main work-related health problem, 
accounting for 60 % of all work- related 
diseases in the EU-27.
Environmental tobacco 7.3.5. 
smoke
On 10 December 2008, the Commis-
sion launched a first stage consultation 
of the social partners at EU level on 
the protection of workers from risks 
related to exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke at the workplace. This 
consultation of the social partners 
regarded the possible direction of an 
EU legislative initiative. Following 
an analysis of the responses received 
from the social partner organisations, 
the second stage consultation of the 
social partners is under preparation.
Work equipment7.3.6. 
On 16 September 2009, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted 
Directive 2009/104/EC concerning the 
minimum safety and health require-
ments for the use of work equipment 
by workers (codified version) (46). 
45 Eurostat 2007, European labour force survey, Ad 
hoc module on accidents at work and work-related 
health problems.
46 OJ L 260, 3.10.2009, pp. 5–19.
In the interests of clarity and ration-
ality, Directive 2009/104/EC incorpo-
rates in one text the texts of Directive 
89/655/EEC concerning the minimum 
safety and health requirements for the 
use of work equipment by workers 
at work (second individual directive 
within the meaning of Article 16(1) 
of Directive 89/391/EEC) and its 
amendments, i.e. Directives 95/63/EC, 
2001/45/EC and 2007/30/EC.
Construction sector7.3.7. 
Practical implementation 7.3.7.1. 
report
On 6 November 2008, the Commission 
adopted a communication on the prac-
tical implementation of two directives 
on health and safety in the construction 
sector, namely Directives 92/57/EEC 
(temporary and mobile sites) and 
92/58/EEC (safety signs at work) (47). 
This communication assesses the prac-
tical implementation of Directives 
92/57/EEC and 92/58/EEC in the 
EU-15 countries and highlights issues 
where further action is needed for 
improvement, especially in the con-
struction sector with its extremely high 
rate of accidents. As regards Direc-
tive 92/57/EEC, the communication 
addresses such issues as its transposi-
tion by the Member States, the main 
actors on a construction site, the docu-
ments required, the responsibility of 
the various players on the site and its 
enforcement. The main positive effects 
and the problems of implementation of 
the two directives are also addressed.
Guide7.3.7.2. 
A non-binding guide to help improve 
the practical application of Directive 
92/57/EEC on the  implementation 
47 COM(2008) 698 final.
of minimum safety and health 
 requirements at temporary or mobile 
construction sites has been published.
Extractive industries7.3.8. 
On 3 September 2009, the Commission 
adopted a report on the practical imple-
mentation of two directives on health 
and safety in the extractive indus-
tries, namely, Directives 92/91/EEC 
(mineral extraction through drilling) 
and 92/104/EEC (surface and under-
ground mineral extraction) (48). The 
report assesses the practical imple-
mentation of Directives 92/91/EEC 
and 92/104/EEC in the EU-15 Member 
States, and points to issues where fur-
ther action is needed for improvement, 
especially since the extractive indus-
tries sector is a traditionally high risk 
sector. It addresses issues such as the 
directives’ transposition and enforce-
ment in the Member States, workers’ 
qualifications, health surveillance, and 
accidents and their causes. It highlights 
the need for Member States to provide 
extra support to SMEs enabling them 
to put in place an effective health and 
safety policy.
Maritime sector7.3.9. 
Directive implementing 7.3.9.1. 
social partners’ agreement on 
Maritime Labour Convention
As reported at 2.7.1 above, the  Council 
adopted on 16 February 2009 Direc-
tive 2009/13/EC  implementing  ECSA’s 
and ETF’s agreement on the 2006 
Maritime Labour  Convention (49). 
The agreement aims in particular at 
improving the working conditions of 
seafarers in terms of, inter alia, health 
and safety protection and medical care 
(see above for details).
48 COM(2009) 449 final.
49 OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, p. 30.
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Practical implementation 7.3.9.2. 
report
On 29 October 2009, the Commis-
sion adopted a report on the practical 
implementation of health and safety 
at work Directives 93/103/EC (fish-
ing vessels) and 92/29/EEC (medical 
treatment on board of vessels)) (50).
The report assesses the practical 
implementation of Directives 92/29/
EEC and 93/103/EC in the EU-15 
Member States and highlights issues 
where further action is needed for 
improvement, especially since the 
maritime sector is a high risk sector.
For Directive 92/29/EEC, the report 
addresses, among others, the issues of 
medical supplies, training and inspec-
tions. The report concludes that action 
will be taken with a view to a technical 
adaptation of the directive’s Annexes 
in the light of technical progress.
As regards Directive 93/103/EC, it is 
stressed, among others, that whilst 
its scope covers solely vessels of 15 m 
in length and more, vessels of under 
15 m in length account for a major-
ity of the fleet and have higher acci-
dent rates. The report concludes that 
attention will be given to this issue by 
analysing options such as guidance 
for smaller vessels and the possibility 
of amending the directive in order to 
extend its scope to cover also vessels 
under 15 m in length.
Healthcare sector7.3.10. 
Injuries from sharp 7.3.10.1. 
instruments
On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted 
Directive 2010/32/EU implement-
ing the framework agreement on 
50 COM(2009) 599 final.
 prevention of injuries from sharp 
instruments in the hospital and 
healthcare sector concluded by the 
sector’s European social partners, 
Hospeem and EPSU (51) (see Chapter 6 
for details of the agreement). Member 
States must take the necessary meas-
ures to comply with this directive by 
11 May 2013 at the latest.
Guide7.3.10.2. 
A non-binding guide on preven-
tion and good practice with a view 
to improving the health and safety 
of workers in the hospitals and the 
healthcare sector has been published.
Statistics7.3.11. 
On 16 December 2008, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted 
51 OJ L 134, 1.6.2010, p. 66.
Regulation (EC) No 1338/2008 on 
Community statistics on public health 
and health and safety at work (52).The 
regulation aims at establishing the 
framework for the systematic produc-
tion of statistics in these two areas, in 
the form of a minimum data set, to be 
carried out by the European statistical 
system, i.e. Eurostat, the national sta-
tistical institutes and all other national 
authorities responsible for the provi-
sion of official statistics in these areas. 
It sets out the general principles and 
describes the main contents of the 
data to be collected.
Senior Labour 7.3.12. 
Inspectors’ Committee
On 22 October 2008, the Commission 
adopted a decision amending Deci-
sion 95/319/EC setting up a commit-
tee of senior labour inspectors (SLIC), 
52 OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 70.
Box 7.4: Significant judgments of the Court of Justice  
in the field of health and safety at work in 2008–10
Commission v France (1): In a ruling, the Court condemned France for not respecting cer-
tain provisions of the so-called framework directive (89/391/EEC) (safety and health of 
workers at work). It concerned firstly the fact that French legislation allowed for deroga-
tions for the French public transport company RATP, despite the fact that Article 2 of the 
directive defines its scope of application as covering all sectors of activity, both public and 
private. Furthermore, the Court condemned France as regards the public railway company 
SNCF, which had failed to include in its proper regulations certain provisions transposing 
the directive. These concerned Article 7 (protective and preventive services), Article 9(1)
(c) (keeping of a list of occupational accidents) and Article 13(2) (workers’ obligations). 
Thirdly, France had not correctly transposed Article 10(1) of the directive (information 
of workers on health and safety risks and on the protection measures), imposing this for 
example only in companies with more than 20 employees instead of in all companies as 
required by the directive. Finally, France had not transposed Article 12(3) and (4) (training 
of workers’ representatives) in the mining sector.
Commission v Italy (2): The Court declared that Italy did not correctly transpose  Article 
3(1) of Directive 92/57/EEC (construction sites). According to this provision, at construc-
tion sites with more than one company, a coordinator for health and safety matters has to 
be appointed in order to prevent accidents. Italy had transposed the  directive in such a way 
that construction sites with less than 200 working days and those not comprising particu-
lar risks are exempted from this obligation. The Court ruled clearly that the directive does 
not allow for derogations to the obligation contained in Article 3(1). In fact, the risks are 
the same and accidents very often occur at small construction sites.
1 Judgment of 5 June 2008 in Case C-226/06, European Court Reports 2008, p. I-00086.
2 Judgment of 25 July 2008 in Case C-504/06, European Court Reports 2008, p. I-00118.
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primarily to reduce the number of 
members per Member State from two 
to one (53). Since the latest enlarge-
ments of the European Union effec-
tively doubled the size of the SLIC, the 
plenary meetings have comprised 54 
members. With a view to enable the 
SLIC to fulfil its tasks and allow the 
members of the committee to engage 
in a practical, interactive exchange of 
experience and opinion, which is not 
feasible with such a large Committee, 
the number of members per Member 
State was reduced from two to one, 
with effect from 1 January 2010. The 
Member States are allowed to appoint 
an alternate member to attend meet-
ings where the full member cannot be 
present. The SLIC gives its opinion to 
the Commission on all problems relat-
ing to the enforcement by the Member 
States of EU law on health and safety 
at work.
Equality rights  7.4. 
in employment
Directive  7.4.1. 
on parental leave
The Council adopted, on 8 March 2010, 
the Council directive (54) implement-
ing the revised framework agreement 
on parental leave concluded by Busi-
nessEurope, UEAPME, CEEP and the 
ETUC. The new directive repeals and 
replaces Directive 96/34/EC, which 
put into effect the 1995 social partner 
framework agreement and established 
for the first time minimum standards 
on parental leave at EU level. These 
rights for working parents have now 
been strengthened and clarified. The 
provisions of the revised agreement 
are outlined in Chapter 6.
53 OJ L 288, 30.10.2008, p. 5.
54 Directive 2010/18/EU, OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, 
pp. 13–20.
Following their consultation by the 
Commission in 2006 and 2007, the 
European social partners (Busi-
nessEurope, the ETUC, CEEP and 
UEAPME) entered into negotiations 
with a view to revising the 1995 
agreement. On 18 June 2009, they 
signed the revised framework agree-
ment and addressed a joint request 
to the Commission to submit a pro-
posal for a Council decision imple-
menting it. Following the adoption 
of the directive by the Council, 
Member States will have two years 
to transpose the new rights into 
national law.
Pregnant workers 7.4.2. 
directive
In October 2008, the Commis-
sion presented a proposal to amend 
the current provisions of Directive 
92/85/EEC on maternity protection. 
The aim of this proposal is to provide 
for better reconciliation of private, 
professional and family life and thus 
allow more women to enter or stay in 
the employment market if they have 
children.
The most important changes proposed 
are to:
increase maternity leave from 14 to •	
18 weeks;
allow the woman to take the main •	
part of maternity leave only after 
the birth of the child;
provide for an obligatory leave of •	
six weeks after birth (currently 
there is a minimum of two weeks);
improve protection against dismissal;•	
allow the woman to ask for changes •	
in her working conditions.
The legislative procedure is currently 
in the hands of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council.
Self-employed workers 7.4.3. 
directive
In October 2008 the Commission 
presented a proposal for a directive 
on the application of the principle 
of equal treatment between men 
and women engaged in an activ-
ity in a self- employed capacity. This 
proposal has been adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Coun-
cil on 15 July 2010 (55). The directive 
lays down a framework for putting 
into effect in the Member States the 
principle of equal treatment between 
men and women engaged in an activ-
ity in a self-employed capacity, or 
contributing to the pursuit of such 
an activity, as regards the aspects 
that are not covered by Direc-
tives 2006/54/EC and 79/7/EEC. 
It covers self-employed workers and 
assisting spouses and repeals Direc-
tive 86/613/EEC.
The main elements of the directive are 
as follows:
Member States must provide that •	
female self-employed women can, 
if they so request, benefit from a 
maternity allowance for a period of 
at least 14 weeks;
Member States must ensure that, •	
whenever there is a social pro-
tection system for self-employed 
workers, assisting spouses can, at 
their request, benefit from a social 
protection.
It should be noted that life partners, 
when and insofar as recognised by 
national law, are considered as spouses 
for the purpose of the directive.
55 Directive 2010/41/EU, OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, 
pp. 1–6.
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Monitoring of 7.4.4. 
equality and anti-
discrimination 
legislation
The Commission continues to place 
great emphasis on the correct trans-
position and application of the rel-
evant EU directives. This includes 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 
which established a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation across the 
EU. Apart from a few, where Mem-
ber States did not communicate 
their national transposing meas-
ures, the Commission concluded its 
examination of the relevant direc-
tives’ transposition across the EU. 
Following this thorough analysis, the 
Commission was in the position in 
several cases to close the infringement 
proceedings it had initiated against 
several Member States. However, 
in other cases it considered appro-
priate to pursue further its action 
on the basis of Article 157 TFEU 
(ex Article 226 TC) (56).
Conclusion: future 7.5. 
perspectives
As this chapter has shown, signifi-
cant progress was achieved during the 
period 2008–10 in a number of areas 
where new rules create the conditions 
for improving working conditions 
in the EU, while contributing to the 
modernisation of the labour mar-
kets in line with the objectives of the 
Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 
strategy. Examples of such advances 
were particularly evident in the areas 
of temporary agency work, European 
56 In accordance to this provision, when the 
Commission considers that a Member State has failed 
to comply with its obligations under EU law, it may 
deliver a letter of formal notice, a reasoned opinion 
and eventually bring the matter before the CJEU.
works councils, maritime transport, 
protection against risks caused by 
chemical substances and injuries from 
sharp instruments, parental leave and 
protection of self-employed spouses. 
Difficulties also emerged, both in the 
enforcement or interpretation of spe-
cific provisions and in finding a com-
promise between co-legislators for the 
adoption of new legislation, as was the 
case with the proposed revisions to 
the working time directive.
Looking to the future, the Euro-
pean Union has to act within a sig-
nificantly changed context. First, 
the EU currently faces a challenging 
period as a result of, on the one hand, 
the  economic crisis — as shown in 
 relation to industrial relations in 
Chapters 2 and 3 — and, on the other 
hand, long-term challenges such as 
globalisation, demographic ageing, 
climate change and pressure on natu-
ral resources. Chapter 5 has provided 
an overview of what the shift to a 
low-carbon economy could mean for 
industrial relations systems.
Second, the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty offers new possibili-
ties and perspectives. Several changes 
may be of great significance to the fur-
ther development of European social 
policy, in particular: the statement of 
EU values and objectives; the binding 
Charter of Fundamental Rights; the 
social clause of general application, 
the  explicit recognition of the role of 
social dialogue.
Box 7.5: Significant judgments of the Court of Justice  
in the field of equality rights in employment (2008–10)
Generalisations do not justify derogations in age discrimination laws
Is there a conflict between the employment equality directive and national rules in 
the United Kingdom, which permit employers to forcibly retire employees aged 65 
or over? This was in essence the question posed by the UK High Court to the Court 
of Justice, regarding a case brought by an NGO (the National Council on Ageing) 
against the UK government.
The CJEU observed (1) that the Member States enjoy broad discretion when choosing 
the means to achieve their social policy objectives, but not at the expense of frustrat-
ing the implementation of the principle of equality on grounds of age. Mere gener-
alisations do not justify derogations. Certain differences in treatment on the grounds 
of age can be ‘objectively and reasonably’ justified by a legitimate aim, but Member 
States must establish to a high standard of proof the legitimacy of the aim relied on 
as a justification.
Case C-388/07, National Council for Ageing, judgment of 5 March 2009.
Young workers must not be discriminated
The Austrian Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice whether Directive 2000/78/
EC was compatible with an Austrian law which excludes previous service from being 
taken into account for a pay raise, if such service was completed before the person 
reached the age of 18 years.
The Court of Justice accepted as legitimate the aim of avoiding putting persons who 
have pursued a general secondary education at a disadvantage as compared with per-
sons with a vocational education, as well as that of avoiding making apprenticeships 
more costly for the public sector and thereby promoting the integration of young 
people who have pursued training of this type into the labour market.
However, the Court of Justice considered that the criterion of the age at which the 
vocational experience was acquired is not appropriate for achieving the envisaged 
legitimate aims.
Case C-88/08, Hütter, judgment of 18 June 2009.
1 http://curia.europa.eu/ (Case C-388/07, Judgment of 5 March 2009).
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Against this background, the Com-
mission adopted its Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth (57). This strategy sets 
out a vision of Europe’s social market 
economy for the 21st century and puts 
forward the EU’s priorities, targets and 
flagship initiatives in order to realise 
this vision. It outlines also the instru-
ments to be mobilised to this effect. 
The strategy provides for further 
action to be taken to make full use 
of the problem-solving potential of 
social dialogue. Equality of treatment 
and the fight against discrimination 
will be further promoted. A second 
phase of the flexicurity agenda will 
be defined and implemented together 
with the European social partners.
As regards legislation, the Commis-
sion envisages working to adapt the 
57 COM(2010) 2020 of  3.3.2010.
legislative framework, in line with 
‘smart’ regulation principles, to evolv-
ing work patterns (e.g. working time). 
It also intends to adapt the exist-
ing framework to emerging risks for 
health and safety in the workplace 
(e.g. electromagnetic fields, mus-
culoskeletal disorders, environmental 
tobacco smoke, nanomaterials, car-
cinogens and mutagens). Further, it 
will also act in order to clarify rules 
when these are not sufficiently clear to 
allow proper enforcement (e.g. post-
ing of workers).
More generally, the Commission 
intends to undertake an evalua-
tion of several existing directives in 
order to review their effects, to verify 
whether they meet their stated objec-
tives, and to assess the benefits and 
costs generated, including the even-
tual administrative burden. Besides 
the work under way regarding the 
directives on posting of workers and 
on working time (58), priority will 
be given to the directives regarding 
workers’ information and consulta-
tion at national level (59). Such evi-
dence-based research is expected to 
inform the Commission’s assessment 
of the effectiveness of the relevant 
acquis in the current crisis, in par-
ticular concerning the restructuring 
of companies.
The Commission will further pursue, 
in particular, its proposals which are 
currently pending before the EU leg-
islature. It will continue to closely 
involve the European social partners. 
It will also pursue its efforts to moni-
tor the effective implementation and 
enforcement of the acquis.
58 See Sections 2.2 and 2.4 above.
59 As part of the Commission’s 2010 work 
programme, the Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion DG has started to carry out a ‘fitness check’ 
of the following directives: Directive 98/59/EC on 
collective redundancies, Directive 2001/23/EC on 
transfers of undertakings and Directive 2002/14/EC  
establishing a general framework relating to 
information and consultation of workers in the EC. 
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